Add support for google_service_account_key (#472)

* Initial support for google service account keys

* Add vendor for vault and encryption

* Add change for PR comment

* Add doc and improvement fo public key management

* adding waiter for compatibility with issue google/google-api-go-client#234

* improvement

* Add test with pgp_key

* Perform doc anf format

* remove test if public_key exists

* Add link on doc

* correct pr

google/provider.go

@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ func Provider() terraform.ResourceProvider {
 			"google_runtimeconfig_config":                  resourceRuntimeconfigConfig(),
 			"google_runtimeconfig_variable":                resourceRuntimeconfigVariable(),
 			"google_service_account":                       resourceGoogleServiceAccount(),
+			"google_service_account_key":                   resourceGoogleServiceAccountKey(),
 			"google_storage_bucket":                        resourceStorageBucket(),
 			"google_storage_bucket_acl":                    resourceStorageBucketAcl(),
 			"google_storage_bucket_object":                 resourceStorageBucketObject(),

google/resource_google_service_account_key.go

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+package google
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/encryption"
+	"github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/schema"
+	"github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/validation"
+	"google.golang.org/api/iam/v1"
+)
+
+func resourceGoogleServiceAccountKey() *schema.Resource {
+	return &schema.Resource{
+		Create: resourceGoogleServiceAccountKeyCreate,
+		Read:   resourceGoogleServiceAccountKeyRead,
+		Delete: resourceGoogleServiceAccountKeyDelete,
+		Schema: map[string]*schema.Schema{
+			// Required
+			"service_account_id": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Required: true,
+				ForceNew: true,
+			},
+			// Optional
+			"key_algorithm": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:         schema.TypeString,
+				Default:      "KEY_ALG_RSA_2048",
+				Optional:     true,
+				ForceNew:     true,
+				ValidateFunc: validation.StringInSlice([]string{"KEY_ALG_UNSPECIFIED", "KEY_ALG_RSA_1024", "KEY_ALG_RSA_2048"}, false),
+			},
+			"pgp_key": {
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Optional: true,
+				ForceNew: true,
+			},
+			"private_key_type": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:         schema.TypeString,
+				Default:      "TYPE_GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS_FILE",
+				Optional:     true,
+				ForceNew:     true,
+				ValidateFunc: validation.StringInSlice([]string{"TYPE_UNSPECIFIED", "TYPE_PKCS12_FILE", "TYPE_GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS_FILE"}, false),
+			},
+			"public_key_type": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:         schema.TypeString,
+				Default:      "X509_PEM",
+				Optional:     true,
+				ForceNew:     true,
+				ValidateFunc: validation.StringInSlice([]string{"TYPE_NONE", "TYPE_X509_PEM_FILE", "TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY"}, false),
+			},
+			// Computed
+			"name": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Computed: true,
+				ForceNew: true,
+			},
+			"public_key": {
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Computed: true,
+				ForceNew: true,
+			},
+			"private_key": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:      schema.TypeString,
+				Computed:  true,
+				Sensitive: true,
+			},
+			"valid_after": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Computed: true,
+			},
+			"valid_before": &schema.Schema{
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Computed: true,
+			},
+			"private_key_encrypted": {
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Computed: true,
+			},
+			"private_key_fingerprint": {
+				Type:     schema.TypeString,
+				Computed: true,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func resourceGoogleServiceAccountKeyCreate(d *schema.ResourceData, meta interface{}) error {
+	config := meta.(*Config)
+
+	serviceAccount := d.Get("service_account_id").(string)
+
+	r := &iam.CreateServiceAccountKeyRequest{
+		KeyAlgorithm:   d.Get("key_algorithm").(string),
+		PrivateKeyType: d.Get("private_key_type").(string),
+	}
+
+	sak, err := config.clientIAM.Projects.ServiceAccounts.Keys.Create(serviceAccount, r).Do()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("Error creating service account key: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	d.SetId(sak.Name)
+	// Data only available on create.
+	d.Set("valid_after", sak.ValidAfterTime)
+	d.Set("valid_before", sak.ValidBeforeTime)
+	if v, ok := d.GetOk("pgp_key"); ok {
+		encryptionKey, err := encryption.RetrieveGPGKey(v.(string))
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		fingerprint, encrypted, err := encryption.EncryptValue(encryptionKey, sak.PrivateKeyData, "Google Service Account Key")
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		d.Set("private_key_encrypted", encrypted)
+		d.Set("private_key_fingerprint", fingerprint)
+	} else {
+		d.Set("private_key", sak.PrivateKeyData)
+	}
+
+	err = serviceAccountKeyWaitTime(config.clientIAM.Projects.ServiceAccounts.Keys, d.Id(), d.Get("public_key_type").(string), "Creating Service account key", 4)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return resourceGoogleServiceAccountKeyRead(d, meta)
+}
+
+func resourceGoogleServiceAccountKeyRead(d *schema.ResourceData, meta interface{}) error {
+	config := meta.(*Config)
+
+	publicKeyType := d.Get("public_key_type").(string)
+
+	// Confirm the service account key exists
+	sak, err := config.clientIAM.Projects.ServiceAccounts.Keys.Get(d.Id()).PublicKeyType(publicKeyType).Do()
+	if err != nil {
+		return handleNotFoundError(err, d, fmt.Sprintf("Service Account Key %q", d.Id()))
+	}
+
+	d.Set("name", sak.Name)
+	d.Set("key_algorithm", sak.KeyAlgorithm)
+	d.Set("public_key", sak.PublicKeyData)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func resourceGoogleServiceAccountKeyDelete(d *schema.ResourceData, meta interface{}) error {
+	config := meta.(*Config)
+
+	_, err := config.clientIAM.Projects.ServiceAccounts.Keys.Delete(d.Id()).Do()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	d.SetId("")
+	return nil
+}

google/resource_google_service_account_key_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+package google
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/acctest"
+	"github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/resource"
+	"github.com/hashicorp/terraform/terraform"
+)
+
+// Test that a service account key can be created and destroyed
+func TestAccGoogleServiceAccountKey_basic(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	resourceName := "google_service_account_key.acceptance"
+	accountID := "a" + acctest.RandString(10)
+	displayName := "Terraform Test"
+	resource.Test(t, resource.TestCase{
+		PreCheck:  func() { testAccPreCheck(t) },
+		Providers: testAccProviders,
+		Steps: []resource.TestStep{
+			resource.TestStep{
+				Config: testAccGoogleServiceAccountKey(accountID, displayName),
+				Check: resource.ComposeTestCheckFunc(
+					testAccCheckGoogleServiceAccountKeyExists(resourceName),
+					resource.TestCheckResourceAttrSet(resourceName, "public_key"),
+					resource.TestCheckResourceAttrSet(resourceName, "valid_after"),
+					resource.TestCheckResourceAttrSet(resourceName, "valid_before"),
+					resource.TestCheckResourceAttrSet(resourceName, "private_key"),
+				),
+			},
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+func TestAccGoogleServiceAccountKey_pgp(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	resourceName := "google_service_account_key.acceptance"
+	accountID := "a" + acctest.RandString(10)
+	displayName := "Terraform Test"
+	resource.Test(t, resource.TestCase{
+		PreCheck:  func() { testAccPreCheck(t) },
+		Providers: testAccProviders,
+		Steps: []resource.TestStep{
+			resource.TestStep{
+				Config: testAccGoogleServiceAccountKey_pgp(accountID, displayName, testKeyPairPubKey1),
+				Check: resource.ComposeTestCheckFunc(
+					testAccCheckGoogleServiceAccountKeyExists(resourceName),
+					resource.TestCheckResourceAttrSet(resourceName, "public_key"),
+					resource.TestCheckResourceAttrSet(resourceName, "private_key_encrypted"),
+					resource.TestCheckResourceAttrSet(resourceName, "private_key_fingerprint"),
+				),
+			},
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+func testAccCheckGoogleServiceAccountKeyExists(r string) resource.TestCheckFunc {
+	return func(s *terraform.State) error {
+
+		rs, ok := s.RootModule().Resources[r]
+		if !ok {
+			return fmt.Errorf("Not found: %s", r)
+		}
+
+		if rs.Primary.ID == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("No ID is set")
+		}
+		config := testAccProvider.Meta().(*Config)
+
+		_, err := config.clientIAM.Projects.ServiceAccounts.Keys.Get(rs.Primary.ID).Do()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+func testAccGoogleServiceAccountKey(account, name string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`
+resource "google_service_account" "acceptance" {
+	account_id = "%s"
+	display_name = "%s"
+}
+
+resource "google_service_account_key" "acceptance" {
+	service_account_id = "${google_service_account.acceptance.id}"
+	public_key_type = "TYPE_X509_PEM_FILE"
+}
+`, account, name)
+}
+
+func testAccGoogleServiceAccountKey_pgp(account, name string, key string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`
+resource "google_service_account" "acceptance" {
+	account_id = "%s"
+	display_name = "%s"
+}
+
+resource "google_service_account_key" "acceptance" {
+	service_account_id = "${google_service_account.acceptance.id}"
+	public_key_type = "TYPE_X509_PEM_FILE"
+	pgp_key = <<EOF
+%s
+EOF
+}
+`, account, name, key)
+}
+
+const testKeyPairPubKey1 = `mQENBFXbjPUBCADjNjCUQwfxKL+RR2GA6pv/1K+zJZ8UWIF9S0lk7cVIEfJiprzzwiMwBS5cD0da
+rGin1FHvIWOZxujA7oW0O2TUuatqI3aAYDTfRYurh6iKLC+VS+F7H+/mhfFvKmgr0Y5kDCF1j0T/
+063QZ84IRGucR/X43IY7kAtmxGXH0dYOCzOe5UBX1fTn3mXGe2ImCDWBH7gOViynXmb6XNvXkP0f
+sF5St9jhO7mbZU9EFkv9O3t3EaURfHopsCVDOlCkFCw5ArY+DUORHRzoMX0PnkyQb5OzibkChzpg
+8hQssKeVGpuskTdz5Q7PtdW71jXd4fFVzoNH8fYwRpziD2xNvi6HABEBAAG0EFZhdWx0IFRlc3Qg
+S2V5IDGJATgEEwECACIFAlXbjPUCGy8GCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEOfLr44B
+HbeTo+sH/i7bapIgPnZsJ81hmxPj4W12uvunksGJiC7d4hIHsG7kmJRTJfjECi+AuTGeDwBy84TD
+cRaOB6e79fj65Fg6HgSahDUtKJbGxj/lWzmaBuTzlN3CEe8cMwIPqPT2kajJVdOyrvkyuFOdPFOE
+A7bdCH0MqgIdM2SdF8t40k/ATfuD2K1ZmumJ508I3gF39jgTnPzD4C8quswrMQ3bzfvKC3klXRlB
+C0yoArn+0QA3cf2B9T4zJ2qnvgotVbeK/b1OJRNj6Poeo+SsWNc/A5mw7lGScnDgL3yfwCm1gQXa
+QKfOt5x+7GqhWDw10q+bJpJlI10FfzAnhMF9etSqSeURBRW5AQ0EVduM9QEIAL53hJ5bZJ7oEDCn
+aY+SCzt9QsAfnFTAnZJQrvkvusJzrTQ088eUQmAjvxkfRqnv981fFwGnh2+I1Ktm698UAZS9Jt8y
+jak9wWUICKQO5QUt5k8cHwldQXNXVXFa+TpQWQR5yW1a9okjh5o/3d4cBt1yZPUJJyLKY43Wvptb
+6EuEsScO2DnRkh5wSMDQ7dTooddJCmaq3LTjOleRFQbu9ij386Do6jzK69mJU56TfdcydkxkWF5N
+ZLGnED3lq+hQNbe+8UI5tD2oP/3r5tXKgMy1R/XPvR/zbfwvx4FAKFOP01awLq4P3d/2xOkMu4Lu
+9p315E87DOleYwxk+FoTqXEAEQEAAYkCPgQYAQIACQUCVduM9QIbLgEpCRDny6+OAR23k8BdIAQZ
+AQIABgUCVduM9QAKCRAID0JGyHtSGmqYB/4m4rJbbWa7dBJ8VqRU7ZKnNRDR9CVhEGipBmpDGRYu
+lEimOPzLUX/ZXZmTZzgemeXLBaJJlWnopVUWuAsyjQuZAfdd8nHkGRHG0/DGum0l4sKTta3OPGHN
+C1z1dAcQ1RCr9bTD3PxjLBczdGqhzw71trkQRBRdtPiUchltPMIyjUHqVJ0xmg0hPqFic0fICsr0
+YwKoz3h9+QEcZHvsjSZjgydKvfLYcm+4DDMCCqcHuJrbXJKUWmJcXR0y/+HQONGrGJ5xWdO+6eJi
+oPn2jVMnXCm4EKc7fcLFrz/LKmJ8seXhxjM3EdFtylBGCrx3xdK0f+JDNQaC/rhUb5V2XuX6VwoH
+/AtY+XsKVYRfNIupLOUcf/srsm3IXT4SXWVomOc9hjGQiJ3rraIbADsc+6bCAr4XNZS7moViAAcI
+PXFv3m3WfUlnG/om78UjQqyVACRZqqAGmuPq+TSkRUCpt9h+A39LQWkojHqyob3cyLgy6z9Q557O
+9uK3lQozbw2gH9zC0RqnePl+rsWIUU/ga16fH6pWc1uJiEBt8UZGypQ/E56/343epmYAe0a87sHx
+8iDV+dNtDVKfPRENiLOOc19MmS+phmUyrbHqI91c0pmysYcJZCD3a502X1gpjFbPZcRtiTmGnUKd
+OIu60YPNE4+h7u2CfYyFPu3AlUaGNMBlvy6PEpU=`

google/service_account_waiter.go

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package google
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/resource"
+	"google.golang.org/api/googleapi"
+	"google.golang.org/api/iam/v1"
+)
+
+type ServiceAccountKeyWaiter struct {
+	Service       *iam.ProjectsServiceAccountsKeysService
+	PublicKeyType string
+	KeyName       string
+}
+
+func (w *ServiceAccountKeyWaiter) RefreshFunc() resource.StateRefreshFunc {
+	return func() (interface{}, string, error) {
+		var err error
+		var sak *iam.ServiceAccountKey
+		sak, err = w.Service.Get(w.KeyName).PublicKeyType(w.PublicKeyType).Do()
+
+		if err != nil {
+			if err.(*googleapi.Error).Code == 404 {
+				return nil, "PENDING", nil
+			} else {
+				return nil, "", err
+			}
+		} else {
+			return sak, "DONE", nil
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (w *ServiceAccountKeyWaiter) Conf() *resource.StateChangeConf {
+	return &resource.StateChangeConf{
+		Pending: []string{"PENDING"},
+		Target:  []string{"DONE"},
+		Refresh: w.RefreshFunc(),
+	}
+}
+
+func serviceAccountKeyWaitTime(client *iam.ProjectsServiceAccountsKeysService, keyName, publicKeyType, activity string, timeoutMin int) error {
+	w := &ServiceAccountKeyWaiter{
+		Service:       client,
+		PublicKeyType: publicKeyType,
+		KeyName:       keyName,
+	}
+
+	state := w.Conf()
+	state.Delay = 10 * time.Second
+	state.Timeout = time.Duration(timeoutMin) * time.Minute
+	state.MinTimeout = 2 * time.Second
+	_, err := state.WaitForState()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("Error waiting for %s: %s", activity, err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/AUTHORS

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# This is the official list of Snappy-Go authors for copyright purposes.
+# This file is distinct from the CONTRIBUTORS files.
+# See the latter for an explanation.
+
+# Names should be added to this file as
+#	Name or Organization <email address>
+# The email address is not required for organizations.
+
+# Please keep the list sorted.
+
+Damian Gryski <dgryski@gmail.com>
+Google Inc.
+Jan Mercl <0xjnml@gmail.com>
+Rodolfo Carvalho <rhcarvalho@gmail.com>
+Sebastien Binet <seb.binet@gmail.com>

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/CONTRIBUTORS

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# This is the official list of people who can contribute
+# (and typically have contributed) code to the Snappy-Go repository.
+# The AUTHORS file lists the copyright holders; this file
+# lists people.  For example, Google employees are listed here
+# but not in AUTHORS, because Google holds the copyright.
+#
+# The submission process automatically checks to make sure
+# that people submitting code are listed in this file (by email address).
+#
+# Names should be added to this file only after verifying that
+# the individual or the individual's organization has agreed to
+# the appropriate Contributor License Agreement, found here:
+#
+#     http://code.google.com/legal/individual-cla-v1.0.html
+#     http://code.google.com/legal/corporate-cla-v1.0.html
+#
+# The agreement for individuals can be filled out on the web.
+#
+# When adding J Random Contributor's name to this file,
+# either J's name or J's organization's name should be
+# added to the AUTHORS file, depending on whether the
+# individual or corporate CLA was used.
+
+# Names should be added to this file like so:
+#     Name <email address>
+
+# Please keep the list sorted.
+
+Damian Gryski <dgryski@gmail.com>
+Jan Mercl <0xjnml@gmail.com>
+Kai Backman <kaib@golang.org>
+Marc-Antoine Ruel <maruel@chromium.org>
+Nigel Tao <nigeltao@golang.org>
+Rob Pike <r@golang.org>
+Rodolfo Carvalho <rhcarvalho@gmail.com>
+Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
+Sebastien Binet <seb.binet@gmail.com>

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Copyright (c) 2011 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+met:
+
+   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
+in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+distribution.
+   * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
+contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/README

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+The Snappy compression format in the Go programming language.
+
+To download and install from source:
+$ go get github.com/golang/snappy
+
+Unless otherwise noted, the Snappy-Go source files are distributed
+under the BSD-style license found in the LICENSE file.
+
+
+
+Benchmarks.
+
+The golang/snappy benchmarks include compressing (Z) and decompressing (U) ten
+or so files, the same set used by the C++ Snappy code (github.com/google/snappy
+and note the "google", not "golang"). On an "Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU @
+3.40GHz", Go's GOARCH=amd64 numbers as of 2016-05-29:
+
+"go test -test.bench=."
+
+_UFlat0-8         2.19GB/s ± 0%  html
+_UFlat1-8         1.41GB/s ± 0%  urls
+_UFlat2-8         23.5GB/s ± 2%  jpg
+_UFlat3-8         1.91GB/s ± 0%  jpg_200
+_UFlat4-8         14.0GB/s ± 1%  pdf
+_UFlat5-8         1.97GB/s ± 0%  html4
+_UFlat6-8          814MB/s ± 0%  txt1
+_UFlat7-8          785MB/s ± 0%  txt2
+_UFlat8-8          857MB/s ± 0%  txt3
+_UFlat9-8          719MB/s ± 1%  txt4
+_UFlat10-8        2.84GB/s ± 0%  pb
+_UFlat11-8        1.05GB/s ± 0%  gaviota
+
+_ZFlat0-8         1.04GB/s ± 0%  html
+_ZFlat1-8          534MB/s ± 0%  urls
+_ZFlat2-8         15.7GB/s ± 1%  jpg
+_ZFlat3-8          740MB/s ± 3%  jpg_200
+_ZFlat4-8         9.20GB/s ± 1%  pdf
+_ZFlat5-8          991MB/s ± 0%  html4
+_ZFlat6-8          379MB/s ± 0%  txt1
+_ZFlat7-8          352MB/s ± 0%  txt2
+_ZFlat8-8          396MB/s ± 1%  txt3
+_ZFlat9-8          327MB/s ± 1%  txt4
+_ZFlat10-8        1.33GB/s ± 1%  pb
+_ZFlat11-8         605MB/s ± 1%  gaviota
+
+
+
+"go test -test.bench=. -tags=noasm"
+
+_UFlat0-8          621MB/s ± 2%  html
+_UFlat1-8          494MB/s ± 1%  urls
+_UFlat2-8         23.2GB/s ± 1%  jpg
+_UFlat3-8         1.12GB/s ± 1%  jpg_200
+_UFlat4-8         4.35GB/s ± 1%  pdf
+_UFlat5-8          609MB/s ± 0%  html4
+_UFlat6-8          296MB/s ± 0%  txt1
+_UFlat7-8          288MB/s ± 0%  txt2
+_UFlat8-8          309MB/s ± 1%  txt3
+_UFlat9-8          280MB/s ± 1%  txt4
+_UFlat10-8         753MB/s ± 0%  pb
+_UFlat11-8         400MB/s ± 0%  gaviota
+
+_ZFlat0-8          409MB/s ± 1%  html
+_ZFlat1-8          250MB/s ± 1%  urls
+_ZFlat2-8         12.3GB/s ± 1%  jpg
+_ZFlat3-8          132MB/s ± 0%  jpg_200
+_ZFlat4-8         2.92GB/s ± 0%  pdf
+_ZFlat5-8          405MB/s ± 1%  html4
+_ZFlat6-8          179MB/s ± 1%  txt1
+_ZFlat7-8          170MB/s ± 1%  txt2
+_ZFlat8-8          189MB/s ± 1%  txt3
+_ZFlat9-8          164MB/s ± 1%  txt4
+_ZFlat10-8         479MB/s ± 1%  pb
+_ZFlat11-8         270MB/s ± 1%  gaviota
+
+
+
+For comparison (Go's encoded output is byte-for-byte identical to C++'s), here
+are the numbers from C++ Snappy's
+
+make CXXFLAGS="-O2 -DNDEBUG -g" clean snappy_unittest.log && cat snappy_unittest.log
+
+BM_UFlat/0     2.4GB/s  html
+BM_UFlat/1     1.4GB/s  urls
+BM_UFlat/2    21.8GB/s  jpg
+BM_UFlat/3     1.5GB/s  jpg_200
+BM_UFlat/4    13.3GB/s  pdf
+BM_UFlat/5     2.1GB/s  html4
+BM_UFlat/6     1.0GB/s  txt1
+BM_UFlat/7   959.4MB/s  txt2
+BM_UFlat/8     1.0GB/s  txt3
+BM_UFlat/9   864.5MB/s  txt4
+BM_UFlat/10    2.9GB/s  pb
+BM_UFlat/11    1.2GB/s  gaviota
+
+BM_ZFlat/0   944.3MB/s  html (22.31 %)
+BM_ZFlat/1   501.6MB/s  urls (47.78 %)
+BM_ZFlat/2    14.3GB/s  jpg (99.95 %)
+BM_ZFlat/3   538.3MB/s  jpg_200 (73.00 %)
+BM_ZFlat/4     8.3GB/s  pdf (83.30 %)
+BM_ZFlat/5   903.5MB/s  html4 (22.52 %)
+BM_ZFlat/6   336.0MB/s  txt1 (57.88 %)
+BM_ZFlat/7   312.3MB/s  txt2 (61.91 %)
+BM_ZFlat/8   353.1MB/s  txt3 (54.99 %)
+BM_ZFlat/9   289.9MB/s  txt4 (66.26 %)
+BM_ZFlat/10    1.2GB/s  pb (19.68 %)
+BM_ZFlat/11  527.4MB/s  gaviota (37.72 %)

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/decode.go

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package snappy
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrCorrupt reports that the input is invalid.
+	ErrCorrupt = errors.New("snappy: corrupt input")
+	// ErrTooLarge reports that the uncompressed length is too large.
+	ErrTooLarge = errors.New("snappy: decoded block is too large")
+	// ErrUnsupported reports that the input isn't supported.
+	ErrUnsupported = errors.New("snappy: unsupported input")
+
+	errUnsupportedLiteralLength = errors.New("snappy: unsupported literal length")
+)
+
+// DecodedLen returns the length of the decoded block.
+func DecodedLen(src []byte) (int, error) {
+	v, _, err := decodedLen(src)
+	return v, err
+}
+
+// decodedLen returns the length of the decoded block and the number of bytes
+// that the length header occupied.
+func decodedLen(src []byte) (blockLen, headerLen int, err error) {
+	v, n := binary.Uvarint(src)
+	if n <= 0 || v > 0xffffffff {
+		return 0, 0, ErrCorrupt
+	}
+
+	const wordSize = 32 << (^uint(0) >> 32 & 1)
+	if wordSize == 32 && v > 0x7fffffff {
+		return 0, 0, ErrTooLarge
+	}
+	return int(v), n, nil
+}
+
+const (
+	decodeErrCodeCorrupt                  = 1
+	decodeErrCodeUnsupportedLiteralLength = 2
+)
+
+// Decode returns the decoded form of src. The returned slice may be a sub-
+// slice of dst if dst was large enough to hold the entire decoded block.
+// Otherwise, a newly allocated slice will be returned.
+//
+// The dst and src must not overlap. It is valid to pass a nil dst.
+func Decode(dst, src []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	dLen, s, err := decodedLen(src)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if dLen <= len(dst) {
+		dst = dst[:dLen]
+	} else {
+		dst = make([]byte, dLen)
+	}
+	switch decode(dst, src[s:]) {
+	case 0:
+		return dst, nil
+	case decodeErrCodeUnsupportedLiteralLength:
+		return nil, errUnsupportedLiteralLength
+	}
+	return nil, ErrCorrupt
+}
+
+// NewReader returns a new Reader that decompresses from r, using the framing
+// format described at
+// https://github.com/google/snappy/blob/master/framing_format.txt
+func NewReader(r io.Reader) *Reader {
+	return &Reader{
+		r:       r,
+		decoded: make([]byte, maxBlockSize),
+		buf:     make([]byte, maxEncodedLenOfMaxBlockSize+checksumSize),
+	}
+}
+
+// Reader is an io.Reader that can read Snappy-compressed bytes.
+type Reader struct {
+	r       io.Reader
+	err     error
+	decoded []byte
+	buf     []byte
+	// decoded[i:j] contains decoded bytes that have not yet been passed on.
+	i, j       int
+	readHeader bool
+}
+
+// Reset discards any buffered data, resets all state, and switches the Snappy
+// reader to read from r. This permits reusing a Reader rather than allocating
+// a new one.
+func (r *Reader) Reset(reader io.Reader) {
+	r.r = reader
+	r.err = nil
+	r.i = 0
+	r.j = 0
+	r.readHeader = false
+}
+
+func (r *Reader) readFull(p []byte, allowEOF bool) (ok bool) {
+	if _, r.err = io.ReadFull(r.r, p); r.err != nil {
+		if r.err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF || (r.err == io.EOF && !allowEOF) {
+			r.err = ErrCorrupt
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// Read satisfies the io.Reader interface.
+func (r *Reader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	if r.err != nil {
+		return 0, r.err
+	}
+	for {
+		if r.i < r.j {
+			n := copy(p, r.decoded[r.i:r.j])
+			r.i += n
+			return n, nil
+		}
+		if !r.readFull(r.buf[:4], true) {
+			return 0, r.err
+		}
+		chunkType := r.buf[0]
+		if !r.readHeader {
+			if chunkType != chunkTypeStreamIdentifier {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			r.readHeader = true
+		}
+		chunkLen := int(r.buf[1]) | int(r.buf[2])<<8 | int(r.buf[3])<<16
+		if chunkLen > len(r.buf) {
+			r.err = ErrUnsupported
+			return 0, r.err
+		}
+
+		// The chunk types are specified at
+		// https://github.com/google/snappy/blob/master/framing_format.txt
+		switch chunkType {
+		case chunkTypeCompressedData:
+			// Section 4.2. Compressed data (chunk type 0x00).
+			if chunkLen < checksumSize {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			buf := r.buf[:chunkLen]
+			if !r.readFull(buf, false) {
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			checksum := uint32(buf[0]) | uint32(buf[1])<<8 | uint32(buf[2])<<16 | uint32(buf[3])<<24
+			buf = buf[checksumSize:]
+
+			n, err := DecodedLen(buf)
+			if err != nil {
+				r.err = err
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			if n > len(r.decoded) {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			if _, err := Decode(r.decoded, buf); err != nil {
+				r.err = err
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			if crc(r.decoded[:n]) != checksum {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			r.i, r.j = 0, n
+			continue
+
+		case chunkTypeUncompressedData:
+			// Section 4.3. Uncompressed data (chunk type 0x01).
+			if chunkLen < checksumSize {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			buf := r.buf[:checksumSize]
+			if !r.readFull(buf, false) {
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			checksum := uint32(buf[0]) | uint32(buf[1])<<8 | uint32(buf[2])<<16 | uint32(buf[3])<<24
+			// Read directly into r.decoded instead of via r.buf.
+			n := chunkLen - checksumSize
+			if n > len(r.decoded) {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			if !r.readFull(r.decoded[:n], false) {
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			if crc(r.decoded[:n]) != checksum {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			r.i, r.j = 0, n
+			continue
+
+		case chunkTypeStreamIdentifier:
+			// Section 4.1. Stream identifier (chunk type 0xff).
+			if chunkLen != len(magicBody) {
+				r.err = ErrCorrupt
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			if !r.readFull(r.buf[:len(magicBody)], false) {
+				return 0, r.err
+			}
+			for i := 0; i < len(magicBody); i++ {
+				if r.buf[i] != magicBody[i] {
+					r.err = ErrCorrupt
+					return 0, r.err
+				}
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if chunkType <= 0x7f {
+			// Section 4.5. Reserved unskippable chunks (chunk types 0x02-0x7f).
+			r.err = ErrUnsupported
+			return 0, r.err
+		}
+		// Section 4.4 Padding (chunk type 0xfe).
+		// Section 4.6. Reserved skippable chunks (chunk types 0x80-0xfd).
+		if !r.readFull(r.buf[:chunkLen], false) {
+			return 0, r.err
+		}
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/decode_amd64.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !appengine
+// +build gc
+// +build !noasm
+
+package snappy
+
+// decode has the same semantics as in decode_other.go.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func decode(dst, src []byte) int

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/decode_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !appengine
+// +build gc
+// +build !noasm
+
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+// The asm code generally follows the pure Go code in decode_other.go, except
+// where marked with a "!!!".
+
+// func decode(dst, src []byte) int
+//
+// All local variables fit into registers. The non-zero stack size is only to
+// spill registers and push args when issuing a CALL. The register allocation:
+//	- AX	scratch
+//	- BX	scratch
+//	- CX	length or x
+//	- DX	offset
+//	- SI	&src[s]
+//	- DI	&dst[d]
+//	+ R8	dst_base
+//	+ R9	dst_len
+//	+ R10	dst_base + dst_len
+//	+ R11	src_base
+//	+ R12	src_len
+//	+ R13	src_base + src_len
+//	- R14	used by doCopy
+//	- R15	used by doCopy
+//
+// The registers R8-R13 (marked with a "+") are set at the start of the
+// function, and after a CALL returns, and are not otherwise modified.
+//
+// The d variable is implicitly DI - R8,  and len(dst)-d is R10 - DI.
+// The s variable is implicitly SI - R11, and len(src)-s is R13 - SI.
+TEXT ·decode(SB), NOSPLIT, $48-56
+	// Initialize SI, DI and R8-R13.
+	MOVQ dst_base+0(FP), R8
+	MOVQ dst_len+8(FP), R9
+	MOVQ R8, DI
+	MOVQ R8, R10
+	ADDQ R9, R10
+	MOVQ src_base+24(FP), R11
+	MOVQ src_len+32(FP), R12
+	MOVQ R11, SI
+	MOVQ R11, R13
+	ADDQ R12, R13
+
+loop:
+	// for s < len(src)
+	CMPQ SI, R13
+	JEQ  end
+
+	// CX = uint32(src[s])
+	//
+	// switch src[s] & 0x03
+	MOVBLZX (SI), CX
+	MOVL    CX, BX
+	ANDL    $3, BX
+	CMPL    BX, $1
+	JAE     tagCopy
+
+	// ----------------------------------------
+	// The code below handles literal tags.
+
+	// case tagLiteral:
+	// x := uint32(src[s] >> 2)
+	// switch
+	SHRL $2, CX
+	CMPL CX, $60
+	JAE  tagLit60Plus
+
+	// case x < 60:
+	// s++
+	INCQ SI
+
+doLit:
+	// This is the end of the inner "switch", when we have a literal tag.
+	//
+	// We assume that CX == x and x fits in a uint32, where x is the variable
+	// used in the pure Go decode_other.go code.
+
+	// length = int(x) + 1
+	//
+	// Unlike the pure Go code, we don't need to check if length <= 0 because
+	// CX can hold 64 bits, so the increment cannot overflow.
+	INCQ CX
+
+	// Prepare to check if copying length bytes will run past the end of dst or
+	// src.
+	//
+	// AX = len(dst) - d
+	// BX = len(src) - s
+	MOVQ R10, AX
+	SUBQ DI, AX
+	MOVQ R13, BX
+	SUBQ SI, BX
+
+	// !!! Try a faster technique for short (16 or fewer bytes) copies.
+	//
+	// if length > 16 || len(dst)-d < 16 || len(src)-s < 16 {
+	//   goto callMemmove // Fall back on calling runtime·memmove.
+	// }
+	//
+	// The C++ snappy code calls this TryFastAppend. It also checks len(src)-s
+	// against 21 instead of 16, because it cannot assume that all of its input
+	// is contiguous in memory and so it needs to leave enough source bytes to
+	// read the next tag without refilling buffers, but Go's Decode assumes
+	// contiguousness (the src argument is a []byte).
+	CMPQ CX, $16
+	JGT  callMemmove
+	CMPQ AX, $16
+	JLT  callMemmove
+	CMPQ BX, $16
+	JLT  callMemmove
+
+	// !!! Implement the copy from src to dst as a 16-byte load and store.
+	// (Decode's documentation says that dst and src must not overlap.)
+	//
+	// This always copies 16 bytes, instead of only length bytes, but that's
+	// OK. If the input is a valid Snappy encoding then subsequent iterations
+	// will fix up the overrun. Otherwise, Decode returns a nil []byte (and a
+	// non-nil error), so the overrun will be ignored.
+	//
+	// Note that on amd64, it is legal and cheap to issue unaligned 8-byte or
+	// 16-byte loads and stores. This technique probably wouldn't be as
+	// effective on architectures that are fussier about alignment.
+	MOVOU 0(SI), X0
+	MOVOU X0, 0(DI)
+
+	// d += length
+	// s += length
+	ADDQ CX, DI
+	ADDQ CX, SI
+	JMP  loop
+
+callMemmove:
+	// if length > len(dst)-d || length > len(src)-s { etc }
+	CMPQ CX, AX
+	JGT  errCorrupt
+	CMPQ CX, BX
+	JGT  errCorrupt
+
+	// copy(dst[d:], src[s:s+length])
+	//
+	// This means calling runtime·memmove(&dst[d], &src[s], length), so we push
+	// DI, SI and CX as arguments. Coincidentally, we also need to spill those
+	// three registers to the stack, to save local variables across the CALL.
+	MOVQ DI, 0(SP)
+	MOVQ SI, 8(SP)
+	MOVQ CX, 16(SP)
+	MOVQ DI, 24(SP)
+	MOVQ SI, 32(SP)
+	MOVQ CX, 40(SP)
+	CALL runtime·memmove(SB)
+
+	// Restore local variables: unspill registers from the stack and
+	// re-calculate R8-R13.
+	MOVQ 24(SP), DI
+	MOVQ 32(SP), SI
+	MOVQ 40(SP), CX
+	MOVQ dst_base+0(FP), R8
+	MOVQ dst_len+8(FP), R9
+	MOVQ R8, R10
+	ADDQ R9, R10
+	MOVQ src_base+24(FP), R11
+	MOVQ src_len+32(FP), R12
+	MOVQ R11, R13
+	ADDQ R12, R13
+
+	// d += length
+	// s += length
+	ADDQ CX, DI
+	ADDQ CX, SI
+	JMP  loop
+
+tagLit60Plus:
+	// !!! This fragment does the
+	//
+	// s += x - 58; if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { etc }
+	//
+	// checks. In the asm version, we code it once instead of once per switch case.
+	ADDQ CX, SI
+	SUBQ $58, SI
+	MOVQ SI, BX
+	SUBQ R11, BX
+	CMPQ BX, R12
+	JA   errCorrupt
+
+	// case x == 60:
+	CMPL CX, $61
+	JEQ  tagLit61
+	JA   tagLit62Plus
+
+	// x = uint32(src[s-1])
+	MOVBLZX -1(SI), CX
+	JMP     doLit
+
+tagLit61:
+	// case x == 61:
+	// x = uint32(src[s-2]) | uint32(src[s-1])<<8
+	MOVWLZX -2(SI), CX
+	JMP     doLit
+
+tagLit62Plus:
+	CMPL CX, $62
+	JA   tagLit63
+
+	// case x == 62:
+	// x = uint32(src[s-3]) | uint32(src[s-2])<<8 | uint32(src[s-1])<<16
+	MOVWLZX -3(SI), CX
+	MOVBLZX -1(SI), BX
+	SHLL    $16, BX
+	ORL     BX, CX
+	JMP     doLit
+
+tagLit63:
+	// case x == 63:
+	// x = uint32(src[s-4]) | uint32(src[s-3])<<8 | uint32(src[s-2])<<16 | uint32(src[s-1])<<24
+	MOVL -4(SI), CX
+	JMP  doLit
+
+// The code above handles literal tags.
+// ----------------------------------------
+// The code below handles copy tags.
+
+tagCopy4:
+	// case tagCopy4:
+	// s += 5
+	ADDQ $5, SI
+
+	// if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { etc }
+	MOVQ SI, BX
+	SUBQ R11, BX
+	CMPQ BX, R12
+	JA   errCorrupt
+
+	// length = 1 + int(src[s-5])>>2
+	SHRQ $2, CX
+	INCQ CX
+
+	// offset = int(uint32(src[s-4]) | uint32(src[s-3])<<8 | uint32(src[s-2])<<16 | uint32(src[s-1])<<24)
+	MOVLQZX -4(SI), DX
+	JMP     doCopy
+
+tagCopy2:
+	// case tagCopy2:
+	// s += 3
+	ADDQ $3, SI
+
+	// if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { etc }
+	MOVQ SI, BX
+	SUBQ R11, BX
+	CMPQ BX, R12
+	JA   errCorrupt
+
+	// length = 1 + int(src[s-3])>>2
+	SHRQ $2, CX
+	INCQ CX
+
+	// offset = int(uint32(src[s-2]) | uint32(src[s-1])<<8)
+	MOVWQZX -2(SI), DX
+	JMP     doCopy
+
+tagCopy:
+	// We have a copy tag. We assume that:
+	//	- BX == src[s] & 0x03
+	//	- CX == src[s]
+	CMPQ BX, $2
+	JEQ  tagCopy2
+	JA   tagCopy4
+
+	// case tagCopy1:
+	// s += 2
+	ADDQ $2, SI
+
+	// if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { etc }
+	MOVQ SI, BX
+	SUBQ R11, BX
+	CMPQ BX, R12
+	JA   errCorrupt
+
+	// offset = int(uint32(src[s-2])&0xe0<<3 | uint32(src[s-1]))
+	MOVQ    CX, DX
+	ANDQ    $0xe0, DX
+	SHLQ    $3, DX
+	MOVBQZX -1(SI), BX
+	ORQ     BX, DX
+
+	// length = 4 + int(src[s-2])>>2&0x7
+	SHRQ $2, CX
+	ANDQ $7, CX
+	ADDQ $4, CX
+
+doCopy:
+	// This is the end of the outer "switch", when we have a copy tag.
+	//
+	// We assume that:
+	//	- CX == length && CX > 0
+	//	- DX == offset
+
+	// if offset <= 0 { etc }
+	CMPQ DX, $0
+	JLE  errCorrupt
+
+	// if d < offset { etc }
+	MOVQ DI, BX
+	SUBQ R8, BX
+	CMPQ BX, DX
+	JLT  errCorrupt
+
+	// if length > len(dst)-d { etc }
+	MOVQ R10, BX
+	SUBQ DI, BX
+	CMPQ CX, BX
+	JGT  errCorrupt
+
+	// forwardCopy(dst[d:d+length], dst[d-offset:]); d += length
+	//
+	// Set:
+	//	- R14 = len(dst)-d
+	//	- R15 = &dst[d-offset]
+	MOVQ R10, R14
+	SUBQ DI, R14
+	MOVQ DI, R15
+	SUBQ DX, R15
+
+	// !!! Try a faster technique for short (16 or fewer bytes) forward copies.
+	//
+	// First, try using two 8-byte load/stores, similar to the doLit technique
+	// above. Even if dst[d:d+length] and dst[d-offset:] can overlap, this is
+	// still OK if offset >= 8. Note that this has to be two 8-byte load/stores
+	// and not one 16-byte load/store, and the first store has to be before the
+	// second load, due to the overlap if offset is in the range [8, 16).
+	//
+	// if length > 16 || offset < 8 || len(dst)-d < 16 {
+	//   goto slowForwardCopy
+	// }
+	// copy 16 bytes
+	// d += length
+	CMPQ CX, $16
+	JGT  slowForwardCopy
+	CMPQ DX, $8
+	JLT  slowForwardCopy
+	CMPQ R14, $16
+	JLT  slowForwardCopy
+	MOVQ 0(R15), AX
+	MOVQ AX, 0(DI)
+	MOVQ 8(R15), BX
+	MOVQ BX, 8(DI)
+	ADDQ CX, DI
+	JMP  loop
+
+slowForwardCopy:
+	// !!! If the forward copy is longer than 16 bytes, or if offset < 8, we
+	// can still try 8-byte load stores, provided we can overrun up to 10 extra
+	// bytes. As above, the overrun will be fixed up by subsequent iterations
+	// of the outermost loop.
+	//
+	// The C++ snappy code calls this technique IncrementalCopyFastPath. Its
+	// commentary says:
+	//
+	// ----
+	//
+	// The main part of this loop is a simple copy of eight bytes at a time
+	// until we've copied (at least) the requested amount of bytes.  However,
+	// if d and d-offset are less than eight bytes apart (indicating a
+	// repeating pattern of length < 8), we first need to expand the pattern in
+	// order to get the correct results. For instance, if the buffer looks like
+	// this, with the eight-byte <d-offset> and <d> patterns marked as
+	// intervals:
+	//
+	//    abxxxxxxxxxxxx
+	//    [------]           d-offset
+	//      [------]         d
+	//
+	// a single eight-byte copy from <d-offset> to <d> will repeat the pattern
+	// once, after which we can move <d> two bytes without moving <d-offset>:
+	//
+	//    ababxxxxxxxxxx
+	//    [------]           d-offset
+	//        [------]       d
+	//
+	// and repeat the exercise until the two no longer overlap.
+	//
+	// This allows us to do very well in the special case of one single byte
+	// repeated many times, without taking a big hit for more general cases.
+	//
+	// The worst case of extra writing past the end of the match occurs when
+	// offset == 1 and length == 1; the last copy will read from byte positions
+	// [0..7] and write to [4..11], whereas it was only supposed to write to
+	// position 1. Thus, ten excess bytes.
+	//
+	// ----
+	//
+	// That "10 byte overrun" worst case is confirmed by Go's
+	// TestSlowForwardCopyOverrun, which also tests the fixUpSlowForwardCopy
+	// and finishSlowForwardCopy algorithm.
+	//
+	// if length > len(dst)-d-10 {
+	//   goto verySlowForwardCopy
+	// }
+	SUBQ $10, R14
+	CMPQ CX, R14
+	JGT  verySlowForwardCopy
+
+makeOffsetAtLeast8:
+	// !!! As above, expand the pattern so that offset >= 8 and we can use
+	// 8-byte load/stores.
+	//
+	// for offset < 8 {
+	//   copy 8 bytes from dst[d-offset:] to dst[d:]
+	//   length -= offset
+	//   d      += offset
+	//   offset += offset
+	//   // The two previous lines together means that d-offset, and therefore
+	//   // R15, is unchanged.
+	// }
+	CMPQ DX, $8
+	JGE  fixUpSlowForwardCopy
+	MOVQ (R15), BX
+	MOVQ BX, (DI)
+	SUBQ DX, CX
+	ADDQ DX, DI
+	ADDQ DX, DX
+	JMP  makeOffsetAtLeast8
+
+fixUpSlowForwardCopy:
+	// !!! Add length (which might be negative now) to d (implied by DI being
+	// &dst[d]) so that d ends up at the right place when we jump back to the
+	// top of the loop. Before we do that, though, we save DI to AX so that, if
+	// length is positive, copying the remaining length bytes will write to the
+	// right place.
+	MOVQ DI, AX
+	ADDQ CX, DI
+
+finishSlowForwardCopy:
+	// !!! Repeat 8-byte load/stores until length <= 0. Ending with a negative
+	// length means that we overrun, but as above, that will be fixed up by
+	// subsequent iterations of the outermost loop.
+	CMPQ CX, $0
+	JLE  loop
+	MOVQ (R15), BX
+	MOVQ BX, (AX)
+	ADDQ $8, R15
+	ADDQ $8, AX
+	SUBQ $8, CX
+	JMP  finishSlowForwardCopy
+
+verySlowForwardCopy:
+	// verySlowForwardCopy is a simple implementation of forward copy. In C
+	// parlance, this is a do/while loop instead of a while loop, since we know
+	// that length > 0. In Go syntax:
+	//
+	// for {
+	//   dst[d] = dst[d - offset]
+	//   d++
+	//   length--
+	//   if length == 0 {
+	//     break
+	//   }
+	// }
+	MOVB (R15), BX
+	MOVB BX, (DI)
+	INCQ R15
+	INCQ DI
+	DECQ CX
+	JNZ  verySlowForwardCopy
+	JMP  loop
+
+// The code above handles copy tags.
+// ----------------------------------------
+
+end:
+	// This is the end of the "for s < len(src)".
+	//
+	// if d != len(dst) { etc }
+	CMPQ DI, R10
+	JNE  errCorrupt
+
+	// return 0
+	MOVQ $0, ret+48(FP)
+	RET
+
+errCorrupt:
+	// return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+	MOVQ $1, ret+48(FP)
+	RET

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/decode_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !amd64 appengine !gc noasm
+
+package snappy
+
+// decode writes the decoding of src to dst. It assumes that the varint-encoded
+// length of the decompressed bytes has already been read, and that len(dst)
+// equals that length.
+//
+// It returns 0 on success or a decodeErrCodeXxx error code on failure.
+func decode(dst, src []byte) int {
+	var d, s, offset, length int
+	for s < len(src) {
+		switch src[s] & 0x03 {
+		case tagLiteral:
+			x := uint32(src[s] >> 2)
+			switch {
+			case x < 60:
+				s++
+			case x == 60:
+				s += 2
+				if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { // The uint conversions catch overflow from the previous line.
+					return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+				}
+				x = uint32(src[s-1])
+			case x == 61:
+				s += 3
+				if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { // The uint conversions catch overflow from the previous line.
+					return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+				}
+				x = uint32(src[s-2]) | uint32(src[s-1])<<8
+			case x == 62:
+				s += 4
+				if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { // The uint conversions catch overflow from the previous line.
+					return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+				}
+				x = uint32(src[s-3]) | uint32(src[s-2])<<8 | uint32(src[s-1])<<16
+			case x == 63:
+				s += 5
+				if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { // The uint conversions catch overflow from the previous line.
+					return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+				}
+				x = uint32(src[s-4]) | uint32(src[s-3])<<8 | uint32(src[s-2])<<16 | uint32(src[s-1])<<24
+			}
+			length = int(x) + 1
+			if length <= 0 {
+				return decodeErrCodeUnsupportedLiteralLength
+			}
+			if length > len(dst)-d || length > len(src)-s {
+				return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+			}
+			copy(dst[d:], src[s:s+length])
+			d += length
+			s += length
+			continue
+
+		case tagCopy1:
+			s += 2
+			if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { // The uint conversions catch overflow from the previous line.
+				return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+			}
+			length = 4 + int(src[s-2])>>2&0x7
+			offset = int(uint32(src[s-2])&0xe0<<3 | uint32(src[s-1]))
+
+		case tagCopy2:
+			s += 3
+			if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { // The uint conversions catch overflow from the previous line.
+				return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+			}
+			length = 1 + int(src[s-3])>>2
+			offset = int(uint32(src[s-2]) | uint32(src[s-1])<<8)
+
+		case tagCopy4:
+			s += 5
+			if uint(s) > uint(len(src)) { // The uint conversions catch overflow from the previous line.
+				return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+			}
+			length = 1 + int(src[s-5])>>2
+			offset = int(uint32(src[s-4]) | uint32(src[s-3])<<8 | uint32(src[s-2])<<16 | uint32(src[s-1])<<24)
+		}
+
+		if offset <= 0 || d < offset || length > len(dst)-d {
+			return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+		}
+		// Copy from an earlier sub-slice of dst to a later sub-slice. Unlike
+		// the built-in copy function, this byte-by-byte copy always runs
+		// forwards, even if the slices overlap. Conceptually, this is:
+		//
+		// d += forwardCopy(dst[d:d+length], dst[d-offset:])
+		for end := d + length; d != end; d++ {
+			dst[d] = dst[d-offset]
+		}
+	}
+	if d != len(dst) {
+		return decodeErrCodeCorrupt
+	}
+	return 0
+}

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/encode.go

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package snappy
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// Encode returns the encoded form of src. The returned slice may be a sub-
+// slice of dst if dst was large enough to hold the entire encoded block.
+// Otherwise, a newly allocated slice will be returned.
+//
+// The dst and src must not overlap. It is valid to pass a nil dst.
+func Encode(dst, src []byte) []byte {
+	if n := MaxEncodedLen(len(src)); n < 0 {
+		panic(ErrTooLarge)
+	} else if len(dst) < n {
+		dst = make([]byte, n)
+	}
+
+	// The block starts with the varint-encoded length of the decompressed bytes.
+	d := binary.PutUvarint(dst, uint64(len(src)))
+
+	for len(src) > 0 {
+		p := src
+		src = nil
+		if len(p) > maxBlockSize {
+			p, src = p[:maxBlockSize], p[maxBlockSize:]
+		}
+		if len(p) < minNonLiteralBlockSize {
+			d += emitLiteral(dst[d:], p)
+		} else {
+			d += encodeBlock(dst[d:], p)
+		}
+	}
+	return dst[:d]
+}
+
+// inputMargin is the minimum number of extra input bytes to keep, inside
+// encodeBlock's inner loop. On some architectures, this margin lets us
+// implement a fast path for emitLiteral, where the copy of short (<= 16 byte)
+// literals can be implemented as a single load to and store from a 16-byte
+// register. That literal's actual length can be as short as 1 byte, so this
+// can copy up to 15 bytes too much, but that's OK as subsequent iterations of
+// the encoding loop will fix up the copy overrun, and this inputMargin ensures
+// that we don't overrun the dst and src buffers.
+const inputMargin = 16 - 1
+
+// minNonLiteralBlockSize is the minimum size of the input to encodeBlock that
+// could be encoded with a copy tag. This is the minimum with respect to the
+// algorithm used by encodeBlock, not a minimum enforced by the file format.
+//
+// The encoded output must start with at least a 1 byte literal, as there are
+// no previous bytes to copy. A minimal (1 byte) copy after that, generated
+// from an emitCopy call in encodeBlock's main loop, would require at least
+// another inputMargin bytes, for the reason above: we want any emitLiteral
+// calls inside encodeBlock's main loop to use the fast path if possible, which
+// requires being able to overrun by inputMargin bytes. Thus,
+// minNonLiteralBlockSize equals 1 + 1 + inputMargin.
+//
+// The C++ code doesn't use this exact threshold, but it could, as discussed at
+// https://groups.google.com/d/topic/snappy-compression/oGbhsdIJSJ8/discussion
+// The difference between Go (2+inputMargin) and C++ (inputMargin) is purely an
+// optimization. It should not affect the encoded form. This is tested by
+// TestSameEncodingAsCppShortCopies.
+const minNonLiteralBlockSize = 1 + 1 + inputMargin
+
+// MaxEncodedLen returns the maximum length of a snappy block, given its
+// uncompressed length.
+//
+// It will return a negative value if srcLen is too large to encode.
+func MaxEncodedLen(srcLen int) int {
+	n := uint64(srcLen)
+	if n > 0xffffffff {
+		return -1
+	}
+	// Compressed data can be defined as:
+	//    compressed := item* literal*
+	//    item       := literal* copy
+	//
+	// The trailing literal sequence has a space blowup of at most 62/60
+	// since a literal of length 60 needs one tag byte + one extra byte
+	// for length information.
+	//
+	// Item blowup is trickier to measure. Suppose the "copy" op copies
+	// 4 bytes of data. Because of a special check in the encoding code,
+	// we produce a 4-byte copy only if the offset is < 65536. Therefore
+	// the copy op takes 3 bytes to encode, and this type of item leads
+	// to at most the 62/60 blowup for representing literals.
+	//
+	// Suppose the "copy" op copies 5 bytes of data. If the offset is big
+	// enough, it will take 5 bytes to encode the copy op. Therefore the
+	// worst case here is a one-byte literal followed by a five-byte copy.
+	// That is, 6 bytes of input turn into 7 bytes of "compressed" data.
+	//
+	// This last factor dominates the blowup, so the final estimate is:
+	n = 32 + n + n/6
+	if n > 0xffffffff {
+		return -1
+	}
+	return int(n)
+}
+
+var errClosed = errors.New("snappy: Writer is closed")
+
+// NewWriter returns a new Writer that compresses to w.
+//
+// The Writer returned does not buffer writes. There is no need to Flush or
+// Close such a Writer.
+//
+// Deprecated: the Writer returned is not suitable for many small writes, only
+// for few large writes. Use NewBufferedWriter instead, which is efficient
+// regardless of the frequency and shape of the writes, and remember to Close
+// that Writer when done.
+func NewWriter(w io.Writer) *Writer {
+	return &Writer{
+		w:    w,
+		obuf: make([]byte, obufLen),
+	}
+}
+
+// NewBufferedWriter returns a new Writer that compresses to w, using the
+// framing format described at
+// https://github.com/google/snappy/blob/master/framing_format.txt
+//
+// The Writer returned buffers writes. Users must call Close to guarantee all
+// data has been forwarded to the underlying io.Writer. They may also call
+// Flush zero or more times before calling Close.
+func NewBufferedWriter(w io.Writer) *Writer {
+	return &Writer{
+		w:    w,
+		ibuf: make([]byte, 0, maxBlockSize),
+		obuf: make([]byte, obufLen),
+	}
+}
+
+// Writer is an io.Writer that can write Snappy-compressed bytes.
+type Writer struct {
+	w   io.Writer
+	err error
+
+	// ibuf is a buffer for the incoming (uncompressed) bytes.
+	//
+	// Its use is optional. For backwards compatibility, Writers created by the
+	// NewWriter function have ibuf == nil, do not buffer incoming bytes, and
+	// therefore do not need to be Flush'ed or Close'd.
+	ibuf []byte
+
+	// obuf is a buffer for the outgoing (compressed) bytes.
+	obuf []byte
+
+	// wroteStreamHeader is whether we have written the stream header.
+	wroteStreamHeader bool
+}
+
+// Reset discards the writer's state and switches the Snappy writer to write to
+// w. This permits reusing a Writer rather than allocating a new one.
+func (w *Writer) Reset(writer io.Writer) {
+	w.w = writer
+	w.err = nil
+	if w.ibuf != nil {
+		w.ibuf = w.ibuf[:0]
+	}
+	w.wroteStreamHeader = false
+}
+
+// Write satisfies the io.Writer interface.
+func (w *Writer) Write(p []byte) (nRet int, errRet error) {
+	if w.ibuf == nil {
+		// Do not buffer incoming bytes. This does not perform or compress well
+		// if the caller of Writer.Write writes many small slices. This
+		// behavior is therefore deprecated, but still supported for backwards
+		// compatibility with code that doesn't explicitly Flush or Close.
+		return w.write(p)
+	}
+
+	// The remainder of this method is based on bufio.Writer.Write from the
+	// standard library.
+
+	for len(p) > (cap(w.ibuf)-len(w.ibuf)) && w.err == nil {
+		var n int
+		if len(w.ibuf) == 0 {
+			// Large write, empty buffer.
+			// Write directly from p to avoid copy.
+			n, _ = w.write(p)
+		} else {
+			n = copy(w.ibuf[len(w.ibuf):cap(w.ibuf)], p)
+			w.ibuf = w.ibuf[:len(w.ibuf)+n]
+			w.Flush()
+		}
+		nRet += n
+		p = p[n:]
+	}
+	if w.err != nil {
+		return nRet, w.err
+	}
+	n := copy(w.ibuf[len(w.ibuf):cap(w.ibuf)], p)
+	w.ibuf = w.ibuf[:len(w.ibuf)+n]
+	nRet += n
+	return nRet, nil
+}
+
+func (w *Writer) write(p []byte) (nRet int, errRet error) {
+	if w.err != nil {
+		return 0, w.err
+	}
+	for len(p) > 0 {
+		obufStart := len(magicChunk)
+		if !w.wroteStreamHeader {
+			w.wroteStreamHeader = true
+			copy(w.obuf, magicChunk)
+			obufStart = 0
+		}
+
+		var uncompressed []byte
+		if len(p) > maxBlockSize {
+			uncompressed, p = p[:maxBlockSize], p[maxBlockSize:]
+		} else {
+			uncompressed, p = p, nil
+		}
+		checksum := crc(uncompressed)
+
+		// Compress the buffer, discarding the result if the improvement
+		// isn't at least 12.5%.
+		compressed := Encode(w.obuf[obufHeaderLen:], uncompressed)
+		chunkType := uint8(chunkTypeCompressedData)
+		chunkLen := 4 + len(compressed)
+		obufEnd := obufHeaderLen + len(compressed)
+		if len(compressed) >= len(uncompressed)-len(uncompressed)/8 {
+			chunkType = chunkTypeUncompressedData
+			chunkLen = 4 + len(uncompressed)
+			obufEnd = obufHeaderLen
+		}
+
+		// Fill in the per-chunk header that comes before the body.
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+0] = chunkType
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+1] = uint8(chunkLen >> 0)
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+2] = uint8(chunkLen >> 8)
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+3] = uint8(chunkLen >> 16)
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+4] = uint8(checksum >> 0)
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+5] = uint8(checksum >> 8)
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+6] = uint8(checksum >> 16)
+		w.obuf[len(magicChunk)+7] = uint8(checksum >> 24)
+
+		if _, err := w.w.Write(w.obuf[obufStart:obufEnd]); err != nil {
+			w.err = err
+			return nRet, err
+		}
+		if chunkType == chunkTypeUncompressedData {
+			if _, err := w.w.Write(uncompressed); err != nil {
+				w.err = err
+				return nRet, err
+			}
+		}
+		nRet += len(uncompressed)
+	}
+	return nRet, nil
+}
+
+// Flush flushes the Writer to its underlying io.Writer.
+func (w *Writer) Flush() error {
+	if w.err != nil {
+		return w.err
+	}
+	if len(w.ibuf) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	w.write(w.ibuf)
+	w.ibuf = w.ibuf[:0]
+	return w.err
+}
+
+// Close calls Flush and then closes the Writer.
+func (w *Writer) Close() error {
+	w.Flush()
+	ret := w.err
+	if w.err == nil {
+		w.err = errClosed
+	}
+	return ret
+}

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/encode_amd64.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !appengine
+// +build gc
+// +build !noasm
+
+package snappy
+
+// emitLiteral has the same semantics as in encode_other.go.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func emitLiteral(dst, lit []byte) int
+
+// emitCopy has the same semantics as in encode_other.go.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func emitCopy(dst []byte, offset, length int) int
+
+// extendMatch has the same semantics as in encode_other.go.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func extendMatch(src []byte, i, j int) int
+
+// encodeBlock has the same semantics as in encode_other.go.
+//
+//go:noescape
+func encodeBlock(dst, src []byte) (d int)

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/encode_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,730 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !appengine
+// +build gc
+// +build !noasm
+
+#include "textflag.h"
+
+// The XXX lines assemble on Go 1.4, 1.5 and 1.7, but not 1.6, due to a
+// Go toolchain regression. See https://github.com/golang/go/issues/15426 and
+// https://github.com/golang/snappy/issues/29
+//
+// As a workaround, the package was built with a known good assembler, and
+// those instructions were disassembled by "objdump -d" to yield the
+//	4e 0f b7 7c 5c 78       movzwq 0x78(%rsp,%r11,2),%r15
+// style comments, in AT&T asm syntax. Note that rsp here is a physical
+// register, not Go/asm's SP pseudo-register (see https://golang.org/doc/asm).
+// The instructions were then encoded as "BYTE $0x.." sequences, which assemble
+// fine on Go 1.6.
+
+// The asm code generally follows the pure Go code in encode_other.go, except
+// where marked with a "!!!".
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// func emitLiteral(dst, lit []byte) int
+//
+// All local variables fit into registers. The register allocation:
+//	- AX	len(lit)
+//	- BX	n
+//	- DX	return value
+//	- DI	&dst[i]
+//	- R10	&lit[0]
+//
+// The 24 bytes of stack space is to call runtime·memmove.
+//
+// The unusual register allocation of local variables, such as R10 for the
+// source pointer, matches the allocation used at the call site in encodeBlock,
+// which makes it easier to manually inline this function.
+TEXT ·emitLiteral(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-56
+	MOVQ dst_base+0(FP), DI
+	MOVQ lit_base+24(FP), R10
+	MOVQ lit_len+32(FP), AX
+	MOVQ AX, DX
+	MOVL AX, BX
+	SUBL $1, BX
+
+	CMPL BX, $60
+	JLT  oneByte
+	CMPL BX, $256
+	JLT  twoBytes
+
+threeBytes:
+	MOVB $0xf4, 0(DI)
+	MOVW BX, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+	ADDQ $3, DX
+	JMP  memmove
+
+twoBytes:
+	MOVB $0xf0, 0(DI)
+	MOVB BX, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $2, DI
+	ADDQ $2, DX
+	JMP  memmove
+
+oneByte:
+	SHLB $2, BX
+	MOVB BX, 0(DI)
+	ADDQ $1, DI
+	ADDQ $1, DX
+
+memmove:
+	MOVQ DX, ret+48(FP)
+
+	// copy(dst[i:], lit)
+	//
+	// This means calling runtime·memmove(&dst[i], &lit[0], len(lit)), so we push
+	// DI, R10 and AX as arguments.
+	MOVQ DI, 0(SP)
+	MOVQ R10, 8(SP)
+	MOVQ AX, 16(SP)
+	CALL runtime·memmove(SB)
+	RET
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// func emitCopy(dst []byte, offset, length int) int
+//
+// All local variables fit into registers. The register allocation:
+//	- AX	length
+//	- SI	&dst[0]
+//	- DI	&dst[i]
+//	- R11	offset
+//
+// The unusual register allocation of local variables, such as R11 for the
+// offset, matches the allocation used at the call site in encodeBlock, which
+// makes it easier to manually inline this function.
+TEXT ·emitCopy(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-48
+	MOVQ dst_base+0(FP), DI
+	MOVQ DI, SI
+	MOVQ offset+24(FP), R11
+	MOVQ length+32(FP), AX
+
+loop0:
+	// for length >= 68 { etc }
+	CMPL AX, $68
+	JLT  step1
+
+	// Emit a length 64 copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+	MOVB $0xfe, 0(DI)
+	MOVW R11, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+	SUBL $64, AX
+	JMP  loop0
+
+step1:
+	// if length > 64 { etc }
+	CMPL AX, $64
+	JLE  step2
+
+	// Emit a length 60 copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+	MOVB $0xee, 0(DI)
+	MOVW R11, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+	SUBL $60, AX
+
+step2:
+	// if length >= 12 || offset >= 2048 { goto step3 }
+	CMPL AX, $12
+	JGE  step3
+	CMPL R11, $2048
+	JGE  step3
+
+	// Emit the remaining copy, encoded as 2 bytes.
+	MOVB R11, 1(DI)
+	SHRL $8, R11
+	SHLB $5, R11
+	SUBB $4, AX
+	SHLB $2, AX
+	ORB  AX, R11
+	ORB  $1, R11
+	MOVB R11, 0(DI)
+	ADDQ $2, DI
+
+	// Return the number of bytes written.
+	SUBQ SI, DI
+	MOVQ DI, ret+40(FP)
+	RET
+
+step3:
+	// Emit the remaining copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+	SUBL $1, AX
+	SHLB $2, AX
+	ORB  $2, AX
+	MOVB AX, 0(DI)
+	MOVW R11, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+
+	// Return the number of bytes written.
+	SUBQ SI, DI
+	MOVQ DI, ret+40(FP)
+	RET
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// func extendMatch(src []byte, i, j int) int
+//
+// All local variables fit into registers. The register allocation:
+//	- DX	&src[0]
+//	- SI	&src[j]
+//	- R13	&src[len(src) - 8]
+//	- R14	&src[len(src)]
+//	- R15	&src[i]
+//
+// The unusual register allocation of local variables, such as R15 for a source
+// pointer, matches the allocation used at the call site in encodeBlock, which
+// makes it easier to manually inline this function.
+TEXT ·extendMatch(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-48
+	MOVQ src_base+0(FP), DX
+	MOVQ src_len+8(FP), R14
+	MOVQ i+24(FP), R15
+	MOVQ j+32(FP), SI
+	ADDQ DX, R14
+	ADDQ DX, R15
+	ADDQ DX, SI
+	MOVQ R14, R13
+	SUBQ $8, R13
+
+cmp8:
+	// As long as we are 8 or more bytes before the end of src, we can load and
+	// compare 8 bytes at a time. If those 8 bytes are equal, repeat.
+	CMPQ SI, R13
+	JA   cmp1
+	MOVQ (R15), AX
+	MOVQ (SI), BX
+	CMPQ AX, BX
+	JNE  bsf
+	ADDQ $8, R15
+	ADDQ $8, SI
+	JMP  cmp8
+
+bsf:
+	// If those 8 bytes were not equal, XOR the two 8 byte values, and return
+	// the index of the first byte that differs. The BSF instruction finds the
+	// least significant 1 bit, the amd64 architecture is little-endian, and
+	// the shift by 3 converts a bit index to a byte index.
+	XORQ AX, BX
+	BSFQ BX, BX
+	SHRQ $3, BX
+	ADDQ BX, SI
+
+	// Convert from &src[ret] to ret.
+	SUBQ DX, SI
+	MOVQ SI, ret+40(FP)
+	RET
+
+cmp1:
+	// In src's tail, compare 1 byte at a time.
+	CMPQ SI, R14
+	JAE  extendMatchEnd
+	MOVB (R15), AX
+	MOVB (SI), BX
+	CMPB AX, BX
+	JNE  extendMatchEnd
+	ADDQ $1, R15
+	ADDQ $1, SI
+	JMP  cmp1
+
+extendMatchEnd:
+	// Convert from &src[ret] to ret.
+	SUBQ DX, SI
+	MOVQ SI, ret+40(FP)
+	RET
+
+// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// func encodeBlock(dst, src []byte) (d int)
+//
+// All local variables fit into registers, other than "var table". The register
+// allocation:
+//	- AX	.	.
+//	- BX	.	.
+//	- CX	56	shift (note that amd64 shifts by non-immediates must use CX).
+//	- DX	64	&src[0], tableSize
+//	- SI	72	&src[s]
+//	- DI	80	&dst[d]
+//	- R9	88	sLimit
+//	- R10	.	&src[nextEmit]
+//	- R11	96	prevHash, currHash, nextHash, offset
+//	- R12	104	&src[base], skip
+//	- R13	.	&src[nextS], &src[len(src) - 8]
+//	- R14	.	len(src), bytesBetweenHashLookups, &src[len(src)], x
+//	- R15	112	candidate
+//
+// The second column (56, 64, etc) is the stack offset to spill the registers
+// when calling other functions. We could pack this slightly tighter, but it's
+// simpler to have a dedicated spill map independent of the function called.
+//
+// "var table [maxTableSize]uint16" takes up 32768 bytes of stack space. An
+// extra 56 bytes, to call other functions, and an extra 64 bytes, to spill
+// local variables (registers) during calls gives 32768 + 56 + 64 = 32888.
+TEXT ·encodeBlock(SB), 0, $32888-56
+	MOVQ dst_base+0(FP), DI
+	MOVQ src_base+24(FP), SI
+	MOVQ src_len+32(FP), R14
+
+	// shift, tableSize := uint32(32-8), 1<<8
+	MOVQ $24, CX
+	MOVQ $256, DX
+
+calcShift:
+	// for ; tableSize < maxTableSize && tableSize < len(src); tableSize *= 2 {
+	//	shift--
+	// }
+	CMPQ DX, $16384
+	JGE  varTable
+	CMPQ DX, R14
+	JGE  varTable
+	SUBQ $1, CX
+	SHLQ $1, DX
+	JMP  calcShift
+
+varTable:
+	// var table [maxTableSize]uint16
+	//
+	// In the asm code, unlike the Go code, we can zero-initialize only the
+	// first tableSize elements. Each uint16 element is 2 bytes and each MOVOU
+	// writes 16 bytes, so we can do only tableSize/8 writes instead of the
+	// 2048 writes that would zero-initialize all of table's 32768 bytes.
+	SHRQ $3, DX
+	LEAQ table-32768(SP), BX
+	PXOR X0, X0
+
+memclr:
+	MOVOU X0, 0(BX)
+	ADDQ  $16, BX
+	SUBQ  $1, DX
+	JNZ   memclr
+
+	// !!! DX = &src[0]
+	MOVQ SI, DX
+
+	// sLimit := len(src) - inputMargin
+	MOVQ R14, R9
+	SUBQ $15, R9
+
+	// !!! Pre-emptively spill CX, DX and R9 to the stack. Their values don't
+	// change for the rest of the function.
+	MOVQ CX, 56(SP)
+	MOVQ DX, 64(SP)
+	MOVQ R9, 88(SP)
+
+	// nextEmit := 0
+	MOVQ DX, R10
+
+	// s := 1
+	ADDQ $1, SI
+
+	// nextHash := hash(load32(src, s), shift)
+	MOVL  0(SI), R11
+	IMULL $0x1e35a7bd, R11
+	SHRL  CX, R11
+
+outer:
+	// for { etc }
+
+	// skip := 32
+	MOVQ $32, R12
+
+	// nextS := s
+	MOVQ SI, R13
+
+	// candidate := 0
+	MOVQ $0, R15
+
+inner0:
+	// for { etc }
+
+	// s := nextS
+	MOVQ R13, SI
+
+	// bytesBetweenHashLookups := skip >> 5
+	MOVQ R12, R14
+	SHRQ $5, R14
+
+	// nextS = s + bytesBetweenHashLookups
+	ADDQ R14, R13
+
+	// skip += bytesBetweenHashLookups
+	ADDQ R14, R12
+
+	// if nextS > sLimit { goto emitRemainder }
+	MOVQ R13, AX
+	SUBQ DX, AX
+	CMPQ AX, R9
+	JA   emitRemainder
+
+	// candidate = int(table[nextHash])
+	// XXX: MOVWQZX table-32768(SP)(R11*2), R15
+	// XXX: 4e 0f b7 7c 5c 78       movzwq 0x78(%rsp,%r11,2),%r15
+	BYTE $0x4e
+	BYTE $0x0f
+	BYTE $0xb7
+	BYTE $0x7c
+	BYTE $0x5c
+	BYTE $0x78
+
+	// table[nextHash] = uint16(s)
+	MOVQ SI, AX
+	SUBQ DX, AX
+
+	// XXX: MOVW AX, table-32768(SP)(R11*2)
+	// XXX: 66 42 89 44 5c 78       mov    %ax,0x78(%rsp,%r11,2)
+	BYTE $0x66
+	BYTE $0x42
+	BYTE $0x89
+	BYTE $0x44
+	BYTE $0x5c
+	BYTE $0x78
+
+	// nextHash = hash(load32(src, nextS), shift)
+	MOVL  0(R13), R11
+	IMULL $0x1e35a7bd, R11
+	SHRL  CX, R11
+
+	// if load32(src, s) != load32(src, candidate) { continue } break
+	MOVL 0(SI), AX
+	MOVL (DX)(R15*1), BX
+	CMPL AX, BX
+	JNE  inner0
+
+fourByteMatch:
+	// As per the encode_other.go code:
+	//
+	// A 4-byte match has been found. We'll later see etc.
+
+	// !!! Jump to a fast path for short (<= 16 byte) literals. See the comment
+	// on inputMargin in encode.go.
+	MOVQ SI, AX
+	SUBQ R10, AX
+	CMPQ AX, $16
+	JLE  emitLiteralFastPath
+
+	// ----------------------------------------
+	// Begin inline of the emitLiteral call.
+	//
+	// d += emitLiteral(dst[d:], src[nextEmit:s])
+
+	MOVL AX, BX
+	SUBL $1, BX
+
+	CMPL BX, $60
+	JLT  inlineEmitLiteralOneByte
+	CMPL BX, $256
+	JLT  inlineEmitLiteralTwoBytes
+
+inlineEmitLiteralThreeBytes:
+	MOVB $0xf4, 0(DI)
+	MOVW BX, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+	JMP  inlineEmitLiteralMemmove
+
+inlineEmitLiteralTwoBytes:
+	MOVB $0xf0, 0(DI)
+	MOVB BX, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $2, DI
+	JMP  inlineEmitLiteralMemmove
+
+inlineEmitLiteralOneByte:
+	SHLB $2, BX
+	MOVB BX, 0(DI)
+	ADDQ $1, DI
+
+inlineEmitLiteralMemmove:
+	// Spill local variables (registers) onto the stack; call; unspill.
+	//
+	// copy(dst[i:], lit)
+	//
+	// This means calling runtime·memmove(&dst[i], &lit[0], len(lit)), so we push
+	// DI, R10 and AX as arguments.
+	MOVQ DI, 0(SP)
+	MOVQ R10, 8(SP)
+	MOVQ AX, 16(SP)
+	ADDQ AX, DI              // Finish the "d +=" part of "d += emitLiteral(etc)".
+	MOVQ SI, 72(SP)
+	MOVQ DI, 80(SP)
+	MOVQ R15, 112(SP)
+	CALL runtime·memmove(SB)
+	MOVQ 56(SP), CX
+	MOVQ 64(SP), DX
+	MOVQ 72(SP), SI
+	MOVQ 80(SP), DI
+	MOVQ 88(SP), R9
+	MOVQ 112(SP), R15
+	JMP  inner1
+
+inlineEmitLiteralEnd:
+	// End inline of the emitLiteral call.
+	// ----------------------------------------
+
+emitLiteralFastPath:
+	// !!! Emit the 1-byte encoding "uint8(len(lit)-1)<<2".
+	MOVB AX, BX
+	SUBB $1, BX
+	SHLB $2, BX
+	MOVB BX, (DI)
+	ADDQ $1, DI
+
+	// !!! Implement the copy from lit to dst as a 16-byte load and store.
+	// (Encode's documentation says that dst and src must not overlap.)
+	//
+	// This always copies 16 bytes, instead of only len(lit) bytes, but that's
+	// OK. Subsequent iterations will fix up the overrun.
+	//
+	// Note that on amd64, it is legal and cheap to issue unaligned 8-byte or
+	// 16-byte loads and stores. This technique probably wouldn't be as
+	// effective on architectures that are fussier about alignment.
+	MOVOU 0(R10), X0
+	MOVOU X0, 0(DI)
+	ADDQ  AX, DI
+
+inner1:
+	// for { etc }
+
+	// base := s
+	MOVQ SI, R12
+
+	// !!! offset := base - candidate
+	MOVQ R12, R11
+	SUBQ R15, R11
+	SUBQ DX, R11
+
+	// ----------------------------------------
+	// Begin inline of the extendMatch call.
+	//
+	// s = extendMatch(src, candidate+4, s+4)
+
+	// !!! R14 = &src[len(src)]
+	MOVQ src_len+32(FP), R14
+	ADDQ DX, R14
+
+	// !!! R13 = &src[len(src) - 8]
+	MOVQ R14, R13
+	SUBQ $8, R13
+
+	// !!! R15 = &src[candidate + 4]
+	ADDQ $4, R15
+	ADDQ DX, R15
+
+	// !!! s += 4
+	ADDQ $4, SI
+
+inlineExtendMatchCmp8:
+	// As long as we are 8 or more bytes before the end of src, we can load and
+	// compare 8 bytes at a time. If those 8 bytes are equal, repeat.
+	CMPQ SI, R13
+	JA   inlineExtendMatchCmp1
+	MOVQ (R15), AX
+	MOVQ (SI), BX
+	CMPQ AX, BX
+	JNE  inlineExtendMatchBSF
+	ADDQ $8, R15
+	ADDQ $8, SI
+	JMP  inlineExtendMatchCmp8
+
+inlineExtendMatchBSF:
+	// If those 8 bytes were not equal, XOR the two 8 byte values, and return
+	// the index of the first byte that differs. The BSF instruction finds the
+	// least significant 1 bit, the amd64 architecture is little-endian, and
+	// the shift by 3 converts a bit index to a byte index.
+	XORQ AX, BX
+	BSFQ BX, BX
+	SHRQ $3, BX
+	ADDQ BX, SI
+	JMP  inlineExtendMatchEnd
+
+inlineExtendMatchCmp1:
+	// In src's tail, compare 1 byte at a time.
+	CMPQ SI, R14
+	JAE  inlineExtendMatchEnd
+	MOVB (R15), AX
+	MOVB (SI), BX
+	CMPB AX, BX
+	JNE  inlineExtendMatchEnd
+	ADDQ $1, R15
+	ADDQ $1, SI
+	JMP  inlineExtendMatchCmp1
+
+inlineExtendMatchEnd:
+	// End inline of the extendMatch call.
+	// ----------------------------------------
+
+	// ----------------------------------------
+	// Begin inline of the emitCopy call.
+	//
+	// d += emitCopy(dst[d:], base-candidate, s-base)
+
+	// !!! length := s - base
+	MOVQ SI, AX
+	SUBQ R12, AX
+
+inlineEmitCopyLoop0:
+	// for length >= 68 { etc }
+	CMPL AX, $68
+	JLT  inlineEmitCopyStep1
+
+	// Emit a length 64 copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+	MOVB $0xfe, 0(DI)
+	MOVW R11, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+	SUBL $64, AX
+	JMP  inlineEmitCopyLoop0
+
+inlineEmitCopyStep1:
+	// if length > 64 { etc }
+	CMPL AX, $64
+	JLE  inlineEmitCopyStep2
+
+	// Emit a length 60 copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+	MOVB $0xee, 0(DI)
+	MOVW R11, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+	SUBL $60, AX
+
+inlineEmitCopyStep2:
+	// if length >= 12 || offset >= 2048 { goto inlineEmitCopyStep3 }
+	CMPL AX, $12
+	JGE  inlineEmitCopyStep3
+	CMPL R11, $2048
+	JGE  inlineEmitCopyStep3
+
+	// Emit the remaining copy, encoded as 2 bytes.
+	MOVB R11, 1(DI)
+	SHRL $8, R11
+	SHLB $5, R11
+	SUBB $4, AX
+	SHLB $2, AX
+	ORB  AX, R11
+	ORB  $1, R11
+	MOVB R11, 0(DI)
+	ADDQ $2, DI
+	JMP  inlineEmitCopyEnd
+
+inlineEmitCopyStep3:
+	// Emit the remaining copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+	SUBL $1, AX
+	SHLB $2, AX
+	ORB  $2, AX
+	MOVB AX, 0(DI)
+	MOVW R11, 1(DI)
+	ADDQ $3, DI
+
+inlineEmitCopyEnd:
+	// End inline of the emitCopy call.
+	// ----------------------------------------
+
+	// nextEmit = s
+	MOVQ SI, R10
+
+	// if s >= sLimit { goto emitRemainder }
+	MOVQ SI, AX
+	SUBQ DX, AX
+	CMPQ AX, R9
+	JAE  emitRemainder
+
+	// As per the encode_other.go code:
+	//
+	// We could immediately etc.
+
+	// x := load64(src, s-1)
+	MOVQ -1(SI), R14
+
+	// prevHash := hash(uint32(x>>0), shift)
+	MOVL  R14, R11
+	IMULL $0x1e35a7bd, R11
+	SHRL  CX, R11
+
+	// table[prevHash] = uint16(s-1)
+	MOVQ SI, AX
+	SUBQ DX, AX
+	SUBQ $1, AX
+
+	// XXX: MOVW AX, table-32768(SP)(R11*2)
+	// XXX: 66 42 89 44 5c 78       mov    %ax,0x78(%rsp,%r11,2)
+	BYTE $0x66
+	BYTE $0x42
+	BYTE $0x89
+	BYTE $0x44
+	BYTE $0x5c
+	BYTE $0x78
+
+	// currHash := hash(uint32(x>>8), shift)
+	SHRQ  $8, R14
+	MOVL  R14, R11
+	IMULL $0x1e35a7bd, R11
+	SHRL  CX, R11
+
+	// candidate = int(table[currHash])
+	// XXX: MOVWQZX table-32768(SP)(R11*2), R15
+	// XXX: 4e 0f b7 7c 5c 78       movzwq 0x78(%rsp,%r11,2),%r15
+	BYTE $0x4e
+	BYTE $0x0f
+	BYTE $0xb7
+	BYTE $0x7c
+	BYTE $0x5c
+	BYTE $0x78
+
+	// table[currHash] = uint16(s)
+	ADDQ $1, AX
+
+	// XXX: MOVW AX, table-32768(SP)(R11*2)
+	// XXX: 66 42 89 44 5c 78       mov    %ax,0x78(%rsp,%r11,2)
+	BYTE $0x66
+	BYTE $0x42
+	BYTE $0x89
+	BYTE $0x44
+	BYTE $0x5c
+	BYTE $0x78
+
+	// if uint32(x>>8) == load32(src, candidate) { continue }
+	MOVL (DX)(R15*1), BX
+	CMPL R14, BX
+	JEQ  inner1
+
+	// nextHash = hash(uint32(x>>16), shift)
+	SHRQ  $8, R14
+	MOVL  R14, R11
+	IMULL $0x1e35a7bd, R11
+	SHRL  CX, R11
+
+	// s++
+	ADDQ $1, SI
+
+	// break out of the inner1 for loop, i.e. continue the outer loop.
+	JMP outer
+
+emitRemainder:
+	// if nextEmit < len(src) { etc }
+	MOVQ src_len+32(FP), AX
+	ADDQ DX, AX
+	CMPQ R10, AX
+	JEQ  encodeBlockEnd
+
+	// d += emitLiteral(dst[d:], src[nextEmit:])
+	//
+	// Push args.
+	MOVQ DI, 0(SP)
+	MOVQ $0, 8(SP)   // Unnecessary, as the callee ignores it, but conservative.
+	MOVQ $0, 16(SP)  // Unnecessary, as the callee ignores it, but conservative.
+	MOVQ R10, 24(SP)
+	SUBQ R10, AX
+	MOVQ AX, 32(SP)
+	MOVQ AX, 40(SP)  // Unnecessary, as the callee ignores it, but conservative.
+
+	// Spill local variables (registers) onto the stack; call; unspill.
+	MOVQ DI, 80(SP)
+	CALL ·emitLiteral(SB)
+	MOVQ 80(SP), DI
+
+	// Finish the "d +=" part of "d += emitLiteral(etc)".
+	ADDQ 48(SP), DI
+
+encodeBlockEnd:
+	MOVQ dst_base+0(FP), AX
+	SUBQ AX, DI
+	MOVQ DI, d+48(FP)
+	RET

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/encode_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build !amd64 appengine !gc noasm
+
+package snappy
+
+func load32(b []byte, i int) uint32 {
+	b = b[i : i+4 : len(b)] // Help the compiler eliminate bounds checks on the next line.
+	return uint32(b[0]) | uint32(b[1])<<8 | uint32(b[2])<<16 | uint32(b[3])<<24
+}
+
+func load64(b []byte, i int) uint64 {
+	b = b[i : i+8 : len(b)] // Help the compiler eliminate bounds checks on the next line.
+	return uint64(b[0]) | uint64(b[1])<<8 | uint64(b[2])<<16 | uint64(b[3])<<24 |
+		uint64(b[4])<<32 | uint64(b[5])<<40 | uint64(b[6])<<48 | uint64(b[7])<<56
+}
+
+// emitLiteral writes a literal chunk and returns the number of bytes written.
+//
+// It assumes that:
+//	dst is long enough to hold the encoded bytes
+//	1 <= len(lit) && len(lit) <= 65536
+func emitLiteral(dst, lit []byte) int {
+	i, n := 0, uint(len(lit)-1)
+	switch {
+	case n < 60:
+		dst[0] = uint8(n)<<2 | tagLiteral
+		i = 1
+	case n < 1<<8:
+		dst[0] = 60<<2 | tagLiteral
+		dst[1] = uint8(n)
+		i = 2
+	default:
+		dst[0] = 61<<2 | tagLiteral
+		dst[1] = uint8(n)
+		dst[2] = uint8(n >> 8)
+		i = 3
+	}
+	return i + copy(dst[i:], lit)
+}
+
+// emitCopy writes a copy chunk and returns the number of bytes written.
+//
+// It assumes that:
+//	dst is long enough to hold the encoded bytes
+//	1 <= offset && offset <= 65535
+//	4 <= length && length <= 65535
+func emitCopy(dst []byte, offset, length int) int {
+	i := 0
+	// The maximum length for a single tagCopy1 or tagCopy2 op is 64 bytes. The
+	// threshold for this loop is a little higher (at 68 = 64 + 4), and the
+	// length emitted down below is is a little lower (at 60 = 64 - 4), because
+	// it's shorter to encode a length 67 copy as a length 60 tagCopy2 followed
+	// by a length 7 tagCopy1 (which encodes as 3+2 bytes) than to encode it as
+	// a length 64 tagCopy2 followed by a length 3 tagCopy2 (which encodes as
+	// 3+3 bytes). The magic 4 in the 64±4 is because the minimum length for a
+	// tagCopy1 op is 4 bytes, which is why a length 3 copy has to be an
+	// encodes-as-3-bytes tagCopy2 instead of an encodes-as-2-bytes tagCopy1.
+	for length >= 68 {
+		// Emit a length 64 copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+		dst[i+0] = 63<<2 | tagCopy2
+		dst[i+1] = uint8(offset)
+		dst[i+2] = uint8(offset >> 8)
+		i += 3
+		length -= 64
+	}
+	if length > 64 {
+		// Emit a length 60 copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+		dst[i+0] = 59<<2 | tagCopy2
+		dst[i+1] = uint8(offset)
+		dst[i+2] = uint8(offset >> 8)
+		i += 3
+		length -= 60
+	}
+	if length >= 12 || offset >= 2048 {
+		// Emit the remaining copy, encoded as 3 bytes.
+		dst[i+0] = uint8(length-1)<<2 | tagCopy2
+		dst[i+1] = uint8(offset)
+		dst[i+2] = uint8(offset >> 8)
+		return i + 3
+	}
+	// Emit the remaining copy, encoded as 2 bytes.
+	dst[i+0] = uint8(offset>>8)<<5 | uint8(length-4)<<2 | tagCopy1
+	dst[i+1] = uint8(offset)
+	return i + 2
+}
+
+// extendMatch returns the largest k such that k <= len(src) and that
+// src[i:i+k-j] and src[j:k] have the same contents.
+//
+// It assumes that:
+//	0 <= i && i < j && j <= len(src)
+func extendMatch(src []byte, i, j int) int {
+	for ; j < len(src) && src[i] == src[j]; i, j = i+1, j+1 {
+	}
+	return j
+}
+
+func hash(u, shift uint32) uint32 {
+	return (u * 0x1e35a7bd) >> shift
+}
+
+// encodeBlock encodes a non-empty src to a guaranteed-large-enough dst. It
+// assumes that the varint-encoded length of the decompressed bytes has already
+// been written.
+//
+// It also assumes that:
+//	len(dst) >= MaxEncodedLen(len(src)) &&
+// 	minNonLiteralBlockSize <= len(src) && len(src) <= maxBlockSize
+func encodeBlock(dst, src []byte) (d int) {
+	// Initialize the hash table. Its size ranges from 1<<8 to 1<<14 inclusive.
+	// The table element type is uint16, as s < sLimit and sLimit < len(src)
+	// and len(src) <= maxBlockSize and maxBlockSize == 65536.
+	const (
+		maxTableSize = 1 << 14
+		// tableMask is redundant, but helps the compiler eliminate bounds
+		// checks.
+		tableMask = maxTableSize - 1
+	)
+	shift := uint32(32 - 8)
+	for tableSize := 1 << 8; tableSize < maxTableSize && tableSize < len(src); tableSize *= 2 {
+		shift--
+	}
+	// In Go, all array elements are zero-initialized, so there is no advantage
+	// to a smaller tableSize per se. However, it matches the C++ algorithm,
+	// and in the asm versions of this code, we can get away with zeroing only
+	// the first tableSize elements.
+	var table [maxTableSize]uint16
+
+	// sLimit is when to stop looking for offset/length copies. The inputMargin
+	// lets us use a fast path for emitLiteral in the main loop, while we are
+	// looking for copies.
+	sLimit := len(src) - inputMargin
+
+	// nextEmit is where in src the next emitLiteral should start from.
+	nextEmit := 0
+
+	// The encoded form must start with a literal, as there are no previous
+	// bytes to copy, so we start looking for hash matches at s == 1.
+	s := 1
+	nextHash := hash(load32(src, s), shift)
+
+	for {
+		// Copied from the C++ snappy implementation:
+		//
+		// Heuristic match skipping: If 32 bytes are scanned with no matches
+		// found, start looking only at every other byte. If 32 more bytes are
+		// scanned (or skipped), look at every third byte, etc.. When a match
+		// is found, immediately go back to looking at every byte. This is a
+		// small loss (~5% performance, ~0.1% density) for compressible data
+		// due to more bookkeeping, but for non-compressible data (such as
+		// JPEG) it's a huge win since the compressor quickly "realizes" the
+		// data is incompressible and doesn't bother looking for matches
+		// everywhere.
+		//
+		// The "skip" variable keeps track of how many bytes there are since
+		// the last match; dividing it by 32 (ie. right-shifting by five) gives
+		// the number of bytes to move ahead for each iteration.
+		skip := 32
+
+		nextS := s
+		candidate := 0
+		for {
+			s = nextS
+			bytesBetweenHashLookups := skip >> 5
+			nextS = s + bytesBetweenHashLookups
+			skip += bytesBetweenHashLookups
+			if nextS > sLimit {
+				goto emitRemainder
+			}
+			candidate = int(table[nextHash&tableMask])
+			table[nextHash&tableMask] = uint16(s)
+			nextHash = hash(load32(src, nextS), shift)
+			if load32(src, s) == load32(src, candidate) {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+
+		// A 4-byte match has been found. We'll later see if more than 4 bytes
+		// match. But, prior to the match, src[nextEmit:s] are unmatched. Emit
+		// them as literal bytes.
+		d += emitLiteral(dst[d:], src[nextEmit:s])
+
+		// Call emitCopy, and then see if another emitCopy could be our next
+		// move. Repeat until we find no match for the input immediately after
+		// what was consumed by the last emitCopy call.
+		//
+		// If we exit this loop normally then we need to call emitLiteral next,
+		// though we don't yet know how big the literal will be. We handle that
+		// by proceeding to the next iteration of the main loop. We also can
+		// exit this loop via goto if we get close to exhausting the input.
+		for {
+			// Invariant: we have a 4-byte match at s, and no need to emit any
+			// literal bytes prior to s.
+			base := s
+
+			// Extend the 4-byte match as long as possible.
+			//
+			// This is an inlined version of:
+			//	s = extendMatch(src, candidate+4, s+4)
+			s += 4
+			for i := candidate + 4; s < len(src) && src[i] == src[s]; i, s = i+1, s+1 {
+			}
+
+			d += emitCopy(dst[d:], base-candidate, s-base)
+			nextEmit = s
+			if s >= sLimit {
+				goto emitRemainder
+			}
+
+			// We could immediately start working at s now, but to improve
+			// compression we first update the hash table at s-1 and at s. If
+			// another emitCopy is not our next move, also calculate nextHash
+			// at s+1. At least on GOARCH=amd64, these three hash calculations
+			// are faster as one load64 call (with some shifts) instead of
+			// three load32 calls.
+			x := load64(src, s-1)
+			prevHash := hash(uint32(x>>0), shift)
+			table[prevHash&tableMask] = uint16(s - 1)
+			currHash := hash(uint32(x>>8), shift)
+			candidate = int(table[currHash&tableMask])
+			table[currHash&tableMask] = uint16(s)
+			if uint32(x>>8) != load32(src, candidate) {
+				nextHash = hash(uint32(x>>16), shift)
+				s++
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+emitRemainder:
+	if nextEmit < len(src) {
+		d += emitLiteral(dst[d:], src[nextEmit:])
+	}
+	return d
+}

vendor/github.com/golang/snappy/snappy.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Snappy-Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package snappy implements the snappy block-based compression format.
+// It aims for very high speeds and reasonable compression.
+//
+// The C++ snappy implementation is at https://github.com/google/snappy
+package snappy // import "github.com/golang/snappy"
+
+import (
+	"hash/crc32"
+)
+
+/*
+Each encoded block begins with the varint-encoded length of the decoded data,
+followed by a sequence of chunks. Chunks begin and end on byte boundaries. The
+first byte of each chunk is broken into its 2 least and 6 most significant bits
+called l and m: l ranges in [0, 4) and m ranges in [0, 64). l is the chunk tag.
+Zero means a literal tag. All other values mean a copy tag.
+
+For literal tags:
+  - If m < 60, the next 1 + m bytes are literal bytes.
+  - Otherwise, let n be the little-endian unsigned integer denoted by the next
+    m - 59 bytes. The next 1 + n bytes after that are literal bytes.
+
+For copy tags, length bytes are copied from offset bytes ago, in the style of
+Lempel-Ziv compression algorithms. In particular:
+  - For l == 1, the offset ranges in [0, 1<<11) and the length in [4, 12).
+    The length is 4 + the low 3 bits of m. The high 3 bits of m form bits 8-10
+    of the offset. The next byte is bits 0-7 of the offset.
+  - For l == 2, the offset ranges in [0, 1<<16) and the length in [1, 65).
+    The length is 1 + m. The offset is the little-endian unsigned integer
+    denoted by the next 2 bytes.
+  - For l == 3, this tag is a legacy format that is no longer issued by most
+    encoders. Nonetheless, the offset ranges in [0, 1<<32) and the length in
+    [1, 65). The length is 1 + m. The offset is the little-endian unsigned
+    integer denoted by the next 4 bytes.
+*/
+const (
+	tagLiteral = 0x00
+	tagCopy1   = 0x01
+	tagCopy2   = 0x02
+	tagCopy4   = 0x03
+)
+
+const (
+	checksumSize    = 4
+	chunkHeaderSize = 4
+	magicChunk      = "\xff\x06\x00\x00" + magicBody
+	magicBody       = "sNaPpY"
+
+	// maxBlockSize is the maximum size of the input to encodeBlock. It is not
+	// part of the wire format per se, but some parts of the encoder assume
+	// that an offset fits into a uint16.
+	//
+	// Also, for the framing format (Writer type instead of Encode function),
+	// https://github.com/google/snappy/blob/master/framing_format.txt says
+	// that "the uncompressed data in a chunk must be no longer than 65536
+	// bytes".
+	maxBlockSize = 65536
+
+	// maxEncodedLenOfMaxBlockSize equals MaxEncodedLen(maxBlockSize), but is
+	// hard coded to be a const instead of a variable, so that obufLen can also
+	// be a const. Their equivalence is confirmed by
+	// TestMaxEncodedLenOfMaxBlockSize.
+	maxEncodedLenOfMaxBlockSize = 76490
+
+	obufHeaderLen = len(magicChunk) + checksumSize + chunkHeaderSize
+	obufLen       = obufHeaderLen + maxEncodedLenOfMaxBlockSize
+)
+
+const (
+	chunkTypeCompressedData   = 0x00
+	chunkTypeUncompressedData = 0x01
+	chunkTypePadding          = 0xfe
+	chunkTypeStreamIdentifier = 0xff
+)
+
+var crcTable = crc32.MakeTable(crc32.Castagnoli)
+
+// crc implements the checksum specified in section 3 of
+// https://github.com/google/snappy/blob/master/framing_format.txt
+func crc(b []byte) uint32 {
+	c := crc32.Update(0, crcTable, b)
+	return uint32(c>>15|c<<17) + 0xa282ead8
+}

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/encryption/encryption.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package encryption
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/errwrap"
+	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/pgpkeys"
+)
+
+// RetrieveGPGKey returns the PGP key specified as the pgpKey parameter, or queries
+// the public key from the keybase service if the parameter is a keybase username
+// prefixed with the phrase "keybase:"
+func RetrieveGPGKey(pgpKey string) (string, error) {
+	const keybasePrefix = "keybase:"
+
+	encryptionKey := pgpKey
+	if strings.HasPrefix(pgpKey, keybasePrefix) {
+		publicKeys, err := pgpkeys.FetchKeybasePubkeys([]string{pgpKey})
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", errwrap.Wrapf(fmt.Sprintf("Error retrieving Public Key for %s: {{err}}", pgpKey), err)
+		}
+		encryptionKey = publicKeys[pgpKey]
+	}
+
+	return encryptionKey, nil
+}
+
+// EncryptValue encrypts the given value with the given encryption key. Description
+// should be set such that errors return a meaningful user-facing response.
+func EncryptValue(encryptionKey, value, description string) (string, string, error) {
+	fingerprints, encryptedValue, err :=
+		pgpkeys.EncryptShares([][]byte{[]byte(value)}, []string{encryptionKey})
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", errwrap.Wrapf(fmt.Sprintf("Error encrypting %s: {{err}}", description), err)
+	}
+
+	return fingerprints[0], base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(encryptedValue[0]), nil
+}

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/vault/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+Mozilla Public License, version 2.0
+
+1. Definitions
+
+1.1. "Contributor"
+
+     means each individual or legal entity that creates, contributes to the
+     creation of, or owns Covered Software.
+
+1.2. "Contributor Version"
+
+     means the combination of the Contributions of others (if any) used by a
+     Contributor and that particular Contributor's Contribution.
+
+1.3. "Contribution"
+
+     means Covered Software of a particular Contributor.
+
+1.4. "Covered Software"
+
+     means Source Code Form to which the initial Contributor has attached the
+     notice in Exhibit A, the Executable Form of such Source Code Form, and
+     Modifications of such Source Code Form, in each case including portions
+     thereof.
+
+1.5. "Incompatible With Secondary Licenses"
+     means
+
+     a. that the initial Contributor has attached the notice described in
+        Exhibit B to the Covered Software; or
+
+     b. that the Covered Software was made available under the terms of
+        version 1.1 or earlier of the License, but not also under the terms of
+        a Secondary License.
+
+1.6. "Executable Form"
+
+     means any form of the work other than Source Code Form.
+
+1.7. "Larger Work"
+
+     means a work that combines Covered Software with other material, in a
+     separate file or files, that is not Covered Software.
+
+1.8. "License"
+
+     means this document.
+
+1.9. "Licensable"
+
+     means having the right to grant, to the maximum extent possible, whether
+     at the time of the initial grant or subsequently, any and all of the
+     rights conveyed by this License.
+
+1.10. "Modifications"
+
+     means any of the following:
+
+     a. any file in Source Code Form that results from an addition to,
+        deletion from, or modification of the contents of Covered Software; or
+
+     b. any new file in Source Code Form that contains any Covered Software.
+
+1.11. "Patent Claims" of a Contributor
+
+      means any patent claim(s), including without limitation, method,
+      process, and apparatus claims, in any patent Licensable by such
+      Contributor that would be infringed, but for the grant of the License,
+      by the making, using, selling, offering for sale, having made, import,
+      or transfer of either its Contributions or its Contributor Version.
+
+1.12. "Secondary License"
+
+      means either the GNU General Public License, Version 2.0, the GNU Lesser
+      General Public License, Version 2.1, the GNU Affero General Public
+      License, Version 3.0, or any later versions of those licenses.
+
+1.13. "Source Code Form"
+
+      means the form of the work preferred for making modifications.
+
+1.14. "You" (or "Your")
+
+      means an individual or a legal entity exercising rights under this
+      License. For legal entities, "You" includes any entity that controls, is
+      controlled by, or is under common control with You. For purposes of this
+      definition, "control" means (a) the power, direct or indirect, to cause
+      the direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or
+      otherwise, or (b) ownership of more than fifty percent (50%) of the
+      outstanding shares or beneficial ownership of such entity.
+
+
+2. License Grants and Conditions
+
+2.1. Grants
+
+     Each Contributor hereby grants You a world-wide, royalty-free,
+     non-exclusive license:
+
+     a. under intellectual property rights (other than patent or trademark)
+        Licensable by such Contributor to use, reproduce, make available,
+        modify, display, perform, distribute, and otherwise exploit its
+        Contributions, either on an unmodified basis, with Modifications, or
+        as part of a Larger Work; and
+
+     b. under Patent Claims of such Contributor to make, use, sell, offer for
+        sale, have made, import, and otherwise transfer either its
+        Contributions or its Contributor Version.
+
+2.2. Effective Date
+
+     The licenses granted in Section 2.1 with respect to any Contribution
+     become effective for each Contribution on the date the Contributor first
+     distributes such Contribution.
+
+2.3. Limitations on Grant Scope
+
+     The licenses granted in this Section 2 are the only rights granted under
+     this License. No additional rights or licenses will be implied from the
+     distribution or licensing of Covered Software under this License.
+     Notwithstanding Section 2.1(b) above, no patent license is granted by a
+     Contributor:
+
+     a. for any code that a Contributor has removed from Covered Software; or
+
+     b. for infringements caused by: (i) Your and any other third party's
+        modifications of Covered Software, or (ii) the combination of its
+        Contributions with other software (except as part of its Contributor
+        Version); or
+
+     c. under Patent Claims infringed by Covered Software in the absence of
+        its Contributions.
+
+     This License does not grant any rights in the trademarks, service marks,
+     or logos of any Contributor (except as may be necessary to comply with
+     the notice requirements in Section 3.4).
+
+2.4. Subsequent Licenses
+
+     No Contributor makes additional grants as a result of Your choice to
+     distribute the Covered Software under a subsequent version of this
+     License (see Section 10.2) or under the terms of a Secondary License (if
+     permitted under the terms of Section 3.3).
+
+2.5. Representation
+
+     Each Contributor represents that the Contributor believes its
+     Contributions are its original creation(s) or it has sufficient rights to
+     grant the rights to its Contributions conveyed by this License.
+
+2.6. Fair Use
+
+     This License is not intended to limit any rights You have under
+     applicable copyright doctrines of fair use, fair dealing, or other
+     equivalents.
+
+2.7. Conditions
+
+     Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 are conditions of the licenses granted in
+     Section 2.1.
+
+
+3. Responsibilities
+
+3.1. Distribution of Source Form
+
+     All distribution of Covered Software in Source Code Form, including any
+     Modifications that You create or to which You contribute, must be under
+     the terms of this License. You must inform recipients that the Source
+     Code Form of the Covered Software is governed by the terms of this
+     License, and how they can obtain a copy of this License. You may not
+     attempt to alter or restrict the recipients' rights in the Source Code
+     Form.
+
+3.2. Distribution of Executable Form
+
+     If You distribute Covered Software in Executable Form then:
+
+     a. such Covered Software must also be made available in Source Code Form,
+        as described in Section 3.1, and You must inform recipients of the
+        Executable Form how they can obtain a copy of such Source Code Form by
+        reasonable means in a timely manner, at a charge no more than the cost
+        of distribution to the recipient; and
+
+     b. You may distribute such Executable Form under the terms of this
+        License, or sublicense it under different terms, provided that the
+        license for the Executable Form does not attempt to limit or alter the
+        recipients' rights in the Source Code Form under this License.
+
+3.3. Distribution of a Larger Work
+
+     You may create and distribute a Larger Work under terms of Your choice,
+     provided that You also comply with the requirements of this License for
+     the Covered Software. If the Larger Work is a combination of Covered
+     Software with a work governed by one or more Secondary Licenses, and the
+     Covered Software is not Incompatible With Secondary Licenses, this
+     License permits You to additionally distribute such Covered Software
+     under the terms of such Secondary License(s), so that the recipient of
+     the Larger Work may, at their option, further distribute the Covered
+     Software under the terms of either this License or such Secondary
+     License(s).
+
+3.4. Notices
+
+     You may not remove or alter the substance of any license notices
+     (including copyright notices, patent notices, disclaimers of warranty, or
+     limitations of liability) contained within the Source Code Form of the
+     Covered Software, except that You may alter any license notices to the
+     extent required to remedy known factual inaccuracies.
+
+3.5. Application of Additional Terms
+
+     You may choose to offer, and to charge a fee for, warranty, support,
+     indemnity or liability obligations to one or more recipients of Covered
+     Software. However, You may do so only on Your own behalf, and not on
+     behalf of any Contributor. You must make it absolutely clear that any
+     such warranty, support, indemnity, or liability obligation is offered by
+     You alone, and You hereby agree to indemnify every Contributor for any
+     liability incurred by such Contributor as a result of warranty, support,
+     indemnity or liability terms You offer. You may include additional
+     disclaimers of warranty and limitations of liability specific to any
+     jurisdiction.
+
+4. Inability to Comply Due to Statute or Regulation
+
+   If it is impossible for You to comply with any of the terms of this License
+   with respect to some or all of the Covered Software due to statute,
+   judicial order, or regulation then You must: (a) comply with the terms of
+   this License to the maximum extent possible; and (b) describe the
+   limitations and the code they affect. Such description must be placed in a
+   text file included with all distributions of the Covered Software under
+   this License. Except to the extent prohibited by statute or regulation,
+   such description must be sufficiently detailed for a recipient of ordinary
+   skill to be able to understand it.
+
+5. Termination
+
+5.1. The rights granted under this License will terminate automatically if You
+     fail to comply with any of its terms. However, if You become compliant,
+     then the rights granted under this License from a particular Contributor
+     are reinstated (a) provisionally, unless and until such Contributor
+     explicitly and finally terminates Your grants, and (b) on an ongoing
+     basis, if such Contributor fails to notify You of the non-compliance by
+     some reasonable means prior to 60 days after You have come back into
+     compliance. Moreover, Your grants from a particular Contributor are
+     reinstated on an ongoing basis if such Contributor notifies You of the
+     non-compliance by some reasonable means, this is the first time You have
+     received notice of non-compliance with this License from such
+     Contributor, and You become compliant prior to 30 days after Your receipt
+     of the notice.
+
+5.2. If You initiate litigation against any entity by asserting a patent
+     infringement claim (excluding declaratory judgment actions,
+     counter-claims, and cross-claims) alleging that a Contributor Version
+     directly or indirectly infringes any patent, then the rights granted to
+     You by any and all Contributors for the Covered Software under Section
+     2.1 of this License shall terminate.
+
+5.3. In the event of termination under Sections 5.1 or 5.2 above, all end user
+     license agreements (excluding distributors and resellers) which have been
+     validly granted by You or Your distributors under this License prior to
+     termination shall survive termination.
+
+6. Disclaimer of Warranty
+
+   Covered Software is provided under this License on an "as is" basis,
+   without warranty of any kind, either expressed, implied, or statutory,
+   including, without limitation, warranties that the Covered Software is free
+   of defects, merchantable, fit for a particular purpose or non-infringing.
+   The entire risk as to the quality and performance of the Covered Software
+   is with You. Should any Covered Software prove defective in any respect,
+   You (not any Contributor) assume the cost of any necessary servicing,
+   repair, or correction. This disclaimer of warranty constitutes an essential
+   part of this License. No use of  any Covered Software is authorized under
+   this License except under this disclaimer.
+
+7. Limitation of Liability
+
+   Under no circumstances and under no legal theory, whether tort (including
+   negligence), contract, or otherwise, shall any Contributor, or anyone who
+   distributes Covered Software as permitted above, be liable to You for any
+   direct, indirect, special, incidental, or consequential damages of any
+   character including, without limitation, damages for lost profits, loss of
+   goodwill, work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
+   other commercial damages or losses, even if such party shall have been
+   informed of the possibility of such damages. This limitation of liability
+   shall not apply to liability for death or personal injury resulting from
+   such party's negligence to the extent applicable law prohibits such
+   limitation. Some jurisdictions do not allow the exclusion or limitation of
+   incidental or consequential damages, so this exclusion and limitation may
+   not apply to You.
+
+8. Litigation
+
+   Any litigation relating to this License may be brought only in the courts
+   of a jurisdiction where the defendant maintains its principal place of
+   business and such litigation shall be governed by laws of that
+   jurisdiction, without reference to its conflict-of-law provisions. Nothing
+   in this Section shall prevent a party's ability to bring cross-claims or
+   counter-claims.
+
+9. Miscellaneous
+
+   This License represents the complete agreement concerning the subject
+   matter hereof. If any provision of this License is held to be
+   unenforceable, such provision shall be reformed only to the extent
+   necessary to make it enforceable. Any law or regulation which provides that
+   the language of a contract shall be construed against the drafter shall not
+   be used to construe this License against a Contributor.
+
+
+10. Versions of the License
+
+10.1. New Versions
+
+      Mozilla Foundation is the license steward. Except as provided in Section
+      10.3, no one other than the license steward has the right to modify or
+      publish new versions of this License. Each version will be given a
+      distinguishing version number.
+
+10.2. Effect of New Versions
+
+      You may distribute the Covered Software under the terms of the version
+      of the License under which You originally received the Covered Software,
+      or under the terms of any subsequent version published by the license
+      steward.
+
+10.3. Modified Versions
+
+      If you create software not governed by this License, and you want to
+      create a new license for such software, you may create and use a
+      modified version of this License if you rename the license and remove
+      any references to the name of the license steward (except to note that
+      such modified license differs from this License).
+
+10.4. Distributing Source Code Form that is Incompatible With Secondary
+      Licenses If You choose to distribute Source Code Form that is
+      Incompatible With Secondary Licenses under the terms of this version of
+      the License, the notice described in Exhibit B of this License must be
+      attached.
+
+Exhibit A - Source Code Form License Notice
+
+      This Source Code Form is subject to the
+      terms of the Mozilla Public License, v.
+      2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not
+      distributed with this file, You can
+      obtain one at
+      http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+If it is not possible or desirable to put the notice in a particular file,
+then You may include the notice in a location (such as a LICENSE file in a
+relevant directory) where a recipient would be likely to look for such a
+notice.
+
+You may add additional accurate notices of copyright ownership.
+
+Exhibit B - "Incompatible With Secondary Licenses" Notice
+
+      This Source Code Form is "Incompatible
+      With Secondary Licenses", as defined by
+      the Mozilla Public License, v. 2.0.
+

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/compressutil/compress.go

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+package compressutil
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/gzip"
+	"compress/lzw"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/golang/snappy"
+)
+
+const (
+	// A byte value used as a canary prefix for the compressed information
+	// which is used to distinguish if a JSON input is compressed or not.
+	// The value of this constant should not be a first character of any
+	// valid JSON string.
+
+	// Byte value used as canary when using Gzip format
+	CompressionCanaryGzip byte = 'G'
+
+	// Byte value used as canary when using Lzw format
+	CompressionCanaryLzw byte = 'L'
+
+	// Byte value used as canary when using Snappy format
+	CompressionCanarySnappy byte = 'S'
+
+	CompressionTypeLzw = "lzw"
+
+	CompressionTypeGzip = "gzip"
+
+	CompressionTypeSnappy = "snappy"
+)
+
+// SnappyReadCloser embeds the snappy reader which implements the io.Reader
+// interface. The decompress procedure in this utility expectes an
+// io.ReadCloser. This type implements the io.Closer interface to retain the
+// generic way of decompression.
+type SnappyReadCloser struct {
+	*snappy.Reader
+}
+
+// Close is a noop method implemented only to satisfy the io.Closer interface
+func (s *SnappyReadCloser) Close() error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CompressionConfig is used to select a compression type to be performed by
+// Compress and Decompress utilities.
+// Supported types are:
+// * CompressionTypeLzw
+// * CompressionTypeGzip
+// * CompressionTypeSnappy
+//
+// When using CompressionTypeGzip, the compression levels can also be chosen:
+// * gzip.DefaultCompression
+// * gzip.BestSpeed
+// * gzip.BestCompression
+type CompressionConfig struct {
+	// Type of the compression algorithm to be used
+	Type string
+
+	// When using Gzip format, the compression level to employ
+	GzipCompressionLevel int
+}
+
+// Compress places the canary byte in a buffer and uses the same buffer to fill
+// in the compressed information of the given input. The configuration supports
+// two type of compression: LZW and Gzip. When using Gzip compression format,
+// if GzipCompressionLevel is not specified, the 'gzip.DefaultCompression' will
+// be assumed.
+func Compress(data []byte, config *CompressionConfig) ([]byte, error) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	var writer io.WriteCloser
+	var err error
+
+	if config == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("config is nil")
+	}
+
+	// Write the canary into the buffer and create writer to compress the
+	// input data based on the configured type
+	switch config.Type {
+	case CompressionTypeLzw:
+		buf.Write([]byte{CompressionCanaryLzw})
+
+		writer = lzw.NewWriter(&buf, lzw.LSB, 8)
+	case CompressionTypeGzip:
+		buf.Write([]byte{CompressionCanaryGzip})
+
+		switch {
+		case config.GzipCompressionLevel == gzip.BestCompression,
+			config.GzipCompressionLevel == gzip.BestSpeed,
+			config.GzipCompressionLevel == gzip.DefaultCompression:
+			// These are valid compression levels
+		default:
+			// If compression level is set to NoCompression or to
+			// any invalid value, fallback to Defaultcompression
+			config.GzipCompressionLevel = gzip.DefaultCompression
+		}
+		writer, err = gzip.NewWriterLevel(&buf, config.GzipCompressionLevel)
+	case CompressionTypeSnappy:
+		buf.Write([]byte{CompressionCanarySnappy})
+		writer = snappy.NewBufferedWriter(&buf)
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported compression type")
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create a compression writer; err: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if writer == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create a compression writer")
+	}
+
+	// Compress the input and place it in the same buffer containing the
+	// canary byte.
+	if _, err = writer.Write(data); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to compress input data; err: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Close the io.WriteCloser
+	if err = writer.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Return the compressed bytes with canary byte at the start
+	return buf.Bytes(), nil
+}
+
+// Decompress checks if the first byte in the input matches the canary byte.
+// If the first byte is a canary byte, then the input past the canary byte
+// will be decompressed using the method specified in the given configuration.
+// If the first byte isn't a canary byte, then the utility returns a boolean
+// value indicating that the input was not compressed.
+func Decompress(data []byte) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+	var err error
+	var reader io.ReadCloser
+	if data == nil || len(data) == 0 {
+		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("'data' being decompressed is empty")
+	}
+
+	switch {
+	// If the first byte matches the canary byte, remove the canary
+	// byte and try to decompress the data that is after the canary.
+	case data[0] == CompressionCanaryGzip:
+		if len(data) < 2 {
+			return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("invalid 'data' after the canary")
+		}
+		data = data[1:]
+		reader, err = gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data))
+	case data[0] == CompressionCanaryLzw:
+		if len(data) < 2 {
+			return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("invalid 'data' after the canary")
+		}
+		data = data[1:]
+		reader = lzw.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data), lzw.LSB, 8)
+
+	case data[0] == CompressionCanarySnappy:
+		if len(data) < 2 {
+			return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("invalid 'data' after the canary")
+		}
+		data = data[1:]
+		reader = &SnappyReadCloser{
+			Reader: snappy.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data)),
+		}
+	default:
+		// If the first byte doesn't match the canary byte, it means
+		// that the content was not compressed at all. Indicate the
+		// caller that the input was not compressed.
+		return nil, true, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("failed to create a compression reader; err: %v", err)
+	}
+	if reader == nil {
+		return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("failed to create a compression reader")
+	}
+
+	// Close the io.ReadCloser
+	defer reader.Close()
+
+	// Read all the compressed data into a buffer
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	if _, err = io.Copy(&buf, reader); err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+
+	return buf.Bytes(), false, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil/json.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package jsonutil
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"compress/gzip"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/compressutil"
+)
+
+// Encodes/Marshals the given object into JSON
+func EncodeJSON(in interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
+	if in == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("input for encoding is nil")
+	}
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	enc := json.NewEncoder(&buf)
+	if err := enc.Encode(in); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return buf.Bytes(), nil
+}
+
+// EncodeJSONAndCompress encodes the given input into JSON and compresses the
+// encoded value (using Gzip format BestCompression level, by default). A
+// canary byte is placed at the beginning of the returned bytes for the logic
+// in decompression method to identify compressed input.
+func EncodeJSONAndCompress(in interface{}, config *compressutil.CompressionConfig) ([]byte, error) {
+	if in == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("input for encoding is nil")
+	}
+
+	// First JSON encode the given input
+	encodedBytes, err := EncodeJSON(in)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if config == nil {
+		config = &compressutil.CompressionConfig{
+			Type:                 compressutil.CompressionTypeGzip,
+			GzipCompressionLevel: gzip.BestCompression,
+		}
+	}
+
+	return compressutil.Compress(encodedBytes, config)
+}
+
+// DecodeJSON tries to decompress the given data. The call to decompress, fails
+// if the content was not compressed in the first place, which is identified by
+// a canary byte before the compressed data. If the data is not compressed, it
+// is JSON decoded directly. Otherwise the decompressed data will be JSON
+// decoded.
+func DecodeJSON(data []byte, out interface{}) error {
+	if data == nil || len(data) == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("'data' being decoded is nil")
+	}
+	if out == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("output parameter 'out' is nil")
+	}
+
+	// Decompress the data if it was compressed in the first place
+	decompressedBytes, uncompressed, err := compressutil.Decompress(data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to decompress JSON: err: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !uncompressed && (decompressedBytes == nil || len(decompressedBytes) == 0) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("decompressed data being decoded is invalid")
+	}
+
+	// If the input supplied failed to contain the compression canary, it
+	// will be notified by the compression utility. Decode the decompressed
+	// input.
+	if !uncompressed {
+		data = decompressedBytes
+	}
+
+	return DecodeJSONFromReader(bytes.NewReader(data), out)
+}
+
+// Decodes/Unmarshals the given io.Reader pointing to a JSON, into a desired object
+func DecodeJSONFromReader(r io.Reader, out interface{}) error {
+	if r == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("'io.Reader' being decoded is nil")
+	}
+	if out == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("output parameter 'out' is nil")
+	}
+
+	dec := json.NewDecoder(r)
+
+	// While decoding JSON values, intepret the integer values as `json.Number`s instead of `float64`.
+	dec.UseNumber()
+
+	// Since 'out' is an interface representing a pointer, pass it to the decoder without an '&'
+	return dec.Decode(out)
+}

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/pgpkeys/encrypt_decrypt.go

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+package pgpkeys
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet"
+)
+
+// EncryptShares takes an ordered set of byte slices to encrypt and the
+// corresponding base64-encoded public keys to encrypt them with, encrypts each
+// byte slice with the corresponding public key.
+//
+// Note: There is no corresponding test function; this functionality is
+// thoroughly tested in the init and rekey command unit tests
+func EncryptShares(input [][]byte, pgpKeys []string) ([]string, [][]byte, error) {
+	if len(input) != len(pgpKeys) {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("Mismatch between number items to encrypt and number of PGP keys")
+	}
+	encryptedShares := make([][]byte, 0, len(pgpKeys))
+	entities, err := GetEntities(pgpKeys)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+	for i, entity := range entities {
+		ctBuf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+		pt, err := openpgp.Encrypt(ctBuf, []*openpgp.Entity{entity}, nil, nil, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("Error setting up encryption for PGP message: %s", err)
+		}
+		_, err = pt.Write(input[i])
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("Error encrypting PGP message: %s", err)
+		}
+		pt.Close()
+		encryptedShares = append(encryptedShares, ctBuf.Bytes())
+	}
+
+	fingerprints, err := GetFingerprints(nil, entities)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	return fingerprints, encryptedShares, nil
+}
+
+// GetFingerprints takes in a list of openpgp Entities and returns the
+// fingerprints. If entities is nil, it will instead parse both entities and
+// fingerprints from the pgpKeys string slice.
+func GetFingerprints(pgpKeys []string, entities []*openpgp.Entity) ([]string, error) {
+	if entities == nil {
+		var err error
+		entities, err = GetEntities(pgpKeys)
+
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	ret := make([]string, 0, len(entities))
+	for _, entity := range entities {
+		ret = append(ret, fmt.Sprintf("%x", entity.PrimaryKey.Fingerprint))
+	}
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+// GetEntities takes in a string array of base64-encoded PGP keys and returns
+// the openpgp Entities
+func GetEntities(pgpKeys []string) ([]*openpgp.Entity, error) {
+	ret := make([]*openpgp.Entity, 0, len(pgpKeys))
+	for _, keystring := range pgpKeys {
+		data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(keystring)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error decoding given PGP key: %s", err)
+		}
+		entity, err := openpgp.ReadEntity(packet.NewReader(bytes.NewBuffer(data)))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error parsing given PGP key: %s", err)
+		}
+		ret = append(ret, entity)
+	}
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+// DecryptBytes takes in base64-encoded encrypted bytes and the base64-encoded
+// private key and decrypts it. A bytes.Buffer is returned to allow the caller
+// to do useful thing with it (get it as a []byte, get it as a string, use it
+// as an io.Reader, etc), and also because this function doesn't know if what
+// comes out is binary data or a string, so let the caller decide.
+func DecryptBytes(encodedCrypt, privKey string) (*bytes.Buffer, error) {
+	privKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(privKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error decoding base64 private key: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	cryptBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encodedCrypt)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error decoding base64 crypted bytes: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	entity, err := openpgp.ReadEntity(packet.NewReader(bytes.NewBuffer(privKeyBytes)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error parsing private key: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	entityList := &openpgp.EntityList{entity}
+	md, err := openpgp.ReadMessage(bytes.NewBuffer(cryptBytes), entityList, nil, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("Error decrypting the messages: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	ptBuf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+	ptBuf.ReadFrom(md.UnverifiedBody)
+
+	return ptBuf, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/pgpkeys/flag.go

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+package pgpkeys
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp"
+)
+
+// PGPPubKeyFiles implements the flag.Value interface and allows
+// parsing and reading a list of pgp public key files
+type PubKeyFilesFlag []string
+
+func (p *PubKeyFilesFlag) String() string {
+	return fmt.Sprint(*p)
+}
+
+func (p *PubKeyFilesFlag) Set(value string) error {
+	if len(*p) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("pgp-keys can only be specified once")
+	}
+
+	splitValues := strings.Split(value, ",")
+
+	keybaseMap, err := FetchKeybasePubkeys(splitValues)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Now go through the actual flag, and substitute in resolved keybase
+	// entries where appropriate
+	for _, keyfile := range splitValues {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(keyfile, kbPrefix) {
+			key := keybaseMap[keyfile]
+			if key == "" {
+				return fmt.Errorf("key for keybase user %s was not found in the map", strings.TrimPrefix(keyfile, kbPrefix))
+			}
+			*p = append(*p, key)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		pgpStr, err := ReadPGPFile(keyfile)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		*p = append(*p, pgpStr)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func ReadPGPFile(path string) (string, error) {
+	if path[0] == '@' {
+		path = path[1:]
+	}
+	f, err := os.Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer f.Close()
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+	_, err = buf.ReadFrom(f)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	// First parse as an armored keyring file, if that doesn't work, treat it as a straight binary/b64 string
+	keyReader := bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes())
+	entityList, err := openpgp.ReadArmoredKeyRing(keyReader)
+	if err == nil {
+		if len(entityList) != 1 {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("more than one key found in file %s", path)
+		}
+		if entityList[0] == nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("primary key was nil for file %s", path)
+		}
+
+		serializedEntity := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+		err = entityList[0].Serialize(serializedEntity)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("error serializing entity for file %s: %s", path, err)
+		}
+
+		return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(serializedEntity.Bytes()), nil
+	}
+
+	_, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(buf.String())
+	if err == nil {
+		return buf.String(), nil
+	}
+	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(buf.Bytes()), nil
+
+}

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/pgpkeys/keybase.go

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+package pgpkeys
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/go-cleanhttp"
+	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp"
+)
+
+const (
+	kbPrefix = "keybase:"
+)
+
+// FetchKeybasePubkeys fetches public keys from Keybase given a set of
+// usernames, which are derived from correctly formatted input entries. It
+// doesn't use their client code due to both the API and the fact that it is
+// considered alpha and probably best not to rely on it.  The keys are returned
+// as base64-encoded strings.
+func FetchKeybasePubkeys(input []string) (map[string]string, error) {
+	client := cleanhttp.DefaultClient()
+	if client == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to create an http client")
+	}
+
+	if len(input) == 0 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	usernames := make([]string, 0, len(input))
+	for _, v := range input {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(v, kbPrefix) {
+			usernames = append(usernames, strings.TrimPrefix(v, kbPrefix))
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(usernames) == 0 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	ret := make(map[string]string, len(usernames))
+	url := fmt.Sprintf("https://keybase.io/_/api/1.0/user/lookup.json?usernames=%s&fields=public_keys", strings.Join(usernames, ","))
+	resp, err := client.Get(url)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	type publicKeys struct {
+		Primary struct {
+			Bundle string
+		}
+	}
+
+	type them struct {
+		publicKeys `json:"public_keys"`
+	}
+
+	type kbResp struct {
+		Status struct {
+			Name string
+		}
+		Them []them
+	}
+
+	out := &kbResp{
+		Them: []them{},
+	}
+
+	if err := jsonutil.DecodeJSONFromReader(resp.Body, out); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if out.Status.Name != "OK" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("got non-OK response: %s", out.Status.Name)
+	}
+
+	missingNames := make([]string, 0, len(usernames))
+	var keyReader *bytes.Reader
+	serializedEntity := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+	for i, themVal := range out.Them {
+		if themVal.Primary.Bundle == "" {
+			missingNames = append(missingNames, usernames[i])
+			continue
+		}
+		keyReader = bytes.NewReader([]byte(themVal.Primary.Bundle))
+		entityList, err := openpgp.ReadArmoredKeyRing(keyReader)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if len(entityList) != 1 {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("primary key could not be parsed for user %s", usernames[i])
+		}
+		if entityList[0] == nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("primary key was nil for user %s", usernames[i])
+		}
+
+		serializedEntity.Reset()
+		err = entityList[0].Serialize(serializedEntity)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("error serializing entity for user %s: %s", usernames[i], err)
+		}
+
+		// The API returns values in the same ordering requested, so this should properly match
+		ret[kbPrefix+usernames[i]] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(serializedEntity.Bytes())
+	}
+
+	if len(missingNames) > 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to fetch keys for user(s) %s from keybase", strings.Join(missingNames, ","))
+	}
+
+	return ret, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/pgpkeys/test_keys.go

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+package pgpkeys
+
+const (
+	TestPrivKey1 = `lQOYBFXbjPUBCADjNjCUQwfxKL+RR2GA6pv/1K+zJZ8UWIF9S0lk7cVIEfJiprzzwiMwBS5cD0da
+rGin1FHvIWOZxujA7oW0O2TUuatqI3aAYDTfRYurh6iKLC+VS+F7H+/mhfFvKmgr0Y5kDCF1j0T/
+063QZ84IRGucR/X43IY7kAtmxGXH0dYOCzOe5UBX1fTn3mXGe2ImCDWBH7gOViynXmb6XNvXkP0f
+sF5St9jhO7mbZU9EFkv9O3t3EaURfHopsCVDOlCkFCw5ArY+DUORHRzoMX0PnkyQb5OzibkChzpg
+8hQssKeVGpuskTdz5Q7PtdW71jXd4fFVzoNH8fYwRpziD2xNvi6HABEBAAEAB/wL+KX0mdeISEpX
+oDgt766Key1Kthe8nbEs5dOXIsP7OR7ZPcnE2hy6gftgVFnBGEZnWVN70vmJd6Z5y9d1mI+GecXj
+UL0EpI0EmohyYDJsHUnght/5ecRNFA+VeNmGPYNQGCeHJyZOiFunGGENpHU7BbubAht8delz37Mx
+JQgvMyR6AKvg8HKBoQeqV1uMWNJE/vKwV/z1dh1sjK/GFxu05Qaq0GTfAjVLuFOyJTS95yq6gblD
+jUdbHLp7tBeqIKo9voWCJF5mGOlq3973vVoWETy9b0YYPCE/M7fXmK9dJITHqkROLMW6TgcFeIw4
+yL5KOBCHk+QGPSvyQN7R7Fd5BADwuT1HZmvg7Y9GjarKXDjxdNemUiHtba2rUzfH6uNmKNQvwQek
+nma5palNUJ4/dz1aPB21FUBXJF5yWwXEdApl+lIDU0J5m4UD26rqEVRq9Kx3GsX+yfcwObkrSzW6
+kmnQSB5KI0fIuegMTM+Jxo3pB/mIRwDTMmk+vfzIGyW+7QQA8aFwFLMdKdfLgSGbl5Z6etmOAVQ2
+Oe2ebegU9z/ewi/Rdt2s9yQiAdGVM8+q15Saz8a+kyS/l1CjNPzr3VpYx1OdZ3gb7i2xoy9GdMYR
+ZpTq3TuST95kx/9DqA97JrP23G47U0vwF/cg8ixCYF8Fz5dG4DEsxgMwKqhGdW58wMMD/iytkfMk
+Vk6Z958Rpy7lhlC6L3zpO38767bSeZ8gRRi/NMFVOSGYepKFarnfxcTiNa+EoSVA6hUo1N64nALE
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+
+	TestPrivKey2 = `lQOYBFXbkJEBCADKb1ZvlT14XrJa2rTOe5924LQr2PTZlRv+651TXy33yEhelZ+V4sMrELN8fKEG
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+
+	TestPrivKey3 = `lQOXBFXbkiMBCACiHW4/VI2JkfvSEINddS7vE6wEu5e1leNQDaLUh6PrATQZS2a4Q6kRE6WlJumj
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+
+	TestPubKey1 = `mQENBFXbjPUBCADjNjCUQwfxKL+RR2GA6pv/1K+zJZ8UWIF9S0lk7cVIEfJiprzzwiMwBS5cD0da
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+S2V5IDGJATgEEwECACIFAlXbjPUCGy8GCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEOfLr44B
+HbeTo+sH/i7bapIgPnZsJ81hmxPj4W12uvunksGJiC7d4hIHsG7kmJRTJfjECi+AuTGeDwBy84TD
+cRaOB6e79fj65Fg6HgSahDUtKJbGxj/lWzmaBuTzlN3CEe8cMwIPqPT2kajJVdOyrvkyuFOdPFOE
+A7bdCH0MqgIdM2SdF8t40k/ATfuD2K1ZmumJ508I3gF39jgTnPzD4C8quswrMQ3bzfvKC3klXRlB
+C0yoArn+0QA3cf2B9T4zJ2qnvgotVbeK/b1OJRNj6Poeo+SsWNc/A5mw7lGScnDgL3yfwCm1gQXa
+QKfOt5x+7GqhWDw10q+bJpJlI10FfzAnhMF9etSqSeURBRW5AQ0EVduM9QEIAL53hJ5bZJ7oEDCn
+aY+SCzt9QsAfnFTAnZJQrvkvusJzrTQ088eUQmAjvxkfRqnv981fFwGnh2+I1Ktm698UAZS9Jt8y
+jak9wWUICKQO5QUt5k8cHwldQXNXVXFa+TpQWQR5yW1a9okjh5o/3d4cBt1yZPUJJyLKY43Wvptb
+6EuEsScO2DnRkh5wSMDQ7dTooddJCmaq3LTjOleRFQbu9ij386Do6jzK69mJU56TfdcydkxkWF5N
+ZLGnED3lq+hQNbe+8UI5tD2oP/3r5tXKgMy1R/XPvR/zbfwvx4FAKFOP01awLq4P3d/2xOkMu4Lu
+9p315E87DOleYwxk+FoTqXEAEQEAAYkCPgQYAQIACQUCVduM9QIbLgEpCRDny6+OAR23k8BdIAQZ
+AQIABgUCVduM9QAKCRAID0JGyHtSGmqYB/4m4rJbbWa7dBJ8VqRU7ZKnNRDR9CVhEGipBmpDGRYu
+lEimOPzLUX/ZXZmTZzgemeXLBaJJlWnopVUWuAsyjQuZAfdd8nHkGRHG0/DGum0l4sKTta3OPGHN
+C1z1dAcQ1RCr9bTD3PxjLBczdGqhzw71trkQRBRdtPiUchltPMIyjUHqVJ0xmg0hPqFic0fICsr0
+YwKoz3h9+QEcZHvsjSZjgydKvfLYcm+4DDMCCqcHuJrbXJKUWmJcXR0y/+HQONGrGJ5xWdO+6eJi
+oPn2jVMnXCm4EKc7fcLFrz/LKmJ8seXhxjM3EdFtylBGCrx3xdK0f+JDNQaC/rhUb5V2XuX6VwoH
+/AtY+XsKVYRfNIupLOUcf/srsm3IXT4SXWVomOc9hjGQiJ3rraIbADsc+6bCAr4XNZS7moViAAcI
+PXFv3m3WfUlnG/om78UjQqyVACRZqqAGmuPq+TSkRUCpt9h+A39LQWkojHqyob3cyLgy6z9Q557O
+9uK3lQozbw2gH9zC0RqnePl+rsWIUU/ga16fH6pWc1uJiEBt8UZGypQ/E56/343epmYAe0a87sHx
+8iDV+dNtDVKfPRENiLOOc19MmS+phmUyrbHqI91c0pmysYcJZCD3a502X1gpjFbPZcRtiTmGnUKd
+OIu60YPNE4+h7u2CfYyFPu3AlUaGNMBlvy6PEpU=`
+
+	TestPubKey2 = `mQENBFXbkJEBCADKb1ZvlT14XrJa2rTOe5924LQr2PTZlRv+651TXy33yEhelZ+V4sMrELN8fKEG
+Zy1kNixmbq3MCF/671k3LigHA7VrOaH9iiQgr6IIq2MeIkUYKZ27C992vQkYLjbYUG8+zl5h69S4
+0Ixm0yL0M54XOJ0gm+maEK1ZESKTUlDNkIS7l0jLZSYwfUeGXSEt6FWs8OgbyRTaHw4PDHrDEE9e
+Q67K6IZ3YMhPOL4fVk4Jwrp5R/RwiklT+lNozWEyFVwPFH4MeQMs9nMbt+fWlTzEA7tI4acI9yDk
+Cm1yN2R9rmY0UjODRiJw6z6sLV2T+Pf32n3MNSUOYczOjZa4VBwjABEBAAG0EFZhdWx0IFRlc3Qg
+S2V5IDKJATgEEwECACIFAlXbkJECGy8GCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEOuDLGfr
+XolXqz4H/28IuoRxGKoJ064YHjPkkpoddW6zdzzNfHipZnNfEUiTEls4qF1IB81M2xqfiXIFRIdO
+2kaLkRPFhO0hRxbtI6VuZYLgG3QCaXhxW6GyFa5zKABqhb5ojexdnAYRswaHV201ZCclj9rnJN1P
+Ag0Rz6MdX/w1euEWktQxWKo42oZKyx8oT9p6lrv5KRmGkdrg8K8ARmRILjmwuBAgJM0eXBZHNGWX
+elk4YmOgnAAcZA6ZAo1G+8Pg6pKKP61ETewuCg3/u7N0vDttB+ZXqF88W9jAYlvdgbTtajNF5IDY
+DjTzWfeCaIB18F9gOzXq15SwWeDDI+CU9Nmq358IzXlxk4e5AQ0EVduQkQEIAOjZV5tbpfIh5Qef
+pIp2dpGMVfpgPj4RNc15CyFnb8y6dhCrdybkY9GveXJe4F3GNYnSfB42cgxrfhizX3LakmZQ/SAg
++YO5KxfCIN7Q9LPNeTgPsZZT6h8lVuXUxOFKXfRaR3/tGF5xE3e5CoZRsHV/c92h3t1LdJNOnC5m
+UKIPO4zDxiw/C2T2q3rP1kmIMaOH724kEH5A+xcp1cBHyt0tdHtIWuQv6joTJzujqViRhlCwQYzQ
+SKpSBxwhBsorPvyinZI/ZXA4XXZc5RoMqV9rikedrb1rENO8JOuPu6tMS+znFu67skq2gFFZwCQW
+IjdHm+2ukE+PE580WAWudyMAEQEAAYkCPgQYAQIACQUCVduQkQIbLgEpCRDrgyxn616JV8BdIAQZ
+AQIABgUCVduQkQAKCRArYtevdF38xtzgB/4zVzozBpVOnagRkA7FDsHo36xX60Lik+ew0m28ueDD
+hnV3bXQsCvn/6wiCVWqLOTDeYCPlyTTpEMyk8zwdCICW6MgSkVHWcEDOrRqIrqm86rirjTGjJSgQ
+e3l4CqJvkn6jybShYoBk1OZZV6vVv9hPTXXv9E6dLKoEW5YZBrrF+VC0w1iOIvaAQ+QXph20eV4K
+BIrp/bhG6PdnigKxuBZ79cdqDnXIzT9UiIa6LYpR0rbeg+7BmuZTTPS8t+41hIiKS+UZFdKa67eY
+ENtyOmEMWOFCLLRJGxkleukchiMJ70rknloZXsvJIweXBzSZ6m7mJQBgaig/L/dXyjv6+j2pNB4H
+/1trYUtJjXQKHmqlgCmpCkHt3g7JoxWvglnDNmE6q3hIWuVIYQpnzZy1g05+X9Egwc1WVpBB02H7
+PkUZTfpaP/L6DLneMmSKPhZE3I+lPIPjwrxqh6xy5uQezcWkJTNKvPWF4FJzrVvx7XTPjfGvOB0U
+PEnjvtZTp5yOhTeZK7DgIEtb/Wcrqs+iRArQKboM930ORSZhwvGK3F9V/gMDpIrvge5vDFsTEYQd
+w/2epIewH0L/FUb/6jBRcVEpGo9Ayg+Jnhq14GOGcd1y9oMZ48kYVLVBTA9tQ+82WE8Bch7uFPj4
+MFOMVRn1dc3qdXlg3mimA+iK7tABQfG0RJ9YzWs=`
+
+	TestPubKey3 = `mQENBFXbkiMBCACiHW4/VI2JkfvSEINddS7vE6wEu5e1leNQDaLUh6PrATQZS2a4Q6kRE6WlJumj
+6wCeN753Cm93UGQl2Bi3USIEeArIZnPTcocrckOVXxtoLBNKXgqKvEsDXgfw8A+doSfXoDm/3Js4
+Wy3WsYKNR9LaPuJZHnpjsFAJhvRVyhH4UFD+1RTSSefq1mozPfDdMoZeZNEpfhwt3DuTJs7RqcTH
+CgR2CqhEHnOOE5jJUljHKYLCglE2+8dth1bZlQi4xly/VHZzP3Bn7wKeolK/ROP6VZz/e0xq/BKy
+resmxvlBWZ1zWwqGIrV9b0uwYvGrh2hOd5C5+5oGaA2MGcjxwaLBABEBAAG0EFZhdWx0IFRlc3Qg
+S2V5IDOJATgEEwECACIFAlXbkiMCGy8GCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEPR5S1b8
+LcbdWjEH/2mhqC9a0Vk1IzOgxEoVxYVqVdvaxI0nTZOTfmcFYn4HQlQ+SLEoyNWe5jtkhx4k5uHi
+pxwKHzOv02YM14NWC6bvKw2CQETLDPG4Cv8YMUmpho5tnMDdttIzp8HjyJRtHazU1uTes2/yuqh6
+LHCejVJI0uST3RibquwdG3QjPP8Umxu+YC9+FOW2Kit/AQ8JluFDJdq3/wSX8VfYZrGdgmreE7KY
+MolhCkzGSPj7oFygw8LqKoJvt9tCuBKhZMBuMv1sB5CoJIWdPoqOZc4U7L1XdqfKvFZR/RhuXgN1
+lkI9MqrnLDpikL3Lk+ctLxWOjUCW8roqKoHZYBF7XPqdAfm5AQ0EVduSIwEIAOPcjd4QgbLlqIk3
+s6BPRRyVzglTgUdf+I0rUDybaDJfJobZd8U6e4hkPvRoQ8tJefnz/qnD/63watAbJYcVTme40I3V
+KDOmVGcyaDxiKP1disKqcEJd7XQiI72oAiXmEH0y+5UwnOMks/lwaAGDMGVRjHEXI6fiRPFsfTr8
+7qvMJ3pW1OiOXVSezuBNTlmyJC7srQ1/nwxL337ev6D1zQZd3JuhcxLkHrUELLNwzhvcZ70vg645
+jAmz8EdmvvoqEPPoHqKgP5AeHACOsTm953KHhgx3NYuGPU/RoIvugKt4Iq5nw7TWFTjPHGVF3GTQ
+ry5CZ/AzXiL57hVEhDvmuT8AEQEAAYkCPgQYAQIACQUCVduSIwIbLgEpCRD0eUtW/C3G3cBdIAQZ
+AQIABgUCVduSIwAKCRAFI/9Nx3K5IPOFCACsZ/Z4s2LcEoA51TW+T5w+YevlIuq+332JtqNIpuGI
+WpGxUxyDyPT0YQWr0SObBORYNr7RP8d/I2rbaFKyaDaKvRofYr+TwXy92phBo7pdEUamBpfrm/sr
++2BgAB2x3HWXp+IMdeVVhqQe8t4cnFm3c1fIdxADyiJuV5ge2Ml5gK5yNwqCQPh7U2RqC+lmVlMJ
+GvWInIRn2mf6A7phDYNZfOz6dkar4yyh5r9rRgrZw88r/yIlrq/c6KRUIgnPMrFYEauggOceZ827
++jKkbKWFEuHtiCxW7kRAN25UfnGsPaF+NSGM2q1vCG4HiFydx6lMoXM0Shf8+ZwyrV/5BzAqpWwI
+AJ37tEwC58Fboynly6OGOzgPS0xKnzkXMOtquTo0qEH/1bEUsBknn795BmZOTf4oBC5blN6qRv7c
+GSP00i+sxql1NhTjJcjJtfOPUzgfW+Af/+HR648z4c7c6MCjDFKnk8ZkoGLRU7ISjenkNFzvu2bj
+lxJkil0uJDlLPbbX80ojzV1GS9g+ZxVPR+68N1QLl2FU6zsfg34upmLLHG8VG4vExzgyNkOwfTYv
+dgyRNTjnuPue6H12fZZ9uCNeG52v7lR3eoQcCxBOniwgipB8UJ52RWXblwxzCtGtDi/EWB3zLTUn
+puKcgucA0LotbihSMxhDylaARfVO1QV6csabM/g=`
+
+	TestAAPubKey1 = `-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
+Version: GnuPG v1
+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+=NUTS
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----`
+)

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Copyright (c) 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
+met:
+
+   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
+in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+distribution.
+   * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
+contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
+this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/PATENTS

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Additional IP Rights Grant (Patents)
+
+"This implementation" means the copyrightable works distributed by
+Google as part of the Go project.
+
+Google hereby grants to You a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive,
+no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable (except as stated in this section)
+patent license to make, have made, use, offer to sell, sell, import,
+transfer and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of this
+implementation of Go, where such license applies only to those patent
+claims, both currently owned or controlled by Google and acquired in
+the future, licensable by Google that are necessarily infringed by this
+implementation of Go.  This grant does not include claims that would be
+infringed only as a consequence of further modification of this
+implementation.  If you or your agent or exclusive licensee institute or
+order or agree to the institution of patent litigation against any
+entity (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging
+that this implementation of Go or any code incorporated within this
+implementation of Go constitutes direct or contributory patent
+infringement, or inducement of patent infringement, then any patent
+rights granted to you under this License for this implementation of Go
+shall terminate as of the date such litigation is filed.

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/brainpool/brainpool.go

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+// Package brainpool implements Brainpool elliptic curves.
+// Implementation of rcurves is from github.com/ebfe/brainpool
+// Note that these curves are implemented with naive, non-constant time operations
+// and are likely not suitable for enviroments where timing attacks are a concern.
+package brainpool
+
+import (
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"math/big"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+var (
+	once                   sync.Once
+	p256t1, p384t1, p512t1 *elliptic.CurveParams
+	p256r1, p384r1, p512r1 *rcurve
+)
+
+func initAll() {
+	initP256t1()
+	initP384t1()
+	initP512t1()
+	initP256r1()
+	initP384r1()
+	initP512r1()
+}
+
+func initP256t1() {
+	p256t1 = &elliptic.CurveParams{Name: "brainpoolP256t1"}
+	p256t1.P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5377", 16)
+	p256t1.N, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7", 16)
+	p256t1.B, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("662C61C430D84EA4FE66A7733D0B76B7BF93EBC4AF2F49256AE58101FEE92B04", 16)
+	p256t1.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("A3E8EB3CC1CFE7B7732213B23A656149AFA142C47AAFBC2B79A191562E1305F4", 16)
+	p256t1.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("2D996C823439C56D7F7B22E14644417E69BCB6DE39D027001DABE8F35B25C9BE", 16)
+	p256t1.BitSize = 256
+}
+
+func initP256r1() {
+	twisted := p256t1
+	params := &elliptic.CurveParams{
+		Name:    "brainpoolP256r1",
+		P:       twisted.P,
+		N:       twisted.N,
+		BitSize: twisted.BitSize,
+	}
+	params.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("8BD2AEB9CB7E57CB2C4B482FFC81B7AFB9DE27E1E3BD23C23A4453BD9ACE3262", 16)
+	params.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("547EF835C3DAC4FD97F8461A14611DC9C27745132DED8E545C1D54C72F046997", 16)
+	z, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("3E2D4BD9597B58639AE7AA669CAB9837CF5CF20A2C852D10F655668DFC150EF0", 16)
+	p256r1 = newrcurve(twisted, params, z)
+}
+
+func initP384t1() {
+	p384t1 = &elliptic.CurveParams{Name: "brainpoolP384t1"}
+	p384t1.P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B412B1DA197FB71123ACD3A729901D1A71874700133107EC53", 16)
+	p384t1.N, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425A7CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565", 16)
+	p384t1.B, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("7F519EADA7BDA81BD826DBA647910F8C4B9346ED8CCDC64E4B1ABD11756DCE1D2074AA263B88805CED70355A33B471EE", 16)
+	p384t1.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("18DE98B02DB9A306F2AFCD7235F72A819B80AB12EBD653172476FECD462AABFFC4FF191B946A5F54D8D0AA2F418808CC", 16)
+	p384t1.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("25AB056962D30651A114AFD2755AD336747F93475B7A1FCA3B88F2B6A208CCFE469408584DC2B2912675BF5B9E582928", 16)
+	p384t1.BitSize = 384
+}
+
+func initP384r1() {
+	twisted := p384t1
+	params := &elliptic.CurveParams{
+		Name:    "brainpoolP384r1",
+		P:       twisted.P,
+		N:       twisted.N,
+		BitSize: twisted.BitSize,
+	}
+	params.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("1D1C64F068CF45FFA2A63A81B7C13F6B8847A3E77EF14FE3DB7FCAFE0CBD10E8E826E03436D646AAEF87B2E247D4AF1E", 16)
+	params.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("8ABE1D7520F9C2A45CB1EB8E95CFD55262B70B29FEEC5864E19C054FF99129280E4646217791811142820341263C5315", 16)
+	z, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("41DFE8DD399331F7166A66076734A89CD0D2BCDB7D068E44E1F378F41ECBAE97D2D63DBC87BCCDDCCC5DA39E8589291C", 16)
+	p384r1 = newrcurve(twisted, params, z)
+}
+
+func initP512t1() {
+	p512t1 = &elliptic.CurveParams{Name: "brainpoolP512t1"}
+	p512t1.P, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA703308717D4D9B009BC66842AECDA12AE6A380E62881FF2F2D82C68528AA6056583A48F3", 16)
+	p512t1.N, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA70330870553E5C414CA92619418661197FAC10471DB1D381085DDADDB58796829CA90069", 16)
+	p512t1.B, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("7CBBBCF9441CFAB76E1890E46884EAE321F70C0BCB4981527897504BEC3E36A62BCDFA2304976540F6450085F2DAE145C22553B465763689180EA2571867423E", 16)
+	p512t1.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("640ECE5C12788717B9C1BA06CBC2A6FEBA85842458C56DDE9DB1758D39C0313D82BA51735CDB3EA499AA77A7D6943A64F7A3F25FE26F06B51BAA2696FA9035DA", 16)
+	p512t1.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("5B534BD595F5AF0FA2C892376C84ACE1BB4E3019B71634C01131159CAE03CEE9D9932184BEEF216BD71DF2DADF86A627306ECFF96DBB8BACE198B61E00F8B332", 16)
+	p512t1.BitSize = 512
+}
+
+func initP512r1() {
+	twisted := p512t1
+	params := &elliptic.CurveParams{
+		Name:    "brainpoolP512r1",
+		P:       twisted.P,
+		N:       twisted.N,
+		BitSize: twisted.BitSize,
+	}
+	params.Gx, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("81AEE4BDD82ED9645A21322E9C4C6A9385ED9F70B5D916C1B43B62EEF4D0098EFF3B1F78E2D0D48D50D1687B93B97D5F7C6D5047406A5E688B352209BCB9F822", 16)
+	params.Gy, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("7DDE385D566332ECC0EABFA9CF7822FDF209F70024A57B1AA000C55B881F8111B2DCDE494A5F485E5BCA4BD88A2763AED1CA2B2FA8F0540678CD1E0F3AD80892", 16)
+	z, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("12EE58E6764838B69782136F0F2D3BA06E27695716054092E60A80BEDB212B64E585D90BCE13761F85C3F1D2A64E3BE8FEA2220F01EBA5EEB0F35DBD29D922AB", 16)
+	p512r1 = newrcurve(twisted, params, z)
+}
+
+// P256t1 returns a Curve which implements Brainpool P256t1 (see RFC 5639, section 3.4)
+func P256t1() elliptic.Curve {
+	once.Do(initAll)
+	return p256t1
+}
+
+// P256r1 returns a Curve which implements Brainpool P256r1 (see RFC 5639, section 3.4)
+func P256r1() elliptic.Curve {
+	once.Do(initAll)
+	return p256r1
+}
+
+// P384t1 returns a Curve which implements Brainpool P384t1 (see RFC 5639, section 3.6)
+func P384t1() elliptic.Curve {
+	once.Do(initAll)
+	return p384t1
+}
+
+// P384r1 returns a Curve which implements Brainpool P384r1 (see RFC 5639, section 3.6)
+func P384r1() elliptic.Curve {
+	once.Do(initAll)
+	return p384r1
+}
+
+// P512t1 returns a Curve which implements Brainpool P512t1 (see RFC 5639, section 3.7)
+func P512t1() elliptic.Curve {
+	once.Do(initAll)
+	return p512t1
+}
+
+// P512r1 returns a Curve which implements Brainpool P512r1 (see RFC 5639, section 3.7)
+func P512r1() elliptic.Curve {
+	once.Do(initAll)
+	return p512r1
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/brainpool/rcurve.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package brainpool
+
+import (
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+var _ elliptic.Curve = (*rcurve)(nil)
+
+type rcurve struct {
+	twisted elliptic.Curve
+	params  *elliptic.CurveParams
+	z       *big.Int
+	zinv    *big.Int
+	z2      *big.Int
+	z3      *big.Int
+	zinv2   *big.Int
+	zinv3   *big.Int
+}
+
+var (
+	two   = big.NewInt(2)
+	three = big.NewInt(3)
+)
+
+func newrcurve(twisted elliptic.Curve, params *elliptic.CurveParams, z *big.Int) *rcurve {
+	zinv := new(big.Int).ModInverse(z, params.P)
+	return &rcurve{
+		twisted: twisted,
+		params:  params,
+		z:       z,
+		zinv:    zinv,
+		z2:      new(big.Int).Exp(z, two, params.P),
+		z3:      new(big.Int).Exp(z, three, params.P),
+		zinv2:   new(big.Int).Exp(zinv, two, params.P),
+		zinv3:   new(big.Int).Exp(zinv, three, params.P),
+	}
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) toTwisted(x, y *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) {
+	var tx, ty big.Int
+	tx.Mul(x, curve.z2)
+	tx.Mod(&tx, curve.params.P)
+	ty.Mul(y, curve.z3)
+	ty.Mod(&ty, curve.params.P)
+	return &tx, &ty
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) fromTwisted(tx, ty *big.Int) (*big.Int, *big.Int) {
+	var x, y big.Int
+	x.Mul(tx, curve.zinv2)
+	x.Mod(&x, curve.params.P)
+	y.Mul(ty, curve.zinv3)
+	y.Mod(&y, curve.params.P)
+	return &x, &y
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) Params() *elliptic.CurveParams {
+	return curve.params
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) IsOnCurve(x, y *big.Int) bool {
+	return curve.twisted.IsOnCurve(curve.toTwisted(x, y))
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) Add(x1, y1, x2, y2 *big.Int) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	tx1, ty1 := curve.toTwisted(x1, y1)
+	tx2, ty2 := curve.toTwisted(x2, y2)
+	return curve.fromTwisted(curve.twisted.Add(tx1, ty1, tx2, ty2))
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) Double(x1, y1 *big.Int) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	return curve.fromTwisted(curve.twisted.Double(curve.toTwisted(x1, y1)))
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) ScalarMult(x1, y1 *big.Int, scalar []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	tx1, ty1 := curve.toTwisted(x1, y1)
+	return curve.fromTwisted(curve.twisted.ScalarMult(tx1, ty1, scalar))
+}
+
+func (curve *rcurve) ScalarBaseMult(scalar []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	return curve.fromTwisted(curve.twisted.ScalarBaseMult(scalar))
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/cast5/cast5.go

@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package cast5 implements CAST5, as defined in RFC 2144. CAST5 is a common
+// OpenPGP cipher.
+package cast5
+
+import "errors"
+
+const BlockSize = 8
+const KeySize = 16
+
+type Cipher struct {
+	masking [16]uint32
+	rotate  [16]uint8
+}
+
+func NewCipher(key []byte) (c *Cipher, err error) {
+	if len(key) != KeySize {
+		return nil, errors.New("CAST5: keys must be 16 bytes")
+	}
+
+	c = new(Cipher)
+	c.keySchedule(key)
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Cipher) BlockSize() int {
+	return BlockSize
+}
+
+func (c *Cipher) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	l := uint32(src[0])<<24 | uint32(src[1])<<16 | uint32(src[2])<<8 | uint32(src[3])
+	r := uint32(src[4])<<24 | uint32(src[5])<<16 | uint32(src[6])<<8 | uint32(src[7])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[0], c.rotate[0])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[1], c.rotate[1])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[2], c.rotate[2])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[3], c.rotate[3])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[4], c.rotate[4])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[5], c.rotate[5])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[6], c.rotate[6])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[7], c.rotate[7])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[8], c.rotate[8])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[9], c.rotate[9])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[10], c.rotate[10])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[11], c.rotate[11])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[12], c.rotate[12])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[13], c.rotate[13])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[14], c.rotate[14])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[15], c.rotate[15])
+
+	dst[0] = uint8(r >> 24)
+	dst[1] = uint8(r >> 16)
+	dst[2] = uint8(r >> 8)
+	dst[3] = uint8(r)
+	dst[4] = uint8(l >> 24)
+	dst[5] = uint8(l >> 16)
+	dst[6] = uint8(l >> 8)
+	dst[7] = uint8(l)
+}
+
+func (c *Cipher) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) {
+	l := uint32(src[0])<<24 | uint32(src[1])<<16 | uint32(src[2])<<8 | uint32(src[3])
+	r := uint32(src[4])<<24 | uint32(src[5])<<16 | uint32(src[6])<<8 | uint32(src[7])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[15], c.rotate[15])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[14], c.rotate[14])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[13], c.rotate[13])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[12], c.rotate[12])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[11], c.rotate[11])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[10], c.rotate[10])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[9], c.rotate[9])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[8], c.rotate[8])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[7], c.rotate[7])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[6], c.rotate[6])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[5], c.rotate[5])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[4], c.rotate[4])
+
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[3], c.rotate[3])
+	l, r = r, l^f3(r, c.masking[2], c.rotate[2])
+	l, r = r, l^f2(r, c.masking[1], c.rotate[1])
+	l, r = r, l^f1(r, c.masking[0], c.rotate[0])
+
+	dst[0] = uint8(r >> 24)
+	dst[1] = uint8(r >> 16)
+	dst[2] = uint8(r >> 8)
+	dst[3] = uint8(r)
+	dst[4] = uint8(l >> 24)
+	dst[5] = uint8(l >> 16)
+	dst[6] = uint8(l >> 8)
+	dst[7] = uint8(l)
+}
+
+type keyScheduleA [4][7]uint8
+type keyScheduleB [4][5]uint8
+
+// keyScheduleRound contains the magic values for a round of the key schedule.
+// The keyScheduleA deals with the lines like:
+//   z0z1z2z3 = x0x1x2x3 ^ S5[xD] ^ S6[xF] ^ S7[xC] ^ S8[xE] ^ S7[x8]
+// Conceptually, both x and z are in the same array, x first. The first
+// element describes which word of this array gets written to and the
+// second, which word gets read. So, for the line above, it's "4, 0", because
+// it's writing to the first word of z, which, being after x, is word 4, and
+// reading from the first word of x: word 0.
+//
+// Next are the indexes into the S-boxes. Now the array is treated as bytes. So
+// "xD" is 0xd. The first byte of z is written as "16 + 0", just to be clear
+// that it's z that we're indexing.
+//
+// keyScheduleB deals with lines like:
+//   K1 = S5[z8] ^ S6[z9] ^ S7[z7] ^ S8[z6] ^ S5[z2]
+// "K1" is ignored because key words are always written in order. So the five
+// elements are the S-box indexes. They use the same form as in keyScheduleA,
+// above.
+
+type keyScheduleRound struct{}
+type keySchedule []keyScheduleRound
+
+var schedule = []struct {
+	a keyScheduleA
+	b keyScheduleB
+}{
+	{
+		keyScheduleA{
+			{4, 0, 0xd, 0xf, 0xc, 0xe, 0x8},
+			{5, 2, 16 + 0, 16 + 2, 16 + 1, 16 + 3, 0xa},
+			{6, 3, 16 + 7, 16 + 6, 16 + 5, 16 + 4, 9},
+			{7, 1, 16 + 0xa, 16 + 9, 16 + 0xb, 16 + 8, 0xb},
+		},
+		keyScheduleB{
+			{16 + 8, 16 + 9, 16 + 7, 16 + 6, 16 + 2},
+			{16 + 0xa, 16 + 0xb, 16 + 5, 16 + 4, 16 + 6},
+			{16 + 0xc, 16 + 0xd, 16 + 3, 16 + 2, 16 + 9},
+			{16 + 0xe, 16 + 0xf, 16 + 1, 16 + 0, 16 + 0xc},
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		keyScheduleA{
+			{0, 6, 16 + 5, 16 + 7, 16 + 4, 16 + 6, 16 + 0},
+			{1, 4, 0, 2, 1, 3, 16 + 2},
+			{2, 5, 7, 6, 5, 4, 16 + 1},
+			{3, 7, 0xa, 9, 0xb, 8, 16 + 3},
+		},
+		keyScheduleB{
+			{3, 2, 0xc, 0xd, 8},
+			{1, 0, 0xe, 0xf, 0xd},
+			{7, 6, 8, 9, 3},
+			{5, 4, 0xa, 0xb, 7},
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		keyScheduleA{
+			{4, 0, 0xd, 0xf, 0xc, 0xe, 8},
+			{5, 2, 16 + 0, 16 + 2, 16 + 1, 16 + 3, 0xa},
+			{6, 3, 16 + 7, 16 + 6, 16 + 5, 16 + 4, 9},
+			{7, 1, 16 + 0xa, 16 + 9, 16 + 0xb, 16 + 8, 0xb},
+		},
+		keyScheduleB{
+			{16 + 3, 16 + 2, 16 + 0xc, 16 + 0xd, 16 + 9},
+			{16 + 1, 16 + 0, 16 + 0xe, 16 + 0xf, 16 + 0xc},
+			{16 + 7, 16 + 6, 16 + 8, 16 + 9, 16 + 2},
+			{16 + 5, 16 + 4, 16 + 0xa, 16 + 0xb, 16 + 6},
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		keyScheduleA{
+			{0, 6, 16 + 5, 16 + 7, 16 + 4, 16 + 6, 16 + 0},
+			{1, 4, 0, 2, 1, 3, 16 + 2},
+			{2, 5, 7, 6, 5, 4, 16 + 1},
+			{3, 7, 0xa, 9, 0xb, 8, 16 + 3},
+		},
+		keyScheduleB{
+			{8, 9, 7, 6, 3},
+			{0xa, 0xb, 5, 4, 7},
+			{0xc, 0xd, 3, 2, 8},
+			{0xe, 0xf, 1, 0, 0xd},
+		},
+	},
+}
+
+func (c *Cipher) keySchedule(in []byte) {
+	var t [8]uint32
+	var k [32]uint32
+
+	for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
+		j := i * 4
+		t[i] = uint32(in[j])<<24 | uint32(in[j+1])<<16 | uint32(in[j+2])<<8 | uint32(in[j+3])
+	}
+
+	x := []byte{6, 7, 4, 5}
+	ki := 0
+
+	for half := 0; half < 2; half++ {
+		for _, round := range schedule {
+			for j := 0; j < 4; j++ {
+				var a [7]uint8
+				copy(a[:], round.a[j][:])
+				w := t[a[1]]
+				w ^= sBox[4][(t[a[2]>>2]>>(24-8*(a[2]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[5][(t[a[3]>>2]>>(24-8*(a[3]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[6][(t[a[4]>>2]>>(24-8*(a[4]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[7][(t[a[5]>>2]>>(24-8*(a[5]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[x[j]][(t[a[6]>>2]>>(24-8*(a[6]&3)))&0xff]
+				t[a[0]] = w
+			}
+
+			for j := 0; j < 4; j++ {
+				var b [5]uint8
+				copy(b[:], round.b[j][:])
+				w := sBox[4][(t[b[0]>>2]>>(24-8*(b[0]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[5][(t[b[1]>>2]>>(24-8*(b[1]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[6][(t[b[2]>>2]>>(24-8*(b[2]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[7][(t[b[3]>>2]>>(24-8*(b[3]&3)))&0xff]
+				w ^= sBox[4+j][(t[b[4]>>2]>>(24-8*(b[4]&3)))&0xff]
+				k[ki] = w
+				ki++
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < 16; i++ {
+		c.masking[i] = k[i]
+		c.rotate[i] = uint8(k[16+i] & 0x1f)
+	}
+}
+
+// These are the three 'f' functions. See RFC 2144, section 2.2.
+func f1(d, m uint32, r uint8) uint32 {
+	t := m + d
+	I := (t << r) | (t >> (32 - r))
+	return ((sBox[0][I>>24] ^ sBox[1][(I>>16)&0xff]) - sBox[2][(I>>8)&0xff]) + sBox[3][I&0xff]
+}
+
+func f2(d, m uint32, r uint8) uint32 {
+	t := m ^ d
+	I := (t << r) | (t >> (32 - r))
+	return ((sBox[0][I>>24] - sBox[1][(I>>16)&0xff]) + sBox[2][(I>>8)&0xff]) ^ sBox[3][I&0xff]
+}
+
+func f3(d, m uint32, r uint8) uint32 {
+	t := m - d
+	I := (t << r) | (t >> (32 - r))
+	return ((sBox[0][I>>24] + sBox[1][(I>>16)&0xff]) ^ sBox[2][(I>>8)&0xff]) - sBox[3][I&0xff]
+}
+
+var sBox = [8][256]uint32{
+	{
+		0x30fb40d4, 0x9fa0ff0b, 0x6beccd2f, 0x3f258c7a, 0x1e213f2f, 0x9c004dd3, 0x6003e540, 0xcf9fc949,
+		0xbfd4af27, 0x88bbbdb5, 0xe2034090, 0x98d09675, 0x6e63a0e0, 0x15c361d2, 0xc2e7661d, 0x22d4ff8e,
+		0x28683b6f, 0xc07fd059, 0xff2379c8, 0x775f50e2, 0x43c340d3, 0xdf2f8656, 0x887ca41a, 0xa2d2bd2d,
+		0xa1c9e0d6, 0x346c4819, 0x61b76d87, 0x22540f2f, 0x2abe32e1, 0xaa54166b, 0x22568e3a, 0xa2d341d0,
+		0x66db40c8, 0xa784392f, 0x004dff2f, 0x2db9d2de, 0x97943fac, 0x4a97c1d8, 0x527644b7, 0xb5f437a7,
+		0xb82cbaef, 0xd751d159, 0x6ff7f0ed, 0x5a097a1f, 0x827b68d0, 0x90ecf52e, 0x22b0c054, 0xbc8e5935,
+		0x4b6d2f7f, 0x50bb64a2, 0xd2664910, 0xbee5812d, 0xb7332290, 0xe93b159f, 0xb48ee411, 0x4bff345d,
+		0xfd45c240, 0xad31973f, 0xc4f6d02e, 0x55fc8165, 0xd5b1caad, 0xa1ac2dae, 0xa2d4b76d, 0xc19b0c50,
+		0x882240f2, 0x0c6e4f38, 0xa4e4bfd7, 0x4f5ba272, 0x564c1d2f, 0xc59c5319, 0xb949e354, 0xb04669fe,
+		0xb1b6ab8a, 0xc71358dd, 0x6385c545, 0x110f935d, 0x57538ad5, 0x6a390493, 0xe63d37e0, 0x2a54f6b3,
+		0x3a787d5f, 0x6276a0b5, 0x19a6fcdf, 0x7a42206a, 0x29f9d4d5, 0xf61b1891, 0xbb72275e, 0xaa508167,
+		0x38901091, 0xc6b505eb, 0x84c7cb8c, 0x2ad75a0f, 0x874a1427, 0xa2d1936b, 0x2ad286af, 0xaa56d291,
+		0xd7894360, 0x425c750d, 0x93b39e26, 0x187184c9, 0x6c00b32d, 0x73e2bb14, 0xa0bebc3c, 0x54623779,
+		0x64459eab, 0x3f328b82, 0x7718cf82, 0x59a2cea6, 0x04ee002e, 0x89fe78e6, 0x3fab0950, 0x325ff6c2,
+		0x81383f05, 0x6963c5c8, 0x76cb5ad6, 0xd49974c9, 0xca180dcf, 0x380782d5, 0xc7fa5cf6, 0x8ac31511,
+		0x35e79e13, 0x47da91d0, 0xf40f9086, 0xa7e2419e, 0x31366241, 0x051ef495, 0xaa573b04, 0x4a805d8d,
+		0x548300d0, 0x00322a3c, 0xbf64cddf, 0xba57a68e, 0x75c6372b, 0x50afd341, 0xa7c13275, 0x915a0bf5,
+		0x6b54bfab, 0x2b0b1426, 0xab4cc9d7, 0x449ccd82, 0xf7fbf265, 0xab85c5f3, 0x1b55db94, 0xaad4e324,
+		0xcfa4bd3f, 0x2deaa3e2, 0x9e204d02, 0xc8bd25ac, 0xeadf55b3, 0xd5bd9e98, 0xe31231b2, 0x2ad5ad6c,
+		0x954329de, 0xadbe4528, 0xd8710f69, 0xaa51c90f, 0xaa786bf6, 0x22513f1e, 0xaa51a79b, 0x2ad344cc,
+		0x7b5a41f0, 0xd37cfbad, 0x1b069505, 0x41ece491, 0xb4c332e6, 0x032268d4, 0xc9600acc, 0xce387e6d,
+		0xbf6bb16c, 0x6a70fb78, 0x0d03d9c9, 0xd4df39de, 0xe01063da, 0x4736f464, 0x5ad328d8, 0xb347cc96,
+		0x75bb0fc3, 0x98511bfb, 0x4ffbcc35, 0xb58bcf6a, 0xe11f0abc, 0xbfc5fe4a, 0xa70aec10, 0xac39570a,
+		0x3f04442f, 0x6188b153, 0xe0397a2e, 0x5727cb79, 0x9ceb418f, 0x1cacd68d, 0x2ad37c96, 0x0175cb9d,
+		0xc69dff09, 0xc75b65f0, 0xd9db40d8, 0xec0e7779, 0x4744ead4, 0xb11c3274, 0xdd24cb9e, 0x7e1c54bd,
+		0xf01144f9, 0xd2240eb1, 0x9675b3fd, 0xa3ac3755, 0xd47c27af, 0x51c85f4d, 0x56907596, 0xa5bb15e6,
+		0x580304f0, 0xca042cf1, 0x011a37ea, 0x8dbfaadb, 0x35ba3e4a, 0x3526ffa0, 0xc37b4d09, 0xbc306ed9,
+		0x98a52666, 0x5648f725, 0xff5e569d, 0x0ced63d0, 0x7c63b2cf, 0x700b45e1, 0xd5ea50f1, 0x85a92872,
+		0xaf1fbda7, 0xd4234870, 0xa7870bf3, 0x2d3b4d79, 0x42e04198, 0x0cd0ede7, 0x26470db8, 0xf881814c,
+		0x474d6ad7, 0x7c0c5e5c, 0xd1231959, 0x381b7298, 0xf5d2f4db, 0xab838653, 0x6e2f1e23, 0x83719c9e,
+		0xbd91e046, 0x9a56456e, 0xdc39200c, 0x20c8c571, 0x962bda1c, 0xe1e696ff, 0xb141ab08, 0x7cca89b9,
+		0x1a69e783, 0x02cc4843, 0xa2f7c579, 0x429ef47d, 0x427b169c, 0x5ac9f049, 0xdd8f0f00, 0x5c8165bf,
+	},
+	{
+		0x1f201094, 0xef0ba75b, 0x69e3cf7e, 0x393f4380, 0xfe61cf7a, 0xeec5207a, 0x55889c94, 0x72fc0651,
+		0xada7ef79, 0x4e1d7235, 0xd55a63ce, 0xde0436ba, 0x99c430ef, 0x5f0c0794, 0x18dcdb7d, 0xa1d6eff3,
+		0xa0b52f7b, 0x59e83605, 0xee15b094, 0xe9ffd909, 0xdc440086, 0xef944459, 0xba83ccb3, 0xe0c3cdfb,
+		0xd1da4181, 0x3b092ab1, 0xf997f1c1, 0xa5e6cf7b, 0x01420ddb, 0xe4e7ef5b, 0x25a1ff41, 0xe180f806,
+		0x1fc41080, 0x179bee7a, 0xd37ac6a9, 0xfe5830a4, 0x98de8b7f, 0x77e83f4e, 0x79929269, 0x24fa9f7b,
+		0xe113c85b, 0xacc40083, 0xd7503525, 0xf7ea615f, 0x62143154, 0x0d554b63, 0x5d681121, 0xc866c359,
+		0x3d63cf73, 0xcee234c0, 0xd4d87e87, 0x5c672b21, 0x071f6181, 0x39f7627f, 0x361e3084, 0xe4eb573b,
+		0x602f64a4, 0xd63acd9c, 0x1bbc4635, 0x9e81032d, 0x2701f50c, 0x99847ab4, 0xa0e3df79, 0xba6cf38c,
+		0x10843094, 0x2537a95e, 0xf46f6ffe, 0xa1ff3b1f, 0x208cfb6a, 0x8f458c74, 0xd9e0a227, 0x4ec73a34,
+		0xfc884f69, 0x3e4de8df, 0xef0e0088, 0x3559648d, 0x8a45388c, 0x1d804366, 0x721d9bfd, 0xa58684bb,
+		0xe8256333, 0x844e8212, 0x128d8098, 0xfed33fb4, 0xce280ae1, 0x27e19ba5, 0xd5a6c252, 0xe49754bd,
+		0xc5d655dd, 0xeb667064, 0x77840b4d, 0xa1b6a801, 0x84db26a9, 0xe0b56714, 0x21f043b7, 0xe5d05860,
+		0x54f03084, 0x066ff472, 0xa31aa153, 0xdadc4755, 0xb5625dbf, 0x68561be6, 0x83ca6b94, 0x2d6ed23b,
+		0xeccf01db, 0xa6d3d0ba, 0xb6803d5c, 0xaf77a709, 0x33b4a34c, 0x397bc8d6, 0x5ee22b95, 0x5f0e5304,
+		0x81ed6f61, 0x20e74364, 0xb45e1378, 0xde18639b, 0x881ca122, 0xb96726d1, 0x8049a7e8, 0x22b7da7b,
+		0x5e552d25, 0x5272d237, 0x79d2951c, 0xc60d894c, 0x488cb402, 0x1ba4fe5b, 0xa4b09f6b, 0x1ca815cf,
+		0xa20c3005, 0x8871df63, 0xb9de2fcb, 0x0cc6c9e9, 0x0beeff53, 0xe3214517, 0xb4542835, 0x9f63293c,
+		0xee41e729, 0x6e1d2d7c, 0x50045286, 0x1e6685f3, 0xf33401c6, 0x30a22c95, 0x31a70850, 0x60930f13,
+		0x73f98417, 0xa1269859, 0xec645c44, 0x52c877a9, 0xcdff33a6, 0xa02b1741, 0x7cbad9a2, 0x2180036f,
+		0x50d99c08, 0xcb3f4861, 0xc26bd765, 0x64a3f6ab, 0x80342676, 0x25a75e7b, 0xe4e6d1fc, 0x20c710e6,
+		0xcdf0b680, 0x17844d3b, 0x31eef84d, 0x7e0824e4, 0x2ccb49eb, 0x846a3bae, 0x8ff77888, 0xee5d60f6,
+		0x7af75673, 0x2fdd5cdb, 0xa11631c1, 0x30f66f43, 0xb3faec54, 0x157fd7fa, 0xef8579cc, 0xd152de58,
+		0xdb2ffd5e, 0x8f32ce19, 0x306af97a, 0x02f03ef8, 0x99319ad5, 0xc242fa0f, 0xa7e3ebb0, 0xc68e4906,
+		0xb8da230c, 0x80823028, 0xdcdef3c8, 0xd35fb171, 0x088a1bc8, 0xbec0c560, 0x61a3c9e8, 0xbca8f54d,
+		0xc72feffa, 0x22822e99, 0x82c570b4, 0xd8d94e89, 0x8b1c34bc, 0x301e16e6, 0x273be979, 0xb0ffeaa6,
+		0x61d9b8c6, 0x00b24869, 0xb7ffce3f, 0x08dc283b, 0x43daf65a, 0xf7e19798, 0x7619b72f, 0x8f1c9ba4,
+		0xdc8637a0, 0x16a7d3b1, 0x9fc393b7, 0xa7136eeb, 0xc6bcc63e, 0x1a513742, 0xef6828bc, 0x520365d6,
+		0x2d6a77ab, 0x3527ed4b, 0x821fd216, 0x095c6e2e, 0xdb92f2fb, 0x5eea29cb, 0x145892f5, 0x91584f7f,
+		0x5483697b, 0x2667a8cc, 0x85196048, 0x8c4bacea, 0x833860d4, 0x0d23e0f9, 0x6c387e8a, 0x0ae6d249,
+		0xb284600c, 0xd835731d, 0xdcb1c647, 0xac4c56ea, 0x3ebd81b3, 0x230eabb0, 0x6438bc87, 0xf0b5b1fa,
+		0x8f5ea2b3, 0xfc184642, 0x0a036b7a, 0x4fb089bd, 0x649da589, 0xa345415e, 0x5c038323, 0x3e5d3bb9,
+		0x43d79572, 0x7e6dd07c, 0x06dfdf1e, 0x6c6cc4ef, 0x7160a539, 0x73bfbe70, 0x83877605, 0x4523ecf1,
+	},
+	{
+		0x8defc240, 0x25fa5d9f, 0xeb903dbf, 0xe810c907, 0x47607fff, 0x369fe44b, 0x8c1fc644, 0xaececa90,
+		0xbeb1f9bf, 0xeefbcaea, 0xe8cf1950, 0x51df07ae, 0x920e8806, 0xf0ad0548, 0xe13c8d83, 0x927010d5,
+		0x11107d9f, 0x07647db9, 0xb2e3e4d4, 0x3d4f285e, 0xb9afa820, 0xfade82e0, 0xa067268b, 0x8272792e,
+		0x553fb2c0, 0x489ae22b, 0xd4ef9794, 0x125e3fbc, 0x21fffcee, 0x825b1bfd, 0x9255c5ed, 0x1257a240,
+		0x4e1a8302, 0xbae07fff, 0x528246e7, 0x8e57140e, 0x3373f7bf, 0x8c9f8188, 0xa6fc4ee8, 0xc982b5a5,
+		0xa8c01db7, 0x579fc264, 0x67094f31, 0xf2bd3f5f, 0x40fff7c1, 0x1fb78dfc, 0x8e6bd2c1, 0x437be59b,
+		0x99b03dbf, 0xb5dbc64b, 0x638dc0e6, 0x55819d99, 0xa197c81c, 0x4a012d6e, 0xc5884a28, 0xccc36f71,
+		0xb843c213, 0x6c0743f1, 0x8309893c, 0x0feddd5f, 0x2f7fe850, 0xd7c07f7e, 0x02507fbf, 0x5afb9a04,
+		0xa747d2d0, 0x1651192e, 0xaf70bf3e, 0x58c31380, 0x5f98302e, 0x727cc3c4, 0x0a0fb402, 0x0f7fef82,
+		0x8c96fdad, 0x5d2c2aae, 0x8ee99a49, 0x50da88b8, 0x8427f4a0, 0x1eac5790, 0x796fb449, 0x8252dc15,
+		0xefbd7d9b, 0xa672597d, 0xada840d8, 0x45f54504, 0xfa5d7403, 0xe83ec305, 0x4f91751a, 0x925669c2,
+		0x23efe941, 0xa903f12e, 0x60270df2, 0x0276e4b6, 0x94fd6574, 0x927985b2, 0x8276dbcb, 0x02778176,
+		0xf8af918d, 0x4e48f79e, 0x8f616ddf, 0xe29d840e, 0x842f7d83, 0x340ce5c8, 0x96bbb682, 0x93b4b148,
+		0xef303cab, 0x984faf28, 0x779faf9b, 0x92dc560d, 0x224d1e20, 0x8437aa88, 0x7d29dc96, 0x2756d3dc,
+		0x8b907cee, 0xb51fd240, 0xe7c07ce3, 0xe566b4a1, 0xc3e9615e, 0x3cf8209d, 0x6094d1e3, 0xcd9ca341,
+		0x5c76460e, 0x00ea983b, 0xd4d67881, 0xfd47572c, 0xf76cedd9, 0xbda8229c, 0x127dadaa, 0x438a074e,
+		0x1f97c090, 0x081bdb8a, 0x93a07ebe, 0xb938ca15, 0x97b03cff, 0x3dc2c0f8, 0x8d1ab2ec, 0x64380e51,
+		0x68cc7bfb, 0xd90f2788, 0x12490181, 0x5de5ffd4, 0xdd7ef86a, 0x76a2e214, 0xb9a40368, 0x925d958f,
+		0x4b39fffa, 0xba39aee9, 0xa4ffd30b, 0xfaf7933b, 0x6d498623, 0x193cbcfa, 0x27627545, 0x825cf47a,
+		0x61bd8ba0, 0xd11e42d1, 0xcead04f4, 0x127ea392, 0x10428db7, 0x8272a972, 0x9270c4a8, 0x127de50b,
+		0x285ba1c8, 0x3c62f44f, 0x35c0eaa5, 0xe805d231, 0x428929fb, 0xb4fcdf82, 0x4fb66a53, 0x0e7dc15b,
+		0x1f081fab, 0x108618ae, 0xfcfd086d, 0xf9ff2889, 0x694bcc11, 0x236a5cae, 0x12deca4d, 0x2c3f8cc5,
+		0xd2d02dfe, 0xf8ef5896, 0xe4cf52da, 0x95155b67, 0x494a488c, 0xb9b6a80c, 0x5c8f82bc, 0x89d36b45,
+		0x3a609437, 0xec00c9a9, 0x44715253, 0x0a874b49, 0xd773bc40, 0x7c34671c, 0x02717ef6, 0x4feb5536,
+		0xa2d02fff, 0xd2bf60c4, 0xd43f03c0, 0x50b4ef6d, 0x07478cd1, 0x006e1888, 0xa2e53f55, 0xb9e6d4bc,
+		0xa2048016, 0x97573833, 0xd7207d67, 0xde0f8f3d, 0x72f87b33, 0xabcc4f33, 0x7688c55d, 0x7b00a6b0,
+		0x947b0001, 0x570075d2, 0xf9bb88f8, 0x8942019e, 0x4264a5ff, 0x856302e0, 0x72dbd92b, 0xee971b69,
+		0x6ea22fde, 0x5f08ae2b, 0xaf7a616d, 0xe5c98767, 0xcf1febd2, 0x61efc8c2, 0xf1ac2571, 0xcc8239c2,
+		0x67214cb8, 0xb1e583d1, 0xb7dc3e62, 0x7f10bdce, 0xf90a5c38, 0x0ff0443d, 0x606e6dc6, 0x60543a49,
+		0x5727c148, 0x2be98a1d, 0x8ab41738, 0x20e1be24, 0xaf96da0f, 0x68458425, 0x99833be5, 0x600d457d,
+		0x282f9350, 0x8334b362, 0xd91d1120, 0x2b6d8da0, 0x642b1e31, 0x9c305a00, 0x52bce688, 0x1b03588a,
+		0xf7baefd5, 0x4142ed9c, 0xa4315c11, 0x83323ec5, 0xdfef4636, 0xa133c501, 0xe9d3531c, 0xee353783,
+	},
+	{
+		0x9db30420, 0x1fb6e9de, 0xa7be7bef, 0xd273a298, 0x4a4f7bdb, 0x64ad8c57, 0x85510443, 0xfa020ed1,
+		0x7e287aff, 0xe60fb663, 0x095f35a1, 0x79ebf120, 0xfd059d43, 0x6497b7b1, 0xf3641f63, 0x241e4adf,
+		0x28147f5f, 0x4fa2b8cd, 0xc9430040, 0x0cc32220, 0xfdd30b30, 0xc0a5374f, 0x1d2d00d9, 0x24147b15,
+		0xee4d111a, 0x0fca5167, 0x71ff904c, 0x2d195ffe, 0x1a05645f, 0x0c13fefe, 0x081b08ca, 0x05170121,
+		0x80530100, 0xe83e5efe, 0xac9af4f8, 0x7fe72701, 0xd2b8ee5f, 0x06df4261, 0xbb9e9b8a, 0x7293ea25,
+		0xce84ffdf, 0xf5718801, 0x3dd64b04, 0xa26f263b, 0x7ed48400, 0x547eebe6, 0x446d4ca0, 0x6cf3d6f5,
+		0x2649abdf, 0xaea0c7f5, 0x36338cc1, 0x503f7e93, 0xd3772061, 0x11b638e1, 0x72500e03, 0xf80eb2bb,
+		0xabe0502e, 0xec8d77de, 0x57971e81, 0xe14f6746, 0xc9335400, 0x6920318f, 0x081dbb99, 0xffc304a5,
+		0x4d351805, 0x7f3d5ce3, 0xa6c866c6, 0x5d5bcca9, 0xdaec6fea, 0x9f926f91, 0x9f46222f, 0x3991467d,
+		0xa5bf6d8e, 0x1143c44f, 0x43958302, 0xd0214eeb, 0x022083b8, 0x3fb6180c, 0x18f8931e, 0x281658e6,
+		0x26486e3e, 0x8bd78a70, 0x7477e4c1, 0xb506e07c, 0xf32d0a25, 0x79098b02, 0xe4eabb81, 0x28123b23,
+		0x69dead38, 0x1574ca16, 0xdf871b62, 0x211c40b7, 0xa51a9ef9, 0x0014377b, 0x041e8ac8, 0x09114003,
+		0xbd59e4d2, 0xe3d156d5, 0x4fe876d5, 0x2f91a340, 0x557be8de, 0x00eae4a7, 0x0ce5c2ec, 0x4db4bba6,
+		0xe756bdff, 0xdd3369ac, 0xec17b035, 0x06572327, 0x99afc8b0, 0x56c8c391, 0x6b65811c, 0x5e146119,
+		0x6e85cb75, 0xbe07c002, 0xc2325577, 0x893ff4ec, 0x5bbfc92d, 0xd0ec3b25, 0xb7801ab7, 0x8d6d3b24,
+		0x20c763ef, 0xc366a5fc, 0x9c382880, 0x0ace3205, 0xaac9548a, 0xeca1d7c7, 0x041afa32, 0x1d16625a,
+		0x6701902c, 0x9b757a54, 0x31d477f7, 0x9126b031, 0x36cc6fdb, 0xc70b8b46, 0xd9e66a48, 0x56e55a79,
+		0x026a4ceb, 0x52437eff, 0x2f8f76b4, 0x0df980a5, 0x8674cde3, 0xedda04eb, 0x17a9be04, 0x2c18f4df,
+		0xb7747f9d, 0xab2af7b4, 0xefc34d20, 0x2e096b7c, 0x1741a254, 0xe5b6a035, 0x213d42f6, 0x2c1c7c26,
+		0x61c2f50f, 0x6552daf9, 0xd2c231f8, 0x25130f69, 0xd8167fa2, 0x0418f2c8, 0x001a96a6, 0x0d1526ab,
+		0x63315c21, 0x5e0a72ec, 0x49bafefd, 0x187908d9, 0x8d0dbd86, 0x311170a7, 0x3e9b640c, 0xcc3e10d7,
+		0xd5cad3b6, 0x0caec388, 0xf73001e1, 0x6c728aff, 0x71eae2a1, 0x1f9af36e, 0xcfcbd12f, 0xc1de8417,
+		0xac07be6b, 0xcb44a1d8, 0x8b9b0f56, 0x013988c3, 0xb1c52fca, 0xb4be31cd, 0xd8782806, 0x12a3a4e2,
+		0x6f7de532, 0x58fd7eb6, 0xd01ee900, 0x24adffc2, 0xf4990fc5, 0x9711aac5, 0x001d7b95, 0x82e5e7d2,
+		0x109873f6, 0x00613096, 0xc32d9521, 0xada121ff, 0x29908415, 0x7fbb977f, 0xaf9eb3db, 0x29c9ed2a,
+		0x5ce2a465, 0xa730f32c, 0xd0aa3fe8, 0x8a5cc091, 0xd49e2ce7, 0x0ce454a9, 0xd60acd86, 0x015f1919,
+		0x77079103, 0xdea03af6, 0x78a8565e, 0xdee356df, 0x21f05cbe, 0x8b75e387, 0xb3c50651, 0xb8a5c3ef,
+		0xd8eeb6d2, 0xe523be77, 0xc2154529, 0x2f69efdf, 0xafe67afb, 0xf470c4b2, 0xf3e0eb5b, 0xd6cc9876,
+		0x39e4460c, 0x1fda8538, 0x1987832f, 0xca007367, 0xa99144f8, 0x296b299e, 0x492fc295, 0x9266beab,
+		0xb5676e69, 0x9bd3ddda, 0xdf7e052f, 0xdb25701c, 0x1b5e51ee, 0xf65324e6, 0x6afce36c, 0x0316cc04,
+		0x8644213e, 0xb7dc59d0, 0x7965291f, 0xccd6fd43, 0x41823979, 0x932bcdf6, 0xb657c34d, 0x4edfd282,
+		0x7ae5290c, 0x3cb9536b, 0x851e20fe, 0x9833557e, 0x13ecf0b0, 0xd3ffb372, 0x3f85c5c1, 0x0aef7ed2,
+	},
+	{
+		0x7ec90c04, 0x2c6e74b9, 0x9b0e66df, 0xa6337911, 0xb86a7fff, 0x1dd358f5, 0x44dd9d44, 0x1731167f,
+		0x08fbf1fa, 0xe7f511cc, 0xd2051b00, 0x735aba00, 0x2ab722d8, 0x386381cb, 0xacf6243a, 0x69befd7a,
+		0xe6a2e77f, 0xf0c720cd, 0xc4494816, 0xccf5c180, 0x38851640, 0x15b0a848, 0xe68b18cb, 0x4caadeff,
+		0x5f480a01, 0x0412b2aa, 0x259814fc, 0x41d0efe2, 0x4e40b48d, 0x248eb6fb, 0x8dba1cfe, 0x41a99b02,
+		0x1a550a04, 0xba8f65cb, 0x7251f4e7, 0x95a51725, 0xc106ecd7, 0x97a5980a, 0xc539b9aa, 0x4d79fe6a,
+		0xf2f3f763, 0x68af8040, 0xed0c9e56, 0x11b4958b, 0xe1eb5a88, 0x8709e6b0, 0xd7e07156, 0x4e29fea7,
+		0x6366e52d, 0x02d1c000, 0xc4ac8e05, 0x9377f571, 0x0c05372a, 0x578535f2, 0x2261be02, 0xd642a0c9,
+		0xdf13a280, 0x74b55bd2, 0x682199c0, 0xd421e5ec, 0x53fb3ce8, 0xc8adedb3, 0x28a87fc9, 0x3d959981,
+		0x5c1ff900, 0xfe38d399, 0x0c4eff0b, 0x062407ea, 0xaa2f4fb1, 0x4fb96976, 0x90c79505, 0xb0a8a774,
+		0xef55a1ff, 0xe59ca2c2, 0xa6b62d27, 0xe66a4263, 0xdf65001f, 0x0ec50966, 0xdfdd55bc, 0x29de0655,
+		0x911e739a, 0x17af8975, 0x32c7911c, 0x89f89468, 0x0d01e980, 0x524755f4, 0x03b63cc9, 0x0cc844b2,
+		0xbcf3f0aa, 0x87ac36e9, 0xe53a7426, 0x01b3d82b, 0x1a9e7449, 0x64ee2d7e, 0xcddbb1da, 0x01c94910,
+		0xb868bf80, 0x0d26f3fd, 0x9342ede7, 0x04a5c284, 0x636737b6, 0x50f5b616, 0xf24766e3, 0x8eca36c1,
+		0x136e05db, 0xfef18391, 0xfb887a37, 0xd6e7f7d4, 0xc7fb7dc9, 0x3063fcdf, 0xb6f589de, 0xec2941da,
+		0x26e46695, 0xb7566419, 0xf654efc5, 0xd08d58b7, 0x48925401, 0xc1bacb7f, 0xe5ff550f, 0xb6083049,
+		0x5bb5d0e8, 0x87d72e5a, 0xab6a6ee1, 0x223a66ce, 0xc62bf3cd, 0x9e0885f9, 0x68cb3e47, 0x086c010f,
+		0xa21de820, 0xd18b69de, 0xf3f65777, 0xfa02c3f6, 0x407edac3, 0xcbb3d550, 0x1793084d, 0xb0d70eba,
+		0x0ab378d5, 0xd951fb0c, 0xded7da56, 0x4124bbe4, 0x94ca0b56, 0x0f5755d1, 0xe0e1e56e, 0x6184b5be,
+		0x580a249f, 0x94f74bc0, 0xe327888e, 0x9f7b5561, 0xc3dc0280, 0x05687715, 0x646c6bd7, 0x44904db3,
+		0x66b4f0a3, 0xc0f1648a, 0x697ed5af, 0x49e92ff6, 0x309e374f, 0x2cb6356a, 0x85808573, 0x4991f840,
+		0x76f0ae02, 0x083be84d, 0x28421c9a, 0x44489406, 0x736e4cb8, 0xc1092910, 0x8bc95fc6, 0x7d869cf4,
+		0x134f616f, 0x2e77118d, 0xb31b2be1, 0xaa90b472, 0x3ca5d717, 0x7d161bba, 0x9cad9010, 0xaf462ba2,
+		0x9fe459d2, 0x45d34559, 0xd9f2da13, 0xdbc65487, 0xf3e4f94e, 0x176d486f, 0x097c13ea, 0x631da5c7,
+		0x445f7382, 0x175683f4, 0xcdc66a97, 0x70be0288, 0xb3cdcf72, 0x6e5dd2f3, 0x20936079, 0x459b80a5,
+		0xbe60e2db, 0xa9c23101, 0xeba5315c, 0x224e42f2, 0x1c5c1572, 0xf6721b2c, 0x1ad2fff3, 0x8c25404e,
+		0x324ed72f, 0x4067b7fd, 0x0523138e, 0x5ca3bc78, 0xdc0fd66e, 0x75922283, 0x784d6b17, 0x58ebb16e,
+		0x44094f85, 0x3f481d87, 0xfcfeae7b, 0x77b5ff76, 0x8c2302bf, 0xaaf47556, 0x5f46b02a, 0x2b092801,
+		0x3d38f5f7, 0x0ca81f36, 0x52af4a8a, 0x66d5e7c0, 0xdf3b0874, 0x95055110, 0x1b5ad7a8, 0xf61ed5ad,
+		0x6cf6e479, 0x20758184, 0xd0cefa65, 0x88f7be58, 0x4a046826, 0x0ff6f8f3, 0xa09c7f70, 0x5346aba0,
+		0x5ce96c28, 0xe176eda3, 0x6bac307f, 0x376829d2, 0x85360fa9, 0x17e3fe2a, 0x24b79767, 0xf5a96b20,
+		0xd6cd2595, 0x68ff1ebf, 0x7555442c, 0xf19f06be, 0xf9e0659a, 0xeeb9491d, 0x34010718, 0xbb30cab8,
+		0xe822fe15, 0x88570983, 0x750e6249, 0xda627e55, 0x5e76ffa8, 0xb1534546, 0x6d47de08, 0xefe9e7d4,
+	},
+	{
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+		0xbf9f0960, 0xdfa1e2ed, 0x83f0579d, 0x63ed86b9, 0x1ab6a6b8, 0xde5ebe39, 0xf38ff732, 0x8989b138,
+		0x33f14961, 0xc01937bd, 0xf506c6da, 0xe4625e7e, 0xa308ea99, 0x4e23e33c, 0x79cbd7cc, 0x48a14367,
+		0xa3149619, 0xfec94bd5, 0xa114174a, 0xeaa01866, 0xa084db2d, 0x09a8486f, 0xa888614a, 0x2900af98,
+		0x01665991, 0xe1992863, 0xc8f30c60, 0x2e78ef3c, 0xd0d51932, 0xcf0fec14, 0xf7ca07d2, 0xd0a82072,
+		0xfd41197e, 0x9305a6b0, 0xe86be3da, 0x74bed3cd, 0x372da53c, 0x4c7f4448, 0xdab5d440, 0x6dba0ec3,
+		0x083919a7, 0x9fbaeed9, 0x49dbcfb0, 0x4e670c53, 0x5c3d9c01, 0x64bdb941, 0x2c0e636a, 0xba7dd9cd,
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+		0x284caf89, 0xaa928223, 0x9334be53, 0x3b3a21bf, 0x16434be3, 0x9aea3906, 0xefe8c36e, 0xf890cdd9,
+		0x80226dae, 0xc340a4a3, 0xdf7e9c09, 0xa694a807, 0x5b7c5ecc, 0x221db3a6, 0x9a69a02f, 0x68818a54,
+		0xceb2296f, 0x53c0843a, 0xfe893655, 0x25bfe68a, 0xb4628abc, 0xcf222ebf, 0x25ac6f48, 0xa9a99387,
+		0x53bddb65, 0xe76ffbe7, 0xe967fd78, 0x0ba93563, 0x8e342bc1, 0xe8a11be9, 0x4980740d, 0xc8087dfc,
+		0x8de4bf99, 0xa11101a0, 0x7fd37975, 0xda5a26c0, 0xe81f994f, 0x9528cd89, 0xfd339fed, 0xb87834bf,
+		0x5f04456d, 0x22258698, 0xc9c4c83b, 0x2dc156be, 0x4f628daa, 0x57f55ec5, 0xe2220abe, 0xd2916ebf,
+		0x4ec75b95, 0x24f2c3c0, 0x42d15d99, 0xcd0d7fa0, 0x7b6e27ff, 0xa8dc8af0, 0x7345c106, 0xf41e232f,
+		0x35162386, 0xe6ea8926, 0x3333b094, 0x157ec6f2, 0x372b74af, 0x692573e4, 0xe9a9d848, 0xf3160289,
+		0x3a62ef1d, 0xa787e238, 0xf3a5f676, 0x74364853, 0x20951063, 0x4576698d, 0xb6fad407, 0x592af950,
+		0x36f73523, 0x4cfb6e87, 0x7da4cec0, 0x6c152daa, 0xcb0396a8, 0xc50dfe5d, 0xfcd707ab, 0x0921c42f,
+		0x89dff0bb, 0x5fe2be78, 0x448f4f33, 0x754613c9, 0x2b05d08d, 0x48b9d585, 0xdc049441, 0xc8098f9b,
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+		0xbf32679d, 0xd45b5b75, 0xb353fd00, 0xcbb0e358, 0x830f220a, 0x1f8fb214, 0xd372cf08, 0xcc3c4a13,
+		0x8cf63166, 0x061c87be, 0x88c98f88, 0x6062e397, 0x47cf8e7a, 0xb6c85283, 0x3cc2acfb, 0x3fc06976,
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+		0x3007cd3e, 0x74719eef, 0xdc872681, 0x073340d4, 0x7e432fd9, 0x0c5ec241, 0x8809286c, 0xf592d891,
+		0x08a930f6, 0x957ef305, 0xb7fbffbd, 0xc266e96f, 0x6fe4ac98, 0xb173ecc0, 0xbc60b42a, 0x953498da,
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+		0xe8816f4a, 0x3814f200, 0xa3f94043, 0x9c7a54c2, 0xbc704f57, 0xda41e7f9, 0xc25ad33a, 0x54f4a084,
+		0xb17f5505, 0x59357cbe, 0xedbd15c8, 0x7f97c5ab, 0xba5ac7b5, 0xb6f6deaf, 0x3a479c3a, 0x5302da25,
+		0x653d7e6a, 0x54268d49, 0x51a477ea, 0x5017d55b, 0xd7d25d88, 0x44136c76, 0x0404a8c8, 0xb8e5a121,
+		0xb81a928a, 0x60ed5869, 0x97c55b96, 0xeaec991b, 0x29935913, 0x01fdb7f1, 0x088e8dfa, 0x9ab6f6f5,
+		0x3b4cbf9f, 0x4a5de3ab, 0xe6051d35, 0xa0e1d855, 0xd36b4cf1, 0xf544edeb, 0xb0e93524, 0xbebb8fbd,
+		0xa2d762cf, 0x49c92f54, 0x38b5f331, 0x7128a454, 0x48392905, 0xa65b1db8, 0x851c97bd, 0xd675cf2f,
+	},
+	{
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+		0x0227bce7, 0x4d642916, 0x18fac300, 0x50f18b82, 0x2cb2cb11, 0xb232e75c, 0x4b3695f2, 0xb28707de,
+		0xa05fbcf6, 0xcd4181e9, 0xe150210c, 0xe24ef1bd, 0xb168c381, 0xfde4e789, 0x5c79b0d8, 0x1e8bfd43,
+		0x4d495001, 0x38be4341, 0x913cee1d, 0x92a79c3f, 0x089766be, 0xbaeeadf4, 0x1286becf, 0xb6eacb19,
+		0x2660c200, 0x7565bde4, 0x64241f7a, 0x8248dca9, 0xc3b3ad66, 0x28136086, 0x0bd8dfa8, 0x356d1cf2,
+		0x107789be, 0xb3b2e9ce, 0x0502aa8f, 0x0bc0351e, 0x166bf52a, 0xeb12ff82, 0xe3486911, 0xd34d7516,
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+		0x47bc2829, 0x4725ba37, 0xa66ad22b, 0x7ad61f1e, 0x0c5cbafa, 0x4437f107, 0xb6e79962, 0x42d2d816,
+		0x0a961288, 0xe1a5c06e, 0x13749e67, 0x72fc081a, 0xb1d139f7, 0xf9583745, 0xcf19df58, 0xbec3f756,
+		0xc06eba30, 0x07211b24, 0x45c28829, 0xc95e317f, 0xbc8ec511, 0x38bc46e9, 0xc6e6fa14, 0xbae8584a,
+		0xad4ebc46, 0x468f508b, 0x7829435f, 0xf124183b, 0x821dba9f, 0xaff60ff4, 0xea2c4e6d, 0x16e39264,
+		0x92544a8b, 0x009b4fc3, 0xaba68ced, 0x9ac96f78, 0x06a5b79a, 0xb2856e6e, 0x1aec3ca9, 0xbe838688,
+		0x0e0804e9, 0x55f1be56, 0xe7e5363b, 0xb3a1f25d, 0xf7debb85, 0x61fe033c, 0x16746233, 0x3c034c28,
+		0xda6d0c74, 0x79aac56c, 0x3ce4e1ad, 0x51f0c802, 0x98f8f35a, 0x1626a49f, 0xeed82b29, 0x1d382fe3,
+		0x0c4fb99a, 0xbb325778, 0x3ec6d97b, 0x6e77a6a9, 0xcb658b5c, 0xd45230c7, 0x2bd1408b, 0x60c03eb7,
+		0xb9068d78, 0xa33754f4, 0xf430c87d, 0xc8a71302, 0xb96d8c32, 0xebd4e7be, 0xbe8b9d2d, 0x7979fb06,
+		0xe7225308, 0x8b75cf77, 0x11ef8da4, 0xe083c858, 0x8d6b786f, 0x5a6317a6, 0xfa5cf7a0, 0x5dda0033,
+		0xf28ebfb0, 0xf5b9c310, 0xa0eac280, 0x08b9767a, 0xa3d9d2b0, 0x79d34217, 0x021a718d, 0x9ac6336a,
+		0x2711fd60, 0x438050e3, 0x069908a8, 0x3d7fedc4, 0x826d2bef, 0x4eeb8476, 0x488dcf25, 0x36c9d566,
+		0x28e74e41, 0xc2610aca, 0x3d49a9cf, 0xbae3b9df, 0xb65f8de6, 0x92aeaf64, 0x3ac7d5e6, 0x9ea80509,
+		0xf22b017d, 0xa4173f70, 0xdd1e16c3, 0x15e0d7f9, 0x50b1b887, 0x2b9f4fd5, 0x625aba82, 0x6a017962,
+		0x2ec01b9c, 0x15488aa9, 0xd716e740, 0x40055a2c, 0x93d29a22, 0xe32dbf9a, 0x058745b9, 0x3453dc1e,
+		0xd699296e, 0x496cff6f, 0x1c9f4986, 0xdfe2ed07, 0xb87242d1, 0x19de7eae, 0x053e561a, 0x15ad6f8c,
+		0x66626c1c, 0x7154c24c, 0xea082b2a, 0x93eb2939, 0x17dcb0f0, 0x58d4f2ae, 0x9ea294fb, 0x52cf564c,
+		0x9883fe66, 0x2ec40581, 0x763953c3, 0x01d6692e, 0xd3a0c108, 0xa1e7160e, 0xe4f2dfa6, 0x693ed285,
+		0x74904698, 0x4c2b0edd, 0x4f757656, 0x5d393378, 0xa132234f, 0x3d321c5d, 0xc3f5e194, 0x4b269301,
+		0xc79f022f, 0x3c997e7e, 0x5e4f9504, 0x3ffafbbd, 0x76f7ad0e, 0x296693f4, 0x3d1fce6f, 0xc61e45be,
+		0xd3b5ab34, 0xf72bf9b7, 0x1b0434c0, 0x4e72b567, 0x5592a33d, 0xb5229301, 0xcfd2a87f, 0x60aeb767,
+		0x1814386b, 0x30bcc33d, 0x38a0c07d, 0xfd1606f2, 0xc363519b, 0x589dd390, 0x5479f8e6, 0x1cb8d647,
+		0x97fd61a9, 0xea7759f4, 0x2d57539d, 0x569a58cf, 0xe84e63ad, 0x462e1b78, 0x6580f87e, 0xf3817914,
+		0x91da55f4, 0x40a230f3, 0xd1988f35, 0xb6e318d2, 0x3ffa50bc, 0x3d40f021, 0xc3c0bdae, 0x4958c24c,
+		0x518f36b2, 0x84b1d370, 0x0fedce83, 0x878ddada, 0xf2a279c7, 0x94e01be8, 0x90716f4b, 0x954b8aa3,
+	},
+	{
+		0xe216300d, 0xbbddfffc, 0xa7ebdabd, 0x35648095, 0x7789f8b7, 0xe6c1121b, 0x0e241600, 0x052ce8b5,
+		0x11a9cfb0, 0xe5952f11, 0xece7990a, 0x9386d174, 0x2a42931c, 0x76e38111, 0xb12def3a, 0x37ddddfc,
+		0xde9adeb1, 0x0a0cc32c, 0xbe197029, 0x84a00940, 0xbb243a0f, 0xb4d137cf, 0xb44e79f0, 0x049eedfd,
+		0x0b15a15d, 0x480d3168, 0x8bbbde5a, 0x669ded42, 0xc7ece831, 0x3f8f95e7, 0x72df191b, 0x7580330d,
+		0x94074251, 0x5c7dcdfa, 0xabbe6d63, 0xaa402164, 0xb301d40a, 0x02e7d1ca, 0x53571dae, 0x7a3182a2,
+		0x12a8ddec, 0xfdaa335d, 0x176f43e8, 0x71fb46d4, 0x38129022, 0xce949ad4, 0xb84769ad, 0x965bd862,
+		0x82f3d055, 0x66fb9767, 0x15b80b4e, 0x1d5b47a0, 0x4cfde06f, 0xc28ec4b8, 0x57e8726e, 0x647a78fc,
+		0x99865d44, 0x608bd593, 0x6c200e03, 0x39dc5ff6, 0x5d0b00a3, 0xae63aff2, 0x7e8bd632, 0x70108c0c,
+		0xbbd35049, 0x2998df04, 0x980cf42a, 0x9b6df491, 0x9e7edd53, 0x06918548, 0x58cb7e07, 0x3b74ef2e,
+		0x522fffb1, 0xd24708cc, 0x1c7e27cd, 0xa4eb215b, 0x3cf1d2e2, 0x19b47a38, 0x424f7618, 0x35856039,
+		0x9d17dee7, 0x27eb35e6, 0xc9aff67b, 0x36baf5b8, 0x09c467cd, 0xc18910b1, 0xe11dbf7b, 0x06cd1af8,
+		0x7170c608, 0x2d5e3354, 0xd4de495a, 0x64c6d006, 0xbcc0c62c, 0x3dd00db3, 0x708f8f34, 0x77d51b42,
+		0x264f620f, 0x24b8d2bf, 0x15c1b79e, 0x46a52564, 0xf8d7e54e, 0x3e378160, 0x7895cda5, 0x859c15a5,
+		0xe6459788, 0xc37bc75f, 0xdb07ba0c, 0x0676a3ab, 0x7f229b1e, 0x31842e7b, 0x24259fd7, 0xf8bef472,
+		0x835ffcb8, 0x6df4c1f2, 0x96f5b195, 0xfd0af0fc, 0xb0fe134c, 0xe2506d3d, 0x4f9b12ea, 0xf215f225,
+		0xa223736f, 0x9fb4c428, 0x25d04979, 0x34c713f8, 0xc4618187, 0xea7a6e98, 0x7cd16efc, 0x1436876c,
+		0xf1544107, 0xbedeee14, 0x56e9af27, 0xa04aa441, 0x3cf7c899, 0x92ecbae6, 0xdd67016d, 0x151682eb,
+		0xa842eedf, 0xfdba60b4, 0xf1907b75, 0x20e3030f, 0x24d8c29e, 0xe139673b, 0xefa63fb8, 0x71873054,
+		0xb6f2cf3b, 0x9f326442, 0xcb15a4cc, 0xb01a4504, 0xf1e47d8d, 0x844a1be5, 0xbae7dfdc, 0x42cbda70,
+		0xcd7dae0a, 0x57e85b7a, 0xd53f5af6, 0x20cf4d8c, 0xcea4d428, 0x79d130a4, 0x3486ebfb, 0x33d3cddc,
+		0x77853b53, 0x37effcb5, 0xc5068778, 0xe580b3e6, 0x4e68b8f4, 0xc5c8b37e, 0x0d809ea2, 0x398feb7c,
+		0x132a4f94, 0x43b7950e, 0x2fee7d1c, 0x223613bd, 0xdd06caa2, 0x37df932b, 0xc4248289, 0xacf3ebc3,
+		0x5715f6b7, 0xef3478dd, 0xf267616f, 0xc148cbe4, 0x9052815e, 0x5e410fab, 0xb48a2465, 0x2eda7fa4,
+		0xe87b40e4, 0xe98ea084, 0x5889e9e1, 0xefd390fc, 0xdd07d35b, 0xdb485694, 0x38d7e5b2, 0x57720101,
+		0x730edebc, 0x5b643113, 0x94917e4f, 0x503c2fba, 0x646f1282, 0x7523d24a, 0xe0779695, 0xf9c17a8f,
+		0x7a5b2121, 0xd187b896, 0x29263a4d, 0xba510cdf, 0x81f47c9f, 0xad1163ed, 0xea7b5965, 0x1a00726e,
+		0x11403092, 0x00da6d77, 0x4a0cdd61, 0xad1f4603, 0x605bdfb0, 0x9eedc364, 0x22ebe6a8, 0xcee7d28a,
+		0xa0e736a0, 0x5564a6b9, 0x10853209, 0xc7eb8f37, 0x2de705ca, 0x8951570f, 0xdf09822b, 0xbd691a6c,
+		0xaa12e4f2, 0x87451c0f, 0xe0f6a27a, 0x3ada4819, 0x4cf1764f, 0x0d771c2b, 0x67cdb156, 0x350d8384,
+		0x5938fa0f, 0x42399ef3, 0x36997b07, 0x0e84093d, 0x4aa93e61, 0x8360d87b, 0x1fa98b0c, 0x1149382c,
+		0xe97625a5, 0x0614d1b7, 0x0e25244b, 0x0c768347, 0x589e8d82, 0x0d2059d1, 0xa466bb1e, 0xf8da0a82,
+		0x04f19130, 0xba6e4ec0, 0x99265164, 0x1ee7230d, 0x50b2ad80, 0xeaee6801, 0x8db2a283, 0xea8bf59e,
+	},
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
+// domain sources in SUPERCOP: http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
+
+// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
+
+DATA ·REDMASK51(SB)/8, $0x0007FFFFFFFFFFFF
+GLOBL ·REDMASK51(SB), 8, $8
+
+DATA ·_121666_213(SB)/8, $996687872
+GLOBL ·_121666_213(SB), 8, $8
+
+DATA ·_2P0(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA
+GLOBL ·_2P0(SB), 8, $8
+
+DATA ·_2P1234(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE
+GLOBL ·_2P1234(SB), 8, $8

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/cswap_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
+// domain sources in SUPERCOP: http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
+
+// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
+
+// func cswap(inout *[5]uint64, v uint64)
+TEXT ·cswap(SB),7,$0
+	MOVQ inout+0(FP),DI
+	MOVQ v+8(FP),SI
+
+	CMPQ SI,$1
+	MOVQ 0(DI),SI
+	MOVQ 80(DI),DX
+	MOVQ 8(DI),CX
+	MOVQ 88(DI),R8
+	MOVQ SI,R9
+	CMOVQEQ DX,SI
+	CMOVQEQ R9,DX
+	MOVQ CX,R9
+	CMOVQEQ R8,CX
+	CMOVQEQ R9,R8
+	MOVQ SI,0(DI)
+	MOVQ DX,80(DI)
+	MOVQ CX,8(DI)
+	MOVQ R8,88(DI)
+	MOVQ 16(DI),SI
+	MOVQ 96(DI),DX
+	MOVQ 24(DI),CX
+	MOVQ 104(DI),R8
+	MOVQ SI,R9
+	CMOVQEQ DX,SI
+	CMOVQEQ R9,DX
+	MOVQ CX,R9
+	CMOVQEQ R8,CX
+	CMOVQEQ R9,R8
+	MOVQ SI,16(DI)
+	MOVQ DX,96(DI)
+	MOVQ CX,24(DI)
+	MOVQ R8,104(DI)
+	MOVQ 32(DI),SI
+	MOVQ 112(DI),DX
+	MOVQ 40(DI),CX
+	MOVQ 120(DI),R8
+	MOVQ SI,R9
+	CMOVQEQ DX,SI
+	CMOVQEQ R9,DX
+	MOVQ CX,R9
+	CMOVQEQ R8,CX
+	CMOVQEQ R9,R8
+	MOVQ SI,32(DI)
+	MOVQ DX,112(DI)
+	MOVQ CX,40(DI)
+	MOVQ R8,120(DI)
+	MOVQ 48(DI),SI
+	MOVQ 128(DI),DX
+	MOVQ 56(DI),CX
+	MOVQ 136(DI),R8
+	MOVQ SI,R9
+	CMOVQEQ DX,SI
+	CMOVQEQ R9,DX
+	MOVQ CX,R9
+	CMOVQEQ R8,CX
+	CMOVQEQ R9,R8
+	MOVQ SI,48(DI)
+	MOVQ DX,128(DI)
+	MOVQ CX,56(DI)
+	MOVQ R8,136(DI)
+	MOVQ 64(DI),SI
+	MOVQ 144(DI),DX
+	MOVQ 72(DI),CX
+	MOVQ 152(DI),R8
+	MOVQ SI,R9
+	CMOVQEQ DX,SI
+	CMOVQEQ R9,DX
+	MOVQ CX,R9
+	CMOVQEQ R8,CX
+	CMOVQEQ R9,R8
+	MOVQ SI,64(DI)
+	MOVQ DX,144(DI)
+	MOVQ CX,72(DI)
+	MOVQ R8,152(DI)
+	MOVQ DI,AX
+	MOVQ SI,DX
+	RET

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go

@@ -0,0 +1,841 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// We have a implementation in amd64 assembly so this code is only run on
+// non-amd64 platforms. The amd64 assembly does not support gccgo.
+// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine
+
+package curve25519
+
+// This code is a port of the public domain, "ref10" implementation of
+// curve25519 from SUPERCOP 20130419 by D. J. Bernstein.
+
+// fieldElement represents an element of the field GF(2^255 - 19). An element
+// t, entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77
+// t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on
+// context.
+type fieldElement [10]int32
+
+func feZero(fe *fieldElement) {
+	for i := range fe {
+		fe[i] = 0
+	}
+}
+
+func feOne(fe *fieldElement) {
+	feZero(fe)
+	fe[0] = 1
+}
+
+func feAdd(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
+	for i := range dst {
+		dst[i] = a[i] + b[i]
+	}
+}
+
+func feSub(dst, a, b *fieldElement) {
+	for i := range dst {
+		dst[i] = a[i] - b[i]
+	}
+}
+
+func feCopy(dst, src *fieldElement) {
+	for i := range dst {
+		dst[i] = src[i]
+	}
+}
+
+// feCSwap replaces (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; replaces (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0.
+//
+// Preconditions: b in {0,1}.
+func feCSwap(f, g *fieldElement, b int32) {
+	var x fieldElement
+	b = -b
+	for i := range x {
+		x[i] = b & (f[i] ^ g[i])
+	}
+
+	for i := range f {
+		f[i] ^= x[i]
+	}
+	for i := range g {
+		g[i] ^= x[i]
+	}
+}
+
+// load3 reads a 24-bit, little-endian value from in.
+func load3(in []byte) int64 {
+	var r int64
+	r = int64(in[0])
+	r |= int64(in[1]) << 8
+	r |= int64(in[2]) << 16
+	return r
+}
+
+// load4 reads a 32-bit, little-endian value from in.
+func load4(in []byte) int64 {
+	var r int64
+	r = int64(in[0])
+	r |= int64(in[1]) << 8
+	r |= int64(in[2]) << 16
+	r |= int64(in[3]) << 24
+	return r
+}
+
+func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) {
+	h0 := load4(src[:])
+	h1 := load3(src[4:]) << 6
+	h2 := load3(src[7:]) << 5
+	h3 := load3(src[10:]) << 3
+	h4 := load3(src[13:]) << 2
+	h5 := load4(src[16:])
+	h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7
+	h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5
+	h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4
+	h9 := load3(src[29:]) << 2
+
+	var carry [10]int64
+	carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25
+	h0 += carry[9] * 19
+	h9 -= carry[9] << 25
+	carry[1] = (h1 + 1<<24) >> 25
+	h2 += carry[1]
+	h1 -= carry[1] << 25
+	carry[3] = (h3 + 1<<24) >> 25
+	h4 += carry[3]
+	h3 -= carry[3] << 25
+	carry[5] = (h5 + 1<<24) >> 25
+	h6 += carry[5]
+	h5 -= carry[5] << 25
+	carry[7] = (h7 + 1<<24) >> 25
+	h8 += carry[7]
+	h7 -= carry[7] << 25
+
+	carry[0] = (h0 + 1<<25) >> 26
+	h1 += carry[0]
+	h0 -= carry[0] << 26
+	carry[2] = (h2 + 1<<25) >> 26
+	h3 += carry[2]
+	h2 -= carry[2] << 26
+	carry[4] = (h4 + 1<<25) >> 26
+	h5 += carry[4]
+	h4 -= carry[4] << 26
+	carry[6] = (h6 + 1<<25) >> 26
+	h7 += carry[6]
+	h6 -= carry[6] << 26
+	carry[8] = (h8 + 1<<25) >> 26
+	h9 += carry[8]
+	h8 -= carry[8] << 26
+
+	dst[0] = int32(h0)
+	dst[1] = int32(h1)
+	dst[2] = int32(h2)
+	dst[3] = int32(h3)
+	dst[4] = int32(h4)
+	dst[5] = int32(h5)
+	dst[6] = int32(h6)
+	dst[7] = int32(h7)
+	dst[8] = int32(h8)
+	dst[9] = int32(h9)
+}
+
+// feToBytes marshals h to s.
+// Preconditions:
+//   |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+//
+// Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p).
+// Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))).
+//
+// Proof:
+//   Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4.
+//   Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^230 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4.
+//
+//   Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9).
+//   Then 0<y<1.
+//
+//   Write r=h-pq.
+//   Have 0<=r<=p-1=2^255-20.
+//   Thus 0<=r+19(2^-255)r<r+19(2^-255)2^255<=2^255-1.
+//
+//   Write x=r+19(2^-255)r+y.
+//   Then 0<x<2^255 so floor(2^(-255)x) = 0 so floor(q+2^(-255)x) = q.
+//
+//   Have q+2^(-255)x = 2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))
+//   so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q.
+func feToBytes(s *[32]byte, h *fieldElement) {
+	var carry [10]int32
+
+	q := (19*h[9] + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	q = (h[0] + q) >> 26
+	q = (h[1] + q) >> 25
+	q = (h[2] + q) >> 26
+	q = (h[3] + q) >> 25
+	q = (h[4] + q) >> 26
+	q = (h[5] + q) >> 25
+	q = (h[6] + q) >> 26
+	q = (h[7] + q) >> 25
+	q = (h[8] + q) >> 26
+	q = (h[9] + q) >> 25
+
+	// Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
+	h[0] += 19 * q
+	// Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
+
+	carry[0] = h[0] >> 26
+	h[1] += carry[0]
+	h[0] -= carry[0] << 26
+	carry[1] = h[1] >> 25
+	h[2] += carry[1]
+	h[1] -= carry[1] << 25
+	carry[2] = h[2] >> 26
+	h[3] += carry[2]
+	h[2] -= carry[2] << 26
+	carry[3] = h[3] >> 25
+	h[4] += carry[3]
+	h[3] -= carry[3] << 25
+	carry[4] = h[4] >> 26
+	h[5] += carry[4]
+	h[4] -= carry[4] << 26
+	carry[5] = h[5] >> 25
+	h[6] += carry[5]
+	h[5] -= carry[5] << 25
+	carry[6] = h[6] >> 26
+	h[7] += carry[6]
+	h[6] -= carry[6] << 26
+	carry[7] = h[7] >> 25
+	h[8] += carry[7]
+	h[7] -= carry[7] << 25
+	carry[8] = h[8] >> 26
+	h[9] += carry[8]
+	h[8] -= carry[8] << 26
+	carry[9] = h[9] >> 25
+	h[9] -= carry[9] << 25
+	// h10 = carry9
+
+	// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20.
+	// Have h[0]+...+2^230 h[9] between 0 and 2^255-1;
+	// evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0.
+	// Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^230 h[9].
+
+	s[0] = byte(h[0] >> 0)
+	s[1] = byte(h[0] >> 8)
+	s[2] = byte(h[0] >> 16)
+	s[3] = byte((h[0] >> 24) | (h[1] << 2))
+	s[4] = byte(h[1] >> 6)
+	s[5] = byte(h[1] >> 14)
+	s[6] = byte((h[1] >> 22) | (h[2] << 3))
+	s[7] = byte(h[2] >> 5)
+	s[8] = byte(h[2] >> 13)
+	s[9] = byte((h[2] >> 21) | (h[3] << 5))
+	s[10] = byte(h[3] >> 3)
+	s[11] = byte(h[3] >> 11)
+	s[12] = byte((h[3] >> 19) | (h[4] << 6))
+	s[13] = byte(h[4] >> 2)
+	s[14] = byte(h[4] >> 10)
+	s[15] = byte(h[4] >> 18)
+	s[16] = byte(h[5] >> 0)
+	s[17] = byte(h[5] >> 8)
+	s[18] = byte(h[5] >> 16)
+	s[19] = byte((h[5] >> 24) | (h[6] << 1))
+	s[20] = byte(h[6] >> 7)
+	s[21] = byte(h[6] >> 15)
+	s[22] = byte((h[6] >> 23) | (h[7] << 3))
+	s[23] = byte(h[7] >> 5)
+	s[24] = byte(h[7] >> 13)
+	s[25] = byte((h[7] >> 21) | (h[8] << 4))
+	s[26] = byte(h[8] >> 4)
+	s[27] = byte(h[8] >> 12)
+	s[28] = byte((h[8] >> 20) | (h[9] << 6))
+	s[29] = byte(h[9] >> 2)
+	s[30] = byte(h[9] >> 10)
+	s[31] = byte(h[9] >> 18)
+}
+
+// feMul calculates h = f * g
+// Can overlap h with f or g.
+//
+// Preconditions:
+//    |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+//    |g| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+//
+// Postconditions:
+//    |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+//
+// Notes on implementation strategy:
+//
+// Using schoolbook multiplication.
+// Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models.
+//
+// Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations;
+// cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations.
+//
+// There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain;
+// one *19 precomputation can be merged into this,
+// but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean.
+//
+// There are 12 carries below.
+// 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable.
+// Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper.
+//
+// With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32.
+func feMul(h, f, g *fieldElement) {
+	f0 := f[0]
+	f1 := f[1]
+	f2 := f[2]
+	f3 := f[3]
+	f4 := f[4]
+	f5 := f[5]
+	f6 := f[6]
+	f7 := f[7]
+	f8 := f[8]
+	f9 := f[9]
+	g0 := g[0]
+	g1 := g[1]
+	g2 := g[2]
+	g3 := g[3]
+	g4 := g[4]
+	g5 := g[5]
+	g6 := g[6]
+	g7 := g[7]
+	g8 := g[8]
+	g9 := g[9]
+	g1_19 := 19 * g1 // 1.4*2^29
+	g2_19 := 19 * g2 // 1.4*2^30; still ok
+	g3_19 := 19 * g3
+	g4_19 := 19 * g4
+	g5_19 := 19 * g5
+	g6_19 := 19 * g6
+	g7_19 := 19 * g7
+	g8_19 := 19 * g8
+	g9_19 := 19 * g9
+	f1_2 := 2 * f1
+	f3_2 := 2 * f3
+	f5_2 := 2 * f5
+	f7_2 := 2 * f7
+	f9_2 := 2 * f9
+	f0g0 := int64(f0) * int64(g0)
+	f0g1 := int64(f0) * int64(g1)
+	f0g2 := int64(f0) * int64(g2)
+	f0g3 := int64(f0) * int64(g3)
+	f0g4 := int64(f0) * int64(g4)
+	f0g5 := int64(f0) * int64(g5)
+	f0g6 := int64(f0) * int64(g6)
+	f0g7 := int64(f0) * int64(g7)
+	f0g8 := int64(f0) * int64(g8)
+	f0g9 := int64(f0) * int64(g9)
+	f1g0 := int64(f1) * int64(g0)
+	f1g1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g1)
+	f1g2 := int64(f1) * int64(g2)
+	f1g3_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g3)
+	f1g4 := int64(f1) * int64(g4)
+	f1g5_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g5)
+	f1g6 := int64(f1) * int64(g6)
+	f1g7_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g7)
+	f1g8 := int64(f1) * int64(g8)
+	f1g9_38 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g9_19)
+	f2g0 := int64(f2) * int64(g0)
+	f2g1 := int64(f2) * int64(g1)
+	f2g2 := int64(f2) * int64(g2)
+	f2g3 := int64(f2) * int64(g3)
+	f2g4 := int64(f2) * int64(g4)
+	f2g5 := int64(f2) * int64(g5)
+	f2g6 := int64(f2) * int64(g6)
+	f2g7 := int64(f2) * int64(g7)
+	f2g8_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g8_19)
+	f2g9_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g9_19)
+	f3g0 := int64(f3) * int64(g0)
+	f3g1_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g1)
+	f3g2 := int64(f3) * int64(g2)
+	f3g3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g3)
+	f3g4 := int64(f3) * int64(g4)
+	f3g5_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g5)
+	f3g6 := int64(f3) * int64(g6)
+	f3g7_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g7_19)
+	f3g8_19 := int64(f3) * int64(g8_19)
+	f3g9_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g9_19)
+	f4g0 := int64(f4) * int64(g0)
+	f4g1 := int64(f4) * int64(g1)
+	f4g2 := int64(f4) * int64(g2)
+	f4g3 := int64(f4) * int64(g3)
+	f4g4 := int64(f4) * int64(g4)
+	f4g5 := int64(f4) * int64(g5)
+	f4g6_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g6_19)
+	f4g7_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g7_19)
+	f4g8_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g8_19)
+	f4g9_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g9_19)
+	f5g0 := int64(f5) * int64(g0)
+	f5g1_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g1)
+	f5g2 := int64(f5) * int64(g2)
+	f5g3_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g3)
+	f5g4 := int64(f5) * int64(g4)
+	f5g5_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g5_19)
+	f5g6_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g6_19)
+	f5g7_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g7_19)
+	f5g8_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g8_19)
+	f5g9_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g9_19)
+	f6g0 := int64(f6) * int64(g0)
+	f6g1 := int64(f6) * int64(g1)
+	f6g2 := int64(f6) * int64(g2)
+	f6g3 := int64(f6) * int64(g3)
+	f6g4_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g4_19)
+	f6g5_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g5_19)
+	f6g6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g6_19)
+	f6g7_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g7_19)
+	f6g8_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g8_19)
+	f6g9_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g9_19)
+	f7g0 := int64(f7) * int64(g0)
+	f7g1_2 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g1)
+	f7g2 := int64(f7) * int64(g2)
+	f7g3_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g3_19)
+	f7g4_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g4_19)
+	f7g5_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g5_19)
+	f7g6_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g6_19)
+	f7g7_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g7_19)
+	f7g8_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g8_19)
+	f7g9_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g9_19)
+	f8g0 := int64(f8) * int64(g0)
+	f8g1 := int64(f8) * int64(g1)
+	f8g2_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g2_19)
+	f8g3_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g3_19)
+	f8g4_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g4_19)
+	f8g5_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g5_19)
+	f8g6_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g6_19)
+	f8g7_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g7_19)
+	f8g8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g8_19)
+	f8g9_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g9_19)
+	f9g0 := int64(f9) * int64(g0)
+	f9g1_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g1_19)
+	f9g2_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g2_19)
+	f9g3_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g3_19)
+	f9g4_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g4_19)
+	f9g5_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g5_19)
+	f9g6_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g6_19)
+	f9g7_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g7_19)
+	f9g8_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g8_19)
+	f9g9_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g9_19)
+	h0 := f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38
+	h1 := f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19
+	h2 := f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38
+	h3 := f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19
+	h4 := f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38
+	h5 := f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19
+	h6 := f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38
+	h7 := f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19
+	h8 := f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38
+	h9 := f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0
+	var carry [10]int64
+
+	// |h0| <= (1.1*1.1*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.1*1.1*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38))
+	//   i.e. |h0| <= 1.2*2^59; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8
+	// |h1| <= (1.1*1.1*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19))
+	//   i.e. |h1| <= 1.5*2^58; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9
+
+	carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h1 += carry[0]
+	h0 -= carry[0] << 26
+	carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h5 += carry[4]
+	h4 -= carry[4] << 26
+	// |h0| <= 2^25
+	// |h4| <= 2^25
+	// |h1| <= 1.51*2^58
+	// |h5| <= 1.51*2^58
+
+	carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h2 += carry[1]
+	h1 -= carry[1] << 25
+	carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h6 += carry[5]
+	h5 -= carry[5] << 25
+	// |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
+	// |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32
+	// |h2| <= 1.21*2^59
+	// |h6| <= 1.21*2^59
+
+	carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h3 += carry[2]
+	h2 -= carry[2] << 26
+	carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h7 += carry[6]
+	h6 -= carry[6] << 26
+	// |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h3| <= 1.51*2^58
+	// |h7| <= 1.51*2^58
+
+	carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h4 += carry[3]
+	h3 -= carry[3] << 25
+	carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h8 += carry[7]
+	h7 -= carry[7] << 25
+	// |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h4| <= 1.52*2^33
+	// |h8| <= 1.52*2^33
+
+	carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h5 += carry[4]
+	h4 -= carry[4] << 26
+	carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h9 += carry[8]
+	h8 -= carry[8] << 26
+	// |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h5| <= 1.01*2^24
+	// |h9| <= 1.51*2^58
+
+	carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h0 += carry[9] * 19
+	h9 -= carry[9] << 25
+	// |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h0| <= 1.8*2^37
+
+	carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h1 += carry[0]
+	h0 -= carry[0] << 26
+	// |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged
+	// |h1| <= 1.01*2^24
+
+	h[0] = int32(h0)
+	h[1] = int32(h1)
+	h[2] = int32(h2)
+	h[3] = int32(h3)
+	h[4] = int32(h4)
+	h[5] = int32(h5)
+	h[6] = int32(h6)
+	h[7] = int32(h7)
+	h[8] = int32(h8)
+	h[9] = int32(h9)
+}
+
+// feSquare calculates h = f*f. Can overlap h with f.
+//
+// Preconditions:
+//    |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+//
+// Postconditions:
+//    |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+func feSquare(h, f *fieldElement) {
+	f0 := f[0]
+	f1 := f[1]
+	f2 := f[2]
+	f3 := f[3]
+	f4 := f[4]
+	f5 := f[5]
+	f6 := f[6]
+	f7 := f[7]
+	f8 := f[8]
+	f9 := f[9]
+	f0_2 := 2 * f0
+	f1_2 := 2 * f1
+	f2_2 := 2 * f2
+	f3_2 := 2 * f3
+	f4_2 := 2 * f4
+	f5_2 := 2 * f5
+	f6_2 := 2 * f6
+	f7_2 := 2 * f7
+	f5_38 := 38 * f5 // 1.31*2^30
+	f6_19 := 19 * f6 // 1.31*2^30
+	f7_38 := 38 * f7 // 1.31*2^30
+	f8_19 := 19 * f8 // 1.31*2^30
+	f9_38 := 38 * f9 // 1.31*2^30
+	f0f0 := int64(f0) * int64(f0)
+	f0f1_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f1)
+	f0f2_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f2)
+	f0f3_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f3)
+	f0f4_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f4)
+	f0f5_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f5)
+	f0f6_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f6)
+	f0f7_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f7)
+	f0f8_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f8)
+	f0f9_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f9)
+	f1f1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f1)
+	f1f2_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f2)
+	f1f3_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f3_2)
+	f1f4_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f4)
+	f1f5_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f5_2)
+	f1f6_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f6)
+	f1f7_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f7_2)
+	f1f8_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f8)
+	f1f9_76 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f9_38)
+	f2f2 := int64(f2) * int64(f2)
+	f2f3_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f3)
+	f2f4_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f4)
+	f2f5_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f5)
+	f2f6_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f6)
+	f2f7_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f7)
+	f2f8_38 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f8_19)
+	f2f9_38 := int64(f2) * int64(f9_38)
+	f3f3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f3)
+	f3f4_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f4)
+	f3f5_4 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f5_2)
+	f3f6_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f6)
+	f3f7_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f7_38)
+	f3f8_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f8_19)
+	f3f9_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f9_38)
+	f4f4 := int64(f4) * int64(f4)
+	f4f5_2 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f5)
+	f4f6_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f6_19)
+	f4f7_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f7_38)
+	f4f8_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f8_19)
+	f4f9_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f9_38)
+	f5f5_38 := int64(f5) * int64(f5_38)
+	f5f6_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f6_19)
+	f5f7_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f7_38)
+	f5f8_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f8_19)
+	f5f9_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f9_38)
+	f6f6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(f6_19)
+	f6f7_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f7_38)
+	f6f8_38 := int64(f6_2) * int64(f8_19)
+	f6f9_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f9_38)
+	f7f7_38 := int64(f7) * int64(f7_38)
+	f7f8_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f8_19)
+	f7f9_76 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f9_38)
+	f8f8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(f8_19)
+	f8f9_38 := int64(f8) * int64(f9_38)
+	f9f9_38 := int64(f9) * int64(f9_38)
+	h0 := f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38
+	h1 := f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38
+	h2 := f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19
+	h3 := f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38
+	h4 := f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38
+	h5 := f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38
+	h6 := f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19
+	h7 := f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38
+	h8 := f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38
+	h9 := f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2
+	var carry [10]int64
+
+	carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h1 += carry[0]
+	h0 -= carry[0] << 26
+	carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h5 += carry[4]
+	h4 -= carry[4] << 26
+
+	carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h2 += carry[1]
+	h1 -= carry[1] << 25
+	carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h6 += carry[5]
+	h5 -= carry[5] << 25
+
+	carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h3 += carry[2]
+	h2 -= carry[2] << 26
+	carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h7 += carry[6]
+	h6 -= carry[6] << 26
+
+	carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h4 += carry[3]
+	h3 -= carry[3] << 25
+	carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h8 += carry[7]
+	h7 -= carry[7] << 25
+
+	carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h5 += carry[4]
+	h4 -= carry[4] << 26
+	carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h9 += carry[8]
+	h8 -= carry[8] << 26
+
+	carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h0 += carry[9] * 19
+	h9 -= carry[9] << 25
+
+	carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h1 += carry[0]
+	h0 -= carry[0] << 26
+
+	h[0] = int32(h0)
+	h[1] = int32(h1)
+	h[2] = int32(h2)
+	h[3] = int32(h3)
+	h[4] = int32(h4)
+	h[5] = int32(h5)
+	h[6] = int32(h6)
+	h[7] = int32(h7)
+	h[8] = int32(h8)
+	h[9] = int32(h9)
+}
+
+// feMul121666 calculates h = f * 121666. Can overlap h with f.
+//
+// Preconditions:
+//    |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc.
+//
+// Postconditions:
+//    |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc.
+func feMul121666(h, f *fieldElement) {
+	h0 := int64(f[0]) * 121666
+	h1 := int64(f[1]) * 121666
+	h2 := int64(f[2]) * 121666
+	h3 := int64(f[3]) * 121666
+	h4 := int64(f[4]) * 121666
+	h5 := int64(f[5]) * 121666
+	h6 := int64(f[6]) * 121666
+	h7 := int64(f[7]) * 121666
+	h8 := int64(f[8]) * 121666
+	h9 := int64(f[9]) * 121666
+	var carry [10]int64
+
+	carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h0 += carry[9] * 19
+	h9 -= carry[9] << 25
+	carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h2 += carry[1]
+	h1 -= carry[1] << 25
+	carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h4 += carry[3]
+	h3 -= carry[3] << 25
+	carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h6 += carry[5]
+	h5 -= carry[5] << 25
+	carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25
+	h8 += carry[7]
+	h7 -= carry[7] << 25
+
+	carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h1 += carry[0]
+	h0 -= carry[0] << 26
+	carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h3 += carry[2]
+	h2 -= carry[2] << 26
+	carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h5 += carry[4]
+	h4 -= carry[4] << 26
+	carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h7 += carry[6]
+	h6 -= carry[6] << 26
+	carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26
+	h9 += carry[8]
+	h8 -= carry[8] << 26
+
+	h[0] = int32(h0)
+	h[1] = int32(h1)
+	h[2] = int32(h2)
+	h[3] = int32(h3)
+	h[4] = int32(h4)
+	h[5] = int32(h5)
+	h[6] = int32(h6)
+	h[7] = int32(h7)
+	h[8] = int32(h8)
+	h[9] = int32(h9)
+}
+
+// feInvert sets out = z^-1.
+func feInvert(out, z *fieldElement) {
+	var t0, t1, t2, t3 fieldElement
+	var i int
+
+	feSquare(&t0, z)
+	for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t0, &t0)
+	}
+	feSquare(&t1, &t0)
+	for i = 1; i < 2; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t1, &t1)
+	}
+	feMul(&t1, z, &t1)
+	feMul(&t0, &t0, &t1)
+	feSquare(&t2, &t0)
+	for i = 1; i < 1; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	}
+	feMul(&t1, &t1, &t2)
+	feSquare(&t2, &t1)
+	for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	}
+	feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
+	feSquare(&t2, &t1)
+	for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	}
+	feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
+	feSquare(&t3, &t2)
+	for i = 1; i < 20; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t3, &t3)
+	}
+	feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
+	feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	for i = 1; i < 10; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	}
+	feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
+	feSquare(&t2, &t1)
+	for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	}
+	feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1)
+	feSquare(&t3, &t2)
+	for i = 1; i < 100; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t3, &t3)
+	}
+	feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2)
+	feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	for i = 1; i < 50; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t2, &t2)
+	}
+	feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1)
+	feSquare(&t1, &t1)
+	for i = 1; i < 5; i++ {
+		feSquare(&t1, &t1)
+	}
+	feMul(out, &t1, &t0)
+}
+
+func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
+	var e [32]byte
+
+	copy(e[:], in[:])
+	e[0] &= 248
+	e[31] &= 127
+	e[31] |= 64
+
+	var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 fieldElement
+	feFromBytes(&x1, base)
+	feOne(&x2)
+	feCopy(&x3, &x1)
+	feOne(&z3)
+
+	swap := int32(0)
+	for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- {
+		b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7)
+		b &= 1
+		swap ^= int32(b)
+		feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
+		feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
+		swap = int32(b)
+
+		feSub(&tmp0, &x3, &z3)
+		feSub(&tmp1, &x2, &z2)
+		feAdd(&x2, &x2, &z2)
+		feAdd(&z2, &x3, &z3)
+		feMul(&z3, &tmp0, &x2)
+		feMul(&z2, &z2, &tmp1)
+		feSquare(&tmp0, &tmp1)
+		feSquare(&tmp1, &x2)
+		feAdd(&x3, &z3, &z2)
+		feSub(&z2, &z3, &z2)
+		feMul(&x2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
+		feSub(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp0)
+		feSquare(&z2, &z2)
+		feMul121666(&z3, &tmp1)
+		feSquare(&x3, &x3)
+		feAdd(&tmp0, &tmp0, &z3)
+		feMul(&z3, &x1, &z2)
+		feMul(&z2, &tmp1, &tmp0)
+	}
+
+	feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap)
+	feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap)
+
+	feInvert(&z2, &z2)
+	feMul(&x2, &x2, &z2)
+	feToBytes(out, &x2)
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/curve_impl.go

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+package curve25519
+
+import (
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"math/big"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+var cv25519 cv25519Curve
+
+type cv25519Curve struct {
+	*elliptic.CurveParams
+}
+
+func copyReverse(dst []byte, src []byte) {
+	// Curve 25519 multiplication functions expect scalars in reverse
+	// order than PGP. To keep the curve25519Curve type consistent
+	// with other curves, we reverse it here.
+	for i, j := 0, len(src)-1; j >= 0; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
+		dst[i] = src[j]
+	}
+}
+
+func (cv25519Curve) ScalarMult(x1, y1 *big.Int, scalar []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	// Assume y1 is 0 with cv25519.
+	var dst [32]byte
+	var x1Bytes [32]byte
+	var scalarBytes [32]byte
+
+	copy(x1Bytes[:], x1.Bytes()[:32])
+	copyReverse(scalarBytes[:], scalar[:32])
+
+	scalarMult(&dst, &scalarBytes, &x1Bytes)
+
+	x = new(big.Int).SetBytes(dst[:])
+	y = new(big.Int)
+	return x, y
+}
+
+func (cv25519Curve) ScalarBaseMult(scalar []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	var dst [32]byte
+	var scalarBytes [32]byte
+	copyReverse(scalarBytes[:], scalar[:32])
+	scalarMult(&dst, &scalarBytes, &basePoint)
+	x = new(big.Int).SetBytes(dst[:])
+	y = new(big.Int)
+	return x, y
+}
+
+func (cv25519Curve) IsOnCurve(bigX, bigY *big.Int) bool {
+	return bigY.Sign() == 0 // bigY == 0 ?
+}
+
+// More information about 0x40 point format:
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-koch-eddsa-for-openpgp-00#section-3
+// In addition to uncompressed point format described here:
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637#section-6
+
+func (cv25519Curve) MarshalType40(x, y *big.Int) []byte {
+	byteLen := 32
+
+	ret := make([]byte, 1+byteLen)
+	ret[0] = 0x40
+
+	xBytes := x.Bytes()
+	copy(ret[1+byteLen-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (cv25519Curve) UnmarshalType40(data []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	if len(data) != 1+32 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	if data[0] != 0x40 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	x = new(big.Int).SetBytes(data[1:])
+	// Any x is a valid curve point.
+	return x, new(big.Int)
+}
+
+// ToCurve25519 casts given elliptic.Curve type to Curve25519 type, or
+// returns nil, false if cast was unsuccessful.
+func ToCurve25519(cv elliptic.Curve) (cv25519Curve, bool) {
+	cv2, ok := cv.(cv25519Curve)
+	return cv2, ok
+}
+
+func initCv25519() {
+	cv25519.CurveParams = &elliptic.CurveParams{Name: "Curve 25519"}
+	// Some code relies on these parameters being available for
+	// checking Curve coordinate length. They should not be used
+	// directly for any calculations.
+	cv25519.P, _ = new (big.Int).SetString("7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffed", 16)
+	cv25519.N, _ = new (big.Int).SetString("1000000000000000000000000000000014def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed", 16)
+	cv25519.Gx, _ = new (big.Int).SetString("9", 16)
+	cv25519.Gy, _ = new (big.Int).SetString("20ae19a1b8a086b4e01edd2c7748d14c923d4d7e6d7c61b229e9c5a27eced3d9", 16)
+	cv25519.BitSize = 256
+}
+
+var initonce sync.Once
+
+// Cv25519 returns a Curve which (partially) implements Cv25519. Only
+// ScalarMult and ScalarBaseMult are valid for this curve. Add and
+// Double should not be used.
+func Cv25519() elliptic.Curve {
+	initonce.Do(initCv25519)
+	return cv25519
+}
+
+func (curve cv25519Curve) Params() *elliptic.CurveParams {
+	return curve.CurveParams
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/doc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of scalar multiplication on
+// the elliptic curve known as curve25519. See http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html
+package curve25519
+
+// basePoint is the x coordinate of the generator of the curve.
+var basePoint = [32]byte{9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+
+// ScalarMult sets dst to the product in*base where dst and base are the x
+// coordinates of group points and all values are in little-endian form.
+func ScalarMult(dst, in, base *[32]byte) {
+	scalarMult(dst, in, base)
+}
+
+// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product in*base where dst and base are the x
+// coordinates of group points, base is the standard generator and all values
+// are in little-endian form.
+func ScalarBaseMult(dst, in *[32]byte) {
+	ScalarMult(dst, in, &basePoint)
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/freeze_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
+// domain sources in SUPERCOP: http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
+
+// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
+
+// func freeze(inout *[5]uint64)
+TEXT ·freeze(SB),7,$96-8
+	MOVQ inout+0(FP), DI
+
+	MOVQ SP,R11
+	MOVQ $31,CX
+	NOTQ CX
+	ANDQ CX,SP
+	ADDQ $32,SP
+
+	MOVQ R11,0(SP)
+	MOVQ R12,8(SP)
+	MOVQ R13,16(SP)
+	MOVQ R14,24(SP)
+	MOVQ R15,32(SP)
+	MOVQ BX,40(SP)
+	MOVQ BP,48(SP)
+	MOVQ 0(DI),SI
+	MOVQ 8(DI),DX
+	MOVQ 16(DI),CX
+	MOVQ 24(DI),R8
+	MOVQ 32(DI),R9
+	MOVQ ·REDMASK51(SB),AX
+	MOVQ AX,R10
+	SUBQ $18,R10
+	MOVQ $3,R11
+REDUCELOOP:
+	MOVQ SI,R12
+	SHRQ $51,R12
+	ANDQ AX,SI
+	ADDQ R12,DX
+	MOVQ DX,R12
+	SHRQ $51,R12
+	ANDQ AX,DX
+	ADDQ R12,CX
+	MOVQ CX,R12
+	SHRQ $51,R12
+	ANDQ AX,CX
+	ADDQ R12,R8
+	MOVQ R8,R12
+	SHRQ $51,R12
+	ANDQ AX,R8
+	ADDQ R12,R9
+	MOVQ R9,R12
+	SHRQ $51,R12
+	ANDQ AX,R9
+	IMUL3Q $19,R12,R12
+	ADDQ R12,SI
+	SUBQ $1,R11
+	JA REDUCELOOP
+	MOVQ $1,R12
+	CMPQ R10,SI
+	CMOVQLT R11,R12
+	CMPQ AX,DX
+	CMOVQNE R11,R12
+	CMPQ AX,CX
+	CMOVQNE R11,R12
+	CMPQ AX,R8
+	CMOVQNE R11,R12
+	CMPQ AX,R9
+	CMOVQNE R11,R12
+	NEGQ R12
+	ANDQ R12,AX
+	ANDQ R12,R10
+	SUBQ R10,SI
+	SUBQ AX,DX
+	SUBQ AX,CX
+	SUBQ AX,R8
+	SUBQ AX,R9
+	MOVQ SI,0(DI)
+	MOVQ DX,8(DI)
+	MOVQ CX,16(DI)
+	MOVQ R8,24(DI)
+	MOVQ R9,32(DI)
+	MOVQ 0(SP),R11
+	MOVQ 8(SP),R12
+	MOVQ 16(SP),R13
+	MOVQ 24(SP),R14
+	MOVQ 32(SP),R15
+	MOVQ 40(SP),BX
+	MOVQ 48(SP),BP
+	MOVQ R11,SP
+	MOVQ DI,AX
+	MOVQ SI,DX
+	RET

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/mont25519_amd64.go

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
+
+package curve25519
+
+// These functions are implemented in the .s files. The names of the functions
+// in the rest of the file are also taken from the SUPERCOP sources to help
+// people following along.
+
+//go:noescape
+
+func cswap(inout *[5]uint64, v uint64)
+
+//go:noescape
+
+func ladderstep(inout *[5][5]uint64)
+
+//go:noescape
+
+func freeze(inout *[5]uint64)
+
+//go:noescape
+
+func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64)
+
+//go:noescape
+
+func square(out, in *[5]uint64)
+
+// mladder uses a Montgomery ladder to calculate (xr/zr) *= s.
+func mladder(xr, zr *[5]uint64, s *[32]byte) {
+	var work [5][5]uint64
+
+	work[0] = *xr
+	setint(&work[1], 1)
+	setint(&work[2], 0)
+	work[3] = *xr
+	setint(&work[4], 1)
+
+	j := uint(6)
+	var prevbit byte
+
+	for i := 31; i >= 0; i-- {
+		for j < 8 {
+			bit := ((*s)[i] >> j) & 1
+			swap := bit ^ prevbit
+			prevbit = bit
+			cswap(&work[1], uint64(swap))
+			ladderstep(&work)
+			j--
+		}
+		j = 7
+	}
+
+	*xr = work[1]
+	*zr = work[2]
+}
+
+func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) {
+	var e [32]byte
+	copy(e[:], (*in)[:])
+	e[0] &= 248
+	e[31] &= 127
+	e[31] |= 64
+
+	var t, z [5]uint64
+	unpack(&t, base)
+	mladder(&t, &z, &e)
+	invert(&z, &z)
+	mul(&t, &t, &z)
+	pack(out, &t)
+}
+
+func setint(r *[5]uint64, v uint64) {
+	r[0] = v
+	r[1] = 0
+	r[2] = 0
+	r[3] = 0
+	r[4] = 0
+}
+
+// unpack sets r = x where r consists of 5, 51-bit limbs in little-endian
+// order.
+func unpack(r *[5]uint64, x *[32]byte) {
+	r[0] = uint64(x[0]) |
+		uint64(x[1])<<8 |
+		uint64(x[2])<<16 |
+		uint64(x[3])<<24 |
+		uint64(x[4])<<32 |
+		uint64(x[5])<<40 |
+		uint64(x[6]&7)<<48
+
+	r[1] = uint64(x[6])>>3 |
+		uint64(x[7])<<5 |
+		uint64(x[8])<<13 |
+		uint64(x[9])<<21 |
+		uint64(x[10])<<29 |
+		uint64(x[11])<<37 |
+		uint64(x[12]&63)<<45
+
+	r[2] = uint64(x[12])>>6 |
+		uint64(x[13])<<2 |
+		uint64(x[14])<<10 |
+		uint64(x[15])<<18 |
+		uint64(x[16])<<26 |
+		uint64(x[17])<<34 |
+		uint64(x[18])<<42 |
+		uint64(x[19]&1)<<50
+
+	r[3] = uint64(x[19])>>1 |
+		uint64(x[20])<<7 |
+		uint64(x[21])<<15 |
+		uint64(x[22])<<23 |
+		uint64(x[23])<<31 |
+		uint64(x[24])<<39 |
+		uint64(x[25]&15)<<47
+
+	r[4] = uint64(x[25])>>4 |
+		uint64(x[26])<<4 |
+		uint64(x[27])<<12 |
+		uint64(x[28])<<20 |
+		uint64(x[29])<<28 |
+		uint64(x[30])<<36 |
+		uint64(x[31]&127)<<44
+}
+
+// pack sets out = x where out is the usual, little-endian form of the 5,
+// 51-bit limbs in x.
+func pack(out *[32]byte, x *[5]uint64) {
+	t := *x
+	freeze(&t)
+
+	out[0] = byte(t[0])
+	out[1] = byte(t[0] >> 8)
+	out[2] = byte(t[0] >> 16)
+	out[3] = byte(t[0] >> 24)
+	out[4] = byte(t[0] >> 32)
+	out[5] = byte(t[0] >> 40)
+	out[6] = byte(t[0] >> 48)
+
+	out[6] ^= byte(t[1]<<3) & 0xf8
+	out[7] = byte(t[1] >> 5)
+	out[8] = byte(t[1] >> 13)
+	out[9] = byte(t[1] >> 21)
+	out[10] = byte(t[1] >> 29)
+	out[11] = byte(t[1] >> 37)
+	out[12] = byte(t[1] >> 45)
+
+	out[12] ^= byte(t[2]<<6) & 0xc0
+	out[13] = byte(t[2] >> 2)
+	out[14] = byte(t[2] >> 10)
+	out[15] = byte(t[2] >> 18)
+	out[16] = byte(t[2] >> 26)
+	out[17] = byte(t[2] >> 34)
+	out[18] = byte(t[2] >> 42)
+	out[19] = byte(t[2] >> 50)
+
+	out[19] ^= byte(t[3]<<1) & 0xfe
+	out[20] = byte(t[3] >> 7)
+	out[21] = byte(t[3] >> 15)
+	out[22] = byte(t[3] >> 23)
+	out[23] = byte(t[3] >> 31)
+	out[24] = byte(t[3] >> 39)
+	out[25] = byte(t[3] >> 47)
+
+	out[25] ^= byte(t[4]<<4) & 0xf0
+	out[26] = byte(t[4] >> 4)
+	out[27] = byte(t[4] >> 12)
+	out[28] = byte(t[4] >> 20)
+	out[29] = byte(t[4] >> 28)
+	out[30] = byte(t[4] >> 36)
+	out[31] = byte(t[4] >> 44)
+}
+
+// invert calculates r = x^-1 mod p using Fermat's little theorem.
+func invert(r *[5]uint64, x *[5]uint64) {
+	var z2, z9, z11, z2_5_0, z2_10_0, z2_20_0, z2_50_0, z2_100_0, t [5]uint64
+
+	square(&z2, x)        /* 2 */
+	square(&t, &z2)       /* 4 */
+	square(&t, &t)        /* 8 */
+	mul(&z9, &t, x)       /* 9 */
+	mul(&z11, &z9, &z2)   /* 11 */
+	square(&t, &z11)      /* 22 */
+	mul(&z2_5_0, &t, &z9) /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */
+
+	square(&t, &z2_5_0)      /* 2^6 - 2^1 */
+	for i := 1; i < 5; i++ { /* 2^20 - 2^10 */
+		square(&t, &t)
+	}
+	mul(&z2_10_0, &t, &z2_5_0) /* 2^10 - 2^0 */
+
+	square(&t, &z2_10_0)      /* 2^11 - 2^1 */
+	for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { /* 2^20 - 2^10 */
+		square(&t, &t)
+	}
+	mul(&z2_20_0, &t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^20 - 2^0 */
+
+	square(&t, &z2_20_0)      /* 2^21 - 2^1 */
+	for i := 1; i < 20; i++ { /* 2^40 - 2^20 */
+		square(&t, &t)
+	}
+	mul(&t, &t, &z2_20_0) /* 2^40 - 2^0 */
+
+	square(&t, &t)            /* 2^41 - 2^1 */
+	for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { /* 2^50 - 2^10 */
+		square(&t, &t)
+	}
+	mul(&z2_50_0, &t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^50 - 2^0 */
+
+	square(&t, &z2_50_0)      /* 2^51 - 2^1 */
+	for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { /* 2^100 - 2^50 */
+		square(&t, &t)
+	}
+	mul(&z2_100_0, &t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^100 - 2^0 */
+
+	square(&t, &z2_100_0)      /* 2^101 - 2^1 */
+	for i := 1; i < 100; i++ { /* 2^200 - 2^100 */
+		square(&t, &t)
+	}
+	mul(&t, &t, &z2_100_0) /* 2^200 - 2^0 */
+
+	square(&t, &t)            /* 2^201 - 2^1 */
+	for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { /* 2^250 - 2^50 */
+		square(&t, &t)
+	}
+	mul(&t, &t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^250 - 2^0 */
+
+	square(&t, &t) /* 2^251 - 2^1 */
+	square(&t, &t) /* 2^252 - 2^2 */
+	square(&t, &t) /* 2^253 - 2^3 */
+
+	square(&t, &t) /* 2^254 - 2^4 */
+
+	square(&t, &t)   /* 2^255 - 2^5 */
+	mul(r, &t, &z11) /* 2^255 - 21 */
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/mul_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
+// domain sources in SUPERCOP: http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
+
+// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
+
+// func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64)
+TEXT ·mul(SB),0,$128-24
+	MOVQ dest+0(FP), DI
+	MOVQ a+8(FP), SI
+	MOVQ b+16(FP), DX
+
+	MOVQ SP,R11
+	MOVQ $31,CX
+	NOTQ CX
+	ANDQ CX,SP
+	ADDQ $32,SP
+
+	MOVQ R11,0(SP)
+	MOVQ R12,8(SP)
+	MOVQ R13,16(SP)
+	MOVQ R14,24(SP)
+	MOVQ R15,32(SP)
+	MOVQ BX,40(SP)
+	MOVQ BP,48(SP)
+	MOVQ DI,56(SP)
+	MOVQ DX,CX
+	MOVQ 24(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
+	MOVQ AX,64(SP)
+	MULQ 16(CX)
+	MOVQ AX,R8
+	MOVQ DX,R9
+	MOVQ 32(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
+	MOVQ AX,72(SP)
+	MULQ 8(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R8
+	ADCQ DX,R9
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	MULQ 0(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R8
+	ADCQ DX,R9
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	MULQ 8(CX)
+	MOVQ AX,R10
+	MOVQ DX,R11
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	MULQ 16(CX)
+	MOVQ AX,R12
+	MOVQ DX,R13
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	MULQ 24(CX)
+	MOVQ AX,R14
+	MOVQ DX,R15
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	MULQ 32(CX)
+	MOVQ AX,BX
+	MOVQ DX,BP
+	MOVQ 8(SI),AX
+	MULQ 0(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R10
+	ADCQ DX,R11
+	MOVQ 8(SI),AX
+	MULQ 8(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R12
+	ADCQ DX,R13
+	MOVQ 8(SI),AX
+	MULQ 16(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R14
+	ADCQ DX,R15
+	MOVQ 8(SI),AX
+	MULQ 24(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,BX
+	ADCQ DX,BP
+	MOVQ 8(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
+	MULQ 32(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R8
+	ADCQ DX,R9
+	MOVQ 16(SI),AX
+	MULQ 0(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R12
+	ADCQ DX,R13
+	MOVQ 16(SI),AX
+	MULQ 8(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R14
+	ADCQ DX,R15
+	MOVQ 16(SI),AX
+	MULQ 16(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,BX
+	ADCQ DX,BP
+	MOVQ 16(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
+	MULQ 24(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R8
+	ADCQ DX,R9
+	MOVQ 16(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
+	MULQ 32(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R10
+	ADCQ DX,R11
+	MOVQ 24(SI),AX
+	MULQ 0(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R14
+	ADCQ DX,R15
+	MOVQ 24(SI),AX
+	MULQ 8(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,BX
+	ADCQ DX,BP
+	MOVQ 64(SP),AX
+	MULQ 24(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R10
+	ADCQ DX,R11
+	MOVQ 64(SP),AX
+	MULQ 32(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R12
+	ADCQ DX,R13
+	MOVQ 32(SI),AX
+	MULQ 0(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,BX
+	ADCQ DX,BP
+	MOVQ 72(SP),AX
+	MULQ 16(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R10
+	ADCQ DX,R11
+	MOVQ 72(SP),AX
+	MULQ 24(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R12
+	ADCQ DX,R13
+	MOVQ 72(SP),AX
+	MULQ 32(CX)
+	ADDQ AX,R14
+	ADCQ DX,R15
+	MOVQ ·REDMASK51(SB),SI
+	SHLQ $13,R9:R8
+	ANDQ SI,R8
+	SHLQ $13,R11:R10
+	ANDQ SI,R10
+	ADDQ R9,R10
+	SHLQ $13,R13:R12
+	ANDQ SI,R12
+	ADDQ R11,R12
+	SHLQ $13,R15:R14
+	ANDQ SI,R14
+	ADDQ R13,R14
+	SHLQ $13,BP:BX
+	ANDQ SI,BX
+	ADDQ R15,BX
+	IMUL3Q $19,BP,DX
+	ADDQ DX,R8
+	MOVQ R8,DX
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ADDQ R10,DX
+	MOVQ DX,CX
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ANDQ SI,R8
+	ADDQ R12,DX
+	MOVQ DX,R9
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ANDQ SI,CX
+	ADDQ R14,DX
+	MOVQ DX,AX
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ANDQ SI,R9
+	ADDQ BX,DX
+	MOVQ DX,R10
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ANDQ SI,AX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX
+	ADDQ DX,R8
+	ANDQ SI,R10
+	MOVQ R8,0(DI)
+	MOVQ CX,8(DI)
+	MOVQ R9,16(DI)
+	MOVQ AX,24(DI)
+	MOVQ R10,32(DI)
+	MOVQ 0(SP),R11
+	MOVQ 8(SP),R12
+	MOVQ 16(SP),R13
+	MOVQ 24(SP),R14
+	MOVQ 32(SP),R15
+	MOVQ 40(SP),BX
+	MOVQ 48(SP),BP
+	MOVQ R11,SP
+	MOVQ DI,AX
+	MOVQ SI,DX
+	RET

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519/square_amd64.s

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public
+// domain sources in SUPERCOP: http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
+
+// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine
+
+// func square(out, in *[5]uint64)
+TEXT ·square(SB),7,$96-16
+	MOVQ out+0(FP), DI
+	MOVQ in+8(FP), SI
+
+	MOVQ SP,R11
+	MOVQ $31,CX
+	NOTQ CX
+	ANDQ CX,SP
+	ADDQ $32, SP
+
+	MOVQ R11,0(SP)
+	MOVQ R12,8(SP)
+	MOVQ R13,16(SP)
+	MOVQ R14,24(SP)
+	MOVQ R15,32(SP)
+	MOVQ BX,40(SP)
+	MOVQ BP,48(SP)
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	MULQ 0(SI)
+	MOVQ AX,CX
+	MOVQ DX,R8
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	SHLQ $1,AX
+	MULQ 8(SI)
+	MOVQ AX,R9
+	MOVQ DX,R10
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	SHLQ $1,AX
+	MULQ 16(SI)
+	MOVQ AX,R11
+	MOVQ DX,R12
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	SHLQ $1,AX
+	MULQ 24(SI)
+	MOVQ AX,R13
+	MOVQ DX,R14
+	MOVQ 0(SI),AX
+	SHLQ $1,AX
+	MULQ 32(SI)
+	MOVQ AX,R15
+	MOVQ DX,BX
+	MOVQ 8(SI),AX
+	MULQ 8(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R11
+	ADCQ DX,R12
+	MOVQ 8(SI),AX
+	SHLQ $1,AX
+	MULQ 16(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R13
+	ADCQ DX,R14
+	MOVQ 8(SI),AX
+	SHLQ $1,AX
+	MULQ 24(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R15
+	ADCQ DX,BX
+	MOVQ 8(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
+	MULQ 32(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,CX
+	ADCQ DX,R8
+	MOVQ 16(SI),AX
+	MULQ 16(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R15
+	ADCQ DX,BX
+	MOVQ 16(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
+	MULQ 24(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,CX
+	ADCQ DX,R8
+	MOVQ 16(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
+	MULQ 32(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R9
+	ADCQ DX,R10
+	MOVQ 24(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
+	MULQ 24(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R9
+	ADCQ DX,R10
+	MOVQ 24(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX
+	MULQ 32(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R11
+	ADCQ DX,R12
+	MOVQ 32(SI),DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX
+	MULQ 32(SI)
+	ADDQ AX,R13
+	ADCQ DX,R14
+	MOVQ ·REDMASK51(SB),SI
+	SHLQ $13,R8:CX
+	ANDQ SI,CX
+	SHLQ $13,R10:R9
+	ANDQ SI,R9
+	ADDQ R8,R9
+	SHLQ $13,R12:R11
+	ANDQ SI,R11
+	ADDQ R10,R11
+	SHLQ $13,R14:R13
+	ANDQ SI,R13
+	ADDQ R12,R13
+	SHLQ $13,BX:R15
+	ANDQ SI,R15
+	ADDQ R14,R15
+	IMUL3Q $19,BX,DX
+	ADDQ DX,CX
+	MOVQ CX,DX
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ADDQ R9,DX
+	ANDQ SI,CX
+	MOVQ DX,R8
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ADDQ R11,DX
+	ANDQ SI,R8
+	MOVQ DX,R9
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ADDQ R13,DX
+	ANDQ SI,R9
+	MOVQ DX,AX
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	ADDQ R15,DX
+	ANDQ SI,AX
+	MOVQ DX,R10
+	SHRQ $51,DX
+	IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX
+	ADDQ DX,CX
+	ANDQ SI,R10
+	MOVQ CX,0(DI)
+	MOVQ R8,8(DI)
+	MOVQ R9,16(DI)
+	MOVQ AX,24(DI)
+	MOVQ R10,32(DI)
+	MOVQ 0(SP),R11
+	MOVQ 8(SP),R12
+	MOVQ 16(SP),R13
+	MOVQ 24(SP),R14
+	MOVQ 32(SP),R15
+	MOVQ 40(SP),BX
+	MOVQ 48(SP),BP
+	MOVQ R11,SP
+	MOVQ DI,AX
+	MOVQ SI,DX
+	RET

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
+// http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
+//
+// These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa-05.
+package ed25519
+
+// This code is a port of the public domain, “ref10” implementation of ed25519
+// from SUPERCOP.
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	cryptorand "crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519"
+)
+
+const (
+	// PublicKeySize is the size, in bytes, of public keys as used in this package.
+	PublicKeySize = 32
+	// PrivateKeySize is the size, in bytes, of private keys as used in this package.
+	PrivateKeySize = 64
+	// SignatureSize is the size, in bytes, of signatures generated and verified by this package.
+	SignatureSize = 64
+)
+
+// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys.
+type PublicKey []byte
+
+// PrivateKey is the type of Ed25519 private keys. It implements crypto.Signer.
+type PrivateKey []byte
+
+// Public returns the PublicKey corresponding to priv.
+func (priv PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+	publicKey := make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
+	copy(publicKey, priv[32:])
+	return PublicKey(publicKey)
+}
+
+// Sign signs the given message with priv.
+// Ed25519 performs two passes over messages to be signed and therefore cannot
+// handle pre-hashed messages. Thus opts.HashFunc() must return zero to
+// indicate the message hasn't been hashed. This can be achieved by passing
+// crypto.Hash(0) as the value for opts.
+func (priv PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, message []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) (signature []byte, err error) {
+	if opts.HashFunc() != crypto.Hash(0) {
+		return nil, errors.New("ed25519: cannot sign hashed message")
+	}
+
+	return Sign(priv, message), nil
+}
+
+// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand.
+// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used.
+func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (publicKey PublicKey, privateKey PrivateKey, err error) {
+	if rand == nil {
+		rand = cryptorand.Reader
+	}
+
+	privateKey = make([]byte, PrivateKeySize)
+	publicKey = make([]byte, PublicKeySize)
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, privateKey[:32])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	digest := sha512.Sum512(privateKey[:32])
+	digest[0] &= 248
+	digest[31] &= 127
+	digest[31] |= 64
+
+	var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
+	var hBytes [32]byte
+	copy(hBytes[:], digest[:])
+	edwards25519.GeScalarMultBase(&A, &hBytes)
+	var publicKeyBytes [32]byte
+	A.ToBytes(&publicKeyBytes)
+
+	copy(privateKey[32:], publicKeyBytes[:])
+	copy(publicKey, publicKeyBytes[:])
+
+	return publicKey, privateKey, nil
+}
+
+// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will
+// panic if len(privateKey) is not PrivateKeySize.
+func Sign(privateKey PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
+	if l := len(privateKey); l != PrivateKeySize {
+		panic("ed25519: bad private key length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
+	}
+
+	h := sha512.New()
+	h.Write(privateKey[:32])
+
+	var digest1, messageDigest, hramDigest [64]byte
+	var expandedSecretKey [32]byte
+	h.Sum(digest1[:0])
+	copy(expandedSecretKey[:], digest1[:])
+	expandedSecretKey[0] &= 248
+	expandedSecretKey[31] &= 63
+	expandedSecretKey[31] |= 64
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(digest1[32:])
+	h.Write(message)
+	h.Sum(messageDigest[:0])
+
+	var messageDigestReduced [32]byte
+	edwards25519.ScReduce(&messageDigestReduced, &messageDigest)
+	var R edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
+	edwards25519.GeScalarMultBase(&R, &messageDigestReduced)
+
+	var encodedR [32]byte
+	R.ToBytes(&encodedR)
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(encodedR[:])
+	h.Write(privateKey[32:])
+	h.Write(message)
+	h.Sum(hramDigest[:0])
+	var hramDigestReduced [32]byte
+	edwards25519.ScReduce(&hramDigestReduced, &hramDigest)
+
+	var s [32]byte
+	edwards25519.ScMulAdd(&s, &hramDigestReduced, &expandedSecretKey, &messageDigestReduced)
+
+	signature := make([]byte, SignatureSize)
+	copy(signature[:], encodedR[:])
+	copy(signature[32:], s[:])
+
+	return signature
+}
+
+// Verify reports whether sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey. It
+// will panic if len(publicKey) is not PublicKeySize.
+func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool {
+	if l := len(publicKey); l != PublicKeySize {
+		panic("ed25519: bad public key length: " + strconv.Itoa(l))
+	}
+
+	if len(sig) != SignatureSize || sig[63]&224 != 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
+	var publicKeyBytes [32]byte
+	copy(publicKeyBytes[:], publicKey)
+	if !A.FromBytes(&publicKeyBytes) {
+		return false
+	}
+	edwards25519.FeNeg(&A.X, &A.X)
+	edwards25519.FeNeg(&A.T, &A.T)
+
+	h := sha512.New()
+	h.Write(sig[:32])
+	h.Write(publicKey[:])
+	h.Write(message)
+	var digest [64]byte
+	h.Sum(digest[:0])
+
+	var hReduced [32]byte
+	edwards25519.ScReduce(&hReduced, &digest)
+
+	var R edwards25519.ProjectiveGroupElement
+	var b [32]byte
+	copy(b[:], sig[32:])
+	edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &b)
+
+	var checkR [32]byte
+	R.ToBytes(&checkR)
+	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(sig[:32], checkR[:]) == 1
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/armor/armor.go

@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package armor implements OpenPGP ASCII Armor, see RFC 4880. OpenPGP Armor is
+// very similar to PEM except that it has an additional CRC checksum.
+package armor // import "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/armor"
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"io"
+	"strings"
+	"unicode"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+)
+
+// A Block represents an OpenPGP armored structure.
+//
+// The encoded form is:
+//    -----BEGIN Type-----
+//    Headers
+//
+//    base64-encoded Bytes
+//    '=' base64 encoded checksum
+//    -----END Type-----
+// where Headers is a possibly empty sequence of Key: Value lines.
+//
+// Since the armored data can be very large, this package presents a streaming
+// interface.
+type Block struct {
+	Type    string            // The type, taken from the preamble (i.e. "PGP SIGNATURE").
+	Header  map[string]string // Optional headers.
+	Body    io.Reader         // A Reader from which the contents can be read
+	lReader lineReader
+	oReader openpgpReader
+}
+
+var ArmorCorrupt error = errors.StructuralError("armor invalid")
+
+const crc24Init = 0xb704ce
+const crc24Poly = 0x1864cfb
+const crc24Mask = 0xffffff
+
+// crc24 calculates the OpenPGP checksum as specified in RFC 4880, section 6.1
+func crc24(crc uint32, d []byte) uint32 {
+	for _, b := range d {
+		crc ^= uint32(b) << 16
+		for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+			crc <<= 1
+			if crc&0x1000000 != 0 {
+				crc ^= crc24Poly
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return crc
+}
+
+var armorStart = []byte("-----BEGIN ")
+var armorEnd = []byte("-----END ")
+var armorEndOfLine = []byte("-----")
+
+// lineReader wraps a line based reader. It watches for the end of an armor
+// block and records the expected CRC value.
+type lineReader struct {
+	in  *bufio.Reader
+	buf []byte
+	eof bool
+	crc *uint32
+}
+
+// ourIsSpace checks if a rune is either space according to unicode
+// package, or ZeroWidthSpace (which is not a space according to
+// unicode module). Used to trim lines during header reading.
+func ourIsSpace(r rune) bool {
+	return r == '\u200b' || unicode.IsSpace(r)
+}
+
+func (l *lineReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	if l.eof {
+		return 0, io.EOF
+	}
+
+	if len(l.buf) > 0 {
+		n = copy(p, l.buf)
+		l.buf = l.buf[n:]
+		return
+	}
+
+	line, _, err := l.in.ReadLine()
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	line = bytes.TrimFunc(line, ourIsSpace)
+
+	if len(line) == 5 && line[0] == '=' {
+		// This is the checksum line
+		var expectedBytes [3]byte
+		var m int
+		m, err = base64.StdEncoding.Decode(expectedBytes[0:], line[1:])
+		if m != 3 || err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		crc := uint32(expectedBytes[0])<<16 |
+			uint32(expectedBytes[1])<<8 |
+			uint32(expectedBytes[2])
+		l.crc = &crc
+
+		for {
+			line, _, err = l.in.ReadLine()
+			if err != nil && err != io.EOF {
+				return
+			}
+			if len(strings.TrimSpace(string(line))) > 0 {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if !bytes.HasPrefix(line, armorEnd) {
+			return 0, ArmorCorrupt
+		}
+
+		l.eof = true
+		return 0, io.EOF
+	}
+
+	if bytes.HasPrefix(line, armorEnd) {
+		// Unexpected ending, there was no checksum.
+		l.eof = true
+		l.crc = nil
+		return 0, io.EOF
+	}
+
+	n = copy(p, line)
+	bytesToSave := len(line) - n
+	if bytesToSave > 0 {
+		if cap(l.buf) < bytesToSave {
+			l.buf = make([]byte, 0, bytesToSave)
+		}
+		l.buf = l.buf[0:bytesToSave]
+		copy(l.buf, line[n:])
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// openpgpReader passes Read calls to the underlying base64 decoder, but keeps
+// a running CRC of the resulting data and checks the CRC against the value
+// found by the lineReader at EOF.
+type openpgpReader struct {
+	lReader    *lineReader
+	b64Reader  io.Reader
+	currentCRC uint32
+}
+
+func (r *openpgpReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	n, err = r.b64Reader.Read(p)
+	r.currentCRC = crc24(r.currentCRC, p[:n])
+
+	if err == io.EOF {
+		if r.lReader.crc != nil && *r.lReader.crc != uint32(r.currentCRC&crc24Mask) {
+			return 0, ArmorCorrupt
+		}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// Decode reads a PGP armored block from the given Reader. It will ignore
+// leading garbage. If it doesn't find a block, it will return nil, io.EOF. The
+// given Reader is not usable after calling this function: an arbitrary amount
+// of data may have been read past the end of the block.
+func Decode(in io.Reader) (p *Block, err error) {
+	r := bufio.NewReaderSize(in, 100)
+	var line []byte
+	ignoreNext := false
+
+TryNextBlock:
+	p = nil
+
+	// Skip leading garbage
+	for {
+		ignoreThis := ignoreNext
+		line, ignoreNext, err = r.ReadLine()
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if ignoreNext || ignoreThis {
+			continue
+		}
+		line = bytes.TrimSpace(line)
+		if len(line) > len(armorStart)+len(armorEndOfLine) && bytes.HasPrefix(line, armorStart) {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	p = new(Block)
+	p.Type = string(line[len(armorStart) : len(line)-len(armorEndOfLine)])
+	p.Header = make(map[string]string)
+	nextIsContinuation := false
+	var lastKey string
+
+	// Read headers
+	for {
+		isContinuation := nextIsContinuation
+		line, nextIsContinuation, err = r.ReadLine()
+		if err != nil {
+			p = nil
+			return
+		}
+		if isContinuation {
+			p.Header[lastKey] += string(line)
+			continue
+		}
+		line = bytes.TrimFunc(line, ourIsSpace)
+		if len(line) == 0 {
+			break
+		}
+
+		i := bytes.Index(line, []byte(": "))
+		if i == -1 {
+			goto TryNextBlock
+		}
+		lastKey = string(line[:i])
+		p.Header[lastKey] = string(line[i+2:])
+	}
+
+	p.lReader.in = r
+	p.oReader.currentCRC = crc24Init
+	p.oReader.lReader = &p.lReader
+	p.oReader.b64Reader = base64.NewDecoder(base64.StdEncoding, &p.lReader)
+	p.Body = &p.oReader
+
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/armor/encode.go

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package armor
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"io"
+)
+
+var armorHeaderSep = []byte(": ")
+var blockEnd = []byte("\n=")
+var newline = []byte("\n")
+var armorEndOfLineOut = []byte("-----\n")
+
+// writeSlices writes its arguments to the given Writer.
+func writeSlices(out io.Writer, slices ...[]byte) (err error) {
+	for _, s := range slices {
+		_, err = out.Write(s)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// lineBreaker breaks data across several lines, all of the same byte length
+// (except possibly the last). Lines are broken with a single '\n'.
+type lineBreaker struct {
+	lineLength  int
+	line        []byte
+	used        int
+	out         io.Writer
+	haveWritten bool
+}
+
+func newLineBreaker(out io.Writer, lineLength int) *lineBreaker {
+	return &lineBreaker{
+		lineLength: lineLength,
+		line:       make([]byte, lineLength),
+		used:       0,
+		out:        out,
+	}
+}
+
+func (l *lineBreaker) Write(b []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	n = len(b)
+
+	if n == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if l.used == 0 && l.haveWritten {
+		_, err = l.out.Write([]byte{'\n'})
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	if l.used+len(b) < l.lineLength {
+		l.used += copy(l.line[l.used:], b)
+		return
+	}
+
+	l.haveWritten = true
+	_, err = l.out.Write(l.line[0:l.used])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	excess := l.lineLength - l.used
+	l.used = 0
+
+	_, err = l.out.Write(b[0:excess])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = l.Write(b[excess:])
+	return
+}
+
+func (l *lineBreaker) Close() (err error) {
+	if l.used > 0 {
+		_, err = l.out.Write(l.line[0:l.used])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// encoding keeps track of a running CRC24 over the data which has been written
+// to it and outputs a OpenPGP checksum when closed, followed by an armor
+// trailer.
+//
+// It's built into a stack of io.Writers:
+//    encoding -> base64 encoder -> lineBreaker -> out
+type encoding struct {
+	out       io.Writer
+	breaker   *lineBreaker
+	b64       io.WriteCloser
+	crc       uint32
+	blockType []byte
+}
+
+func (e *encoding) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	e.crc = crc24(e.crc, data)
+	return e.b64.Write(data)
+}
+
+func (e *encoding) Close() (err error) {
+	err = e.b64.Close()
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	e.breaker.Close()
+
+	var checksumBytes [3]byte
+	checksumBytes[0] = byte(e.crc >> 16)
+	checksumBytes[1] = byte(e.crc >> 8)
+	checksumBytes[2] = byte(e.crc)
+
+	var b64ChecksumBytes [4]byte
+	base64.StdEncoding.Encode(b64ChecksumBytes[:], checksumBytes[:])
+
+	return writeSlices(e.out, blockEnd, b64ChecksumBytes[:], newline, armorEnd, e.blockType, armorEndOfLine, []byte{'\n'})
+}
+
+// Encode returns a WriteCloser which will encode the data written to it in
+// OpenPGP armor.
+func Encode(out io.Writer, blockType string, headers map[string]string) (w io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	bType := []byte(blockType)
+	err = writeSlices(out, armorStart, bType, armorEndOfLineOut)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	for k, v := range headers {
+		err = writeSlices(out, []byte(k), armorHeaderSep, []byte(v), newline)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	_, err = out.Write(newline)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	e := &encoding{
+		out:       out,
+		breaker:   newLineBreaker(out, 64),
+		crc:       crc24Init,
+		blockType: bType,
+	}
+	e.b64 = base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, e.breaker)
+	return e, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/canonical_text.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package openpgp
+
+import "hash"
+
+// NewCanonicalTextHash reformats text written to it into the canonical
+// form and then applies the hash h.  See RFC 4880, section 5.2.1.
+func NewCanonicalTextHash(h hash.Hash) hash.Hash {
+	return &canonicalTextHash{h, 0}
+}
+
+type canonicalTextHash struct {
+	h hash.Hash
+	s int
+}
+
+var newline = []byte{'\r', '\n'}
+
+func (cth *canonicalTextHash) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) {
+	start := 0
+
+	for i, c := range buf {
+		switch cth.s {
+		case 0:
+			if c == '\r' {
+				cth.s = 1
+			} else if c == '\n' {
+				cth.h.Write(buf[start:i])
+				cth.h.Write(newline)
+				start = i + 1
+			}
+		case 1:
+			cth.s = 0
+		}
+	}
+
+	cth.h.Write(buf[start:])
+	return len(buf), nil
+}
+
+func (cth *canonicalTextHash) Sum(in []byte) []byte {
+	return cth.h.Sum(in)
+}
+
+func (cth *canonicalTextHash) Reset() {
+	cth.h.Reset()
+	cth.s = 0
+}
+
+func (cth *canonicalTextHash) Size() int {
+	return cth.h.Size()
+}
+
+func (cth *canonicalTextHash) BlockSize() int {
+	return cth.h.BlockSize()
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/ecdh/ecdh.go

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+package ecdh
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+type PublicKey struct {
+	elliptic.Curve
+	X, Y *big.Int
+}
+
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	X *big.Int
+}
+
+// KDF implements Key Derivation Function as described in
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637#section-7
+func (e *PublicKey) KDF(S []byte, kdfParams []byte, hash crypto.Hash) []byte {
+	sLen := (e.Curve.Params().P.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
+	buf.Write([]byte{0, 0, 0, 1})
+	if sLen > len(S) {
+		// zero-pad the S. If we got invalid S (bigger than curve's
+		// P), we are going to produce invalid key. Garbage in,
+		// garbage out.
+		buf.Write(make([]byte, sLen-len(S)))
+	}
+	buf.Write(S)
+	buf.Write(kdfParams)
+
+	hashw := hash.New()
+
+	hashw.Write(buf.Bytes())
+	key := hashw.Sum(nil)
+
+	return key
+}
+
+// AESKeyUnwrap implements RFC 3394 Key Unwrapping. See
+// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394#section-2.2.1
+// Note: The second described algorithm ("index-based") is implemented
+// here.
+func AESKeyUnwrap(key, cipherText []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(cipherText)%8 != 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("cipherText must by a multiple of 64 bits")
+	}
+
+	cipher, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	nblocks := len(cipherText)/8 - 1
+
+	// 1) Initialize variables.
+	// - Set A = C[0]
+	var A [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	copy(A[:8], cipherText[:8])
+
+	// For i = 1 to n
+	//   Set R[i] = C[i]
+	R := make([]byte, len(cipherText)-8)
+	copy(R, cipherText[8:])
+
+	// 2) Compute intermediate values.
+	for j := 5; j >= 0; j-- {
+		for i := nblocks - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+			// B = AES-1(K, (A ^ t) | R[i]) where t = n*j+i
+			// A = MSB(64, B)
+			t := uint64(nblocks*j + i + 1)
+			At := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(A[:8]) ^ t
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(A[:8], At)
+
+			copy(A[8:], R[i*8:i*8+8])
+			cipher.Decrypt(A[:], A[:])
+
+			// R[i] = LSB(B, 64)
+			copy(R[i*8:i*8+8], A[8:])
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 3) Output results.
+	// If A is an appropriate initial value (see 2.2.3),
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		if A[i] != 0xA6 {
+			return nil, errors.New("Failed to unwrap key (A is not IV)")
+		}
+	}
+
+	return R, nil
+}
+
+// AESKeyWrap implements RFC 3394 Key Wrapping. See
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394#section-2.2.2
+// Note: The second described algorithm ("index-based") is implemented
+// here.
+func AESKeyWrap(key, plainText []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(plainText)%8 != 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("plainText must be a multiple of 64 bits")
+	}
+
+	cipher, err := aes.NewCipher(key) // NewCipher checks key size
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	nblocks := len(plainText) / 8
+
+	// 1) Initialize variables.
+	var A [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	// Section 2.2.3.1 -- Initial Value
+	// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394#section-2.2.3.1
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
+		A[i] = 0xA6
+	}
+
+	// For i = 1 to n
+	//   Set R[i] = P[i]
+	R := make([]byte, len(plainText))
+	copy(R, plainText)
+
+	// 2) Calculate intermediate values.
+	for j := 0; j <= 5; j++ {
+		for i := 0; i < nblocks; i++ {
+			// B = AES(K, A | R[i])
+			copy(A[8:], R[i*8:i*8+8])
+			cipher.Encrypt(A[:], A[:])
+
+			// (Assume B = A)
+			// A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+1
+			t := uint64(j*nblocks + i + 1)
+			At := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(A[:8]) ^ t
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(A[:8], At)
+
+			// R[i] = LSB(64, B)
+			copy(R[i*8:i*8+8], A[8:])
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 3) Output results.
+	// Set C[0] = A
+	// For i = 1 to n
+	//   C[i] = R[i]
+	return append(A[:8], R...), nil
+}
+
+// PadBuffer pads byte buffer buf to a length being multiple of
+// blockLen. Additional bytes appended to the buffer have value of the
+// number padded bytes. E.g. if the buffer is 3 bytes short of being
+// 40 bytes total, the appended bytes will be [03, 03, 03].
+func PadBuffer(buf []byte, blockLen int) []byte {
+	padding := blockLen - (len(buf) % blockLen)
+	if padding == 0 {
+		return buf
+	}
+
+	padBuf := make([]byte, padding)
+	for i := 0; i < padding; i++ {
+		padBuf[i] = byte(padding)
+	}
+
+	return append(buf, padBuf...)
+}
+
+// UnpadBuffer verifies that buffer contains proper padding and
+// returns buffer without the padding, or nil if the padding was
+// invalid.
+func UnpadBuffer(buf []byte, dataLen int) []byte {
+	padding := len(buf) - dataLen
+	outBuf := buf[:dataLen]
+
+	for i := dataLen; i < len(buf); i++ {
+		if buf[i] != byte(padding) {
+			// Invalid padding - bail out
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	return outBuf
+}
+
+func (e *PublicKey) Encrypt(random io.Reader, kdfParams []byte, plain []byte, hash crypto.Hash, kdfKeySize int) (Vx *big.Int, Vy *big.Int, C []byte, err error) {
+	// Vx, Vy - encryption key
+
+	// Note for Curve 25519 - curve25519 library already does key
+	// clamping in scalarMult, so we can use generic random scalar
+	// generation from elliptic.
+	priv, Vx, Vy, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(e.Curve, random)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Sx, Sy - shared secret
+	Sx, _ := e.Curve.ScalarMult(e.X, e.Y, priv)
+
+	// Encrypt the payload with KDF-ed S as the encryption key. Pass
+	// the ciphertext along with V to the recipient. Recipient can
+	// generate S using V and their priv key, and then KDF(S), on
+	// their own, to get encryption key and decrypt the ciphertext,
+	// revealing encryption key for symmetric encryption later.
+
+	plain = PadBuffer(plain, 8)
+	key := e.KDF(Sx.Bytes(), kdfParams, hash)
+
+	// Take only as many bytes from key as the key length (the hash
+	// result might be bigger)
+	encrypted, err := AESKeyWrap(key[:kdfKeySize], plain)
+
+	return Vx, Vy, encrypted, nil
+}
+
+func (e *PrivateKey) DecryptShared(X, Y *big.Int) []byte {
+	Sx, _ := e.Curve.ScalarMult(X, Y, e.X.Bytes())
+	return Sx.Bytes()
+}
+
+func countBits(buffer []byte) int {
+	var headerLen int
+	switch buffer[0] {
+	case 0x4:
+		headerLen = 3
+	case 0x40:
+		headerLen = 7
+	default:
+		// Unexpected header - but we can still count the bits.
+		val := buffer[0]
+		headerLen = 0
+		for val > 0 {
+			val = val / 2
+			headerLen++
+		}
+	}
+
+	return headerLen + (len(buffer)-1)*8
+}
+
+// elliptic.Marshal and elliptic.Unmarshal only marshals uncompressed
+// 0x4 MPI types. These functions will check if the curve is cv25519,
+// and if so, use 0x40 compressed type to (un)marshal. Otherwise,
+// elliptic.(Un)marshal will be called.
+
+// Marshal encodes point into either 0x4 uncompressed point form, or
+// 0x40 compressed point for Curve 25519.
+func Marshal(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) (buf []byte, bitSize int) {
+	// NOTE: Read more about MPI encoding in the RFC:
+	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-3.2
+
+	// We are required to encode size in bits, counting from the most-
+	// significant non-zero bit. So assuming that the buffer never
+	// starts with 0x00, we only need to count bits in the first byte
+	// - and in current implentation it will always be 0x4 or 0x40.
+
+	cv, ok := curve25519.ToCurve25519(curve)
+	if ok {
+		buf = cv.MarshalType40(x, y)
+	} else {
+		buf = elliptic.Marshal(curve, x, y)
+	}
+
+	return buf, countBits(buf)
+}
+
+// Unmarshal converts point, serialized by Marshal, into x, y pair.
+// For 0x40 compressed points (for Curve 25519), y will always be 0.
+// It is an error if point is not on the curve, On error, x = nil.
+func Unmarshal(curve elliptic.Curve, data []byte) (x, y *big.Int) {
+	cv, ok := curve25519.ToCurve25519(curve)
+	if ok {
+		return cv.UnmarshalType40(data)
+	}
+
+	return elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, data)
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/elgamal/elgamal.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package elgamal implements ElGamal encryption, suitable for OpenPGP,
+// as specified in "A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on
+// Discrete Logarithms," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, v. IT-31,
+// n. 4, 1985, pp. 469-472.
+//
+// This form of ElGamal embeds PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, which may make it
+// unsuitable for other protocols. RSA should be used in preference in any
+// case.
+package elgamal // import "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/elgamal"
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+// PublicKey represents an ElGamal public key.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	G, P, Y *big.Int
+}
+
+// PrivateKey represents an ElGamal private key.
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	X *big.Int
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts the given message to the given public key. The result is a
+// pair of integers. Errors can result from reading random, or because msg is
+// too large to be encrypted to the public key.
+func Encrypt(random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (c1, c2 *big.Int, err error) {
+	pLen := (pub.P.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(msg) > pLen-11 {
+		err = errors.New("elgamal: message too long")
+		return
+	}
+
+	// EM = 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M
+	em := make([]byte, pLen-1)
+	em[0] = 2
+	ps, mm := em[1:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]
+	err = nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, random)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0
+	copy(mm, msg)
+
+	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+
+	k, err := rand.Int(random, pub.P)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	c1 = new(big.Int).Exp(pub.G, k, pub.P)
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(pub.Y, k, pub.P)
+	c2 = s.Mul(s, m)
+	c2.Mod(c2, pub.P)
+
+	return
+}
+
+// Decrypt takes two integers, resulting from an ElGamal encryption, and
+// returns the plaintext of the message. An error can result only if the
+// ciphertext is invalid. Users should keep in mind that this is a padding
+// oracle and thus, if exposed to an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, can
+// be used to break the cryptosystem.  See ``Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
+// Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1'', Daniel
+// Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology (Crypto '98),
+func Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, c1, c2 *big.Int) (msg []byte, err error) {
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(c1, priv.X, priv.P)
+	s.ModInverse(s, priv.P)
+	s.Mul(s, c2)
+	s.Mod(s, priv.P)
+	em := s.Bytes()
+
+	firstByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 2)
+
+	// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random
+	// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.
+	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.
+	//   index: the offset of the first zero byte.
+	var lookingForIndex, index int
+	lookingForIndex = 1
+
+	for i := 1; i < len(em); i++ {
+		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)
+		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)
+		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)
+	}
+
+	if firstByteIsTwo != 1 || lookingForIndex != 0 || index < 9 {
+		return nil, errors.New("elgamal: decryption error")
+	}
+	return em[index+1:], nil
+}
+
+// nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.
+func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, rand io.Reader) (err error) {
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
+		for s[i] == 0 {
+			_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s[i:i+1])
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package errors contains common error types for the OpenPGP packages.
+package errors // import "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+
+import (
+	"strconv"
+)
+
+// A StructuralError is returned when OpenPGP data is found to be syntactically
+// invalid.
+type StructuralError string
+
+func (s StructuralError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: invalid data: " + string(s)
+}
+
+// UnsupportedError indicates that, although the OpenPGP data is valid, it
+// makes use of currently unimplemented features.
+type UnsupportedError string
+
+func (s UnsupportedError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: unsupported feature: " + string(s)
+}
+
+// InvalidArgumentError indicates that the caller is in error and passed an
+// incorrect value.
+type InvalidArgumentError string
+
+func (i InvalidArgumentError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: invalid argument: " + string(i)
+}
+
+// SignatureError indicates that a syntactically valid signature failed to
+// validate.
+type SignatureError string
+
+func (b SignatureError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: invalid signature: " + string(b)
+}
+
+type keyIncorrectError int
+
+func (ki keyIncorrectError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: incorrect key"
+}
+
+var ErrKeyIncorrect error = keyIncorrectError(0)
+
+type unknownIssuerError int
+
+func (unknownIssuerError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: signature made by unknown entity"
+}
+
+var ErrUnknownIssuer error = unknownIssuerError(0)
+
+type keyRevokedError int
+
+func (keyRevokedError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: signature made by revoked key"
+}
+
+var ErrKeyRevoked error = keyRevokedError(0)
+
+type UnknownPacketTypeError uint8
+
+func (upte UnknownPacketTypeError) Error() string {
+	return "openpgp: unknown packet type: " + strconv.Itoa(int(upte))
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/keys.go

@@ -0,0 +1,902 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package openpgp
+
+import (
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/armor"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa"
+)
+
+// PublicKeyType is the armor type for a PGP public key.
+var PublicKeyType = "PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK"
+
+// PrivateKeyType is the armor type for a PGP private key.
+var PrivateKeyType = "PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK"
+
+// An Entity represents the components of an OpenPGP key: a primary public key
+// (which must be a signing key), one or more identities claimed by that key,
+// and zero or more subkeys, which may be encryption keys.
+type Entity struct {
+	PrimaryKey  *packet.PublicKey
+	PrivateKey  *packet.PrivateKey
+	Identities  map[string]*Identity // indexed by Identity.Name
+	Revocations []*packet.Signature
+	// Revocations that are signed by designated revokers. Reading keys
+	// will not verify these revocations, because it won't have access to
+	// issuers' public keys, API consumers should do this instead (or
+	// not, and just assume that the key is probably revoked).
+	UnverifiedRevocations []*packet.Signature
+	Subkeys               []Subkey
+	BadSubkeys            []BadSubkey
+}
+
+// An Identity represents an identity claimed by an Entity and zero or more
+// assertions by other entities about that claim.
+type Identity struct {
+	Name          string // by convention, has the form "Full Name (comment) <email@example.com>"
+	UserId        *packet.UserId
+	SelfSignature *packet.Signature
+	Signatures    []*packet.Signature
+	Revocation    *packet.Signature
+}
+
+// A Subkey is an additional public key in an Entity. Subkeys can be used for
+// encryption.
+type Subkey struct {
+	PublicKey  *packet.PublicKey
+	PrivateKey *packet.PrivateKey
+	Sig        *packet.Signature
+	Revocation *packet.Signature
+}
+
+// BadSubkey is one that failed reconstruction, but we'll keep it around for
+// informational purposes.
+type BadSubkey struct {
+	Subkey
+	Err error
+}
+
+// A Key identifies a specific public key in an Entity. This is either the
+// Entity's primary key or a subkey.
+type Key struct {
+	Entity        *Entity
+	PublicKey     *packet.PublicKey
+	PrivateKey    *packet.PrivateKey
+	SelfSignature *packet.Signature
+	KeyFlags      packet.KeyFlagBits
+}
+
+// A KeyRing provides access to public and private keys.
+type KeyRing interface {
+
+	// KeysById returns the set of keys that have the given key id.
+	// fp can be optionally supplied, which is the full key fingerprint.
+	// If it's provided, then it must match. This comes up in the case
+	// of GPG subpacket 33.
+	KeysById(id uint64, fp []byte) []Key
+
+	// KeysByIdAndUsage returns the set of keys with the given id
+	// that also meet the key usage given by requiredUsage.
+	// The requiredUsage is expressed as the bitwise-OR of
+	// packet.KeyFlag* values.
+	// fp can be optionally supplied, which is the full key fingerprint.
+	// If it's provided, then it must match. This comes up in the case
+	// of GPG subpacket 33.
+	KeysByIdUsage(id uint64, fp []byte, requiredUsage byte) []Key
+
+	// DecryptionKeys returns all private keys that are valid for
+	// decryption.
+	DecryptionKeys() []Key
+}
+
+// primaryIdentity returns the Identity marked as primary or the first identity
+// if none are so marked.
+func (e *Entity) primaryIdentity() *Identity {
+	var firstIdentity *Identity
+	for _, ident := range e.Identities {
+		if firstIdentity == nil {
+			firstIdentity = ident
+		}
+		if ident.SelfSignature.IsPrimaryId != nil && *ident.SelfSignature.IsPrimaryId {
+			return ident
+		}
+	}
+	return firstIdentity
+}
+
+// encryptionKey returns the best candidate Key for encrypting a message to the
+// given Entity.
+func (e *Entity) encryptionKey(now time.Time) (Key, bool) {
+	candidateSubkey := -1
+
+	// Iterate the keys to find the newest key
+	var maxTime time.Time
+	for i, subkey := range e.Subkeys {
+
+		// NOTE(maxtaco)
+		// If there is a Flags subpacket, then we have to follow it, and only
+		// use keys that are marked for Encryption of Communication.  If there
+		// isn't a Flags subpacket, and this is an Encrypt-Only key (right now only ElGamal
+		// suffices), then we implicitly use it. The check for primary below is a little
+		// more open-ended, but for now, let's be strict and potentially open up
+		// if we see bugs in the wild.
+		//
+		// One more note: old DSA/ElGamal keys tend not to have the Flags subpacket,
+		// so this sort of thing is pretty important for encrypting to older keys.
+		//
+		if ((subkey.Sig.FlagsValid && subkey.Sig.FlagEncryptCommunications) ||
+			(!subkey.Sig.FlagsValid && subkey.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo == packet.PubKeyAlgoElGamal)) &&
+			subkey.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo.CanEncrypt() &&
+			!subkey.Sig.KeyExpired(now) &&
+			subkey.Revocation == nil &&
+			(maxTime.IsZero() || subkey.Sig.CreationTime.After(maxTime)) {
+			candidateSubkey = i
+			maxTime = subkey.Sig.CreationTime
+		}
+	}
+
+	if candidateSubkey != -1 {
+		subkey := e.Subkeys[candidateSubkey]
+		return Key{e, subkey.PublicKey, subkey.PrivateKey, subkey.Sig, subkey.Sig.GetKeyFlags()}, true
+	}
+
+	// If we don't have any candidate subkeys for encryption and
+	// the primary key doesn't have any usage metadata then we
+	// assume that the primary key is ok. Or, if the primary key is
+	// marked as ok to encrypt to, then we can obviously use it.
+	//
+	// NOTE(maxtaco) - see note above, how this policy is a little too open-ended
+	// for my liking, but leave it for now.
+	i := e.primaryIdentity()
+	if (!i.SelfSignature.FlagsValid || i.SelfSignature.FlagEncryptCommunications) &&
+		e.PrimaryKey.PubKeyAlgo.CanEncrypt() &&
+		!i.SelfSignature.KeyExpired(now) {
+		return Key{e, e.PrimaryKey, e.PrivateKey, i.SelfSignature, i.SelfSignature.GetKeyFlags()}, true
+	}
+
+	// This Entity appears to be signing only.
+	return Key{}, false
+}
+
+// signingKey return the best candidate Key for signing a message with this
+// Entity.
+func (e *Entity) signingKey(now time.Time) (Key, bool) {
+	candidateSubkey := -1
+
+	for i, subkey := range e.Subkeys {
+		if (!subkey.Sig.FlagsValid || subkey.Sig.FlagSign) &&
+			subkey.PrivateKey.PrivateKey != nil &&
+			subkey.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo.CanSign() &&
+			subkey.Revocation == nil &&
+			!subkey.Sig.KeyExpired(now) {
+			candidateSubkey = i
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if candidateSubkey != -1 {
+		subkey := e.Subkeys[candidateSubkey]
+		return Key{e, subkey.PublicKey, subkey.PrivateKey, subkey.Sig, subkey.Sig.GetKeyFlags()}, true
+	}
+
+	// If we have no candidate subkey then we assume that it's ok to sign
+	// with the primary key.
+	i := e.primaryIdentity()
+	if (!i.SelfSignature.FlagsValid || i.SelfSignature.FlagSign) &&
+		e.PrimaryKey.PubKeyAlgo.CanSign() &&
+		!i.SelfSignature.KeyExpired(now) &&
+		e.PrivateKey.PrivateKey != nil {
+		return Key{e, e.PrimaryKey, e.PrivateKey, i.SelfSignature, i.SelfSignature.GetKeyFlags()}, true
+	}
+
+	return Key{}, false
+}
+
+// An EntityList contains one or more Entities.
+type EntityList []*Entity
+
+func keyMatchesIdAndFingerprint(key *packet.PublicKey, id uint64, fp []byte) bool {
+	if key.KeyId != id {
+		return false
+	}
+	if fp == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	return hmac.Equal(fp, key.Fingerprint[:])
+}
+
+// KeysById returns the set of keys that have the given key id.
+// fp can be optionally supplied, which is the full key fingerprint.
+// If it's provided, then it must match. This comes up in the case
+// of GPG subpacket 33.
+func (el EntityList) KeysById(id uint64, fp []byte) (keys []Key) {
+	for _, e := range el {
+		if keyMatchesIdAndFingerprint(e.PrimaryKey, id, fp) {
+			var selfSig *packet.Signature
+			for _, ident := range e.Identities {
+				if selfSig == nil {
+					selfSig = ident.SelfSignature
+				} else if ident.SelfSignature.IsPrimaryId != nil && *ident.SelfSignature.IsPrimaryId {
+					selfSig = ident.SelfSignature
+					break
+				}
+			}
+
+			var keyFlags packet.KeyFlagBits
+			for _, ident := range e.Identities {
+				keyFlags.Merge(ident.SelfSignature.GetKeyFlags())
+			}
+
+			keys = append(keys, Key{e, e.PrimaryKey, e.PrivateKey, selfSig, keyFlags})
+		}
+
+		for _, subKey := range e.Subkeys {
+			if keyMatchesIdAndFingerprint(subKey.PublicKey, id, fp) {
+
+				// If there's both a a revocation and a sig, then take the
+				// revocation. Otherwise, we can proceed with the sig.
+				sig := subKey.Revocation
+				if sig == nil {
+					sig = subKey.Sig
+				}
+
+				keys = append(keys, Key{e, subKey.PublicKey, subKey.PrivateKey, sig, sig.GetKeyFlags()})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// KeysByIdAndUsage returns the set of keys with the given id that also meet
+// the key usage given by requiredUsage.  The requiredUsage is expressed as
+// the bitwise-OR of packet.KeyFlag* values.
+// fp can be optionally supplied, which is the full key fingerprint.
+// If it's provided, then it must match. This comes up in the case
+// of GPG subpacket 33.
+func (el EntityList) KeysByIdUsage(id uint64, fp []byte, requiredUsage byte) (keys []Key) {
+	for _, key := range el.KeysById(id, fp) {
+		if len(key.Entity.Revocations) > 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if key.SelfSignature.RevocationReason != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if requiredUsage != 0 {
+			var usage byte
+
+			switch {
+			case key.KeyFlags.Valid:
+				usage = key.KeyFlags.BitField
+
+			case key.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo == packet.PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+				// We also need to handle the case where, although the sig's
+				// flags aren't valid, the key can is implicitly usable for
+				// encryption by virtue of being ElGamal. See also the comment
+				// in encryptionKey() above.
+				usage |= packet.KeyFlagEncryptCommunications
+				usage |= packet.KeyFlagEncryptStorage
+
+			case key.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo == packet.PubKeyAlgoDSA ||
+				key.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo == packet.PubKeyAlgoECDSA ||
+				key.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo == packet.PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+				usage |= packet.KeyFlagSign
+
+			// For a primary RSA key without any key flags, be as permissiable
+			// as possible.
+			case key.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo == packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA &&
+				keyMatchesIdAndFingerprint(key.Entity.PrimaryKey, id, fp):
+				usage = (packet.KeyFlagCertify | packet.KeyFlagSign |
+					packet.KeyFlagEncryptCommunications | packet.KeyFlagEncryptStorage)
+			}
+
+			if usage&requiredUsage != requiredUsage {
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+
+		keys = append(keys, key)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// DecryptionKeys returns all private keys that are valid for decryption.
+func (el EntityList) DecryptionKeys() (keys []Key) {
+	for _, e := range el {
+		for _, subKey := range e.Subkeys {
+			if subKey.PrivateKey != nil && subKey.PrivateKey.PrivateKey != nil && (!subKey.Sig.FlagsValid || subKey.Sig.FlagEncryptStorage || subKey.Sig.FlagEncryptCommunications) {
+				keys = append(keys, Key{e, subKey.PublicKey, subKey.PrivateKey, subKey.Sig, subKey.Sig.GetKeyFlags()})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// ReadArmoredKeyRing reads one or more public/private keys from an armor keyring file.
+func ReadArmoredKeyRing(r io.Reader) (EntityList, error) {
+	block, err := armor.Decode(r)
+	if err == io.EOF {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("no armored data found")
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if block.Type != PublicKeyType && block.Type != PrivateKeyType {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("expected public or private key block, got: " + block.Type)
+	}
+
+	return ReadKeyRing(block.Body)
+}
+
+// ReadKeyRing reads one or more public/private keys. Unsupported keys are
+// ignored as long as at least a single valid key is found.
+func ReadKeyRing(r io.Reader) (el EntityList, err error) {
+	packets := packet.NewReader(r)
+	var lastUnsupportedError error
+
+	for {
+		var e *Entity
+		e, err = ReadEntity(packets)
+		if err != nil {
+			// TODO: warn about skipped unsupported/unreadable keys
+			if _, ok := err.(errors.UnsupportedError); ok {
+				lastUnsupportedError = err
+				err = readToNextPublicKey(packets)
+			} else if _, ok := err.(errors.StructuralError); ok {
+				// Skip unreadable, badly-formatted keys
+				lastUnsupportedError = err
+				err = readToNextPublicKey(packets)
+			}
+			if err == io.EOF {
+				err = nil
+				break
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				el = nil
+				break
+			}
+		} else {
+			el = append(el, e)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(el) == 0 && err == nil {
+		err = lastUnsupportedError
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// readToNextPublicKey reads packets until the start of the entity and leaves
+// the first packet of the new entity in the Reader.
+func readToNextPublicKey(packets *packet.Reader) (err error) {
+	var p packet.Packet
+	for {
+		p, err = packets.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			return
+		} else if err != nil {
+			if _, ok := err.(errors.UnsupportedError); ok {
+				err = nil
+				continue
+			}
+			return
+		}
+
+		if pk, ok := p.(*packet.PublicKey); ok && !pk.IsSubkey {
+			packets.Unread(p)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	panic("unreachable")
+}
+
+// ReadEntity reads an entity (public key, identities, subkeys etc) from the
+// given Reader.
+func ReadEntity(packets *packet.Reader) (*Entity, error) {
+	e := new(Entity)
+	e.Identities = make(map[string]*Identity)
+
+	p, err := packets.Next()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	var ok bool
+	if e.PrimaryKey, ok = p.(*packet.PublicKey); !ok {
+		if e.PrivateKey, ok = p.(*packet.PrivateKey); !ok {
+			packets.Unread(p)
+			return nil, errors.StructuralError("first packet was not a public/private key")
+		} else {
+			e.PrimaryKey = &e.PrivateKey.PublicKey
+		}
+	}
+
+	if !e.PrimaryKey.PubKeyAlgo.CanSign() {
+		return nil, errors.StructuralError("primary key cannot be used for signatures")
+	}
+
+	var current *Identity
+	var revocations []*packet.Signature
+
+	designatedRevokers := make(map[uint64]bool)
+EachPacket:
+	for {
+		p, err := packets.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		} else if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		switch pkt := p.(type) {
+		case *packet.UserId:
+
+			// Make a new Identity object, that we might wind up throwing away.
+			// We'll only add it if we get a valid self-signature over this
+			// userID.
+			current = new(Identity)
+			current.Name = pkt.Id
+			current.UserId = pkt
+		case *packet.Signature:
+			if pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypeKeyRevocation {
+				// These revocations won't revoke UIDs (see
+				// SigTypeIdentityRevocation). Handle these first,
+				// because key might have revocation coming from
+				// another key (designated revoke).
+				revocations = append(revocations, pkt)
+				continue
+			}
+
+			// These are signatures by other people on this key. Let's just ignore them
+			// from the beginning, since they shouldn't affect our key decoding one way
+			// or the other.
+			if pkt.IssuerKeyId != nil && *pkt.IssuerKeyId != e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			// If this is a signature made by the keyholder, and the signature has stubbed out
+			// critical packets, then *now* we need to bail out.
+			if e := pkt.StubbedOutCriticalError; e != nil {
+				return nil, e
+			}
+
+			// Next handle the case of a self-signature. According to RFC8440,
+			// Section 5.2.3.3, if there are several self-signatures,
+			// we should take the newer one.  If they were both created
+			// at the same time, but one of them has keyflags specified and the
+			// other doesn't, keep the one with the keyflags. We have actually
+			// seen this in the wild (see the 'Yield' test in read_test.go).
+			// If there is a tie, and both have the same value for FlagsValid,
+			// then "last writer wins."
+			//
+			// HOWEVER! We have seen yet more keys in the wild (see the 'Spiros'
+			// test in read_test.go), in which the later self-signature is a bunch
+			// of junk, and doesn't even specify key flags. Does it really make
+			// sense to overwrite reasonable key flags with the empty set? I'm not
+			// sure what that would be trying to achieve, and plus GPG seems to be
+			// ok with this situation, and ignores the later (empty) keyflag set.
+			// So further tighten our overwrite rules, and only allow the later
+			// signature to overwrite the earlier signature if so doing won't
+			// trash the key flags.
+			if current != nil &&
+				(current.SelfSignature == nil ||
+					(!pkt.CreationTime.Before(current.SelfSignature.CreationTime) &&
+						(pkt.FlagsValid || !current.SelfSignature.FlagsValid))) &&
+				(pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypePositiveCert || pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypeGenericCert) &&
+				pkt.IssuerKeyId != nil &&
+				*pkt.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
+
+				if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(current.Name, e.PrimaryKey, pkt); err == nil {
+
+					current.SelfSignature = pkt
+
+					// NOTE(maxtaco) 2016.01.11
+					// Only register an identity once we've gotten a valid self-signature.
+					// It's possible therefore for us to throw away `current` in the case
+					// no valid self-signatures were found. That's OK as long as there are
+					// other identies that make sense.
+					//
+					// NOTE! We might later see a revocation for this very same UID, and it
+					// won't be undone. We've preserved this feature from the original
+					// Google OpenPGP we forked from.
+					e.Identities[current.Name] = current
+				} else {
+					// We really should warn that there was a failure here. Not raise an error
+					// since this really shouldn't be a fail-stop error.
+				}
+			} else if current != nil && pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypeIdentityRevocation {
+				if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(current.Name, e.PrimaryKey, pkt); err == nil {
+					// Note: we are not removing the identity from
+					// e.Identities. Caller can always filter by Revocation
+					// field to ignore revoked identities.
+					current.Revocation = pkt
+				}
+			} else if pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypeDirectSignature {
+				if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyRevocationSignature(e.PrimaryKey, pkt); err == nil {
+					if desig := pkt.DesignatedRevoker; desig != nil {
+						// If it's a designated revoker signature, take last 8 octects
+						// of fingerprint as Key ID and save it to designatedRevokers
+						// map. We consult this map later to see if a foreign
+						// revocation should be added to UnverifiedRevocations.
+						keyID := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(desig.Fingerprint[len(desig.Fingerprint)-8:])
+						designatedRevokers[keyID] = true
+					}
+				}
+			} else if current == nil {
+				// NOTE(maxtaco)
+				//
+				// See https://github.com/keybase/client/issues/2666
+				//
+				// There might have been a user attribute picture before this signature,
+				// in which case this is still a valid PGP key. In the future we might
+				// not ignore user attributes (like picture). But either way, it doesn't
+				// make sense to bail out here. Keep looking for other valid signatures.
+				//
+				// Used to be:
+				//    return nil, errors.StructuralError("signature packet found before user id packet")
+			} else {
+				current.Signatures = append(current.Signatures, pkt)
+			}
+		case *packet.PrivateKey:
+			if pkt.IsSubkey == false {
+				packets.Unread(p)
+				break EachPacket
+			}
+			err = addSubkey(e, packets, &pkt.PublicKey, pkt)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+		case *packet.PublicKey:
+			if pkt.IsSubkey == false {
+				packets.Unread(p)
+				break EachPacket
+			}
+			err = addSubkey(e, packets, pkt, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+		default:
+			// we ignore unknown packets
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(e.Identities) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.StructuralError("entity without any identities")
+	}
+
+	for _, revocation := range revocations {
+		if revocation.IssuerKeyId == nil || *revocation.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
+			// Key revokes itself, something that we can verify.
+			err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyRevocationSignature(e.PrimaryKey, revocation)
+			if err == nil {
+				e.Revocations = append(e.Revocations, revocation)
+			} else {
+				return nil, errors.StructuralError("revocation signature signed by alternate key")
+			}
+		} else if revocation.IssuerKeyId != nil {
+			if _, ok := designatedRevokers[*revocation.IssuerKeyId]; ok {
+				// Revocation is done by certified designated revoker,
+				// but we can't verify the revocation.
+				e.UnverifiedRevocations = append(e.UnverifiedRevocations, revocation)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return e, nil
+}
+
+func addSubkey(e *Entity, packets *packet.Reader, pub *packet.PublicKey, priv *packet.PrivateKey) error {
+	var subKey Subkey
+	subKey.PublicKey = pub
+	subKey.PrivateKey = priv
+	var lastErr error
+	for {
+		p, err := packets.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
+		}
+		sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
+		if !ok {
+			// Hit a non-signature packet, so assume we're up to the next key
+			packets.Unread(p)
+			break
+		}
+		if st := sig.SigType; st != packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding && st != packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
+
+			// Note(maxtaco):
+			// We used to error out here, but instead, let's fast-forward past
+			// packets that are in the wrong place (like misplaced 0x13 signatures)
+			// until we get to one that works.  For a test case,
+			// see TestWithBadSubkeySignaturePackets.
+
+			continue
+		}
+		err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyKeySignature(subKey.PublicKey, sig)
+		if err != nil {
+			// Non valid signature, so again, no need to abandon all hope, just continue;
+			// make a note of the error we hit.
+			lastErr = errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
+			continue
+		}
+		switch sig.SigType {
+		case packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding:
+			// Does the "new" sig set expiration to later date than
+			// "previous" sig?
+			if subKey.Sig == nil || subKey.Sig.ExpiresBeforeOther(sig) {
+				subKey.Sig = sig
+			}
+		case packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation:
+			// First writer wins
+			if subKey.Revocation == nil {
+				subKey.Revocation = sig
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if subKey.Sig != nil {
+		e.Subkeys = append(e.Subkeys, subKey)
+	} else {
+		if lastErr == nil {
+			lastErr = errors.StructuralError("Subkey wasn't signed; expected a 'binding' signature")
+		}
+		e.BadSubkeys = append(e.BadSubkeys, BadSubkey{Subkey: subKey, Err: lastErr})
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+const defaultRSAKeyBits = 2048
+
+// NewEntity returns an Entity that contains a fresh RSA/RSA keypair with a
+// single identity composed of the given full name, comment and email, any of
+// which may be empty but must not contain any of "()<>\x00".
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, error) {
+	currentTime := config.Now()
+
+	bits := defaultRSAKeyBits
+	if config != nil && config.RSABits != 0 {
+		bits = config.RSABits
+	}
+
+	uid := packet.NewUserId(name, comment, email)
+	if uid == nil {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("user id field contained invalid characters")
+	}
+	signingPriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(config.Random(), bits)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	encryptingPriv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(config.Random(), bits)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	e := &Entity{
+		PrimaryKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &signingPriv.PublicKey),
+		PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime, signingPriv),
+		Identities: make(map[string]*Identity),
+	}
+	isPrimaryId := true
+	e.Identities[uid.Id] = &Identity{
+		Name:   uid.Name,
+		UserId: uid,
+		SelfSignature: &packet.Signature{
+			CreationTime: currentTime,
+			SigType:      packet.SigTypePositiveCert,
+			PubKeyAlgo:   packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA,
+			Hash:         config.Hash(),
+			IsPrimaryId:  &isPrimaryId,
+			FlagsValid:   true,
+			FlagSign:     true,
+			FlagCertify:  true,
+			IssuerKeyId:  &e.PrimaryKey.KeyId,
+		},
+	}
+
+	e.Subkeys = make([]Subkey, 1)
+	e.Subkeys[0] = Subkey{
+		PublicKey:  packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &encryptingPriv.PublicKey),
+		PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime, encryptingPriv),
+		Sig: &packet.Signature{
+			CreationTime:              currentTime,
+			SigType:                   packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding,
+			PubKeyAlgo:                packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA,
+			Hash:                      config.Hash(),
+			FlagsValid:                true,
+			FlagEncryptStorage:        true,
+			FlagEncryptCommunications: true,
+			IssuerKeyId:               &e.PrimaryKey.KeyId,
+		},
+	}
+	e.Subkeys[0].PublicKey.IsSubkey = true
+	e.Subkeys[0].PrivateKey.IsSubkey = true
+
+	return e, nil
+}
+
+// SerializePrivate serializes an Entity, including private key material, to
+// the given Writer. For now, it must only be used on an Entity returned from
+// NewEntity.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (e *Entity) SerializePrivate(w io.Writer, config *packet.Config) (err error) {
+	err = e.PrivateKey.Serialize(w)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	for _, ident := range e.Identities {
+		err = ident.UserId.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if e.PrivateKey.PrivateKey != nil {
+			err = ident.SelfSignature.SignUserId(ident.UserId.Id, e.PrimaryKey, e.PrivateKey, config)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		err = ident.SelfSignature.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	for _, subkey := range e.Subkeys {
+		err = subkey.PrivateKey.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		// Workaround shortcoming of SignKey(), which doesn't work to reverse-sign
+		// sub-signing keys. So if requested, just reuse the signatures already
+		// available to us (if we read this key from a keyring).
+		if e.PrivateKey.PrivateKey != nil && !config.ReuseSignatures() {
+			err = subkey.Sig.SignKey(subkey.PublicKey, e.PrivateKey, config)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+
+		if subkey.Revocation != nil {
+			err = subkey.Revocation.Serialize(w)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+
+		err = subkey.Sig.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Serialize writes the public part of the given Entity to w. (No private
+// key material will be output).
+func (e *Entity) Serialize(w io.Writer) error {
+	err := e.PrimaryKey.Serialize(w)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	for _, ident := range e.Identities {
+		err = ident.UserId.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		err = ident.SelfSignature.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		for _, sig := range ident.Signatures {
+			err = sig.Serialize(w)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for _, subkey := range e.Subkeys {
+		err = subkey.PublicKey.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		if subkey.Revocation != nil {
+			err = subkey.Revocation.Serialize(w)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		err = subkey.Sig.Serialize(w)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SignIdentity adds a signature to e, from signer, attesting that identity is
+// associated with e. The provided identity must already be an element of
+// e.Identities and the private key of signer must have been decrypted if
+// necessary.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (e *Entity) SignIdentity(identity string, signer *Entity, config *packet.Config) error {
+	if signer.PrivateKey == nil {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("signing Entity must have a private key")
+	}
+	if signer.PrivateKey.Encrypted {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("signing Entity's private key must be decrypted")
+	}
+	ident, ok := e.Identities[identity]
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("given identity string not found in Entity")
+	}
+
+	sig := &packet.Signature{
+		SigType:      packet.SigTypeGenericCert,
+		PubKeyAlgo:   signer.PrivateKey.PubKeyAlgo,
+		Hash:         config.Hash(),
+		CreationTime: config.Now(),
+		IssuerKeyId:  &signer.PrivateKey.KeyId,
+	}
+	if err := sig.SignUserId(identity, e.PrimaryKey, signer.PrivateKey, config); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	ident.Signatures = append(ident.Signatures, sig)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CopySubkeyRevocations copies subkey revocations from the src Entity over
+// to the receiver entity. We need this because `gpg --export-secret-key` does
+// not appear to output subkey revocations.  In this case we need to manually
+// merge with the output of `gpg --export`.
+func (e *Entity) CopySubkeyRevocations(src *Entity) {
+	m := make(map[[20]byte]*packet.Signature)
+	for _, subkey := range src.Subkeys {
+		if subkey.Revocation != nil {
+			m[subkey.PublicKey.Fingerprint] = subkey.Revocation
+		}
+	}
+	for i, subkey := range e.Subkeys {
+		if r := m[subkey.PublicKey.Fingerprint]; r != nil {
+			e.Subkeys[i].Revocation = r
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// CheckDesignatedRevokers will try to confirm any of designated
+// revocation of entity. For this function to work, revocation
+// issuer's key should be found in keyring. First successfully
+// verified designated revocation is returned along with the key that
+// verified it.
+func FindVerifiedDesignatedRevoke(keyring KeyRing, entity *Entity) (*packet.Signature, *Key) {
+	for _, sig := range entity.UnverifiedRevocations {
+		if sig.IssuerKeyId == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		issuerKeyId := *sig.IssuerKeyId
+		issuerFingerprint := sig.IssuerFingerprint
+		keys := keyring.KeysByIdUsage(issuerKeyId, issuerFingerprint, packet.KeyFlagSign)
+		if len(keys) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, key := range keys {
+			err := key.PublicKey.VerifyRevocationSignature(entity.PrimaryKey, sig)
+			if err == nil {
+				return sig, &key
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil, nil
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/compressed.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"compress/bzip2"
+	"compress/flate"
+	"compress/zlib"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+)
+
+// Compressed represents a compressed OpenPGP packet. The decompressed contents
+// will contain more OpenPGP packets. See RFC 4880, section 5.6.
+type Compressed struct {
+	Body io.Reader
+}
+
+const (
+	NoCompression      = flate.NoCompression
+	BestSpeed          = flate.BestSpeed
+	BestCompression    = flate.BestCompression
+	DefaultCompression = flate.DefaultCompression
+)
+
+// CompressionConfig contains compressor configuration settings.
+type CompressionConfig struct {
+	// Level is the compression level to use. It must be set to
+	// between -1 and 9, with -1 causing the compressor to use the
+	// default compression level, 0 causing the compressor to use
+	// no compression and 1 to 9 representing increasing (better,
+	// slower) compression levels. If Level is less than -1 or
+	// more then 9, a non-nil error will be returned during
+	// encryption. See the constants above for convenient common
+	// settings for Level.
+	Level int
+}
+
+func (c *Compressed) parse(r io.Reader) error {
+	var buf [1]byte
+	_, err := readFull(r, buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	switch buf[0] {
+	case 1:
+		c.Body = flate.NewReader(r)
+	case 2:
+		c.Body, err = zlib.NewReader(r)
+	case 3:
+		c.Body = bzip2.NewReader(r)
+	default:
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("unknown compression algorithm: " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
+	}
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// compressedWriterCloser represents the serialized compression stream
+// header and the compressor. Its Close() method ensures that both the
+// compressor and serialized stream header are closed. Its Write()
+// method writes to the compressor.
+type compressedWriteCloser struct {
+	sh io.Closer      // Stream Header
+	c  io.WriteCloser // Compressor
+}
+
+func (cwc compressedWriteCloser) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	return cwc.c.Write(p)
+}
+
+func (cwc compressedWriteCloser) Close() (err error) {
+	err = cwc.c.Close()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return cwc.sh.Close()
+}
+
+// SerializeCompressed serializes a compressed data packet to w and
+// returns a WriteCloser to which the literal data packets themselves
+// can be written and which MUST be closed on completion. If cc is
+// nil, sensible defaults will be used to configure the compression
+// algorithm.
+func SerializeCompressed(w io.WriteCloser, algo CompressionAlgo, cc *CompressionConfig) (literaldata io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	compressed, err := serializeStreamHeader(w, packetTypeCompressed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = compressed.Write([]byte{uint8(algo)})
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	level := DefaultCompression
+	if cc != nil {
+		level = cc.Level
+	}
+
+	var compressor io.WriteCloser
+	switch algo {
+	case CompressionZIP:
+		compressor, err = flate.NewWriter(compressed, level)
+	case CompressionZLIB:
+		compressor, err = zlib.NewWriterLevel(compressed, level)
+	default:
+		s := strconv.Itoa(int(algo))
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("Unsupported compression algorithm: " + s)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	literaldata = compressedWriteCloser{compressed, compressor}
+
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/config.go

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"io"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// Config collects a number of parameters along with sensible defaults.
+// A nil *Config is valid and results in all default values.
+type Config struct {
+	// Rand provides the source of entropy.
+	// If nil, the crypto/rand Reader is used.
+	Rand io.Reader
+	// DefaultHash is the default hash function to be used.
+	// If zero, SHA-256 is used.
+	DefaultHash crypto.Hash
+	// DefaultCipher is the cipher to be used.
+	// If zero, AES-128 is used.
+	DefaultCipher CipherFunction
+	// Time returns the current time as the number of seconds since the
+	// epoch. If Time is nil, time.Now is used.
+	Time func() time.Time
+	// DefaultCompressionAlgo is the compression algorithm to be
+	// applied to the plaintext before encryption. If zero, no
+	// compression is done.
+	DefaultCompressionAlgo CompressionAlgo
+	// CompressionConfig configures the compression settings.
+	CompressionConfig *CompressionConfig
+	// S2KCount is only used for symmetric encryption. It
+	// determines the strength of the passphrase stretching when
+	// the said passphrase is hashed to produce a key. S2KCount
+	// should be between 1024 and 65011712, inclusive. If Config
+	// is nil or S2KCount is 0, the value 65536 used. Not all
+	// values in the above range can be represented. S2KCount will
+	// be rounded up to the next representable value if it cannot
+	// be encoded exactly. When set, it is strongly encrouraged to
+	// use a value that is at least 65536. See RFC 4880 Section
+	// 3.7.1.3.
+	S2KCount int
+	// RSABits is the number of bits in new RSA keys made with NewEntity.
+	// If zero, then 2048 bit keys are created.
+	RSABits int
+	// ReuseSignatures tells us to reuse existing Signatures
+	// on serialized output.
+	ReuseSignaturesOnSerialize bool
+}
+
+func (c *Config) Random() io.Reader {
+	if c == nil || c.Rand == nil {
+		return rand.Reader
+	}
+	return c.Rand
+}
+
+func (c *Config) Hash() crypto.Hash {
+	if c == nil || uint(c.DefaultHash) == 0 {
+		return crypto.SHA256
+	}
+	return c.DefaultHash
+}
+
+func (c *Config) Cipher() CipherFunction {
+	if c == nil || uint8(c.DefaultCipher) == 0 {
+		return CipherAES128
+	}
+	return c.DefaultCipher
+}
+
+func (c *Config) Now() time.Time {
+	if c == nil || c.Time == nil {
+		return time.Now()
+	}
+	return c.Time()
+}
+
+func (c *Config) Compression() CompressionAlgo {
+	if c == nil {
+		return CompressionNone
+	}
+	return c.DefaultCompressionAlgo
+}
+
+func (c *Config) PasswordHashIterations() int {
+	if c == nil || c.S2KCount == 0 {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return c.S2KCount
+}
+
+func (c *Config) ReuseSignatures() bool {
+	return c != nil && c.ReuseSignaturesOnSerialize
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/ecdh.go

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/ecdh"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+)
+
+// ECDHKdfParams generates KDF parameters sequence for given
+// PublicKey. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637#section-8
+func ECDHKdfParams(pub *PublicKey) []byte {
+	buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
+	oid := pub.ec.oid
+	buf.WriteByte(byte(len(oid)))
+	buf.Write(oid)
+	buf.WriteByte(18) // ECDH TYPE
+	pub.ecdh.serialize(buf)
+	buf.WriteString("Anonymous Sender    ")
+	buf.Write(pub.Fingerprint[:])
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+func decryptKeyECDH(priv *PrivateKey, X, Y *big.Int, C []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	ecdhpriv, ok := priv.PrivateKey.(*ecdh.PrivateKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("bad internal ECDH key")
+	}
+
+	Sx := ecdhpriv.DecryptShared(X, Y)
+
+	kdfParams := ECDHKdfParams(&priv.PublicKey)
+	hash, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(byte(priv.ecdh.KdfHash))
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("invalid hash id in private key")
+	}
+
+	key := ecdhpriv.KDF(Sx, kdfParams, hash)
+	keySize := CipherFunction(priv.ecdh.KdfAlgo).KeySize()
+
+	decrypted, err := ecdh.AESKeyUnwrap(key[:keySize], C)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// We have to "read ahead" to discover real length of the
+	// encryption key and properly unpad buffer.
+	cipherFunc := CipherFunction(decrypted[0])
+	// +3 bytes = 1-byte cipher id and checksum 2-byte checksum.
+	out = ecdh.UnpadBuffer(decrypted, cipherFunc.KeySize()+3)
+	if out == nil {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("invalid padding while ECDH")
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func serializeEncryptedKeyECDH(w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, header [10]byte, pub *PublicKey, keyBlock []byte) error {
+	ecdhpub := pub.PublicKey.(*ecdh.PublicKey)
+	kdfParams := ECDHKdfParams(pub)
+
+	hash, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(byte(pub.ecdh.KdfHash))
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("invalid hash id in private key")
+	}
+
+	kdfKeySize := CipherFunction(pub.ecdh.KdfAlgo).KeySize()
+	Vx, Vy, C, err := ecdhpub.Encrypt(rand, kdfParams, keyBlock, hash, kdfKeySize)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	mpis, mpiBitLen := ecdh.Marshal(ecdhpub.Curve, Vx, Vy)
+
+	packetLen := len(header) /* header length in bytes */
+	packetLen += 2 /* mpi length in bits */ + len(mpis)
+	packetLen += 1 /* ciphertext size in bytes */ + len(C)
+
+	err = serializeHeader(w, packetTypeEncryptedKey, packetLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	_, err = w.Write(header[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	_, err = w.Write([]byte{byte(mpiBitLen >> 8), byte(mpiBitLen)})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	_, err = w.Write(mpis[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	w.Write([]byte{byte(len(C))})
+	w.Write(C[:])
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/ecdh"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/elgamal"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa"
+)
+
+const encryptedKeyVersion = 3
+
+// EncryptedKey represents a public-key encrypted session key. See RFC 4880,
+// section 5.1.
+type EncryptedKey struct {
+	KeyId      uint64
+	Algo       PublicKeyAlgorithm
+	CipherFunc CipherFunction // only valid after a successful Decrypt
+	Key        []byte         // only valid after a successful Decrypt
+
+	encryptedMPI1, encryptedMPI2 parsedMPI
+	ecdh_C                       []byte
+}
+
+func (e *EncryptedKey) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	var buf [10]byte
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0] != encryptedKeyVersion {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("unknown EncryptedKey version " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
+	}
+	e.KeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(buf[1:9])
+	e.Algo = PublicKeyAlgorithm(buf[9])
+	switch e.Algo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
+		e.encryptedMPI1.bytes, e.encryptedMPI1.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		e.encryptedMPI1.bytes, e.encryptedMPI1.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		e.encryptedMPI2.bytes, e.encryptedMPI2.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		e.encryptedMPI1.bytes, e.encryptedMPI1.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		_, err = readFull(r, buf[:1]) // read C len (1 byte)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		e.ecdh_C = make([]byte, int(buf[0]))
+		_, err = readFull(r, e.ecdh_C)
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	_, err = consumeAll(r)
+	return err
+}
+
+func checksumKeyMaterial(key []byte) uint16 {
+	var checksum uint16
+	for _, v := range key {
+		checksum += uint16(v)
+	}
+	return checksum
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts an encrypted session key with the given private key. The
+// private key must have been decrypted first.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (e *EncryptedKey) Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
+	var err error
+	var b []byte
+
+	// TODO(agl): use session key decryption routines here to avoid
+	// padding oracle attacks.
+	switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
+		b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		c1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
+		c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes)
+		b, err = elgamal.Decrypt(priv.PrivateKey.(*elgamal.PrivateKey), c1, c2)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		// Note: Unmarshal checks if point is on the curve.
+		c1, c2 := ecdh.Unmarshal(priv.PrivateKey.(*ecdh.PrivateKey).Curve, e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
+		if c1 == nil {
+			return errors.InvalidArgumentError("failed to parse EC point for encryption key")
+		}
+		b, err = decryptKeyECDH(priv, c1, c2, e.ecdh_C)
+	default:
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot decrypted encrypted session key with private key of type " + strconv.Itoa(int(priv.PubKeyAlgo)))
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	e.CipherFunc = CipherFunction(b[0])
+	e.Key = b[1 : len(b)-2]
+	expectedChecksum := uint16(b[len(b)-2])<<8 | uint16(b[len(b)-1])
+	checksum := checksumKeyMaterial(e.Key)
+	if checksum != expectedChecksum {
+		return errors.StructuralError("EncryptedKey checksum incorrect")
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Serialize writes the encrypted key packet, e, to w.
+func (e *EncryptedKey) Serialize(w io.Writer) error {
+	var mpiLen int
+	switch e.Algo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
+		mpiLen = 2 + len(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		mpiLen = 2 + len(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes) + 2 + len(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes)
+	default:
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("don't know how to serialize encrypted key type " + strconv.Itoa(int(e.Algo)))
+	}
+
+	serializeHeader(w, packetTypeEncryptedKey, 1 /* version */ +8 /* key id */ +1 /* algo */ +mpiLen)
+
+	w.Write([]byte{encryptedKeyVersion})
+	binary.Write(w, binary.BigEndian, e.KeyId)
+	w.Write([]byte{byte(e.Algo)})
+
+	switch e.Algo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
+		writeMPIs(w, e.encryptedMPI1)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		writeMPIs(w, e.encryptedMPI1, e.encryptedMPI2)
+	default:
+		panic("internal error")
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SerializeEncryptedKey serializes an encrypted key packet to w that contains
+// key, encrypted to pub.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func SerializeEncryptedKey(w io.Writer, pub *PublicKey, cipherFunc CipherFunction, key []byte, config *Config) error {
+	var buf [10]byte
+	buf[0] = encryptedKeyVersion
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[1:9], pub.KeyId)
+	buf[9] = byte(pub.PubKeyAlgo)
+
+	keyBlock := make([]byte, 1 /* cipher type */ +len(key)+2 /* checksum */)
+	keyBlock[0] = byte(cipherFunc)
+	copy(keyBlock[1:], key)
+	checksum := checksumKeyMaterial(key)
+	keyBlock[1+len(key)] = byte(checksum >> 8)
+	keyBlock[1+len(key)+1] = byte(checksum)
+
+	switch pub.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
+		return serializeEncryptedKeyRSA(w, config.Random(), buf, pub.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey), keyBlock)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		return serializeEncryptedKeyElGamal(w, config.Random(), buf, pub.PublicKey.(*elgamal.PublicKey), keyBlock)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		return serializeEncryptedKeyECDH(w, config.Random(), buf, pub, keyBlock)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt to public key of type " + strconv.Itoa(int(pub.PubKeyAlgo)))
+	}
+
+	return errors.UnsupportedError("encrypting a key to public key of type " + strconv.Itoa(int(pub.PubKeyAlgo)))
+}
+
+func serializeEncryptedKeyRSA(w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, header [10]byte, pub *rsa.PublicKey, keyBlock []byte) error {
+	cipherText, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(rand, pub, keyBlock)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("RSA encryption failed: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	packetLen := 10 /* header length */ + 2 /* mpi size */ + len(cipherText)
+
+	err = serializeHeader(w, packetTypeEncryptedKey, packetLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(header[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return writeMPI(w, 8*uint16(len(cipherText)), cipherText)
+}
+
+func serializeEncryptedKeyElGamal(w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, header [10]byte, pub *elgamal.PublicKey, keyBlock []byte) error {
+	c1, c2, err := elgamal.Encrypt(rand, pub, keyBlock)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("ElGamal encryption failed: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	packetLen := 10 /* header length */
+	packetLen += 2 /* mpi size */ + (c1.BitLen()+7)/8
+	packetLen += 2 /* mpi size */ + (c2.BitLen()+7)/8
+
+	err = serializeHeader(w, packetTypeEncryptedKey, packetLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(header[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	err = writeBig(w, c1)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return writeBig(w, c2)
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/literal.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// LiteralData represents an encrypted file. See RFC 4880, section 5.9.
+type LiteralData struct {
+	IsBinary bool
+	FileName string
+	Time     uint32 // Unix epoch time. Either creation time or modification time. 0 means undefined.
+	Body     io.Reader
+}
+
+// ForEyesOnly returns whether the contents of the LiteralData have been marked
+// as especially sensitive.
+func (l *LiteralData) ForEyesOnly() bool {
+	return l.FileName == "_CONSOLE"
+}
+
+func (l *LiteralData) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	var buf [256]byte
+
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:2])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	l.IsBinary = buf[0] == 'b'
+	fileNameLen := int(buf[1])
+
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:fileNameLen])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	l.FileName = string(buf[:fileNameLen])
+
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:4])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	l.Time = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[:4])
+	l.Body = r
+	return
+}
+
+// SerializeLiteral serializes a literal data packet to w and returns a
+// WriteCloser to which the data itself can be written and which MUST be closed
+// on completion. The fileName is truncated to 255 bytes.
+func SerializeLiteral(w io.WriteCloser, isBinary bool, fileName string, time uint32) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	var buf [4]byte
+	buf[0] = 't'
+	if isBinary {
+		buf[0] = 'b'
+	}
+	if len(fileName) > 255 {
+		fileName = fileName[:255]
+	}
+	buf[1] = byte(len(fileName))
+
+	inner, err := serializeStreamHeader(w, packetTypeLiteralData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = inner.Write(buf[:2])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	_, err = inner.Write([]byte(fileName))
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[:], time)
+	_, err = inner.Write(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	plaintext = inner
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/ocfb.go

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// OpenPGP CFB Mode. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-13.9
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+)
+
+type ocfbEncrypter struct {
+	b       cipher.Block
+	fre     []byte
+	outUsed int
+}
+
+// An OCFBResyncOption determines if the "resynchronization step" of OCFB is
+// performed.
+type OCFBResyncOption bool
+
+const (
+	OCFBResync   OCFBResyncOption = true
+	OCFBNoResync OCFBResyncOption = false
+)
+
+// NewOCFBEncrypter returns a cipher.Stream which encrypts data with OpenPGP's
+// cipher feedback mode using the given cipher.Block, and an initial amount of
+// ciphertext.  randData must be random bytes and be the same length as the
+// cipher.Block's block size. Resync determines if the "resynchronization step"
+// from RFC 4880, 13.9 step 7 is performed. Different parts of OpenPGP vary on
+// this point.
+func NewOCFBEncrypter(block cipher.Block, randData []byte, resync OCFBResyncOption) (cipher.Stream, []byte) {
+	blockSize := block.BlockSize()
+	if len(randData) != blockSize {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	x := &ocfbEncrypter{
+		b:       block,
+		fre:     make([]byte, blockSize),
+		outUsed: 0,
+	}
+	prefix := make([]byte, blockSize+2)
+
+	block.Encrypt(x.fre, x.fre)
+	for i := 0; i < blockSize; i++ {
+		prefix[i] = randData[i] ^ x.fre[i]
+	}
+
+	block.Encrypt(x.fre, prefix[:blockSize])
+	prefix[blockSize] = x.fre[0] ^ randData[blockSize-2]
+	prefix[blockSize+1] = x.fre[1] ^ randData[blockSize-1]
+
+	if resync {
+		block.Encrypt(x.fre, prefix[2:])
+	} else {
+		x.fre[0] = prefix[blockSize]
+		x.fre[1] = prefix[blockSize+1]
+		x.outUsed = 2
+	}
+	return x, prefix
+}
+
+func (x *ocfbEncrypter) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+	for i := 0; i < len(src); i++ {
+		if x.outUsed == len(x.fre) {
+			x.b.Encrypt(x.fre, x.fre)
+			x.outUsed = 0
+		}
+
+		x.fre[x.outUsed] ^= src[i]
+		dst[i] = x.fre[x.outUsed]
+		x.outUsed++
+	}
+}
+
+type ocfbDecrypter struct {
+	b       cipher.Block
+	fre     []byte
+	outUsed int
+}
+
+// NewOCFBDecrypter returns a cipher.Stream which decrypts data with OpenPGP's
+// cipher feedback mode using the given cipher.Block. Prefix must be the first
+// blockSize + 2 bytes of the ciphertext, where blockSize is the cipher.Block's
+// block size. If an incorrect key is detected then nil is returned. On
+// successful exit, blockSize+2 bytes of decrypted data are written into
+// prefix. Resync determines if the "resynchronization step" from RFC 4880,
+// 13.9 step 7 is performed. Different parts of OpenPGP vary on this point.
+func NewOCFBDecrypter(block cipher.Block, prefix []byte, resync OCFBResyncOption) cipher.Stream {
+	blockSize := block.BlockSize()
+	if len(prefix) != blockSize+2 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	x := &ocfbDecrypter{
+		b:       block,
+		fre:     make([]byte, blockSize),
+		outUsed: 0,
+	}
+	prefixCopy := make([]byte, len(prefix))
+	copy(prefixCopy, prefix)
+
+	block.Encrypt(x.fre, x.fre)
+	for i := 0; i < blockSize; i++ {
+		prefixCopy[i] ^= x.fre[i]
+	}
+
+	block.Encrypt(x.fre, prefix[:blockSize])
+	prefixCopy[blockSize] ^= x.fre[0]
+	prefixCopy[blockSize+1] ^= x.fre[1]
+
+	if prefixCopy[blockSize-2] != prefixCopy[blockSize] ||
+		prefixCopy[blockSize-1] != prefixCopy[blockSize+1] {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if resync {
+		block.Encrypt(x.fre, prefix[2:])
+	} else {
+		x.fre[0] = prefix[blockSize]
+		x.fre[1] = prefix[blockSize+1]
+		x.outUsed = 2
+	}
+	copy(prefix, prefixCopy)
+	return x
+}
+
+func (x *ocfbDecrypter) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
+	for i := 0; i < len(src); i++ {
+		if x.outUsed == len(x.fre) {
+			x.b.Encrypt(x.fre, x.fre)
+			x.outUsed = 0
+		}
+
+		c := src[i]
+		dst[i] = x.fre[x.outUsed] ^ src[i]
+		x.fre[x.outUsed] = c
+		x.outUsed++
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/one_pass_signature.go

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+)
+
+// OnePassSignature represents a one-pass signature packet. See RFC 4880,
+// section 5.4.
+type OnePassSignature struct {
+	SigType    SignatureType
+	Hash       crypto.Hash
+	PubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
+	KeyId      uint64
+	IsLast     bool
+}
+
+const onePassSignatureVersion = 3
+
+func (ops *OnePassSignature) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	var buf [13]byte
+
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0] != onePassSignatureVersion {
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("one-pass-signature packet version " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
+	}
+
+	var ok bool
+	ops.Hash, ok = s2k.HashIdToHash(buf[2])
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("hash function: " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[2])))
+	}
+
+	ops.SigType = SignatureType(buf[1])
+	ops.PubKeyAlgo = PublicKeyAlgorithm(buf[3])
+	ops.KeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(buf[4:12])
+	ops.IsLast = buf[12] != 0
+	return
+}
+
+// Serialize marshals the given OnePassSignature to w.
+func (ops *OnePassSignature) Serialize(w io.Writer) error {
+	var buf [13]byte
+	buf[0] = onePassSignatureVersion
+	buf[1] = uint8(ops.SigType)
+	var ok bool
+	buf[2], ok = s2k.HashToHashId(ops.Hash)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("hash type: " + strconv.Itoa(int(ops.Hash)))
+	}
+	buf[3] = uint8(ops.PubKeyAlgo)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[4:12], ops.KeyId)
+	if ops.IsLast {
+		buf[12] = 1
+	}
+
+	if err := serializeHeader(w, packetTypeOnePassSignature, len(buf)); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err := w.Write(buf[:])
+	return err
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/opaque.go

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+)
+
+// OpaquePacket represents an OpenPGP packet as raw, unparsed data. This is
+// useful for splitting and storing the original packet contents separately,
+// handling unsupported packet types or accessing parts of the packet not yet
+// implemented by this package.
+type OpaquePacket struct {
+	// Packet type
+	Tag uint8
+	// Reason why the packet was parsed opaquely
+	Reason error
+	// Binary contents of the packet data
+	Contents []byte
+}
+
+func (op *OpaquePacket) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	op.Contents, err = ioutil.ReadAll(r)
+	return
+}
+
+// Serialize marshals the packet to a writer in its original form, including
+// the packet header.
+func (op *OpaquePacket) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	err = serializeHeader(w, packetType(op.Tag), len(op.Contents))
+	if err == nil {
+		_, err = w.Write(op.Contents)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// Parse attempts to parse the opaque contents into a structure supported by
+// this package. If the packet is not known then the result will be another
+// OpaquePacket.
+func (op *OpaquePacket) Parse() (p Packet, err error) {
+	hdr := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+	err = serializeHeader(hdr, packetType(op.Tag), len(op.Contents))
+	if err != nil {
+		op.Reason = err
+		return op, err
+	}
+	p, err = Read(io.MultiReader(hdr, bytes.NewBuffer(op.Contents)))
+	if err != nil {
+		op.Reason = err
+		p = op
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// OpaqueReader reads OpaquePackets from an io.Reader.
+type OpaqueReader struct {
+	r io.Reader
+}
+
+func NewOpaqueReader(r io.Reader) *OpaqueReader {
+	return &OpaqueReader{r: r}
+}
+
+// Read the next OpaquePacket.
+func (or *OpaqueReader) Next() (op *OpaquePacket, err error) {
+	tag, _, contents, err := readHeader(or.r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	op = &OpaquePacket{Tag: uint8(tag), Reason: err}
+	err = op.parse(contents)
+	if err != nil {
+		consumeAll(contents)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// OpaqueSubpacket represents an unparsed OpenPGP subpacket,
+// as found in signature and user attribute packets.
+type OpaqueSubpacket struct {
+	SubType  uint8
+	Contents []byte
+}
+
+// OpaqueSubpackets extracts opaque, unparsed OpenPGP subpackets from
+// their byte representation.
+func OpaqueSubpackets(contents []byte) (result []*OpaqueSubpacket, err error) {
+	var (
+		subHeaderLen int
+		subPacket    *OpaqueSubpacket
+	)
+	for len(contents) > 0 {
+		subHeaderLen, subPacket, err = nextSubpacket(contents)
+		if err != nil {
+			break
+		}
+		result = append(result, subPacket)
+		contents = contents[subHeaderLen+len(subPacket.Contents):]
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+func nextSubpacket(contents []byte) (subHeaderLen int, subPacket *OpaqueSubpacket, err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.1
+	var subLen uint32
+	if len(contents) < 1 {
+		goto Truncated
+	}
+	subPacket = &OpaqueSubpacket{}
+	switch {
+	case contents[0] < 192:
+		subHeaderLen = 2 // 1 length byte, 1 subtype byte
+		if len(contents) < subHeaderLen {
+			goto Truncated
+		}
+		subLen = uint32(contents[0])
+		contents = contents[1:]
+	case contents[0] < 255:
+		subHeaderLen = 3 // 2 length bytes, 1 subtype
+		if len(contents) < subHeaderLen {
+			goto Truncated
+		}
+		subLen = uint32(contents[0]-192)<<8 + uint32(contents[1]) + 192
+		contents = contents[2:]
+	default:
+		subHeaderLen = 6 // 5 length bytes, 1 subtype
+		if len(contents) < subHeaderLen {
+			goto Truncated
+		}
+		subLen = uint32(contents[1])<<24 |
+			uint32(contents[2])<<16 |
+			uint32(contents[3])<<8 |
+			uint32(contents[4])
+		contents = contents[5:]
+	}
+	if subLen > uint32(len(contents)) || subLen == 0 {
+		goto Truncated
+	}
+	subPacket.SubType = contents[0]
+	subPacket.Contents = contents[1:subLen]
+	return
+Truncated:
+	err = errors.StructuralError("subpacket truncated")
+	return
+}
+
+func (osp *OpaqueSubpacket) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	buf := make([]byte, 6)
+	n := serializeSubpacketLength(buf, len(osp.Contents)+1)
+	buf[n] = osp.SubType
+	if _, err = w.Write(buf[:n+1]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(osp.Contents)
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go

@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package packet implements parsing and serialization of OpenPGP packets, as
+// specified in RFC 4880.
+package packet // import "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet"
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/des"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/cast5"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+)
+
+// readFull is the same as io.ReadFull except that reading zero bytes returns
+// ErrUnexpectedEOF rather than EOF.
+func readFull(r io.Reader, buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	n, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf)
+	if err == io.EOF {
+		err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// readLength reads an OpenPGP length from r. See RFC 4880, section 4.2.2.
+func readLength(r io.Reader) (length int64, isPartial bool, err error) {
+	var buf [4]byte
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	switch {
+	case buf[0] < 192:
+		length = int64(buf[0])
+	case buf[0] < 224:
+		length = int64(buf[0]-192) << 8
+		_, err = readFull(r, buf[0:1])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		length += int64(buf[0]) + 192
+	case buf[0] < 255:
+		length = int64(1) << (buf[0] & 0x1f)
+		isPartial = true
+	default:
+		_, err = readFull(r, buf[0:4])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		length = int64(buf[0])<<24 |
+			int64(buf[1])<<16 |
+			int64(buf[2])<<8 |
+			int64(buf[3])
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// partialLengthReader wraps an io.Reader and handles OpenPGP partial lengths.
+// The continuation lengths are parsed and removed from the stream and EOF is
+// returned at the end of the packet. See RFC 4880, section 4.2.2.4.
+type partialLengthReader struct {
+	r         io.Reader
+	remaining int64
+	isPartial bool
+}
+
+func (r *partialLengthReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	for r.remaining == 0 {
+		if !r.isPartial {
+			return 0, io.EOF
+		}
+		r.remaining, r.isPartial, err = readLength(r.r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	toRead := int64(len(p))
+	if toRead > r.remaining {
+		toRead = r.remaining
+	}
+
+	n, err = r.r.Read(p[:int(toRead)])
+	r.remaining -= int64(n)
+	if n < int(toRead) && err == io.EOF {
+		err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// partialLengthWriter writes a stream of data using OpenPGP partial lengths.
+// See RFC 4880, section 4.2.2.4.
+type partialLengthWriter struct {
+	w          io.WriteCloser
+	lengthByte [1]byte
+}
+
+func (w *partialLengthWriter) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	for len(p) > 0 {
+		for power := uint(14); power < 32; power-- {
+			l := 1 << power
+			if len(p) >= l {
+				w.lengthByte[0] = 224 + uint8(power)
+				_, err = w.w.Write(w.lengthByte[:])
+				if err != nil {
+					return
+				}
+				var m int
+				m, err = w.w.Write(p[:l])
+				n += m
+				if err != nil {
+					return
+				}
+				p = p[l:]
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+func (w *partialLengthWriter) Close() error {
+	w.lengthByte[0] = 0
+	_, err := w.w.Write(w.lengthByte[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return w.w.Close()
+}
+
+// A spanReader is an io.LimitReader, but it returns ErrUnexpectedEOF if the
+// underlying Reader returns EOF before the limit has been reached.
+type spanReader struct {
+	r io.Reader
+	n int64
+}
+
+func (l *spanReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	if l.n <= 0 {
+		return 0, io.EOF
+	}
+	if int64(len(p)) > l.n {
+		p = p[0:l.n]
+	}
+	n, err = l.r.Read(p)
+	l.n -= int64(n)
+	if l.n > 0 && err == io.EOF {
+		err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// readHeader parses a packet header and returns an io.Reader which will return
+// the contents of the packet. See RFC 4880, section 4.2.
+func readHeader(r io.Reader) (tag packetType, length int64, contents io.Reader, err error) {
+	var buf [4]byte
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[:1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0]&0x80 == 0 {
+		err = errors.StructuralError("tag byte does not have MSB set")
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0]&0x40 == 0 {
+		// Old format packet
+		tag = packetType((buf[0] & 0x3f) >> 2)
+		lengthType := buf[0] & 3
+		if lengthType == 3 {
+			length = -1
+			contents = r
+			return
+		}
+		lengthBytes := 1 << lengthType
+		_, err = readFull(r, buf[0:lengthBytes])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		for i := 0; i < lengthBytes; i++ {
+			length <<= 8
+			length |= int64(buf[i])
+		}
+		contents = &spanReader{r, length}
+		return
+	}
+
+	// New format packet
+	tag = packetType(buf[0] & 0x3f)
+	length, isPartial, err := readLength(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if isPartial {
+		contents = &partialLengthReader{
+			remaining: length,
+			isPartial: true,
+			r:         r,
+		}
+		length = -1
+	} else {
+		contents = &spanReader{r, length}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// serializeHeader writes an OpenPGP packet header to w. See RFC 4880, section
+// 4.2.
+func serializeHeader(w io.Writer, ptype packetType, length int) (err error) {
+	var buf [6]byte
+	var n int
+
+	buf[0] = 0x80 | 0x40 | byte(ptype)
+	if length < 192 {
+		buf[1] = byte(length)
+		n = 2
+	} else if length < 8384 {
+		length -= 192
+		buf[1] = 192 + byte(length>>8)
+		buf[2] = byte(length)
+		n = 3
+	} else {
+		buf[1] = 255
+		buf[2] = byte(length >> 24)
+		buf[3] = byte(length >> 16)
+		buf[4] = byte(length >> 8)
+		buf[5] = byte(length)
+		n = 6
+	}
+
+	_, err = w.Write(buf[:n])
+	return
+}
+
+// serializeStreamHeader writes an OpenPGP packet header to w where the
+// length of the packet is unknown. It returns a io.WriteCloser which can be
+// used to write the contents of the packet. See RFC 4880, section 4.2.
+func serializeStreamHeader(w io.WriteCloser, ptype packetType) (out io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	var buf [1]byte
+	buf[0] = 0x80 | 0x40 | byte(ptype)
+	_, err = w.Write(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	out = &partialLengthWriter{w: w}
+	return
+}
+
+// Packet represents an OpenPGP packet. Users are expected to try casting
+// instances of this interface to specific packet types.
+type Packet interface {
+	parse(io.Reader) error
+}
+
+// consumeAll reads from the given Reader until error, returning the number of
+// bytes read.
+func consumeAll(r io.Reader) (n int64, err error) {
+	var m int
+	var buf [1024]byte
+
+	for {
+		m, err = r.Read(buf[:])
+		n += int64(m)
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			err = nil
+			return
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	panic("unreachable")
+}
+
+// packetType represents the numeric ids of the different OpenPGP packet types. See
+// http://www.iana.org/assignments/pgp-parameters/pgp-parameters.xhtml#pgp-parameters-2
+type packetType uint8
+
+const (
+	packetTypeEncryptedKey              packetType = 1
+	packetTypeSignature                 packetType = 2
+	packetTypeSymmetricKeyEncrypted     packetType = 3
+	packetTypeOnePassSignature          packetType = 4
+	packetTypePrivateKey                packetType = 5
+	packetTypePublicKey                 packetType = 6
+	packetTypePrivateSubkey             packetType = 7
+	packetTypeCompressed                packetType = 8
+	packetTypeSymmetricallyEncrypted    packetType = 9
+	packetTypeLiteralData               packetType = 11
+	packetTypeUserId                    packetType = 13
+	packetTypePublicSubkey              packetType = 14
+	packetTypeUserAttribute             packetType = 17
+	packetTypeSymmetricallyEncryptedMDC packetType = 18
+)
+
+// peekVersion detects the version of a public key packet about to
+// be read. A bufio.Reader at the original position of the io.Reader
+// is returned.
+func peekVersion(r io.Reader) (bufr *bufio.Reader, ver byte, err error) {
+	bufr = bufio.NewReader(r)
+	var verBuf []byte
+	if verBuf, err = bufr.Peek(1); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	ver = verBuf[0]
+	return
+}
+
+// Read reads a single OpenPGP packet from the given io.Reader. If there is an
+// error parsing a packet, the whole packet is consumed from the input.
+func Read(r io.Reader) (p Packet, err error) {
+	tag, _, contents, err := readHeader(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch tag {
+	case packetTypeEncryptedKey:
+		p = new(EncryptedKey)
+	case packetTypeSignature:
+		var version byte
+		// Detect signature version
+		if contents, version, err = peekVersion(contents); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if version < 4 {
+			p = new(SignatureV3)
+		} else {
+			p = new(Signature)
+		}
+	case packetTypeSymmetricKeyEncrypted:
+		p = new(SymmetricKeyEncrypted)
+	case packetTypeOnePassSignature:
+		p = new(OnePassSignature)
+	case packetTypePrivateKey, packetTypePrivateSubkey:
+		pk := new(PrivateKey)
+		if tag == packetTypePrivateSubkey {
+			pk.IsSubkey = true
+		}
+		p = pk
+	case packetTypePublicKey, packetTypePublicSubkey:
+		var version byte
+		if contents, version, err = peekVersion(contents); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		isSubkey := tag == packetTypePublicSubkey
+		if version < 4 {
+			p = &PublicKeyV3{IsSubkey: isSubkey}
+		} else {
+			p = &PublicKey{IsSubkey: isSubkey}
+		}
+	case packetTypeCompressed:
+		p = new(Compressed)
+	case packetTypeSymmetricallyEncrypted:
+		p = new(SymmetricallyEncrypted)
+	case packetTypeLiteralData:
+		p = new(LiteralData)
+	case packetTypeUserId:
+		p = new(UserId)
+	case packetTypeUserAttribute:
+		p = new(UserAttribute)
+	case packetTypeSymmetricallyEncryptedMDC:
+		se := new(SymmetricallyEncrypted)
+		se.MDC = true
+		p = se
+	default:
+		err = errors.UnknownPacketTypeError(tag)
+	}
+	if p != nil {
+		err = p.parse(contents)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		consumeAll(contents)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// SignatureType represents the different semantic meanings of an OpenPGP
+// signature. See RFC 4880, section 5.2.1.
+type SignatureType uint8
+
+const (
+	SigTypeBinary             SignatureType = 0
+	SigTypeText                             = 1
+	SigTypeGenericCert                      = 0x10
+	SigTypePersonaCert                      = 0x11
+	SigTypeCasualCert                       = 0x12
+	SigTypePositiveCert                     = 0x13
+	SigTypeSubkeyBinding                    = 0x18
+	SigTypePrimaryKeyBinding                = 0x19
+	SigTypeDirectSignature                  = 0x1F
+	SigTypeKeyRevocation                    = 0x20
+	SigTypeSubkeyRevocation                 = 0x28
+	SigTypeIdentityRevocation               = 0x30
+)
+
+// PublicKeyAlgorithm represents the different public key system specified for
+// OpenPGP. See
+// http://www.iana.org/assignments/pgp-parameters/pgp-parameters.xhtml#pgp-parameters-12
+type PublicKeyAlgorithm uint8
+
+const (
+	PubKeyAlgoRSA            PublicKeyAlgorithm = 1
+	PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 2
+	PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly    PublicKeyAlgorithm = 3
+	PubKeyAlgoElGamal        PublicKeyAlgorithm = 16
+	PubKeyAlgoDSA            PublicKeyAlgorithm = 17
+	// RFC 6637, Section 5.
+	PubKeyAlgoECDH  PublicKeyAlgorithm = 18
+	PubKeyAlgoECDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 19
+	// RFC -1
+	PubKeyAlgoEdDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 22
+)
+
+// CanEncrypt returns true if it's possible to encrypt a message to a public
+// key of the given type.
+func (pka PublicKeyAlgorithm) CanEncrypt() bool {
+	switch pka {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoElGamal, PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// CanSign returns true if it's possible for a public key of the given type to
+// sign a message.
+func (pka PublicKeyAlgorithm) CanSign() bool {
+	switch pka {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly, PubKeyAlgoDSA, PubKeyAlgoECDSA, PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// CipherFunction represents the different block ciphers specified for OpenPGP. See
+// http://www.iana.org/assignments/pgp-parameters/pgp-parameters.xhtml#pgp-parameters-13
+type CipherFunction uint8
+
+const (
+	Cipher3DES   CipherFunction = 2
+	CipherCAST5  CipherFunction = 3
+	CipherAES128 CipherFunction = 7
+	CipherAES192 CipherFunction = 8
+	CipherAES256 CipherFunction = 9
+)
+
+// KeySize returns the key size, in bytes, of cipher.
+func (cipher CipherFunction) KeySize() int {
+	switch cipher {
+	case Cipher3DES:
+		return 24
+	case CipherCAST5:
+		return cast5.KeySize
+	case CipherAES128:
+		return 16
+	case CipherAES192:
+		return 24
+	case CipherAES256:
+		return 32
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// blockSize returns the block size, in bytes, of cipher.
+func (cipher CipherFunction) blockSize() int {
+	switch cipher {
+	case Cipher3DES:
+		return des.BlockSize
+	case CipherCAST5:
+		return 8
+	case CipherAES128, CipherAES192, CipherAES256:
+		return 16
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// new returns a fresh instance of the given cipher.
+func (cipher CipherFunction) new(key []byte) (block cipher.Block) {
+	switch cipher {
+	case Cipher3DES:
+		block, _ = des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
+	case CipherCAST5:
+		block, _ = cast5.NewCipher(key)
+	case CipherAES128, CipherAES192, CipherAES256:
+		block, _ = aes.NewCipher(key)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// readMPI reads a big integer from r. The bit length returned is the bit
+// length that was specified in r. This is preserved so that the integer can be
+// reserialized exactly.
+func readMPI(r io.Reader) (mpi []byte, bitLength uint16, err error) {
+	var buf [2]byte
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[0:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	bitLength = uint16(buf[0])<<8 | uint16(buf[1])
+	numBytes := (int(bitLength) + 7) / 8
+	mpi = make([]byte, numBytes)
+	_, err = readFull(r, mpi)
+	return
+}
+
+// mpiLength returns the length of the given *big.Int when serialized as an
+// MPI.
+func mpiLength(n *big.Int) (mpiLengthInBytes int) {
+	mpiLengthInBytes = 2 /* MPI length */
+	mpiLengthInBytes += (n.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	return
+}
+
+// writeMPI serializes a big integer to w.
+func writeMPI(w io.Writer, bitLength uint16, mpiBytes []byte) (err error) {
+	_, err = w.Write([]byte{byte(bitLength >> 8), byte(bitLength)})
+	if err == nil {
+		_, err = w.Write(mpiBytes)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+func WritePaddedBigInt(w io.Writer, length int, X *big.Int) (n int, err error) {
+	bytes := X.Bytes()
+	n1, err := w.Write(make([]byte, length-len(bytes)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return n1, err
+	}
+	n2, err := w.Write(bytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return n2, err
+	}
+	return (n1 + n2), err
+}
+
+// Minimum number of bytes to fit the curve coordinates. All
+// coordinates have to be 0-padded to this length.
+func mpiPointByteLength(curve elliptic.Curve) int {
+	return (curve.Params().P.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+}
+
+// writeBig serializes a *big.Int to w.
+func writeBig(w io.Writer, i *big.Int) error {
+	return writeMPI(w, uint16(i.BitLen()), i.Bytes())
+}
+
+// CompressionAlgo Represents the different compression algorithms
+// supported by OpenPGP (except for BZIP2, which is not currently
+// supported). See Section 9.3 of RFC 4880.
+type CompressionAlgo uint8
+
+const (
+	CompressionNone CompressionAlgo = 0
+	CompressionZIP  CompressionAlgo = 1
+	CompressionZLIB CompressionAlgo = 2
+)

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go

@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/dsa"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"math/big"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/ed25519"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/ecdh"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/elgamal"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa"
+)
+
+// PrivateKey represents a possibly encrypted private key. See RFC 4880,
+// section 5.5.3.
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	Encrypted     bool // if true then the private key is unavailable until Decrypt has been called.
+	encryptedData []byte
+	cipher        CipherFunction
+	s2k           func(out, in []byte)
+	PrivateKey    interface{} // An *rsa.PrivateKey or *dsa.PrivateKey.
+	sha1Checksum  bool
+	iv            []byte
+	s2kHeader     []byte
+}
+
+type EdDSAPrivateKey struct {
+	PrivateKey
+	seed parsedMPI
+}
+
+func (e *EdDSAPrivateKey) Sign(digest []byte) (R, S []byte, err error) {
+	r := bytes.NewReader(e.seed.bytes)
+	publicKey, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	if !bytes.Equal(publicKey, e.PublicKey.edk.p.bytes[1:]) { // [1:] because [0] is 0x40 mpi header
+		return nil, nil, errors.UnsupportedError("EdDSA: Private key does not match public key.")
+	}
+
+	sig := ed25519.Sign(privateKey, digest)
+
+	sigLen := ed25519.SignatureSize / 2
+	return sig[:sigLen], sig[sigLen:], nil
+}
+
+func NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *rsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+	pk := new(PrivateKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PrivateKey = priv
+	return pk
+}
+
+func NewDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *dsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+	pk := new(PrivateKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PrivateKey = priv
+	return pk
+}
+
+func NewElGamalPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *elgamal.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+	pk := new(PrivateKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewElGamalPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PrivateKey = priv
+	return pk
+}
+
+func NewECDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
+	pk := new(PrivateKey)
+	pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
+	pk.PrivateKey = priv
+	return pk
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	err = (&pk.PublicKey).parse(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	var buf [1]byte
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	s2kType := buf[0]
+
+	switch s2kType {
+	case 0:
+		pk.s2k = nil
+		pk.Encrypted = false
+	case 254, 255:
+		_, err = readFull(r, buf[:])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		pk.cipher = CipherFunction(buf[0])
+		pk.Encrypted = true
+		pk.s2k, err = s2k.Parse(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if s2kType == 254 {
+			pk.sha1Checksum = true
+		}
+		// S2K == nil implies that we got a "GNU Dummy" S2K. For instance,
+		// because our master secret key is on a USB key in a vault somewhere.
+		// In that case, there is no further data to consume here.
+		if pk.s2k == nil {
+			pk.Encrypted = false
+			return
+		}
+	default:
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("deprecated s2k function in private key")
+	}
+	if pk.Encrypted {
+		blockSize := pk.cipher.blockSize()
+		if blockSize == 0 {
+			return errors.UnsupportedError("unsupported cipher in private key: " + strconv.Itoa(int(pk.cipher)))
+		}
+		pk.iv = make([]byte, blockSize)
+		_, err = readFull(r, pk.iv)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	pk.encryptedData, err = ioutil.ReadAll(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if !pk.Encrypted {
+		return pk.parsePrivateKey(pk.encryptedData)
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func mod64kHash(d []byte) uint16 {
+	var h uint16
+	for _, b := range d {
+		h += uint16(b)
+	}
+	return h
+}
+
+// Encrypt is the counterpart to the Decrypt() method below. It encrypts
+// the private key with the provided passphrase. If config is nil, then
+// the standard, and sensible, defaults apply.
+//
+// A key will be derived from the given passphrase using S2K Specifier
+// Type 3 (Iterated + Salted, see RFC-4880 Sec. 3.7.1.3). This choice
+// is hardcoded in s2k.Serialize(). S2KCount is hardcoded to 0, which is
+// equivalent to 65536. And the hash algorithm for key-derivation can be
+// set with config. The encrypted PrivateKey, using the algorithm specified
+// in config (if provided), is written out to the encryptedData member.
+// When Serialize() is called, this encryptedData member will be
+// serialized, using S2K Usage value of 254, and thus SHA1 checksum.
+func (pk *PrivateKey) Encrypt(passphrase []byte, config *Config) (err error) {
+	if pk.PrivateKey == nil {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("there is no private key to encrypt")
+	}
+
+	pk.sha1Checksum = true
+	pk.cipher = config.Cipher()
+	s2kConfig := s2k.Config{
+		Hash:     config.Hash(),
+		S2KCount: 0,
+	}
+	s2kBuf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+	derivedKey := make([]byte, pk.cipher.KeySize())
+	err = s2k.Serialize(s2kBuf, derivedKey, config.Random(), passphrase, &s2kConfig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	pk.s2kHeader = s2kBuf.Bytes()
+	// No good way to set pk.s2k but to call s2k.Parse(),
+	// even though we have all the information here, but
+	// most of the functions needed are private to s2k.
+	pk.s2k, err = s2k.Parse(s2kBuf)
+	pk.iv = make([]byte, pk.cipher.blockSize())
+	if _, err = config.Random().Read(pk.iv); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	privateKeyBuf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+	if err = pk.serializePrivateKey(privateKeyBuf); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	checksum := sha1.Sum(privateKeyBuf.Bytes())
+	if _, err = privateKeyBuf.Write(checksum[:]); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	pkData := privateKeyBuf.Bytes()
+	block := pk.cipher.new(derivedKey)
+	pk.encryptedData = make([]byte, len(pkData))
+	cfb := cipher.NewCFBEncrypter(block, pk.iv)
+	cfb.XORKeyStream(pk.encryptedData, pkData)
+	pk.Encrypted = true
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+	err = pk.PublicKey.serializeWithoutHeaders(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	privateKeyBuf := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
+
+	if pk.PrivateKey == nil {
+		_, err = buf.Write([]byte{
+			254,           // SHA-1 Convention
+			9,             // Encryption scheme (AES256)
+			101,           // GNU Extensions
+			2,             // Hash value (SHA1)
+			'G', 'N', 'U', // "GNU" as a string
+			1, // Extension type 1001 (minus 1000)
+		})
+	} else if pk.Encrypted {
+		_, err = buf.Write([]byte{
+			254,             // SHA-1 Convention
+			byte(pk.cipher), // Encryption scheme
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err = buf.Write(pk.s2kHeader); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err = buf.Write(pk.iv); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if _, err = privateKeyBuf.Write(pk.encryptedData); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	} else {
+		buf.WriteByte(0 /* no encryption */)
+		if err = pk.serializePrivateKey(privateKeyBuf); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	ptype := packetTypePrivateKey
+	contents := buf.Bytes()
+	privateKeyBytes := privateKeyBuf.Bytes()
+	if pk.IsSubkey {
+		ptype = packetTypePrivateSubkey
+	}
+	totalLen := len(contents) + len(privateKeyBytes)
+	if !pk.Encrypted {
+		totalLen += 2
+	}
+	err = serializeHeader(w, ptype, totalLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(contents)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(privateKeyBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(privateKeyBytes) > 0 && !pk.Encrypted {
+		checksum := mod64kHash(privateKeyBytes)
+		var checksumBytes [2]byte
+		checksumBytes[0] = byte(checksum >> 8)
+		checksumBytes[1] = byte(checksum)
+		_, err = w.Write(checksumBytes[:])
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) serializePrivateKey(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	switch priv := pk.PrivateKey.(type) {
+	case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+		err = serializeRSAPrivateKey(w, priv)
+	case *dsa.PrivateKey:
+		err = serializeDSAPrivateKey(w, priv)
+	case *elgamal.PrivateKey:
+		err = serializeElGamalPrivateKey(w, priv)
+	case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		err = serializeECDSAPrivateKey(w, priv)
+	case *ecdh.PrivateKey:
+		err = serializeECDHPrivateKey(w, priv)
+	case *EdDSAPrivateKey:
+		err = serializeEdDSAPrivateKey(w, priv)
+	default:
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("unknown private key type")
+	}
+
+	return err
+}
+
+func serializeRSAPrivateKey(w io.Writer, priv *rsa.PrivateKey) error {
+	err := writeBig(w, priv.D)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	err = writeBig(w, priv.Primes[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	err = writeBig(w, priv.Primes[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return writeBig(w, priv.Precomputed.Qinv)
+}
+
+func serializeDSAPrivateKey(w io.Writer, priv *dsa.PrivateKey) error {
+	return writeBig(w, priv.X)
+}
+
+func serializeElGamalPrivateKey(w io.Writer, priv *elgamal.PrivateKey) error {
+	return writeBig(w, priv.X)
+}
+
+func serializeECDSAPrivateKey(w io.Writer, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
+	return writeBig(w, priv.D)
+}
+
+func serializeECDHPrivateKey(w io.Writer, priv *ecdh.PrivateKey) error {
+	return writeBig(w, priv.X)
+}
+
+func serializeEdDSAPrivateKey(w io.Writer, priv *EdDSAPrivateKey) error {
+	return writeMPI(w, priv.seed.bitLength, priv.seed.bytes)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts an encrypted private key using a passphrase.
+func (pk *PrivateKey) Decrypt(passphrase []byte) error {
+	if !pk.Encrypted {
+		return nil
+	}
+	// For GNU Dummy S2K, there's no key here, so don't do anything.
+	if pk.s2k == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	key := make([]byte, pk.cipher.KeySize())
+	pk.s2k(key, passphrase)
+	block := pk.cipher.new(key)
+	cfb := cipher.NewCFBDecrypter(block, pk.iv)
+
+	data := make([]byte, len(pk.encryptedData))
+	cfb.XORKeyStream(data, pk.encryptedData)
+
+	if pk.sha1Checksum {
+		if len(data) < sha1.Size {
+			return errors.StructuralError("truncated private key data")
+		}
+		h := sha1.New()
+		h.Write(data[:len(data)-sha1.Size])
+		sum := h.Sum(nil)
+		if !bytes.Equal(sum, data[len(data)-sha1.Size:]) {
+			return errors.StructuralError("private key checksum failure")
+		}
+		data = data[:len(data)-sha1.Size]
+	} else {
+		if len(data) < 2 {
+			return errors.StructuralError("truncated private key data")
+		}
+		var sum uint16
+		for i := 0; i < len(data)-2; i++ {
+			sum += uint16(data[i])
+		}
+		if data[len(data)-2] != uint8(sum>>8) ||
+			data[len(data)-1] != uint8(sum) {
+			return errors.StructuralError("private key checksum failure")
+		}
+		data = data[:len(data)-2]
+	}
+
+	return pk.parsePrivateKey(data)
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parsePrivateKey(data []byte) (err error) {
+	switch pk.PublicKey.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
+		return pk.parseRSAPrivateKey(data)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		return pk.parseDSAPrivateKey(data)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		return pk.parseElGamalPrivateKey(data)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		return pk.parseECDSAPrivateKey(data)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		return pk.parseECDHPrivateKey(data)
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		return pk.parseEdDSAPrivateKey(data)
+	}
+	panic("impossible")
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parseRSAPrivateKey(data []byte) (err error) {
+	rsaPub := pk.PublicKey.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+	rsaPriv := new(rsa.PrivateKey)
+	rsaPriv.PublicKey = *rsaPub
+
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(data)
+	d, _, err := readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	p, _, err := readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	q, _, err := readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	rsaPriv.D = new(big.Int).SetBytes(d)
+	rsaPriv.Primes = make([]*big.Int, 2)
+	rsaPriv.Primes[0] = new(big.Int).SetBytes(p)
+	rsaPriv.Primes[1] = new(big.Int).SetBytes(q)
+	if err := rsaPriv.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	rsaPriv.Precompute()
+	pk.PrivateKey = rsaPriv
+	pk.Encrypted = false
+	pk.encryptedData = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parseDSAPrivateKey(data []byte) (err error) {
+	dsaPub := pk.PublicKey.PublicKey.(*dsa.PublicKey)
+	dsaPriv := new(dsa.PrivateKey)
+	dsaPriv.PublicKey = *dsaPub
+
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(data)
+	x, _, err := readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	dsaPriv.X = new(big.Int).SetBytes(x)
+	pk.PrivateKey = dsaPriv
+	pk.Encrypted = false
+	pk.encryptedData = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parseElGamalPrivateKey(data []byte) (err error) {
+	pub := pk.PublicKey.PublicKey.(*elgamal.PublicKey)
+	priv := new(elgamal.PrivateKey)
+	priv.PublicKey = *pub
+
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(data)
+	x, _, err := readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	priv.X = new(big.Int).SetBytes(x)
+	pk.PrivateKey = priv
+	pk.Encrypted = false
+	pk.encryptedData = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parseECDHPrivateKey(data []byte) (err error) {
+	pub := pk.PublicKey.PublicKey.(*ecdh.PublicKey)
+	priv := new(ecdh.PrivateKey)
+	priv.PublicKey = *pub
+
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(data)
+	d, _, err := readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	priv.X = new(big.Int).SetBytes(d)
+	pk.PrivateKey = priv
+	pk.Encrypted = false
+	pk.encryptedData = nil
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parseECDSAPrivateKey(data []byte) (err error) {
+	ecdsaPub := pk.PublicKey.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+	ecdsaPriv := new(ecdsa.PrivateKey)
+	ecdsaPriv.PublicKey = *ecdsaPub
+
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(data)
+	d, _, err := readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	ecdsaPriv.D = new(big.Int).SetBytes(d)
+	pk.PrivateKey = ecdsaPriv
+	pk.Encrypted = false
+	pk.encryptedData = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (pk *PrivateKey) parseEdDSAPrivateKey(data []byte) (err error) {
+	eddsaPriv := new(EdDSAPrivateKey)
+	eddsaPriv.PublicKey = pk.PublicKey
+
+	buf := bytes.NewBuffer(data)
+	eddsaPriv.seed.bytes, eddsaPriv.seed.bitLength, err = readMPI(buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if bLen := len(eddsaPriv.seed.bytes); bLen != 32 { // 32 bytes private part of ed25519 key.
+		return errors.UnsupportedError(fmt.Sprintf("Unexpected EdDSA private key length: %d", bLen))
+	}
+
+	pk.PrivateKey = eddsaPriv
+	pk.Encrypted = false
+	pk.encryptedData = nil
+
+	return nil
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/public_key.go

@@ -0,0 +1,930 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/dsa"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	_ "crypto/sha256"
+	_ "crypto/sha512"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/brainpool"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/ed25519"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/ecdh"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/elgamal"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa"
+)
+
+var (
+	// NIST curve P-256
+	oidCurveP256 []byte = []byte{0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07}
+	// NIST curve P-384
+	oidCurveP384 []byte = []byte{0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22}
+	// NIST curve P-521
+	oidCurveP521 []byte = []byte{0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23}
+	// Brainpool curve P-256r1
+	oidCurveP256r1 []byte = []byte{0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x07}
+	// Brainpool curve P-384r1
+	oidCurveP384r1 []byte = []byte{0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B}
+	// Brainpool curve P-512r1
+	oidCurveP512r1 []byte = []byte{0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0D}
+	// EdDSA
+	oidEdDSA []byte = []byte{0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0xDA, 0x47, 0x0F, 0x01}
+	// cv25519
+	oidCurve25519 []byte = []byte{0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x97, 0x55, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01}
+)
+
+const maxOIDLength = 10
+
+// ecdsaKey stores the algorithm-specific fields for ECDSA keys.
+// as defined in RFC 6637, Section 9.
+type ecdsaKey struct {
+	// oid contains the OID byte sequence identifying the elliptic curve used
+	oid []byte
+	// p contains the elliptic curve point that represents the public key
+	p parsedMPI
+}
+
+type edDSAkey struct {
+	ecdsaKey
+}
+
+func copyFrontFill(dst, src []byte, length int) int {
+	if srcLen := len(src); srcLen < length {
+		return copy(dst[length-srcLen:], src[:])
+	} else {
+		return copy(dst[:], src[:])
+	}
+}
+
+func (e *edDSAkey) Verify(payload []byte, r parsedMPI, s parsedMPI) bool {
+	const halfSigSize = ed25519.SignatureSize / 2
+	var sig [ed25519.SignatureSize]byte
+
+	// NOTE: The first byte is 0x40 - MPI header
+	// TODO: Maybe clean the code up and use 0x40 as a header when
+	// reading and keep only actual number in p field. Find out how
+	// other MPIs are stored.
+	key := e.p.bytes[1:]
+
+	// Note: it may happen that R + S do not form 64-byte signature buffer that
+	// ed25519 expects, but because we copy it over to an array of exact size,
+	// we will always pass correctly sized slice to Verify. Slice too short
+	// would make ed25519 panic().
+	copyFrontFill(sig[:halfSigSize], r.bytes, halfSigSize)
+	copyFrontFill(sig[halfSigSize:], s.bytes, halfSigSize)
+
+	return ed25519.Verify(key, payload, sig[:])
+}
+
+// parseOID reads the OID for the curve as defined in RFC 6637, Section 9.
+func parseOID(r io.Reader) (oid []byte, err error) {
+	buf := make([]byte, maxOIDLength)
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf[:1]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	oidLen := buf[0]
+	if int(oidLen) > len(buf) {
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("invalid oid length: " + strconv.Itoa(int(oidLen)))
+		return
+	}
+	oid = buf[:oidLen]
+	_, err = readFull(r, oid)
+	return
+}
+
+func (f *ecdsaKey) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	if f.oid, err = parseOID(r); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	f.p.bytes, f.p.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	return err
+}
+
+func (f *ecdsaKey) serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	buf := make([]byte, maxOIDLength+1)
+	buf[0] = byte(len(f.oid))
+	copy(buf[1:], f.oid)
+	if _, err = w.Write(buf[:len(f.oid)+1]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return writeMPIs(w, f.p)
+}
+
+func getCurveByOid(oid []byte) elliptic.Curve {
+	switch {
+	case bytes.Equal(oid, oidCurveP256):
+		return elliptic.P256()
+	case bytes.Equal(oid, oidCurveP384):
+		return elliptic.P384()
+	case bytes.Equal(oid, oidCurveP521):
+		return elliptic.P521()
+	case bytes.Equal(oid, oidCurveP256r1):
+		return brainpool.P256r1()
+	case bytes.Equal(oid, oidCurveP384r1):
+		return brainpool.P384r1()
+	case bytes.Equal(oid, oidCurveP512r1):
+		return brainpool.P512r1()
+	case bytes.Equal(oid, oidCurve25519):
+		return curve25519.Cv25519()
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *ecdsaKey) newECDSA() (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
+	var c = getCurveByOid(f.oid)
+	// Curve25519 should not be used in ECDSA.
+	if c == nil || bytes.Equal(f.oid, oidCurve25519) {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported oid: %x", f.oid))
+	}
+	// Note: Unmarshal already checks if point is on curve.
+	x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(c, f.p.bytes)
+	if x == nil {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("failed to parse EC point")
+	}
+	return &ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: c, X: x, Y: y}, nil
+}
+
+func (f *ecdsaKey) newECDH() (*ecdh.PublicKey, error) {
+	var c = getCurveByOid(f.oid)
+	if c == nil {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported oid: %x", f.oid))
+	}
+	// ecdh.Unmarshal handles unmarshaling for all curve types. It
+	// also checks if point is on curve.
+	x, y := ecdh.Unmarshal(c, f.p.bytes)
+	if x == nil {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("failed to parse EC point")
+	}
+	return &ecdh.PublicKey{Curve: c, X: x, Y: y}, nil
+}
+
+func (f *ecdsaKey) byteLen() int {
+	return 1 + len(f.oid) + 2 + len(f.p.bytes)
+}
+
+type kdfHashFunction byte
+type kdfAlgorithm byte
+
+// ecdhKdf stores key derivation function parameters
+// used for ECDH encryption. See RFC 6637, Section 9.
+type ecdhKdf struct {
+	KdfHash kdfHashFunction
+	KdfAlgo kdfAlgorithm
+}
+
+func (f *ecdhKdf) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	buf := make([]byte, 1)
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	kdfLen := int(buf[0])
+	if kdfLen < 3 {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("Unsupported ECDH KDF length: " + strconv.Itoa(kdfLen))
+	}
+	buf = make([]byte, kdfLen)
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	reserved := int(buf[0])
+	f.KdfHash = kdfHashFunction(buf[1])
+	f.KdfAlgo = kdfAlgorithm(buf[2])
+	if reserved != 0x01 {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("Unsupported KDF reserved field: " + strconv.Itoa(reserved))
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+func (f *ecdhKdf) serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	buf := make([]byte, 4)
+	// See RFC 6637, Section 9, Algorithm-Specific Fields for ECDH keys.
+	buf[0] = byte(0x03) // Length of the following fields
+	buf[1] = byte(0x01) // Reserved for future extensions, must be 1 for now
+	buf[2] = byte(f.KdfHash)
+	buf[3] = byte(f.KdfAlgo)
+	_, err = w.Write(buf[:])
+	return
+}
+
+func (f *ecdhKdf) byteLen() int {
+	return 4
+}
+
+// PublicKey represents an OpenPGP public key. See RFC 4880, section 5.5.2.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	CreationTime time.Time
+	PubKeyAlgo   PublicKeyAlgorithm
+	PublicKey    interface{} // *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey or *ecdsa.PublicKey
+	Fingerprint  [20]byte
+	KeyId        uint64
+	IsSubkey     bool
+
+	n, e, p, q, g, y parsedMPI
+
+	// RFC 6637 fields
+	ec   *ecdsaKey
+	ecdh *ecdhKdf
+
+	// EdDSA fields (no RFC available), uses ecdsa scaffolding
+	edk *edDSAkey
+}
+
+// signingKey provides a convenient abstraction over signature verification
+// for v3 and v4 public keys.
+type signingKey interface {
+	SerializeSignaturePrefix(io.Writer)
+	serializeWithoutHeaders(io.Writer) error
+}
+
+func FromBig(n *big.Int) parsedMPI {
+	return parsedMPI{
+		bytes:     n.Bytes(),
+		bitLength: uint16(n.BitLen()),
+	}
+}
+
+func FromBytes(bytes []byte) parsedMPI {
+	return parsedMPI{
+		bytes:     bytes,
+		bitLength: uint16(8 * len(bytes)),
+	}
+}
+
+// NewRSAPublicKey returns a PublicKey that wraps the given rsa.PublicKey.
+func NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime time.Time, pub *rsa.PublicKey) *PublicKey {
+	pk := &PublicKey{
+		CreationTime: creationTime,
+		PubKeyAlgo:   PubKeyAlgoRSA,
+		PublicKey:    pub,
+		n:            FromBig(pub.N),
+		e:            FromBig(big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))),
+	}
+
+	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
+	return pk
+}
+
+// NewDSAPublicKey returns a PublicKey that wraps the given dsa.PublicKey.
+func NewDSAPublicKey(creationTime time.Time, pub *dsa.PublicKey) *PublicKey {
+	pk := &PublicKey{
+		CreationTime: creationTime,
+		PubKeyAlgo:   PubKeyAlgoDSA,
+		PublicKey:    pub,
+		p:            FromBig(pub.P),
+		q:            FromBig(pub.Q),
+		g:            FromBig(pub.G),
+		y:            FromBig(pub.Y),
+	}
+
+	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
+	return pk
+}
+
+// check EdDSA public key material.
+// There is currently no RFC for it, but it doesn't mean it's not
+// implemented or in use.
+func (e *edDSAkey) check() error {
+	if !bytes.Equal(e.oid, oidEdDSA) {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError(fmt.Sprintf("Bad OID for EdDSA key: %v", e.oid))
+	}
+	if bLen := len(e.p.bytes); bLen != 33 { // 32 bytes for ed25519 key and 1 byte for 0x40 header
+		return errors.UnsupportedError(fmt.Sprintf("Unexpected EdDSA public key length: %d", bLen))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// NewElGamalPublicKey returns a PublicKey that wraps the given elgamal.PublicKey.
+func NewElGamalPublicKey(creationTime time.Time, pub *elgamal.PublicKey) *PublicKey {
+	pk := &PublicKey{
+		CreationTime: creationTime,
+		PubKeyAlgo:   PubKeyAlgoElGamal,
+		PublicKey:    pub,
+		p:            FromBig(pub.P),
+		g:            FromBig(pub.G),
+		y:            FromBig(pub.Y),
+	}
+
+	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
+	return pk
+}
+
+func NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime time.Time, pub *ecdsa.PublicKey) *PublicKey {
+	pk := &PublicKey{
+		CreationTime: creationTime,
+		PubKeyAlgo:   PubKeyAlgoECDSA,
+		PublicKey:    pub,
+		ec:           new(ecdsaKey),
+	}
+	switch pub.Curve {
+	case elliptic.P256():
+		pk.ec.oid = oidCurveP256
+	case elliptic.P384():
+		pk.ec.oid = oidCurveP384
+	case elliptic.P521():
+		pk.ec.oid = oidCurveP521
+	case brainpool.P256r1():
+		pk.ec.oid = oidCurveP256r1
+	case brainpool.P384r1():
+		pk.ec.oid = oidCurveP384r1
+	case brainpool.P512r1():
+		pk.ec.oid = oidCurveP512r1
+	}
+	pk.ec.p.bytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y)
+	pk.ec.p.bitLength = uint16(8 * len(pk.ec.p.bytes))
+
+	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
+	return pk
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.5.2
+	var buf [6]byte
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0] != 4 {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("public key version")
+	}
+	pk.CreationTime = time.Unix(int64(uint32(buf[1])<<24|uint32(buf[2])<<16|uint32(buf[3])<<8|uint32(buf[4])), 0)
+	pk.PubKeyAlgo = PublicKeyAlgorithm(buf[5])
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		err = pk.parseRSA(r)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		err = pk.parseDSA(r)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		err = pk.parseElGamal(r)
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		pk.edk = new(edDSAkey)
+		if err = pk.edk.parse(r); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		err = pk.edk.check()
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		pk.ec = new(ecdsaKey)
+		if err = pk.ec.parse(r); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		pk.PublicKey, err = pk.ec.newECDSA()
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		pk.ec = new(ecdsaKey)
+		if err = pk.ec.parse(r); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		pk.ecdh = new(ecdhKdf)
+		if err = pk.ecdh.parse(r); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		pk.PublicKey, err = pk.ec.newECDH()
+	default:
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("public key type: " + strconv.Itoa(int(pk.PubKeyAlgo)))
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
+	return
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) setFingerPrintAndKeyId() {
+	// RFC 4880, section 12.2
+	fingerPrint := sha1.New()
+	pk.SerializeSignaturePrefix(fingerPrint)
+	pk.serializeWithoutHeaders(fingerPrint)
+	copy(pk.Fingerprint[:], fingerPrint.Sum(nil))
+	pk.KeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(pk.Fingerprint[12:20])
+}
+
+// parseRSA parses RSA public key material from the given Reader. See RFC 4880,
+// section 5.5.2.
+func (pk *PublicKey) parseRSA(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	pk.n.bytes, pk.n.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pk.e.bytes, pk.e.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(pk.e.bytes) > 7 {
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("large public exponent")
+		return
+	}
+	rsa := &rsa.PublicKey{
+		N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.n.bytes),
+		E: 0,
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < len(pk.e.bytes); i++ {
+		rsa.E <<= 8
+		rsa.E |= int64(pk.e.bytes[i])
+	}
+	pk.PublicKey = rsa
+	return
+}
+
+// parseDSA parses DSA public key material from the given Reader. See RFC 4880,
+// section 5.5.2.
+func (pk *PublicKey) parseDSA(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	pk.p.bytes, pk.p.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pk.q.bytes, pk.q.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pk.g.bytes, pk.g.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pk.y.bytes, pk.y.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	dsa := new(dsa.PublicKey)
+	dsa.P = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.p.bytes)
+	dsa.Q = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.q.bytes)
+	dsa.G = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.g.bytes)
+	dsa.Y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.y.bytes)
+	pk.PublicKey = dsa
+	return
+}
+
+// parseElGamal parses ElGamal public key material from the given Reader. See
+// RFC 4880, section 5.5.2.
+func (pk *PublicKey) parseElGamal(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	pk.p.bytes, pk.p.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pk.g.bytes, pk.g.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	pk.y.bytes, pk.y.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	elgamal := new(elgamal.PublicKey)
+	elgamal.P = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.p.bytes)
+	elgamal.G = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.g.bytes)
+	elgamal.Y = new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.y.bytes)
+	pk.PublicKey = elgamal
+	return
+}
+
+// SerializeSignaturePrefix writes the prefix for this public key to the given Writer.
+// The prefix is used when calculating a signature over this public key. See
+// RFC 4880, section 5.2.4.
+func (pk *PublicKey) SerializeSignaturePrefix(h io.Writer) {
+	var pLength uint16
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.n.bytes))
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.e.bytes))
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.p.bytes))
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.q.bytes))
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.g.bytes))
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.y.bytes))
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.p.bytes))
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.g.bytes))
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.y.bytes))
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		pLength += uint16(pk.ec.byteLen())
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		pLength += uint16(pk.ec.byteLen())
+		pLength += uint16(pk.ecdh.byteLen())
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		pLength += uint16(pk.edk.byteLen())
+	default:
+		panic("unknown public key algorithm")
+	}
+	pLength += 6
+	h.Write([]byte{0x99, byte(pLength >> 8), byte(pLength)})
+	return
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	length := 6 // 6 byte header
+
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		length += 2 + len(pk.n.bytes)
+		length += 2 + len(pk.e.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		length += 2 + len(pk.p.bytes)
+		length += 2 + len(pk.q.bytes)
+		length += 2 + len(pk.g.bytes)
+		length += 2 + len(pk.y.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		length += 2 + len(pk.p.bytes)
+		length += 2 + len(pk.g.bytes)
+		length += 2 + len(pk.y.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		length += pk.ec.byteLen()
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		length += pk.ec.byteLen()
+		length += pk.ecdh.byteLen()
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		length += pk.edk.byteLen()
+	default:
+		panic("unknown public key algorithm")
+	}
+
+	packetType := packetTypePublicKey
+	if pk.IsSubkey {
+		packetType = packetTypePublicSubkey
+	}
+	err = serializeHeader(w, packetType, length)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return pk.serializeWithoutHeaders(w)
+}
+
+// serializeWithoutHeaders marshals the PublicKey to w in the form of an
+// OpenPGP public key packet, not including the packet header.
+func (pk *PublicKey) serializeWithoutHeaders(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	var buf [6]byte
+	buf[0] = 4
+	t := uint32(pk.CreationTime.Unix())
+	buf[1] = byte(t >> 24)
+	buf[2] = byte(t >> 16)
+	buf[3] = byte(t >> 8)
+	buf[4] = byte(t)
+	buf[5] = byte(pk.PubKeyAlgo)
+
+	_, err = w.Write(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		return writeMPIs(w, pk.n, pk.e)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		return writeMPIs(w, pk.p, pk.q, pk.g, pk.y)
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		return writeMPIs(w, pk.p, pk.g, pk.y)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		return pk.ec.serialize(w)
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		return pk.edk.serialize(w)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		if err = pk.ec.serialize(w); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		return pk.ecdh.serialize(w)
+	}
+	return errors.InvalidArgumentError("bad public-key algorithm")
+}
+
+// CanSign returns true iff this public key can generate signatures
+func (pk *PublicKey) CanSign() bool {
+	return pk.PubKeyAlgo != PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly && pk.PubKeyAlgo != PubKeyAlgoElGamal
+}
+
+// VerifySignature returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, of the data hashed into signed. signed is mutated by this call.
+func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignature(signed hash.Hash, sig *Signature) (err error) {
+	if !pk.CanSign() {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("public key cannot generate signatures")
+	}
+
+	signed.Write(sig.HashSuffix)
+	hashBytes := signed.Sum(nil)
+
+	// NOTE(maxtaco) 2016-08-22
+	//
+	// We used to do this:
+	//
+	// if hashBytes[0] != sig.HashTag[0] || hashBytes[1] != sig.HashTag[1] {
+	//	  return errors.SignatureError("hash tag doesn't match")
+	// }
+	//
+	// But don't do anything in this case. Some GPGs generate bad
+	// 2-byte hash prefixes, but GPG also doesn't seem to care on
+	// import. See BrentMaxwell's key. I think it's safe to disable
+	// this check!
+
+	if pk.PubKeyAlgo != sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("public key and signature use different algorithms")
+	}
+
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		rsaPublicKey, _ := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+		err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
+		}
+		return nil
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		dsaPublicKey, _ := pk.PublicKey.(*dsa.PublicKey)
+		// Need to truncate hashBytes to match FIPS 186-3 section 4.6.
+		subgroupSize := (dsaPublicKey.Q.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+		if len(hashBytes) > subgroupSize {
+			hashBytes = hashBytes[:subgroupSize]
+		}
+		if !dsa.Verify(dsaPublicKey, hashBytes, new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.DSASigR.bytes), new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.DSASigS.bytes)) {
+			return errors.SignatureError("DSA verification failure")
+		}
+		return nil
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		ecdsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+		if !ecdsa.Verify(ecdsaPublicKey, hashBytes, new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.ECDSASigR.bytes), new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.ECDSASigS.bytes)) {
+			return errors.SignatureError("ECDSA verification failure")
+		}
+		return nil
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		if !pk.edk.Verify(hashBytes, sig.EdDSASigR, sig.EdDSASigS) {
+			return errors.SignatureError("EdDSA verification failure")
+		}
+		return nil
+	default:
+		return errors.SignatureError("Unsupported public key algorithm used in signature")
+	}
+	panic("unreachable")
+}
+
+// VerifySignatureV3 returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, of the data hashed into signed. signed is mutated by this call.
+func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignatureV3(signed hash.Hash, sig *SignatureV3) (err error) {
+	if !pk.CanSign() {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("public key cannot generate signatures")
+	}
+
+	suffix := make([]byte, 5)
+	suffix[0] = byte(sig.SigType)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(suffix[1:], uint32(sig.CreationTime.Unix()))
+	signed.Write(suffix)
+	hashBytes := signed.Sum(nil)
+
+	if hashBytes[0] != sig.HashTag[0] || hashBytes[1] != sig.HashTag[1] {
+		return errors.SignatureError("hash tag doesn't match")
+	}
+
+	if pk.PubKeyAlgo != sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("public key and signature use different algorithms")
+	}
+
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		rsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+		if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes); err != nil {
+			return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
+		}
+		return
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		dsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*dsa.PublicKey)
+		// Need to truncate hashBytes to match FIPS 186-3 section 4.6.
+		subgroupSize := (dsaPublicKey.Q.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+		if len(hashBytes) > subgroupSize {
+			hashBytes = hashBytes[:subgroupSize]
+		}
+		if !dsa.Verify(dsaPublicKey, hashBytes, new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.DSASigR.bytes), new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.DSASigS.bytes)) {
+			return errors.SignatureError("DSA verification failure")
+		}
+		return nil
+	default:
+		panic("shouldn't happen")
+	}
+	panic("unreachable")
+}
+
+// keySignatureHash returns a Hash of the message that needs to be signed for
+// pk to assert a subkey relationship to signed.
+func keySignatureHash(pk, signed signingKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash) (h hash.Hash, err error) {
+	if !hashFunc.Available() {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("hash function")
+	}
+	h = hashFunc.New()
+
+	updateKeySignatureHash(pk, signed, h)
+
+	return
+}
+
+// updateKeySignatureHash does the actual hash updates for keySignatureHash.
+func updateKeySignatureHash(pk, signed signingKey, h hash.Hash) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.4
+	pk.SerializeSignaturePrefix(h)
+	pk.serializeWithoutHeaders(h)
+	signed.SerializeSignaturePrefix(h)
+	signed.serializeWithoutHeaders(h)
+}
+
+// VerifyKeySignature returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, of signed.
+func (pk *PublicKey) VerifyKeySignature(signed *PublicKey, sig *Signature) error {
+	h, err := keySignatureHash(pk, signed, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err = pk.VerifySignature(h, sig); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if sig.FlagSign {
+
+		// BUG(maxtaco)
+		//
+		// We should check for more than FlagsSign here, because if
+		// you read keys.go, we can sometimes use signing subkeys even if they're
+		// not explicitly flagged as such. However, so doing fails lots of currently
+		// working tests, so I'm not going to do much here.
+		//
+		// In other words, we should have this disjunction in the condition above:
+		//
+		//    || (!sig.FlagsValid && pk.PubKeyAlgo.CanSign()) {
+		//
+
+		// Signing subkeys must be cross-signed. See
+		// https://www.gnupg.org/faq/subkey-cross-certify.html.
+		if sig.EmbeddedSignature == nil {
+			return errors.StructuralError("signing subkey is missing cross-signature")
+		}
+		// Verify the cross-signature. This is calculated over the same
+		// data as the main signature, so we cannot just recursively
+		// call signed.VerifyKeySignature(...)
+		if h, err = keySignatureHash(pk, signed, sig.EmbeddedSignature.Hash); err != nil {
+			return errors.StructuralError("error while hashing for cross-signature: " + err.Error())
+		}
+		if err := signed.VerifySignature(h, sig.EmbeddedSignature); err != nil {
+			return errors.StructuralError("error while verifying cross-signature: " + err.Error())
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func keyRevocationHash(pk signingKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash) (h hash.Hash, err error) {
+	if !hashFunc.Available() {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("hash function")
+	}
+	h = hashFunc.New()
+
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.4
+	pk.SerializeSignaturePrefix(h)
+	pk.serializeWithoutHeaders(h)
+
+	return
+}
+
+// VerifyRevocationSignature returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key.
+func (pk *PublicKey) VerifyRevocationSignature(revokedKey *PublicKey, sig *Signature) (err error) {
+	h, err := keyRevocationHash(revokedKey, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return pk.VerifySignature(h, sig)
+}
+
+type teeHash struct {
+	h hash.Hash
+}
+
+func (t teeHash) Write(b []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	fmt.Printf("hash -> %s %+v\n", string(b), b)
+	return t.h.Write(b)
+}
+func (t teeHash) Sum(b []byte) []byte { return t.h.Sum(b) }
+func (t teeHash) Reset()              { t.h.Reset() }
+func (t teeHash) Size() int           { return t.h.Size() }
+func (t teeHash) BlockSize() int      { return t.h.BlockSize() }
+
+// userIdSignatureHash returns a Hash of the message that needs to be signed
+// to assert that pk is a valid key for id.
+func userIdSignatureHash(id string, pk *PublicKey, hashFunc crypto.Hash) (h hash.Hash, err error) {
+	if !hashFunc.Available() {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("hash function")
+	}
+	h = hashFunc.New()
+
+	updateUserIdSignatureHash(id, pk, h)
+
+	return
+}
+
+// updateUserIdSignatureHash does the actual hash updates for
+// userIdSignatureHash.
+func updateUserIdSignatureHash(id string, pk *PublicKey, h hash.Hash) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.4
+	pk.SerializeSignaturePrefix(h)
+	pk.serializeWithoutHeaders(h)
+
+	var buf [5]byte
+	buf[0] = 0xb4
+	buf[1] = byte(len(id) >> 24)
+	buf[2] = byte(len(id) >> 16)
+	buf[3] = byte(len(id) >> 8)
+	buf[4] = byte(len(id))
+	h.Write(buf[:])
+	h.Write([]byte(id))
+
+	return
+}
+
+// VerifyUserIdSignature returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, that id is the identity of pub.
+func (pk *PublicKey) VerifyUserIdSignature(id string, pub *PublicKey, sig *Signature) (err error) {
+	h, err := userIdSignatureHash(id, pub, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return pk.VerifySignature(h, sig)
+}
+
+// VerifyUserIdSignatureV3 returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, that id is the identity of pub.
+func (pk *PublicKey) VerifyUserIdSignatureV3(id string, pub *PublicKey, sig *SignatureV3) (err error) {
+	h, err := userIdSignatureV3Hash(id, pub, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return pk.VerifySignatureV3(h, sig)
+}
+
+// KeyIdString returns the public key's fingerprint in capital hex
+// (e.g. "6C7EE1B8621CC013").
+func (pk *PublicKey) KeyIdString() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%X", pk.Fingerprint[12:20])
+}
+
+// KeyIdShortString returns the short form of public key's fingerprint
+// in capital hex, as shown by gpg --list-keys (e.g. "621CC013").
+func (pk *PublicKey) KeyIdShortString() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%X", pk.Fingerprint[16:20])
+}
+
+// A parsedMPI is used to store the contents of a big integer, along with the
+// bit length that was specified in the original input. This allows the MPI to
+// be reserialized exactly.
+type parsedMPI struct {
+	bytes     []byte
+	bitLength uint16
+}
+
+// writeMPIs is a utility function for serializing several big integers to the
+// given Writer.
+func writeMPIs(w io.Writer, mpis ...parsedMPI) (err error) {
+	for _, mpi := range mpis {
+		err = writeMPI(w, mpi.bitLength, mpi.bytes)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// BitLength returns the bit length for the given public key. Used for
+// displaying key information, actual buffers and BigInts inside may
+// have non-matching different size if the key is invalid.
+func (pk *PublicKey) BitLength() (bitLength uint16, err error) {
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		bitLength = pk.n.bitLength
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		bitLength = pk.p.bitLength
+	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
+		bitLength = pk.p.bitLength
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+		ecdhPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*ecdh.PublicKey)
+		bitLength = uint16(ecdhPublicKey.Curve.Params().BitSize)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		ecdsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+		bitLength = uint16(ecdsaPublicKey.Curve.Params().BitSize)
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		// EdDSA only support ed25519 curves right now, just return
+		// the length. Also, we don't have any PublicKey.Curve object
+		// to look the size up from.
+		bitLength = 256
+	default:
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("bad public-key algorithm")
+	}
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/public_key_v3.go

@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/md5"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa"
+)
+
+// PublicKeyV3 represents older, version 3 public keys. These keys are less secure and
+// should not be used for signing or encrypting. They are supported here only for
+// parsing version 3 key material and validating signatures.
+// See RFC 4880, section 5.5.2.
+type PublicKeyV3 struct {
+	CreationTime time.Time
+	DaysToExpire uint16
+	PubKeyAlgo   PublicKeyAlgorithm
+	PublicKey    *rsa.PublicKey
+	Fingerprint  [16]byte
+	KeyId        uint64
+	IsSubkey     bool
+
+	n, e parsedMPI
+}
+
+// newRSAPublicKeyV3 returns a PublicKey that wraps the given rsa.PublicKey.
+// Included here for testing purposes only. RFC 4880, section 5.5.2:
+// "an implementation MUST NOT generate a V3 key, but MAY accept it."
+func newRSAPublicKeyV3(creationTime time.Time, pub *rsa.PublicKey) *PublicKeyV3 {
+	pk := &PublicKeyV3{
+		CreationTime: creationTime,
+		PublicKey:    pub,
+		n:            FromBig(pub.N),
+		e:            FromBig(big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))),
+	}
+
+	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
+	return pk
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.5.2
+	var buf [8]byte
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf[:]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0] < 2 || buf[0] > 3 {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("public key version")
+	}
+	pk.CreationTime = time.Unix(int64(uint32(buf[1])<<24|uint32(buf[2])<<16|uint32(buf[3])<<8|uint32(buf[4])), 0)
+	pk.DaysToExpire = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[5:7])
+	pk.PubKeyAlgo = PublicKeyAlgorithm(buf[7])
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		err = pk.parseRSA(r)
+	default:
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("public key type: " + strconv.Itoa(int(pk.PubKeyAlgo)))
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
+	return
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) setFingerPrintAndKeyId() {
+	// RFC 4880, section 12.2
+	fingerPrint := md5.New()
+	fingerPrint.Write(pk.n.bytes)
+	fingerPrint.Write(pk.e.bytes)
+	fingerPrint.Sum(pk.Fingerprint[:0])
+	pk.KeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(pk.n.bytes[len(pk.n.bytes)-8:])
+}
+
+// parseRSA parses RSA public key material from the given Reader. See RFC 4880,
+// section 5.5.2.
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) parseRSA(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	if pk.n.bytes, pk.n.bitLength, err = readMPI(r); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if pk.e.bytes, pk.e.bitLength, err = readMPI(r); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// RFC 4880 Section 12.2 requires the low 8 bytes of the
+	// modulus to form the key id.
+	if len(pk.n.bytes) < 8 {
+		return errors.StructuralError("v3 public key modulus is too short")
+	}
+	if len(pk.e.bytes) > 7 {
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("large public exponent")
+		return
+	}
+	rsa := &rsa.PublicKey{N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(pk.n.bytes)}
+	for i := 0; i < len(pk.e.bytes); i++ {
+		rsa.E <<= 8
+		rsa.E |= int64(pk.e.bytes[i])
+	}
+	pk.PublicKey = rsa
+	return
+}
+
+// SerializeSignaturePrefix writes the prefix for this public key to the given Writer.
+// The prefix is used when calculating a signature over this public key. See
+// RFC 4880, section 5.2.4.
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) SerializeSignaturePrefix(w io.Writer) {
+	var pLength uint16
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.n.bytes))
+		pLength += 2 + uint16(len(pk.e.bytes))
+	default:
+		panic("unknown public key algorithm")
+	}
+	pLength += 6
+	w.Write([]byte{0x99, byte(pLength >> 8), byte(pLength)})
+	return
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	length := 8 // 8 byte header
+
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		length += 2 + len(pk.n.bytes)
+		length += 2 + len(pk.e.bytes)
+	default:
+		panic("unknown public key algorithm")
+	}
+
+	packetType := packetTypePublicKey
+	if pk.IsSubkey {
+		packetType = packetTypePublicSubkey
+	}
+	if err = serializeHeader(w, packetType, length); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return pk.serializeWithoutHeaders(w)
+}
+
+// serializeWithoutHeaders marshals the PublicKey to w in the form of an
+// OpenPGP public key packet, not including the packet header.
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) serializeWithoutHeaders(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	var buf [8]byte
+	// Version 3
+	buf[0] = 3
+	// Creation time
+	t := uint32(pk.CreationTime.Unix())
+	buf[1] = byte(t >> 24)
+	buf[2] = byte(t >> 16)
+	buf[3] = byte(t >> 8)
+	buf[4] = byte(t)
+	// Days to expire
+	buf[5] = byte(pk.DaysToExpire >> 8)
+	buf[6] = byte(pk.DaysToExpire)
+	// Public key algorithm
+	buf[7] = byte(pk.PubKeyAlgo)
+
+	if _, err = w.Write(buf[:]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		return writeMPIs(w, pk.n, pk.e)
+	}
+	return errors.InvalidArgumentError("bad public-key algorithm")
+}
+
+// CanSign returns true iff this public key can generate signatures
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) CanSign() bool {
+	return pk.PubKeyAlgo != PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly
+}
+
+// VerifySignatureV3 returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, of the data hashed into signed. signed is mutated by this call.
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) VerifySignatureV3(signed hash.Hash, sig *SignatureV3) (err error) {
+	if !pk.CanSign() {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("public key cannot generate signatures")
+	}
+
+	suffix := make([]byte, 5)
+	suffix[0] = byte(sig.SigType)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(suffix[1:], uint32(sig.CreationTime.Unix()))
+	signed.Write(suffix)
+	hashBytes := signed.Sum(nil)
+
+	if hashBytes[0] != sig.HashTag[0] || hashBytes[1] != sig.HashTag[1] {
+		return errors.SignatureError("hash tag doesn't match")
+	}
+
+	if pk.PubKeyAlgo != sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("public key and signature use different algorithms")
+	}
+
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pk.PublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes); err != nil {
+			return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
+		}
+		return
+	default:
+		// V3 public keys only support RSA.
+		panic("shouldn't happen")
+	}
+	panic("unreachable")
+}
+
+// VerifyUserIdSignatureV3 returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, that id is the identity of pub.
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) VerifyUserIdSignatureV3(id string, pub *PublicKeyV3, sig *SignatureV3) (err error) {
+	h, err := userIdSignatureV3Hash(id, pk, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return pk.VerifySignatureV3(h, sig)
+}
+
+// VerifyKeySignatureV3 returns nil iff sig is a valid signature, made by this
+// public key, of signed.
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) VerifyKeySignatureV3(signed *PublicKeyV3, sig *SignatureV3) (err error) {
+	h, err := keySignatureHash(pk, signed, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return pk.VerifySignatureV3(h, sig)
+}
+
+// userIdSignatureV3Hash returns a Hash of the message that needs to be signed
+// to assert that pk is a valid key for id.
+func userIdSignatureV3Hash(id string, pk signingKey, hfn crypto.Hash) (h hash.Hash, err error) {
+	if !hfn.Available() {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("hash function")
+	}
+	h = hfn.New()
+
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.4
+	pk.SerializeSignaturePrefix(h)
+	pk.serializeWithoutHeaders(h)
+
+	h.Write([]byte(id))
+
+	return
+}
+
+// KeyIdString returns the public key's fingerprint in capital hex
+// (e.g. "6C7EE1B8621CC013").
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) KeyIdString() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%X", pk.KeyId)
+}
+
+// KeyIdShortString returns the short form of public key's fingerprint
+// in capital hex, as shown by gpg --list-keys (e.g. "621CC013").
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) KeyIdShortString() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%X", pk.KeyId&0xFFFFFFFF)
+}
+
+// BitLength returns the bit length for the given public key.
+func (pk *PublicKeyV3) BitLength() (bitLength uint16, err error) {
+	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		bitLength = pk.n.bitLength
+	default:
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("bad public-key algorithm")
+	}
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/reader.go

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+)
+
+// Reader reads packets from an io.Reader and allows packets to be 'unread' so
+// that they result from the next call to Next.
+type Reader struct {
+	q       []Packet
+	readers []io.Reader
+}
+
+// New io.Readers are pushed when a compressed or encrypted packet is processed
+// and recursively treated as a new source of packets. However, a carefully
+// crafted packet can trigger an infinite recursive sequence of packets. See
+// http://mumble.net/~campbell/misc/pgp-quine
+// https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-4402
+// This constant limits the number of recursive packets that may be pushed.
+const maxReaders = 32
+
+// Next returns the most recently unread Packet, or reads another packet from
+// the top-most io.Reader. Unknown packet types are skipped.
+func (r *Reader) Next() (p Packet, err error) {
+	if len(r.q) > 0 {
+		p = r.q[len(r.q)-1]
+		r.q = r.q[:len(r.q)-1]
+		return
+	}
+
+	for len(r.readers) > 0 {
+		p, err = Read(r.readers[len(r.readers)-1])
+		if err == nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			r.readers = r.readers[:len(r.readers)-1]
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, ok := err.(errors.UnknownPacketTypeError); !ok {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, io.EOF
+}
+
+// Push causes the Reader to start reading from a new io.Reader. When an EOF
+// error is seen from the new io.Reader, it is popped and the Reader continues
+// to read from the next most recent io.Reader. Push returns a StructuralError
+// if pushing the reader would exceed the maximum recursion level, otherwise it
+// returns nil.
+func (r *Reader) Push(reader io.Reader) (err error) {
+	if len(r.readers) >= maxReaders {
+		return errors.StructuralError("too many layers of packets")
+	}
+	r.readers = append(r.readers, reader)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Unread causes the given Packet to be returned from the next call to Next.
+func (r *Reader) Unread(p Packet) {
+	r.q = append(r.q, p)
+}
+
+func NewReader(r io.Reader) *Reader {
+	return &Reader{
+		q:       nil,
+		readers: []io.Reader{r},
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/signature.go

@@ -0,0 +1,882 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/dsa"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa"
+)
+
+const (
+	// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.21 for details.
+	KeyFlagCertify = 1 << iota
+	KeyFlagSign
+	KeyFlagEncryptCommunications
+	KeyFlagEncryptStorage
+)
+
+// Signer can be implemented by application code to do actual signing.
+type Signer interface {
+	hash.Hash
+	Sign(sig *Signature) error
+	KeyId() uint64
+	PublicKeyAlgo() PublicKeyAlgorithm
+}
+
+// RevocationKey represents designated revoker packet. See RFC 4880
+// section 5.2.3.15 for details.
+type RevocationKey struct {
+	Class         byte
+	PublicKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
+	Fingerprint   []byte
+}
+
+// KeyFlagBits holds boolean whether any usage flags were provided in
+// the signature and BitField with KeyFlag* flags.
+type KeyFlagBits struct {
+	Valid    bool
+	BitField byte
+}
+
+// Signature represents a signature. See RFC 4880, section 5.2.
+type Signature struct {
+	SigType    SignatureType
+	PubKeyAlgo PublicKeyAlgorithm
+	Hash       crypto.Hash
+
+	// HashSuffix is extra data that is hashed in after the signed data.
+	HashSuffix []byte
+	// HashTag contains the first two bytes of the hash for fast rejection
+	// of bad signed data.
+	HashTag      [2]byte
+	CreationTime time.Time
+
+	RSASignature         parsedMPI
+	DSASigR, DSASigS     parsedMPI
+	ECDSASigR, ECDSASigS parsedMPI
+	EdDSASigR, EdDSASigS parsedMPI
+
+	// rawSubpackets contains the unparsed subpackets, in order.
+	rawSubpackets []outputSubpacket
+
+	// The following are optional so are nil when not included in the
+	// signature.
+
+	SigLifetimeSecs, KeyLifetimeSecs                        *uint32
+	PreferredSymmetric, PreferredHash, PreferredCompression []uint8
+	PreferredKeyServer                                      string
+	IssuerKeyId                                             *uint64
+	IsPrimaryId                                             *bool
+	IssuerFingerprint                                       []byte
+
+	// FlagsValid is set if any flags were given. See RFC 4880, section
+	// 5.2.3.21 for details.
+	FlagsValid                                                           bool
+	FlagCertify, FlagSign, FlagEncryptCommunications, FlagEncryptStorage bool
+
+	// RevocationReason is set if this signature has been revoked.
+	// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.23 for details.
+	RevocationReason     *uint8
+	RevocationReasonText string
+
+	// PolicyURI is optional. See RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.20 for details
+	PolicyURI string
+
+	// Regex is a regex that can match a PGP UID. See RFC 4880, 5.2.3.14 for details
+	Regex string
+
+	// MDC is set if this signature has a feature packet that indicates
+	// support for MDC subpackets.
+	MDC bool
+
+	// EmbeddedSignature, if non-nil, is a signature of the parent key, by
+	// this key. This prevents an attacker from claiming another's signing
+	// subkey as their own.
+	EmbeddedSignature *Signature
+
+	// StubbedOutCriticalError is not fail-stop, since it shouldn't break key parsing
+	// when appearing in WoT-style cross signatures. But it should prevent a signature
+	// from being applied to a primary or subkey.
+	StubbedOutCriticalError error
+
+	// DesignaterRevoker will be present if this signature certifies a
+	// designated revoking key id (3rd party key that can sign
+	// revocation for this key).
+	DesignatedRevoker *RevocationKey
+
+	outSubpackets []outputSubpacket
+}
+
+func (sig *Signature) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.3
+	var buf [5]byte
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0] != 4 {
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("signature packet version " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:5])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	sig.SigType = SignatureType(buf[0])
+	sig.PubKeyAlgo = PublicKeyAlgorithm(buf[1])
+	switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly, PubKeyAlgoDSA, PubKeyAlgoECDSA, PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+	default:
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("public key algorithm " + strconv.Itoa(int(sig.PubKeyAlgo)))
+		return
+	}
+
+	var ok bool
+	sig.Hash, ok = s2k.HashIdToHash(buf[2])
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("hash function " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[2])))
+	}
+
+	hashedSubpacketsLength := int(buf[3])<<8 | int(buf[4])
+	l := 6 + hashedSubpacketsLength
+	sig.HashSuffix = make([]byte, l+6)
+	sig.HashSuffix[0] = 4
+	copy(sig.HashSuffix[1:], buf[:5])
+	hashedSubpackets := sig.HashSuffix[6:l]
+	_, err = readFull(r, hashedSubpackets)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.4
+	trailer := sig.HashSuffix[l:]
+	trailer[0] = 4
+	trailer[1] = 0xff
+	trailer[2] = uint8(l >> 24)
+	trailer[3] = uint8(l >> 16)
+	trailer[4] = uint8(l >> 8)
+	trailer[5] = uint8(l)
+
+	err = parseSignatureSubpackets(sig, hashedSubpackets, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = readFull(r, buf[:2])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	unhashedSubpacketsLength := int(buf[0])<<8 | int(buf[1])
+	unhashedSubpackets := make([]byte, unhashedSubpacketsLength)
+	_, err = readFull(r, unhashedSubpackets)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	err = parseSignatureSubpackets(sig, unhashedSubpackets, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = readFull(r, sig.HashTag[:2])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		sig.RSASignature.bytes, sig.RSASignature.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		sig.DSASigR.bytes, sig.DSASigR.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		if err == nil {
+			sig.DSASigS.bytes, sig.DSASigS.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		}
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		sig.EdDSASigR.bytes, sig.EdDSASigR.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		if err == nil {
+			sig.EdDSASigS.bytes, sig.EdDSASigS.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		}
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		sig.ECDSASigR.bytes, sig.ECDSASigR.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		if err == nil {
+			sig.ECDSASigS.bytes, sig.ECDSASigS.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		}
+	default:
+		panic("unreachable")
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// parseSignatureSubpackets parses subpackets of the main signature packet. See
+// RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.1.
+func parseSignatureSubpackets(sig *Signature, subpackets []byte, isHashed bool) (err error) {
+	for len(subpackets) > 0 {
+		subpackets, err = parseSignatureSubpacket(sig, subpackets, isHashed)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	if sig.CreationTime.IsZero() {
+		err = errors.StructuralError("no creation time in signature")
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+type signatureSubpacketType uint8
+
+const (
+	creationTimeSubpacket        signatureSubpacketType = 2
+	signatureExpirationSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 3
+	regularExpressionSubpacket   signatureSubpacketType = 6
+	keyExpirationSubpacket       signatureSubpacketType = 9
+	prefSymmetricAlgosSubpacket  signatureSubpacketType = 11
+	revocationKey                signatureSubpacketType = 12
+	issuerSubpacket              signatureSubpacketType = 16
+	prefHashAlgosSubpacket       signatureSubpacketType = 21
+	prefCompressionSubpacket     signatureSubpacketType = 22
+	prefKeyServerSubpacket       signatureSubpacketType = 24
+	primaryUserIdSubpacket       signatureSubpacketType = 25
+	policyURISubpacket           signatureSubpacketType = 26
+	keyFlagsSubpacket            signatureSubpacketType = 27
+	reasonForRevocationSubpacket signatureSubpacketType = 29
+	featuresSubpacket            signatureSubpacketType = 30
+	embeddedSignatureSubpacket   signatureSubpacketType = 32
+	issuerFingerprint            signatureSubpacketType = 33
+)
+
+// parseSignatureSubpacket parses a single subpacket. len(subpacket) is >= 1.
+func parseSignatureSubpacket(sig *Signature, subpacket []byte, isHashed bool) (rest []byte, err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.3.1
+	var (
+		length     uint32
+		packetType signatureSubpacketType
+		isCritical bool
+	)
+	switch {
+	case subpacket[0] < 192:
+		length = uint32(subpacket[0])
+		subpacket = subpacket[1:]
+	case subpacket[0] < 255:
+		if len(subpacket) < 2 {
+			goto Truncated
+		}
+		length = uint32(subpacket[0]-192)<<8 + uint32(subpacket[1]) + 192
+		subpacket = subpacket[2:]
+	default:
+		if len(subpacket) < 5 {
+			goto Truncated
+		}
+		length = uint32(subpacket[1])<<24 |
+			uint32(subpacket[2])<<16 |
+			uint32(subpacket[3])<<8 |
+			uint32(subpacket[4])
+		subpacket = subpacket[5:]
+	}
+	if length > uint32(len(subpacket)) {
+		goto Truncated
+	}
+	rest = subpacket[length:]
+	subpacket = subpacket[:length]
+	if len(subpacket) == 0 {
+		err = errors.StructuralError("zero length signature subpacket")
+		return
+	}
+	packetType = signatureSubpacketType(subpacket[0] & 0x7f)
+	isCritical = subpacket[0]&0x80 == 0x80
+	subpacket = subpacket[1:]
+	sig.rawSubpackets = append(sig.rawSubpackets, outputSubpacket{isHashed, packetType, isCritical, subpacket})
+	switch packetType {
+	case creationTimeSubpacket:
+		if !isHashed {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("signature creation time in non-hashed area")
+			return
+		}
+		if len(subpacket) != 4 {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("signature creation time not four bytes")
+			return
+		}
+		t := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(subpacket)
+		sig.CreationTime = time.Unix(int64(t), 0)
+	case signatureExpirationSubpacket:
+		// Signature expiration time, section 5.2.3.10
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		if len(subpacket) != 4 {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("expiration subpacket with bad length")
+			return
+		}
+		sig.SigLifetimeSecs = new(uint32)
+		*sig.SigLifetimeSecs = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(subpacket)
+	case keyExpirationSubpacket:
+		// Key expiration time, section 5.2.3.6
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		if len(subpacket) != 4 {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("key expiration subpacket with bad length")
+			return
+		}
+		sig.KeyLifetimeSecs = new(uint32)
+		*sig.KeyLifetimeSecs = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(subpacket)
+	case prefSymmetricAlgosSubpacket:
+		// Preferred symmetric algorithms, section 5.2.3.7
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		sig.PreferredSymmetric = make([]byte, len(subpacket))
+		copy(sig.PreferredSymmetric, subpacket)
+	case issuerSubpacket:
+		// Issuer, section 5.2.3.5
+		if len(subpacket) != 8 {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("issuer subpacket with bad length")
+			return
+		}
+		sig.IssuerKeyId = new(uint64)
+		*sig.IssuerKeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(subpacket)
+	case prefHashAlgosSubpacket:
+		// Preferred hash algorithms, section 5.2.3.8
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		sig.PreferredHash = make([]byte, len(subpacket))
+		copy(sig.PreferredHash, subpacket)
+	case prefCompressionSubpacket:
+		// Preferred compression algorithms, section 5.2.3.9
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		sig.PreferredCompression = make([]byte, len(subpacket))
+		copy(sig.PreferredCompression, subpacket)
+	case primaryUserIdSubpacket:
+		// Primary User ID, section 5.2.3.19
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		if len(subpacket) != 1 {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("primary user id subpacket with bad length")
+			return
+		}
+		sig.IsPrimaryId = new(bool)
+		if subpacket[0] > 0 {
+			*sig.IsPrimaryId = true
+		}
+	case keyFlagsSubpacket:
+		// Key flags, section 5.2.3.21
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		if len(subpacket) == 0 {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("empty key flags subpacket")
+			return
+		}
+		if subpacket[0] != 0 {
+			sig.FlagsValid = true
+			if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagCertify != 0 {
+				sig.FlagCertify = true
+			}
+			if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagSign != 0 {
+				sig.FlagSign = true
+			}
+			if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagEncryptCommunications != 0 {
+				sig.FlagEncryptCommunications = true
+			}
+			if subpacket[0]&KeyFlagEncryptStorage != 0 {
+				sig.FlagEncryptStorage = true
+			}
+		}
+	case reasonForRevocationSubpacket:
+		// Reason For Revocation, section 5.2.3.23
+		if !isHashed {
+			return
+		}
+		if len(subpacket) == 0 {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("empty revocation reason subpacket")
+			return
+		}
+		sig.RevocationReason = new(uint8)
+		*sig.RevocationReason = subpacket[0]
+		sig.RevocationReasonText = string(subpacket[1:])
+	case featuresSubpacket:
+		// Features subpacket, section 5.2.3.24 specifies a very general
+		// mechanism for OpenPGP implementations to signal support for new
+		// features. In practice, the subpacket is used exclusively to
+		// indicate support for MDC-protected encryption.
+		sig.MDC = len(subpacket) >= 1 && subpacket[0]&1 == 1
+	case embeddedSignatureSubpacket:
+		// Only usage is in signatures that cross-certify
+		// signing subkeys. section 5.2.3.26 describes the
+		// format, with its usage described in section 11.1
+		if sig.EmbeddedSignature != nil {
+			err = errors.StructuralError("Cannot have multiple embedded signatures")
+			return
+		}
+		sig.EmbeddedSignature = new(Signature)
+		// Embedded signatures are required to be v4 signatures see
+		// section 12.1. However, we only parse v4 signatures in this
+		// file anyway.
+		if err := sig.EmbeddedSignature.parse(bytes.NewBuffer(subpacket)); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if sigType := sig.EmbeddedSignature.SigType; sigType != SigTypePrimaryKeyBinding {
+			return nil, errors.StructuralError("cross-signature has unexpected type " + strconv.Itoa(int(sigType)))
+		}
+	case policyURISubpacket:
+		// See RFC 4880, Section 5.2.3.20
+		sig.PolicyURI = string(subpacket[:])
+	case regularExpressionSubpacket:
+		sig.Regex = string(subpacket[:])
+		if isCritical {
+			sig.StubbedOutCriticalError = errors.UnsupportedError("regex support is stubbed out")
+		}
+	case prefKeyServerSubpacket:
+		sig.PreferredKeyServer = string(subpacket[:])
+	case issuerFingerprint:
+		// The first byte is how many bytes the fingerprint is, but we'll just
+		// read until the end of the subpacket, so we'll ignore it.
+		sig.IssuerFingerprint = append([]byte{}, subpacket[1:]...)
+	case revocationKey:
+		// Authorizes the specified key to issue revocation signatures
+		// for a key.
+
+		// TODO: Class octet must have bit 0x80 set. If the bit 0x40
+		// is set, then this means that the revocation information is
+		// sensitive.
+		sig.DesignatedRevoker = &RevocationKey{
+			Class:         subpacket[0],
+			PublicKeyAlgo: PublicKeyAlgorithm(subpacket[1]),
+			Fingerprint:   append([]byte{}, subpacket[2:]...),
+		}
+	default:
+		if isCritical {
+			err = errors.UnsupportedError("unknown critical signature subpacket type " + strconv.Itoa(int(packetType)))
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	return
+
+Truncated:
+	err = errors.StructuralError("signature subpacket truncated")
+	return
+}
+
+// subpacketLengthLength returns the length, in bytes, of an encoded length value.
+func subpacketLengthLength(length int) int {
+	if length < 192 {
+		return 1
+	}
+	if length < 16320 {
+		return 2
+	}
+	return 5
+}
+
+// serializeSubpacketLength marshals the given length into to.
+func serializeSubpacketLength(to []byte, length int) int {
+	// RFC 4880, Section 4.2.2.
+	if length < 192 {
+		to[0] = byte(length)
+		return 1
+	}
+	if length < 16320 {
+		length -= 192
+		to[0] = byte((length >> 8) + 192)
+		to[1] = byte(length)
+		return 2
+	}
+	to[0] = 255
+	to[1] = byte(length >> 24)
+	to[2] = byte(length >> 16)
+	to[3] = byte(length >> 8)
+	to[4] = byte(length)
+	return 5
+}
+
+// subpacketsLength returns the serialized length, in bytes, of the given
+// subpackets.
+func subpacketsLength(subpackets []outputSubpacket, hashed bool) (length int) {
+	for _, subpacket := range subpackets {
+		if subpacket.hashed == hashed {
+			length += subpacketLengthLength(len(subpacket.contents) + 1)
+			length += 1 // type byte
+			length += len(subpacket.contents)
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// serializeSubpackets marshals the given subpackets into to.
+func serializeSubpackets(to []byte, subpackets []outputSubpacket, hashed bool) {
+	for _, subpacket := range subpackets {
+		if subpacket.hashed == hashed {
+			n := serializeSubpacketLength(to, len(subpacket.contents)+1)
+			to[n] = byte(subpacket.subpacketType)
+			to = to[1+n:]
+			n = copy(to, subpacket.contents)
+			to = to[n:]
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// KeyExpired returns whether sig is a self-signature of a key that has
+// expired.
+func (sig *Signature) KeyExpired(currentTime time.Time) bool {
+	if sig.KeyLifetimeSecs == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	expiry := sig.CreationTime.Add(time.Duration(*sig.KeyLifetimeSecs) * time.Second)
+	return currentTime.After(expiry)
+}
+
+// ExpiresBeforeOther checks if other signature has expiration at
+// later date than sig.
+func (sig *Signature) ExpiresBeforeOther(other *Signature) bool {
+	if sig.KeyLifetimeSecs == nil {
+		// This sig never expires, or has infinitely long expiration
+		// time.
+		return false
+	} else if other.KeyLifetimeSecs == nil {
+		// This sig expires at some non-infinite point, but the other
+		// sig never expires.
+		return true
+	}
+
+	getExpiryDate := func(s *Signature) time.Time {
+		return s.CreationTime.Add(time.Duration(*s.KeyLifetimeSecs) * time.Second)
+	}
+
+	return getExpiryDate(other).After(getExpiryDate(sig))
+}
+
+// buildHashSuffix constructs the HashSuffix member of sig in preparation for signing.
+func (sig *Signature) buildHashSuffix() (err error) {
+	hashedSubpacketsLen := subpacketsLength(sig.outSubpackets, true)
+
+	var ok bool
+	l := 6 + hashedSubpacketsLen
+	sig.HashSuffix = make([]byte, l+6)
+	sig.HashSuffix[0] = 4
+	sig.HashSuffix[1] = uint8(sig.SigType)
+	sig.HashSuffix[2] = uint8(sig.PubKeyAlgo)
+	sig.HashSuffix[3], ok = s2k.HashToHashId(sig.Hash)
+	if !ok {
+		sig.HashSuffix = nil
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("hash cannot be represented in OpenPGP: " + strconv.Itoa(int(sig.Hash)))
+	}
+	sig.HashSuffix[4] = byte(hashedSubpacketsLen >> 8)
+	sig.HashSuffix[5] = byte(hashedSubpacketsLen)
+	serializeSubpackets(sig.HashSuffix[6:l], sig.outSubpackets, true)
+	trailer := sig.HashSuffix[l:]
+	trailer[0] = 4
+	trailer[1] = 0xff
+	trailer[2] = byte(l >> 24)
+	trailer[3] = byte(l >> 16)
+	trailer[4] = byte(l >> 8)
+	trailer[5] = byte(l)
+	return
+}
+
+func (sig *Signature) signPrepareHash(h hash.Hash) (digest []byte, err error) {
+	err = sig.buildHashSuffix()
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	h.Write(sig.HashSuffix)
+	digest = h.Sum(nil)
+	copy(sig.HashTag[:], digest)
+	return
+}
+
+// Sign signs a message with a private key. The hash, h, must contain
+// the hash of the message to be signed and will be mutated by this function.
+// On success, the signature is stored in sig. Call Serialize to write it out.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (sig *Signature) Sign(h hash.Hash, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) (err error) {
+	signer, hashIsSigner := h.(Signer)
+
+	if !hashIsSigner && (priv == nil || priv.PrivateKey == nil) {
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("attempting to sign with nil PrivateKey")
+		return
+	}
+
+	sig.outSubpackets = sig.buildSubpackets()
+	digest, err := sig.signPrepareHash(h)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if hashIsSigner {
+		err = signer.Sign(sig)
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		sig.RSASignature.bytes, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(config.Random(), priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), sig.Hash, digest)
+		sig.RSASignature.bitLength = uint16(8 * len(sig.RSASignature.bytes))
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		dsaPriv := priv.PrivateKey.(*dsa.PrivateKey)
+
+		// Need to truncate hashBytes to match FIPS 186-3 section 4.6.
+		subgroupSize := (dsaPriv.Q.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+		if len(digest) > subgroupSize {
+			digest = digest[:subgroupSize]
+		}
+		r, s, err := dsa.Sign(config.Random(), dsaPriv, digest)
+		if err == nil {
+			sig.DSASigR.bytes = r.Bytes()
+			sig.DSASigR.bitLength = uint16(8 * len(sig.DSASigR.bytes))
+			sig.DSASigS.bytes = s.Bytes()
+			sig.DSASigS.bitLength = uint16(8 * len(sig.DSASigS.bytes))
+		}
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(config.Random(), priv.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey), digest)
+		if err == nil {
+			sig.ECDSASigR = FromBig(r)
+			sig.ECDSASigS = FromBig(s)
+		}
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		r, s, err := priv.PrivateKey.(*EdDSAPrivateKey).Sign(digest)
+		if err == nil {
+			sig.EdDSASigR = FromBytes(r)
+			sig.EdDSASigS = FromBytes(s)
+		}
+	default:
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("public key algorithm: " + strconv.Itoa(int(sig.PubKeyAlgo)))
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// SignUserId computes a signature from priv, asserting that pub is a valid
+// key for the identity id.  On success, the signature is stored in sig. Call
+// Serialize to write it out.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (sig *Signature) SignUserId(id string, pub *PublicKey, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
+	h, err := userIdSignatureHash(id, pub, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return sig.Sign(h, priv, config)
+}
+
+// SignUserIdWithSigner computes a signature from priv, asserting that pub is a
+// valid key for the identity id.  On success, the signature is stored in sig.
+// Call Serialize to write it out.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (sig *Signature) SignUserIdWithSigner(id string, pub *PublicKey, s Signer, config *Config) error {
+	updateUserIdSignatureHash(id, pub, s)
+
+	return sig.Sign(s, nil, config)
+}
+
+// SignKey computes a signature from priv, asserting that pub is a subkey. On
+// success, the signature is stored in sig. Call Serialize to write it out.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (sig *Signature) SignKey(pub *PublicKey, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
+	h, err := keySignatureHash(&priv.PublicKey, pub, sig.Hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return sig.Sign(h, priv, config)
+}
+
+// SignKeyWithSigner computes a signature using s, asserting that
+// signeePubKey is a subkey. On success, the signature is stored in sig. Call
+// Serialize to write it out. If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func (sig *Signature) SignKeyWithSigner(signeePubKey *PublicKey, signerPubKey *PublicKey, s Signer, config *Config) error {
+	updateKeySignatureHash(signerPubKey, signeePubKey, s)
+
+	return sig.Sign(s, nil, config)
+}
+
+// Serialize marshals sig to w. Sign, SignUserId or SignKey must have been
+// called first.
+func (sig *Signature) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	if len(sig.outSubpackets) == 0 {
+		sig.outSubpackets = sig.rawSubpackets
+	}
+	if sig.RSASignature.bytes == nil &&
+		sig.DSASigR.bytes == nil &&
+		sig.ECDSASigR.bytes == nil &&
+		sig.EdDSASigR.bytes == nil {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("Signature: need to call Sign, SignUserId or SignKey before Serialize")
+	}
+
+	sigLength := 0
+	switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		sigLength = 2 + len(sig.RSASignature.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		sigLength = 2 + len(sig.DSASigR.bytes)
+		sigLength += 2 + len(sig.DSASigS.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		sigLength = 2 + len(sig.EdDSASigR.bytes)
+		sigLength += 2 + len(sig.EdDSASigS.bytes)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		sigLength = 2 + len(sig.ECDSASigR.bytes)
+		sigLength += 2 + len(sig.ECDSASigS.bytes)
+	default:
+		panic("impossible")
+	}
+
+	unhashedSubpacketsLen := subpacketsLength(sig.outSubpackets, false)
+	length := len(sig.HashSuffix) - 6 /* trailer not included */ +
+		2 /* length of unhashed subpackets */ + unhashedSubpacketsLen +
+		2 /* hash tag */ + sigLength
+	err = serializeHeader(w, packetTypeSignature, length)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = w.Write(sig.HashSuffix[:len(sig.HashSuffix)-6])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	unhashedSubpackets := make([]byte, 2+unhashedSubpacketsLen)
+	unhashedSubpackets[0] = byte(unhashedSubpacketsLen >> 8)
+	unhashedSubpackets[1] = byte(unhashedSubpacketsLen)
+	serializeSubpackets(unhashedSubpackets[2:], sig.outSubpackets, false)
+
+	_, err = w.Write(unhashedSubpackets)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(sig.HashTag[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		err = writeMPIs(w, sig.RSASignature)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		err = writeMPIs(w, sig.DSASigR, sig.DSASigS)
+	case PubKeyAlgoEdDSA:
+		err = writeMPIs(w, sig.EdDSASigR, sig.EdDSASigS)
+	case PubKeyAlgoECDSA:
+		err = writeMPIs(w, sig.ECDSASigR, sig.ECDSASigS)
+	default:
+		panic("impossible")
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// outputSubpacket represents a subpacket to be marshaled.
+type outputSubpacket struct {
+	hashed        bool // true if this subpacket is in the hashed area.
+	subpacketType signatureSubpacketType
+	isCritical    bool
+	contents      []byte
+}
+
+func (sig *Signature) buildSubpackets() (subpackets []outputSubpacket) {
+	creationTime := make([]byte, 4)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(creationTime, uint32(sig.CreationTime.Unix()))
+	subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, creationTimeSubpacket, false, creationTime})
+
+	if sig.IssuerKeyId != nil {
+		keyId := make([]byte, 8)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(keyId, *sig.IssuerKeyId)
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, issuerSubpacket, false, keyId})
+	}
+
+	if sig.SigLifetimeSecs != nil && *sig.SigLifetimeSecs != 0 {
+		sigLifetime := make([]byte, 4)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(sigLifetime, *sig.SigLifetimeSecs)
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, signatureExpirationSubpacket, true, sigLifetime})
+	}
+
+	// Key flags may only appear in self-signatures or certification signatures.
+
+	if sig.FlagsValid {
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, keyFlagsSubpacket, false, []byte{sig.GetKeyFlags().BitField}})
+	}
+
+	// The following subpackets may only appear in self-signatures
+
+	if sig.KeyLifetimeSecs != nil && *sig.KeyLifetimeSecs != 0 {
+		keyLifetime := make([]byte, 4)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(keyLifetime, *sig.KeyLifetimeSecs)
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, keyExpirationSubpacket, true, keyLifetime})
+	}
+
+	if sig.IsPrimaryId != nil && *sig.IsPrimaryId {
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, primaryUserIdSubpacket, false, []byte{1}})
+	}
+
+	if len(sig.PreferredSymmetric) > 0 {
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, prefSymmetricAlgosSubpacket, false, sig.PreferredSymmetric})
+	}
+
+	if len(sig.PreferredHash) > 0 {
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, prefHashAlgosSubpacket, false, sig.PreferredHash})
+	}
+
+	if len(sig.PreferredCompression) > 0 {
+		subpackets = append(subpackets, outputSubpacket{true, prefCompressionSubpacket, false, sig.PreferredCompression})
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func (sig *Signature) GetKeyFlags() (ret KeyFlagBits) {
+	if !sig.FlagsValid {
+		return ret
+	}
+
+	ret.Valid = true
+	if sig.FlagCertify {
+		ret.BitField |= KeyFlagCertify
+	}
+	if sig.FlagSign {
+		ret.BitField |= KeyFlagSign
+	}
+	if sig.FlagEncryptCommunications {
+		ret.BitField |= KeyFlagEncryptCommunications
+	}
+	if sig.FlagEncryptStorage {
+		ret.BitField |= KeyFlagEncryptStorage
+	}
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (f *KeyFlagBits) HasFlagCertify() bool {
+	return f.BitField&KeyFlagCertify != 0
+}
+
+func (f *KeyFlagBits) HasFlagSign() bool {
+	return f.BitField&KeyFlagSign != 0
+}
+
+func (f *KeyFlagBits) HasFlagEncryptCommunications() bool {
+	return f.BitField&KeyFlagEncryptCommunications != 0
+}
+
+func (f *KeyFlagBits) HasFlagEncryptStorage() bool {
+	return f.BitField&KeyFlagEncryptStorage != 0
+}
+
+func (f *KeyFlagBits) Merge(other KeyFlagBits) {
+	if other.Valid {
+		f.Valid = true
+		f.BitField |= other.BitField
+	}
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/signature_v3.go

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+)
+
+// SignatureV3 represents older version 3 signatures. These signatures are less secure
+// than version 4 and should not be used to create new signatures. They are included
+// here for backwards compatibility to read and validate with older key material.
+// See RFC 4880, section 5.2.2.
+type SignatureV3 struct {
+	SigType      SignatureType
+	CreationTime time.Time
+	IssuerKeyId  uint64
+	PubKeyAlgo   PublicKeyAlgorithm
+	Hash         crypto.Hash
+	HashTag      [2]byte
+
+	RSASignature     parsedMPI
+	DSASigR, DSASigS parsedMPI
+}
+
+func (sig *SignatureV3) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.2.2
+	var buf [8]byte
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf[:1]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0] < 2 || buf[0] > 3 {
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("signature packet version " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
+		return
+	}
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf[:1]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if buf[0] != 5 {
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError(
+			"invalid hashed material length " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[0])))
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Read hashed material: signature type + creation time
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf[:5]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	sig.SigType = SignatureType(buf[0])
+	t := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[1:5])
+	sig.CreationTime = time.Unix(int64(t), 0)
+
+	// Eight-octet Key ID of signer.
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf[:8]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	sig.IssuerKeyId = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(buf[:])
+
+	// Public-key and hash algorithm
+	if _, err = readFull(r, buf[:2]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	sig.PubKeyAlgo = PublicKeyAlgorithm(buf[0])
+	switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly, PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+	default:
+		err = errors.UnsupportedError("public key algorithm " + strconv.Itoa(int(sig.PubKeyAlgo)))
+		return
+	}
+	var ok bool
+	if sig.Hash, ok = s2k.HashIdToHash(buf[1]); !ok {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("hash function " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[2])))
+	}
+
+	// Two-octet field holding left 16 bits of signed hash value.
+	if _, err = readFull(r, sig.HashTag[:2]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		sig.RSASignature.bytes, sig.RSASignature.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		if sig.DSASigR.bytes, sig.DSASigR.bitLength, err = readMPI(r); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		sig.DSASigS.bytes, sig.DSASigS.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+	default:
+		panic("unreachable")
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// Serialize marshals sig to w. Sign, SignUserId or SignKey must have been
+// called first.
+func (sig *SignatureV3) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	buf := make([]byte, 8)
+
+	// Write the sig type and creation time
+	buf[0] = byte(sig.SigType)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[1:5], uint32(sig.CreationTime.Unix()))
+	if _, err = w.Write(buf[:5]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Write the issuer long key ID
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buf[:8], sig.IssuerKeyId)
+	if _, err = w.Write(buf[:8]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Write public key algorithm, hash ID, and hash value
+	buf[0] = byte(sig.PubKeyAlgo)
+	hashId, ok := s2k.HashToHashId(sig.Hash)
+	if !ok {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError(fmt.Sprintf("hash function %v", sig.Hash))
+	}
+	buf[1] = hashId
+	copy(buf[2:4], sig.HashTag[:])
+	if _, err = w.Write(buf[:4]); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if sig.RSASignature.bytes == nil && sig.DSASigR.bytes == nil {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("Signature: need to call Sign, SignUserId or SignKey before Serialize")
+	}
+
+	switch sig.PubKeyAlgo {
+	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
+		err = writeMPIs(w, sig.RSASignature)
+	case PubKeyAlgoDSA:
+		err = writeMPIs(w, sig.DSASigR, sig.DSASigS)
+	default:
+		panic("impossible")
+	}
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/symmetric_key_encrypted.go

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+)
+
+// This is the largest session key that we'll support. Since no 512-bit cipher
+// has even been seriously used, this is comfortably large.
+const maxSessionKeySizeInBytes = 64
+
+// SymmetricKeyEncrypted represents a passphrase protected session key. See RFC
+// 4880, section 5.3.
+type SymmetricKeyEncrypted struct {
+	CipherFunc   CipherFunction
+	s2k          func(out, in []byte)
+	encryptedKey []byte
+}
+
+const symmetricKeyEncryptedVersion = 4
+
+func (ske *SymmetricKeyEncrypted) parse(r io.Reader) error {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.3.
+	var buf [2]byte
+	if _, err := readFull(r, buf[:]); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if buf[0] != symmetricKeyEncryptedVersion {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("SymmetricKeyEncrypted version")
+	}
+	ske.CipherFunc = CipherFunction(buf[1])
+
+	if ske.CipherFunc.KeySize() == 0 {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("unknown cipher: " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[1])))
+	}
+
+	var err error
+	ske.s2k, err = s2k.Parse(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if ske.s2k == nil {
+		return errors.UnsupportedError("can't use dummy S2K for symmetric key encryption")
+	}
+
+	encryptedKey := make([]byte, maxSessionKeySizeInBytes)
+	// The session key may follow. We just have to try and read to find
+	// out. If it exists then we limit it to maxSessionKeySizeInBytes.
+	n, err := readFull(r, encryptedKey)
+	if err != nil && err != io.ErrUnexpectedEOF {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if n != 0 {
+		if n == maxSessionKeySizeInBytes {
+			return errors.UnsupportedError("oversized encrypted session key")
+		}
+		ske.encryptedKey = encryptedKey[:n]
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Decrypt attempts to decrypt an encrypted session key and returns the key and
+// the cipher to use when decrypting a subsequent Symmetrically Encrypted Data
+// packet.
+func (ske *SymmetricKeyEncrypted) Decrypt(passphrase []byte) ([]byte, CipherFunction, error) {
+	key := make([]byte, ske.CipherFunc.KeySize())
+	ske.s2k(key, passphrase)
+
+	if len(ske.encryptedKey) == 0 {
+		return key, ske.CipherFunc, nil
+	}
+
+	// the IV is all zeros
+	iv := make([]byte, ske.CipherFunc.blockSize())
+	c := cipher.NewCFBDecrypter(ske.CipherFunc.new(key), iv)
+	plaintextKey := make([]byte, len(ske.encryptedKey))
+	c.XORKeyStream(plaintextKey, ske.encryptedKey)
+	cipherFunc := CipherFunction(plaintextKey[0])
+	if cipherFunc.blockSize() == 0 {
+		return nil, ske.CipherFunc, errors.UnsupportedError("unknown cipher: " + strconv.Itoa(int(cipherFunc)))
+	}
+	plaintextKey = plaintextKey[1:]
+	if l := len(plaintextKey); l == 0 || l%cipherFunc.blockSize() != 0 {
+		return nil, cipherFunc, errors.StructuralError("length of decrypted key not a multiple of block size")
+	}
+
+	return plaintextKey, cipherFunc, nil
+}
+
+// SerializeSymmetricKeyEncrypted serializes a symmetric key packet to w. The
+// packet contains a random session key, encrypted by a key derived from the
+// given passphrase. The session key is returned and must be passed to
+// SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func SerializeSymmetricKeyEncrypted(w io.Writer, passphrase []byte, config *Config) (key []byte, err error) {
+	cipherFunc := config.Cipher()
+	keySize := cipherFunc.KeySize()
+	if keySize == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("unknown cipher: " + strconv.Itoa(int(cipherFunc)))
+	}
+
+	s2kBuf := new(bytes.Buffer)
+	keyEncryptingKey := make([]byte, keySize)
+	// s2k.Serialize salts and stretches the passphrase, and writes the
+	// resulting key to keyEncryptingKey and the s2k descriptor to s2kBuf.
+	err = s2k.Serialize(s2kBuf, keyEncryptingKey, config.Random(), passphrase, &s2k.Config{Hash: config.Hash(), S2KCount: config.PasswordHashIterations()})
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s2kBytes := s2kBuf.Bytes()
+
+	packetLength := 2 /* header */ + len(s2kBytes) + 1 /* cipher type */ + keySize
+	err = serializeHeader(w, packetTypeSymmetricKeyEncrypted, packetLength)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	var buf [2]byte
+	buf[0] = symmetricKeyEncryptedVersion
+	buf[1] = byte(cipherFunc)
+	_, err = w.Write(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(s2kBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	sessionKey := make([]byte, keySize)
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Random(), sessionKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	iv := make([]byte, cipherFunc.blockSize())
+	c := cipher.NewCFBEncrypter(cipherFunc.new(keyEncryptingKey), iv)
+	encryptedCipherAndKey := make([]byte, keySize+1)
+	c.XORKeyStream(encryptedCipherAndKey, buf[1:])
+	c.XORKeyStream(encryptedCipherAndKey[1:], sessionKey)
+	_, err = w.Write(encryptedCipherAndKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	key = sessionKey
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/symmetrically_encrypted.go

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+)
+
+// SymmetricallyEncrypted represents a symmetrically encrypted byte string. The
+// encrypted contents will consist of more OpenPGP packets. See RFC 4880,
+// sections 5.7 and 5.13.
+type SymmetricallyEncrypted struct {
+	MDC      bool // true iff this is a type 18 packet and thus has an embedded MAC.
+	contents io.Reader
+	prefix   []byte
+}
+
+const symmetricallyEncryptedVersion = 1
+
+func (se *SymmetricallyEncrypted) parse(r io.Reader) error {
+	if se.MDC {
+		// See RFC 4880, section 5.13.
+		var buf [1]byte
+		_, err := readFull(r, buf[:])
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if buf[0] != symmetricallyEncryptedVersion {
+			return errors.UnsupportedError("unknown SymmetricallyEncrypted version")
+		}
+	}
+	se.contents = r
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Decrypt returns a ReadCloser, from which the decrypted contents of the
+// packet can be read. An incorrect key can, with high probability, be detected
+// immediately and this will result in a KeyIncorrect error being returned.
+func (se *SymmetricallyEncrypted) Decrypt(c CipherFunction, key []byte) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
+	keySize := c.KeySize()
+	if keySize == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("unknown cipher: " + strconv.Itoa(int(c)))
+	}
+	if len(key) != keySize {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("SymmetricallyEncrypted: incorrect key length")
+	}
+
+	if se.prefix == nil {
+		se.prefix = make([]byte, c.blockSize()+2)
+		_, err := readFull(se.contents, se.prefix)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	} else if len(se.prefix) != c.blockSize()+2 {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("can't try ciphers with different block lengths")
+	}
+
+	ocfbResync := OCFBResync
+	if se.MDC {
+		// MDC packets use a different form of OCFB mode.
+		ocfbResync = OCFBNoResync
+	}
+
+	s := NewOCFBDecrypter(c.new(key), se.prefix, ocfbResync)
+	if s == nil {
+		return nil, errors.ErrKeyIncorrect
+	}
+
+	plaintext := cipher.StreamReader{S: s, R: se.contents}
+
+	if se.MDC {
+		// MDC packets have an embedded hash that we need to check.
+		h := sha1.New()
+		h.Write(se.prefix)
+		return &seMDCReader{in: plaintext, h: h}, nil
+	}
+
+	// Otherwise, we just need to wrap plaintext so that it's a valid ReadCloser.
+	return seReader{plaintext}, nil
+}
+
+// seReader wraps an io.Reader with a no-op Close method.
+type seReader struct {
+	in io.Reader
+}
+
+func (ser seReader) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
+	return ser.in.Read(buf)
+}
+
+func (ser seReader) Close() error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+const mdcTrailerSize = 1 /* tag byte */ + 1 /* length byte */ + sha1.Size
+
+// An seMDCReader wraps an io.Reader, maintains a running hash and keeps hold
+// of the most recent 22 bytes (mdcTrailerSize). Upon EOF, those bytes form an
+// MDC packet containing a hash of the previous contents which is checked
+// against the running hash. See RFC 4880, section 5.13.
+type seMDCReader struct {
+	in          io.Reader
+	h           hash.Hash
+	trailer     [mdcTrailerSize]byte
+	scratch     [mdcTrailerSize]byte
+	trailerUsed int
+	error       bool
+	eof         bool
+}
+
+func (ser *seMDCReader) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	if ser.error {
+		err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
+		return
+	}
+	if ser.eof {
+		err = io.EOF
+		return
+	}
+
+	// If we haven't yet filled the trailer buffer then we must do that
+	// first.
+	for ser.trailerUsed < mdcTrailerSize {
+		n, err = ser.in.Read(ser.trailer[ser.trailerUsed:])
+		ser.trailerUsed += n
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			if ser.trailerUsed != mdcTrailerSize {
+				n = 0
+				err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
+				ser.error = true
+				return
+			}
+			ser.eof = true
+			n = 0
+			return
+		}
+
+		if err != nil {
+			n = 0
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	// If it's a short read then we read into a temporary buffer and shift
+	// the data into the caller's buffer.
+	if len(buf) <= mdcTrailerSize {
+		n, err = readFull(ser.in, ser.scratch[:len(buf)])
+		copy(buf, ser.trailer[:n])
+		ser.h.Write(buf[:n])
+		copy(ser.trailer[:], ser.trailer[n:])
+		copy(ser.trailer[mdcTrailerSize-n:], ser.scratch[:])
+		if n < len(buf) {
+			ser.eof = true
+			err = io.EOF
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	n, err = ser.in.Read(buf[mdcTrailerSize:])
+	copy(buf, ser.trailer[:])
+	ser.h.Write(buf[:n])
+	copy(ser.trailer[:], buf[n:])
+
+	if err == io.EOF {
+		ser.eof = true
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// This is a new-format packet tag byte for a type 19 (MDC) packet.
+const mdcPacketTagByte = byte(0x80) | 0x40 | 19
+
+func (ser *seMDCReader) Close() error {
+	if ser.error {
+		return errors.SignatureError("error during reading")
+	}
+
+	for !ser.eof {
+		// We haven't seen EOF so we need to read to the end
+		var buf [1024]byte
+		_, err := ser.Read(buf[:])
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return errors.SignatureError("error during reading")
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ser.trailer[0] != mdcPacketTagByte || ser.trailer[1] != sha1.Size {
+		return errors.SignatureError("MDC packet not found")
+	}
+	ser.h.Write(ser.trailer[:2])
+
+	final := ser.h.Sum(nil)
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(final, ser.trailer[2:]) != 1 {
+		return errors.SignatureError("hash mismatch")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// An seMDCWriter writes through to an io.WriteCloser while maintains a running
+// hash of the data written. On close, it emits an MDC packet containing the
+// running hash.
+type seMDCWriter struct {
+	w io.WriteCloser
+	h hash.Hash
+}
+
+func (w *seMDCWriter) Write(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	w.h.Write(buf)
+	return w.w.Write(buf)
+}
+
+func (w *seMDCWriter) Close() (err error) {
+	var buf [mdcTrailerSize]byte
+
+	buf[0] = mdcPacketTagByte
+	buf[1] = sha1.Size
+	w.h.Write(buf[:2])
+	digest := w.h.Sum(nil)
+	copy(buf[2:], digest)
+
+	_, err = w.w.Write(buf[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return w.w.Close()
+}
+
+// noOpCloser is like an ioutil.NopCloser, but for an io.Writer.
+type noOpCloser struct {
+	w io.Writer
+}
+
+func (c noOpCloser) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	return c.w.Write(data)
+}
+
+func (c noOpCloser) Close() error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted serializes a symmetrically encrypted packet
+// to w and returns a WriteCloser to which the to-be-encrypted packets can be
+// written.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted(w io.Writer, c CipherFunction, key []byte, config *Config) (contents io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	if c.KeySize() != len(key) {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("SymmetricallyEncrypted.Serialize: bad key length")
+	}
+	writeCloser := noOpCloser{w}
+	ciphertext, err := serializeStreamHeader(writeCloser, packetTypeSymmetricallyEncryptedMDC)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_, err = ciphertext.Write([]byte{symmetricallyEncryptedVersion})
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	block := c.new(key)
+	blockSize := block.BlockSize()
+	iv := make([]byte, blockSize)
+	_, err = config.Random().Read(iv)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s, prefix := NewOCFBEncrypter(block, iv, OCFBNoResync)
+	_, err = ciphertext.Write(prefix)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	plaintext := cipher.StreamWriter{S: s, W: ciphertext}
+
+	h := sha1.New()
+	h.Write(iv)
+	h.Write(iv[blockSize-2:])
+	contents = &seMDCWriter{w: plaintext, h: h}
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/userattribute.go

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"image"
+	"image/jpeg"
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+)
+
+const UserAttrImageSubpacket = 1
+
+// UserAttribute is capable of storing other types of data about a user
+// beyond name, email and a text comment. In practice, user attributes are typically used
+// to store a signed thumbnail photo JPEG image of the user.
+// See RFC 4880, section 5.12.
+type UserAttribute struct {
+	Contents []*OpaqueSubpacket
+}
+
+// NewUserAttributePhoto creates a user attribute packet
+// containing the given images.
+func NewUserAttributePhoto(photos ...image.Image) (uat *UserAttribute, err error) {
+	uat = new(UserAttribute)
+	for _, photo := range photos {
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		// RFC 4880, Section 5.12.1.
+		data := []byte{
+			0x10, 0x00, // Little-endian image header length (16 bytes)
+			0x01,       // Image header version 1
+			0x01,       // JPEG
+			0, 0, 0, 0, // 12 reserved octets, must be all zero.
+			0, 0, 0, 0,
+			0, 0, 0, 0}
+		if _, err = buf.Write(data); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		if err = jpeg.Encode(&buf, photo, nil); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		uat.Contents = append(uat.Contents, &OpaqueSubpacket{
+			SubType:  UserAttrImageSubpacket,
+			Contents: buf.Bytes()})
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// NewUserAttribute creates a new user attribute packet containing the given subpackets.
+func NewUserAttribute(contents ...*OpaqueSubpacket) *UserAttribute {
+	return &UserAttribute{Contents: contents}
+}
+
+func (uat *UserAttribute) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.13
+	b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	uat.Contents, err = OpaqueSubpackets(b)
+	return
+}
+
+// Serialize marshals the user attribute to w in the form of an OpenPGP packet, including
+// header.
+func (uat *UserAttribute) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	for _, sp := range uat.Contents {
+		sp.Serialize(&buf)
+	}
+	if err = serializeHeader(w, packetTypeUserAttribute, buf.Len()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write(buf.Bytes())
+	return
+}
+
+// ImageData returns zero or more byte slices, each containing
+// JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF), for each photo in the
+// the user attribute packet.
+func (uat *UserAttribute) ImageData() (imageData [][]byte) {
+	for _, sp := range uat.Contents {
+		if sp.SubType == UserAttrImageSubpacket && len(sp.Contents) > 16 {
+			imageData = append(imageData, sp.Contents[16:])
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet/userid.go

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package packet
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"io/ioutil"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// UserId contains text that is intended to represent the name and email
+// address of the key holder. See RFC 4880, section 5.11. By convention, this
+// takes the form "Full Name (Comment) <email@example.com>"
+type UserId struct {
+	Id string // By convention, this takes the form "Full Name (Comment) <email@example.com>" which is split out in the fields below.
+
+	Name, Comment, Email string
+}
+
+func hasInvalidCharacters(s string) bool {
+	for _, c := range s {
+		switch c {
+		case '(', ')', '<', '>', 0:
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// NewUserId returns a UserId or nil if any of the arguments contain invalid
+// characters. The invalid characters are '\x00', '(', ')', '<' and '>'
+func NewUserId(name, comment, email string) *UserId {
+	// RFC 4880 doesn't deal with the structure of userid strings; the
+	// name, comment and email form is just a convention. However, there's
+	// no convention about escaping the metacharacters and GPG just refuses
+	// to create user ids where, say, the name contains a '('. We mirror
+	// this behaviour.
+
+	if hasInvalidCharacters(name) || hasInvalidCharacters(comment) || hasInvalidCharacters(email) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	uid := new(UserId)
+	uid.Name, uid.Comment, uid.Email = name, comment, email
+	uid.Id = name
+	if len(comment) > 0 {
+		if len(uid.Id) > 0 {
+			uid.Id += " "
+		}
+		uid.Id += "("
+		uid.Id += comment
+		uid.Id += ")"
+	}
+	if len(email) > 0 {
+		if len(uid.Id) > 0 {
+			uid.Id += " "
+		}
+		uid.Id += "<"
+		uid.Id += email
+		uid.Id += ">"
+	}
+	return uid
+}
+
+func (uid *UserId) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
+	// RFC 4880, section 5.11
+	b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	uid.Id = string(b)
+	uid.Name, uid.Comment, uid.Email = parseUserId(uid.Id)
+	return
+}
+
+// Serialize marshals uid to w in the form of an OpenPGP packet, including
+// header.
+func (uid *UserId) Serialize(w io.Writer) error {
+	err := serializeHeader(w, packetTypeUserId, len(uid.Id))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	_, err = w.Write([]byte(uid.Id))
+	return err
+}
+
+// parseUserId extracts the name, comment and email from a user id string that
+// is formatted as "Full Name (Comment) <email@example.com>".
+func parseUserId(id string) (name, comment, email string) {
+	var n, c, e struct {
+		start, end int
+	}
+	var state int
+
+	for offset, rune := range id {
+		switch state {
+		case 0:
+			// Entering name
+			n.start = offset
+			state = 1
+			fallthrough
+		case 1:
+			// In name
+			if rune == '(' {
+				state = 2
+				n.end = offset
+			} else if rune == '<' {
+				state = 5
+				n.end = offset
+			}
+		case 2:
+			// Entering comment
+			c.start = offset
+			state = 3
+			fallthrough
+		case 3:
+			// In comment
+			if rune == ')' {
+				state = 4
+				c.end = offset
+			}
+		case 4:
+			// Between comment and email
+			if rune == '<' {
+				state = 5
+			}
+		case 5:
+			// Entering email
+			e.start = offset
+			state = 6
+			fallthrough
+		case 6:
+			// In email
+			if rune == '>' {
+				state = 7
+				e.end = offset
+			}
+		default:
+			// After email
+		}
+	}
+	switch state {
+	case 1:
+		// ended in the name
+		n.end = len(id)
+	case 3:
+		// ended in comment
+		c.end = len(id)
+	case 6:
+		// ended in email
+		e.end = len(id)
+	}
+
+	name = strings.TrimSpace(id[n.start:n.end])
+	comment = strings.TrimSpace(id[c.start:c.end])
+	email = strings.TrimSpace(id[e.start:e.end])
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/patch.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+patch < sig-v3.patch
+patch < s2k-gnu-dummy.patch
+find . -type f -name '*.go' -exec sed -i'' -e 's/golang.org\/x\/crypto\/openpgp/github.com\/keybase\/go-crypto\/openpgp/' {} \;
+find . -type f -name '*.go-e' -exec rm {} \;
+go test ./...

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/read.go

@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package openpgp implements high level operations on OpenPGP messages.
+package openpgp // import "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp"
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	_ "crypto/sha256"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/armor"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet"
+)
+
+// SignatureType is the armor type for a PGP signature.
+var SignatureType = "PGP SIGNATURE"
+
+// readArmored reads an armored block with the given type.
+func readArmored(r io.Reader, expectedType string) (body io.Reader, err error) {
+	block, err := armor.Decode(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if block.Type != expectedType {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("expected '" + expectedType + "', got: " + block.Type)
+	}
+
+	return block.Body, nil
+}
+
+// MessageDetails contains the result of parsing an OpenPGP encrypted and/or
+// signed message.
+type MessageDetails struct {
+	IsEncrypted              bool                // true if the message was encrypted.
+	EncryptedToKeyIds        []uint64            // the list of recipient key ids.
+	IsSymmetricallyEncrypted bool                // true if a passphrase could have decrypted the message.
+	DecryptedWith            Key                 // the private key used to decrypt the message, if any.
+	IsSigned                 bool                // true if the message is signed.
+	SignedByKeyId            uint64              // the key id of the signer, if any.
+	SignedBy                 *Key                // the key of the signer, if available.
+	LiteralData              *packet.LiteralData // the metadata of the contents
+	UnverifiedBody           io.Reader           // the contents of the message.
+
+	// If IsSigned is true and SignedBy is non-zero then the signature will
+	// be verified as UnverifiedBody is read. The signature cannot be
+	// checked until the whole of UnverifiedBody is read so UnverifiedBody
+	// must be consumed until EOF before the data can trusted. Even if a
+	// message isn't signed (or the signer is unknown) the data may contain
+	// an authentication code that is only checked once UnverifiedBody has
+	// been consumed. Once EOF has been seen, the following fields are
+	// valid. (An authentication code failure is reported as a
+	// SignatureError error when reading from UnverifiedBody.)
+	SignatureError error               // nil if the signature is good.
+	Signature      *packet.Signature   // the signature packet itself, if v4 (default)
+	SignatureV3    *packet.SignatureV3 // the signature packet if it is a v2 or v3 signature
+
+	decrypted io.ReadCloser
+}
+
+// A PromptFunction is used as a callback by functions that may need to decrypt
+// a private key, or prompt for a passphrase. It is called with a list of
+// acceptable, encrypted private keys and a boolean that indicates whether a
+// passphrase is usable. It should either decrypt a private key or return a
+// passphrase to try. If the decrypted private key or given passphrase isn't
+// correct, the function will be called again, forever. Any error returned will
+// be passed up.
+type PromptFunction func(keys []Key, symmetric bool) ([]byte, error)
+
+// A keyEnvelopePair is used to store a private key with the envelope that
+// contains a symmetric key, encrypted with that key.
+type keyEnvelopePair struct {
+	key          Key
+	encryptedKey *packet.EncryptedKey
+}
+
+// ReadMessage parses an OpenPGP message that may be signed and/or encrypted.
+// The given KeyRing should contain both public keys (for signature
+// verification) and, possibly encrypted, private keys for decrypting.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func ReadMessage(r io.Reader, keyring KeyRing, prompt PromptFunction, config *packet.Config) (md *MessageDetails, err error) {
+	var p packet.Packet
+
+	var symKeys []*packet.SymmetricKeyEncrypted
+	var pubKeys []keyEnvelopePair
+	var se *packet.SymmetricallyEncrypted
+
+	packets := packet.NewReader(r)
+	md = new(MessageDetails)
+	md.IsEncrypted = true
+
+	// The message, if encrypted, starts with a number of packets
+	// containing an encrypted decryption key. The decryption key is either
+	// encrypted to a public key, or with a passphrase. This loop
+	// collects these packets.
+ParsePackets:
+	for {
+		p, err = packets.Next()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		switch p := p.(type) {
+		case *packet.SymmetricKeyEncrypted:
+			// This packet contains the decryption key encrypted with a passphrase.
+			md.IsSymmetricallyEncrypted = true
+			symKeys = append(symKeys, p)
+		case *packet.EncryptedKey:
+			// This packet contains the decryption key encrypted to a public key.
+			md.EncryptedToKeyIds = append(md.EncryptedToKeyIds, p.KeyId)
+			switch p.Algo {
+			case packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA, packet.PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly, packet.PubKeyAlgoElGamal, packet.PubKeyAlgoECDH:
+				break
+			default:
+				continue
+			}
+			var keys []Key
+			if p.KeyId == 0 {
+				keys = keyring.DecryptionKeys()
+			} else {
+				keys = keyring.KeysById(p.KeyId, nil)
+			}
+			for _, k := range keys {
+				pubKeys = append(pubKeys, keyEnvelopePair{k, p})
+			}
+		case *packet.SymmetricallyEncrypted:
+			se = p
+			break ParsePackets
+		case *packet.Compressed, *packet.LiteralData, *packet.OnePassSignature:
+			// This message isn't encrypted.
+			if len(symKeys) != 0 || len(pubKeys) != 0 {
+				return nil, errors.StructuralError("key material not followed by encrypted message")
+			}
+			packets.Unread(p)
+			return readSignedMessage(packets, nil, keyring)
+		}
+	}
+
+	var candidates []Key
+	var decrypted io.ReadCloser
+
+	// Now that we have the list of encrypted keys we need to decrypt at
+	// least one of them or, if we cannot, we need to call the prompt
+	// function so that it can decrypt a key or give us a passphrase.
+FindKey:
+	for {
+		// See if any of the keys already have a private key available
+		candidates = candidates[:0]
+		candidateFingerprints := make(map[string]bool)
+
+		for _, pk := range pubKeys {
+			if pk.key.PrivateKey == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			if !pk.key.PrivateKey.Encrypted {
+				if len(pk.encryptedKey.Key) == 0 {
+					pk.encryptedKey.Decrypt(pk.key.PrivateKey, config)
+				}
+				if len(pk.encryptedKey.Key) == 0 {
+					continue
+				}
+				decrypted, err = se.Decrypt(pk.encryptedKey.CipherFunc, pk.encryptedKey.Key)
+				if err != nil && err != errors.ErrKeyIncorrect {
+					return nil, err
+				}
+				if decrypted != nil {
+					md.DecryptedWith = pk.key
+					break FindKey
+				}
+			} else {
+				fpr := string(pk.key.PublicKey.Fingerprint[:])
+				if v := candidateFingerprints[fpr]; v {
+					continue
+				}
+				candidates = append(candidates, pk.key)
+				candidateFingerprints[fpr] = true
+			}
+		}
+
+		if len(candidates) == 0 && len(symKeys) == 0 {
+			return nil, errors.ErrKeyIncorrect
+		}
+
+		if prompt == nil {
+			return nil, errors.ErrKeyIncorrect
+		}
+
+		passphrase, err := prompt(candidates, len(symKeys) != 0)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		// Try the symmetric passphrase first
+		if len(symKeys) != 0 && passphrase != nil {
+			for _, s := range symKeys {
+				key, cipherFunc, err := s.Decrypt(passphrase)
+				if err == nil {
+					decrypted, err = se.Decrypt(cipherFunc, key)
+					if err != nil && err != errors.ErrKeyIncorrect {
+						return nil, err
+					}
+					if decrypted != nil {
+						break FindKey
+					}
+				}
+
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	md.decrypted = decrypted
+	if err := packets.Push(decrypted); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return readSignedMessage(packets, md, keyring)
+}
+
+// readSignedMessage reads a possibly signed message if mdin is non-zero then
+// that structure is updated and returned. Otherwise a fresh MessageDetails is
+// used.
+func readSignedMessage(packets *packet.Reader, mdin *MessageDetails, keyring KeyRing) (md *MessageDetails, err error) {
+	if mdin == nil {
+		mdin = new(MessageDetails)
+	}
+	md = mdin
+
+	var p packet.Packet
+	var h hash.Hash
+	var wrappedHash hash.Hash
+FindLiteralData:
+	for {
+		p, err = packets.Next()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		switch p := p.(type) {
+		case *packet.Compressed:
+			if err := packets.Push(p.Body); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+		case *packet.OnePassSignature:
+			if !p.IsLast {
+				return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("nested signatures")
+			}
+
+			h, wrappedHash, err = hashForSignature(p.Hash, p.SigType)
+			if err != nil {
+				md = nil
+				return
+			}
+
+			md.IsSigned = true
+			md.SignedByKeyId = p.KeyId
+			keys := keyring.KeysByIdUsage(p.KeyId, nil, packet.KeyFlagSign)
+			if len(keys) > 0 {
+				md.SignedBy = &keys[0]
+			}
+		case *packet.LiteralData:
+			md.LiteralData = p
+			break FindLiteralData
+		}
+	}
+
+	if md.SignedBy != nil {
+		md.UnverifiedBody = &signatureCheckReader{packets, h, wrappedHash, md}
+	} else if md.decrypted != nil {
+		md.UnverifiedBody = checkReader{md}
+	} else {
+		md.UnverifiedBody = md.LiteralData.Body
+	}
+
+	return md, nil
+}
+
+// hashForSignature returns a pair of hashes that can be used to verify a
+// signature. The signature may specify that the contents of the signed message
+// should be preprocessed (i.e. to normalize line endings). Thus this function
+// returns two hashes. The second should be used to hash the message itself and
+// performs any needed preprocessing.
+func hashForSignature(hashId crypto.Hash, sigType packet.SignatureType) (hash.Hash, hash.Hash, error) {
+	if !hashId.Available() {
+		return nil, nil, errors.UnsupportedError("hash not available: " + strconv.Itoa(int(hashId)))
+	}
+	h := hashId.New()
+
+	switch sigType {
+	case packet.SigTypeBinary:
+		return h, h, nil
+	case packet.SigTypeText:
+		return h, NewCanonicalTextHash(h), nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, nil, errors.UnsupportedError("unsupported signature type: " + strconv.Itoa(int(sigType)))
+}
+
+// checkReader wraps an io.Reader from a LiteralData packet. When it sees EOF
+// it closes the ReadCloser from any SymmetricallyEncrypted packet to trigger
+// MDC checks.
+type checkReader struct {
+	md *MessageDetails
+}
+
+func (cr checkReader) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	n, err = cr.md.LiteralData.Body.Read(buf)
+	if err == io.EOF {
+		mdcErr := cr.md.decrypted.Close()
+		if mdcErr != nil {
+			err = mdcErr
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// signatureCheckReader wraps an io.Reader from a LiteralData packet and hashes
+// the data as it is read. When it sees an EOF from the underlying io.Reader
+// it parses and checks a trailing Signature packet and triggers any MDC checks.
+type signatureCheckReader struct {
+	packets        *packet.Reader
+	h, wrappedHash hash.Hash
+	md             *MessageDetails
+}
+
+func (scr *signatureCheckReader) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	n, err = scr.md.LiteralData.Body.Read(buf)
+	scr.wrappedHash.Write(buf[:n])
+	if err == io.EOF {
+		var p packet.Packet
+		p, scr.md.SignatureError = scr.packets.Next()
+		if scr.md.SignatureError != nil {
+			return
+		}
+
+		var ok bool
+		if scr.md.Signature, ok = p.(*packet.Signature); ok {
+			var err error
+			if fingerprint := scr.md.Signature.IssuerFingerprint; fingerprint != nil {
+				if !hmac.Equal(fingerprint, scr.md.SignedBy.PublicKey.Fingerprint[:]) {
+					err = errors.StructuralError("bad key fingerprint")
+				}
+			}
+			if err == nil {
+				err = scr.md.SignedBy.PublicKey.VerifySignature(scr.h, scr.md.Signature)
+			}
+			scr.md.SignatureError = err
+		} else if scr.md.SignatureV3, ok = p.(*packet.SignatureV3); ok {
+			scr.md.SignatureError = scr.md.SignedBy.PublicKey.VerifySignatureV3(scr.h, scr.md.SignatureV3)
+		} else {
+			scr.md.SignatureError = errors.StructuralError("LiteralData not followed by Signature")
+			return
+		}
+
+		// The SymmetricallyEncrypted packet, if any, might have an
+		// unsigned hash of its own. In order to check this we need to
+		// close that Reader.
+		if scr.md.decrypted != nil {
+			mdcErr := scr.md.decrypted.Close()
+			if mdcErr != nil {
+				err = mdcErr
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// CheckDetachedSignature takes a signed file and a detached signature and
+// returns the signer if the signature is valid. If the signer isn't known,
+// ErrUnknownIssuer is returned.
+func CheckDetachedSignature(keyring KeyRing, signed, signature io.Reader) (signer *Entity, err error) {
+	signer, _, err = checkDetachedSignature(keyring, signed, signature)
+	return signer, err
+}
+
+func checkDetachedSignature(keyring KeyRing, signed, signature io.Reader) (signer *Entity, issuer *uint64, err error) {
+	var issuerKeyId uint64
+	var issuerFingerprint []byte
+	var hashFunc crypto.Hash
+	var sigType packet.SignatureType
+	var keys []Key
+	var p packet.Packet
+
+	packets := packet.NewReader(signature)
+	for {
+		p, err = packets.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			return nil, nil, errors.ErrUnknownIssuer
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+
+		switch sig := p.(type) {
+		case *packet.Signature:
+			if sig.IssuerKeyId == nil {
+				return nil, nil, errors.StructuralError("signature doesn't have an issuer")
+			}
+			issuerKeyId = *sig.IssuerKeyId
+			hashFunc = sig.Hash
+			sigType = sig.SigType
+			issuerFingerprint = sig.IssuerFingerprint
+		case *packet.SignatureV3:
+			issuerKeyId = sig.IssuerKeyId
+			hashFunc = sig.Hash
+			sigType = sig.SigType
+		default:
+			return nil, nil, errors.StructuralError("non signature packet found")
+		}
+
+		keys = keyring.KeysByIdUsage(issuerKeyId, issuerFingerprint, packet.KeyFlagSign)
+		if len(keys) > 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(keys) == 0 {
+		panic("unreachable")
+	}
+
+	h, wrappedHash, err := hashForSignature(hashFunc, sigType)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	if _, err := io.Copy(wrappedHash, signed); err != nil && err != io.EOF {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		switch sig := p.(type) {
+		case *packet.Signature:
+			err = key.PublicKey.VerifySignature(h, sig)
+		case *packet.SignatureV3:
+			err = key.PublicKey.VerifySignatureV3(h, sig)
+		default:
+			panic("unreachable")
+		}
+
+		if err == nil {
+			return key.Entity, &issuerKeyId, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil, nil, err
+}
+
+// CheckArmoredDetachedSignature performs the same actions as
+// CheckDetachedSignature but expects the signature to be armored.
+func CheckArmoredDetachedSignature(keyring KeyRing, signed, signature io.Reader) (signer *Entity, err error) {
+	signer, _, err = checkArmoredDetachedSignature(keyring, signed, signature)
+	return signer, err
+}
+
+func checkArmoredDetachedSignature(keyring KeyRing, signed, signature io.Reader) (signer *Entity, issuer *uint64, err error) {
+	body, err := readArmored(signature, SignatureType)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return checkDetachedSignature(keyring, signed, body)
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k/s2k.go

@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package s2k implements the various OpenPGP string-to-key transforms as
+// specified in RFC 4800 section 3.7.1.
+package s2k // import "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+)
+
+// Config collects configuration parameters for s2k key-stretching
+// transformatioms. A nil *Config is valid and results in all default
+// values. Currently, Config is used only by the Serialize function in
+// this package.
+type Config struct {
+	// Hash is the default hash function to be used. If
+	// nil, SHA1 is used.
+	Hash crypto.Hash
+	// S2KCount is only used for symmetric encryption. It
+	// determines the strength of the passphrase stretching when
+	// the said passphrase is hashed to produce a key. S2KCount
+	// should be between 1024 and 65011712, inclusive. If Config
+	// is nil or S2KCount is 0, the value 65536 used. Not all
+	// values in the above range can be represented. S2KCount will
+	// be rounded up to the next representable value if it cannot
+	// be encoded exactly. When set, it is strongly encrouraged to
+	// use a value that is at least 65536. See RFC 4880 Section
+	// 3.7.1.3.
+	S2KCount int
+}
+
+func (c *Config) hash() crypto.Hash {
+	if c == nil || uint(c.Hash) == 0 {
+		// SHA1 is the historical default in this package.
+		return crypto.SHA1
+	}
+
+	return c.Hash
+}
+
+func (c *Config) encodedCount() uint8 {
+	if c == nil || c.S2KCount == 0 {
+		return 96 // The common case. Correspoding to 65536
+	}
+
+	i := c.S2KCount
+	switch {
+	// Behave like GPG. Should we make 65536 the lowest value used?
+	case i < 1024:
+		i = 1024
+	case i > 65011712:
+		i = 65011712
+	}
+
+	return encodeCount(i)
+}
+
+// encodeCount converts an iterative "count" in the range 1024 to
+// 65011712, inclusive, to an encoded count. The return value is the
+// octet that is actually stored in the GPG file. encodeCount panics
+// if i is not in the above range (encodedCount above takes care to
+// pass i in the correct range). See RFC 4880 Section 3.7.7.1.
+func encodeCount(i int) uint8 {
+	if i < 1024 || i > 65011712 {
+		panic("count arg i outside the required range")
+	}
+
+	for encoded := 0; encoded < 256; encoded++ {
+		count := decodeCount(uint8(encoded))
+		if count >= i {
+			return uint8(encoded)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 255
+}
+
+// decodeCount returns the s2k mode 3 iterative "count" corresponding to
+// the encoded octet c.
+func decodeCount(c uint8) int {
+	return (16 + int(c&15)) << (uint32(c>>4) + 6)
+}
+
+// Simple writes to out the result of computing the Simple S2K function (RFC
+// 4880, section 3.7.1.1) using the given hash and input passphrase.
+func Simple(out []byte, h hash.Hash, in []byte) {
+	Salted(out, h, in, nil)
+}
+
+var zero [1]byte
+
+// Salted writes to out the result of computing the Salted S2K function (RFC
+// 4880, section 3.7.1.2) using the given hash, input passphrase and salt.
+func Salted(out []byte, h hash.Hash, in []byte, salt []byte) {
+	done := 0
+	var digest []byte
+
+	for i := 0; done < len(out); i++ {
+		h.Reset()
+		for j := 0; j < i; j++ {
+			h.Write(zero[:])
+		}
+		h.Write(salt)
+		h.Write(in)
+		digest = h.Sum(digest[:0])
+		n := copy(out[done:], digest)
+		done += n
+	}
+}
+
+// Iterated writes to out the result of computing the Iterated and Salted S2K
+// function (RFC 4880, section 3.7.1.3) using the given hash, input passphrase,
+// salt and iteration count.
+func Iterated(out []byte, h hash.Hash, in []byte, salt []byte, count int) {
+	combined := make([]byte, len(in)+len(salt))
+	copy(combined, salt)
+	copy(combined[len(salt):], in)
+
+	if count < len(combined) {
+		count = len(combined)
+	}
+
+	done := 0
+	var digest []byte
+	for i := 0; done < len(out); i++ {
+		h.Reset()
+		for j := 0; j < i; j++ {
+			h.Write(zero[:])
+		}
+		written := 0
+		for written < count {
+			if written+len(combined) > count {
+				todo := count - written
+				h.Write(combined[:todo])
+				written = count
+			} else {
+				h.Write(combined)
+				written += len(combined)
+			}
+		}
+		digest = h.Sum(digest[:0])
+		n := copy(out[done:], digest)
+		done += n
+	}
+}
+
+func parseGNUExtensions(r io.Reader) (f func(out, in []byte), err error) {
+	var buf [9]byte
+
+	// A three-byte string identifier
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[:3])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	gnuExt := string(buf[:3])
+
+	if gnuExt != "GNU" {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("Malformed GNU extension: " + gnuExt)
+	}
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[:1])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	gnuExtType := int(buf[0])
+	switch gnuExtType {
+	case 1:
+		return nil, nil
+	case 2:
+		// Read a serial number, which is prefixed by a 1-byte length.
+		// The maximum length is 16.
+		var lenBuf [1]byte
+		_, err = io.ReadFull(r, lenBuf[:])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+
+		maxLen := 16
+		ivLen := int(lenBuf[0])
+		if ivLen > maxLen {
+			ivLen = maxLen
+		}
+		ivBuf := make([]byte, ivLen)
+		// For now we simply discard the IV
+		_, err = io.ReadFull(r, ivBuf)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		return nil, nil
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("unknown S2K GNU protection mode: " + strconv.Itoa(int(gnuExtType)))
+	}
+}
+
+// Parse reads a binary specification for a string-to-key transformation from r
+// and returns a function which performs that transform.
+func Parse(r io.Reader) (f func(out, in []byte), err error) {
+	var buf [9]byte
+
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[:2])
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// GNU Extensions; handle them before we try to look for a hash, which won't
+	// be needed in most cases anyway.
+	if buf[0] == 101 {
+		return parseGNUExtensions(r)
+	}
+
+	hash, ok := HashIdToHash(buf[1])
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("hash for S2K function: " + strconv.Itoa(int(buf[1])))
+	}
+	if !hash.Available() {
+		return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("hash not available: " + strconv.Itoa(int(hash)))
+	}
+	h := hash.New()
+
+	switch buf[0] {
+	case 0:
+		f := func(out, in []byte) {
+			Simple(out, h, in)
+		}
+		return f, nil
+	case 1:
+		_, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[:8])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		f := func(out, in []byte) {
+			Salted(out, h, in, buf[:8])
+		}
+		return f, nil
+	case 3:
+		_, err = io.ReadFull(r, buf[:9])
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		count := decodeCount(buf[8])
+		f := func(out, in []byte) {
+			Iterated(out, h, in, buf[:8], count)
+		}
+		return f, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.UnsupportedError("S2K function")
+}
+
+// Serialize salts and stretches the given passphrase and writes the
+// resulting key into key. It also serializes an S2K descriptor to
+// w. The key stretching can be configured with c, which may be
+// nil. In that case, sensible defaults will be used.
+func Serialize(w io.Writer, key []byte, rand io.Reader, passphrase []byte, c *Config) error {
+	var buf [11]byte
+	buf[0] = 3 /* iterated and salted */
+	buf[1], _ = HashToHashId(c.hash())
+	salt := buf[2:10]
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, salt); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	encodedCount := c.encodedCount()
+	count := decodeCount(encodedCount)
+	buf[10] = encodedCount
+	if _, err := w.Write(buf[:]); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	Iterated(key, c.hash().New(), passphrase, salt, count)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// hashToHashIdMapping contains pairs relating OpenPGP's hash identifier with
+// Go's crypto.Hash type. See RFC 4880, section 9.4.
+var hashToHashIdMapping = []struct {
+	id   byte
+	hash crypto.Hash
+	name string
+}{
+	{1, crypto.MD5, "MD5"},
+	{2, crypto.SHA1, "SHA1"},
+	{3, crypto.RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160"},
+	{8, crypto.SHA256, "SHA256"},
+	{9, crypto.SHA384, "SHA384"},
+	{10, crypto.SHA512, "SHA512"},
+	{11, crypto.SHA224, "SHA224"},
+}
+
+// HashIdToHash returns a crypto.Hash which corresponds to the given OpenPGP
+// hash id.
+func HashIdToHash(id byte) (h crypto.Hash, ok bool) {
+	for _, m := range hashToHashIdMapping {
+		if m.id == id {
+			return m.hash, true
+		}
+	}
+	return 0, false
+}
+
+// HashIdToString returns the name of the hash function corresponding to the
+// given OpenPGP hash id, or panics if id is unknown.
+func HashIdToString(id byte) (name string, ok bool) {
+	for _, m := range hashToHashIdMapping {
+		if m.id == id {
+			return m.name, true
+		}
+	}
+
+	return "", false
+}
+
+// HashIdToHash returns an OpenPGP hash id which corresponds the given Hash.
+func HashToHashId(h crypto.Hash) (id byte, ok bool) {
+	for _, m := range hashToHashIdMapping {
+		if m.hash == h {
+			return m.id, true
+		}
+	}
+	return 0, false
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/sig-v3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+diff --git a/openpgp/read.go b/openpgp/read.go
+index a6cecc5..0c9397b 100644
+--- a/openpgp/read.go
++++ b/openpgp/read.go
+@@ -56,8 +56,9 @@ type MessageDetails struct {
+ 	// been consumed. Once EOF has been seen, the following fields are
+ 	// valid. (An authentication code failure is reported as a
+ 	// SignatureError error when reading from UnverifiedBody.)
+-	SignatureError error             // nil if the signature is good.
+-	Signature      *packet.Signature // the signature packet itself.
++	SignatureError error               // nil if the signature is good.
++	Signature      *packet.Signature   // the signature packet itself, if v4 (default)
++	SignatureV3    *packet.SignatureV3 // the signature packet if it is a v2 or v3 signature
+ 
+ 	decrypted io.ReadCloser
+ }
+@@ -334,13 +335,15 @@ func (scr *signatureCheckReader) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		var ok bool
+-		if scr.md.Signature, ok = p.(*packet.Signature); !ok {
++		if scr.md.Signature, ok = p.(*packet.Signature); ok {
++			scr.md.SignatureError = scr.md.SignedBy.PublicKey.VerifySignature(scr.h, scr.md.Signature)
++		} else if scr.md.SignatureV3, ok = p.(*packet.SignatureV3); ok {
++			scr.md.SignatureError = scr.md.SignedBy.PublicKey.VerifySignatureV3(scr.h, scr.md.SignatureV3)
++		} else {
+ 			scr.md.SignatureError = errors.StructuralError("LiteralData not followed by Signature")
+ 			return
+ 		}
+ 
+-		scr.md.SignatureError = scr.md.SignedBy.PublicKey.VerifySignature(scr.h, scr.md.Signature)
+-
+ 		// The SymmetricallyEncrypted packet, if any, might have an
+ 		// unsigned hash of its own. In order to check this we need to
+ 		// close that Reader.
+diff --git a/openpgp/read_test.go b/openpgp/read_test.go
+index 52f942c..abe8d7b 100644
+--- a/openpgp/read_test.go
++++ b/openpgp/read_test.go
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
+ 	"strings"
+ 	"testing"
+ 
++	"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor"
+ 	"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
+ )
+ 
+@@ -411,6 +412,50 @@ func TestIssue11504(t *testing.T) {
+ 	testReadMessageError(t, "9303000130303030303030303030983002303030303030030000000130")
+ }
+ 
++// TestSignatureV3Message tests the verification of V3 signature, generated
++// with a modern V4-style key.  Some people have their clients set to generate
++// V3 signatures, so it's useful to be able to verify them.
++func TestSignatureV3Message(t *testing.T) {
++	sig, err := armor.Decode(strings.NewReader(signedMessageV3))
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Error(err)
++		return
++	}
++	key, err := ReadArmoredKeyRing(strings.NewReader(keyV4forVerifyingSignedMessageV3))
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Error(err)
++		return
++	}
++	md, err := ReadMessage(sig.Body, key, nil, nil)
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Error(err)
++		return
++	}
++
++	_, err = ioutil.ReadAll(md.UnverifiedBody)
++	if err != nil {
++		t.Error(err)
++		return
++	}
++
++	// We'll see a sig error here after reading in the UnverifiedBody above,
++	// if there was one to see.
++	if err = md.SignatureError; err != nil {
++		t.Error(err)
++		return
++	}
++
++	if md.SignatureV3 == nil {
++		t.Errorf("No available signature after checking signature")
++		return
++	}
++	if md.Signature != nil {
++		t.Errorf("Did not expect a signature V4 back")
++		return
++	}
++	return
++}
++
+ const testKey1KeyId = 0xA34D7E18C20C31BB
+ const testKey3KeyId = 0x338934250CCC0360
+ 
+@@ -504,3 +549,36 @@ const unknownHashFunctionHex = `8a00000040040001990006050253863c24000a09103b4fe6
+ const missingHashFunctionHex = `8a00000040040001030006050253863c24000a09103b4fe6acc0b21f32ffff0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101`
+ 
+ const campbellQuine = `a0b001000300fcffa0b001000d00f2ff000300fcffa0b001000d00f2ff8270a01c00000500faff8270a01c00000500faff000500faff001400ebff8270a01c00000500faff000500faff001400ebff428821c400001400ebff428821c400001400ebff428821c400001400ebff428821c400001400ebff428821c400000000ffff000000ffff000b00f4ff428821c400000000ffff000000ffff000b00f4ff0233214c40000100feff000233214c40000100feff0000`
++
++const keyV4forVerifyingSignedMessageV3 = `-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
++Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org
++
++mI0EVfxoFQEEAMBIqmbDfYygcvP6Phr1wr1XI41IF7Qixqybs/foBF8qqblD9gIY
++BKpXjnBOtbkcVOJ0nljd3/sQIfH4E0vQwK5/4YRQSI59eKOqd6Fx+fWQOLG+uu6z
++tewpeCj9LLHvibx/Sc7VWRnrznia6ftrXxJ/wHMezSab3tnGC0YPVdGNABEBAAG0
++JEdvY3J5cHRvIFRlc3QgS2V5IDx0aGVtYXhAZ21haWwuY29tPoi5BBMBCgAjBQJV
++/GgVAhsDBwsJCAcDAgEGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQeXnQmhdGW9PFVAP+
++K7TU0qX5ArvIONIxh/WAweyOk884c5cE8f+3NOPOOCRGyVy0FId5A7MmD5GOQh4H
++JseOZVEVCqlmngEvtHZb3U1VYtVGE5WZ+6rQhGsMcWP5qaT4soYwMBlSYxgYwQcx
++YhN9qOr292f9j2Y//TTIJmZT4Oa+lMxhWdqTfX+qMgG4jQRV/GgVAQQArhFSiij1
++b+hT3dnapbEU+23Z1yTu1DfF6zsxQ4XQWEV3eR8v+8mEDDNcz8oyyF56k6UQ3rXi
++UMTIwRDg4V6SbZmaFbZYCOwp/EmXJ3rfhm7z7yzXj2OFN22luuqbyVhuL7LRdB0M
++pxgmjXb4tTvfgKd26x34S+QqUJ7W6uprY4sAEQEAAYifBBgBCgAJBQJV/GgVAhsM
++AAoJEHl50JoXRlvT7y8D/02ckx4OMkKBZo7viyrBw0MLG92i+DC2bs35PooHR6zz
++786mitjOp5z2QWNLBvxC70S0qVfCIz8jKupO1J6rq6Z8CcbLF3qjm6h1omUBf8Nd
++EfXKD2/2HV6zMKVknnKzIEzauh+eCKS2CeJUSSSryap/QLVAjRnckaES/OsEWhNB
++=RZia
++-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
++`
++
++const signedMessageV3 = `-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
++Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org
++
++owGbwMvMwMVYWXlhlrhb9GXG03JJDKF/MtxDMjKLFYAoUaEktbhEITe1uDgxPVWP
++q5NhKjMrWAVcC9evD8z/bF/uWNjqtk/X3y5/38XGRQHm/57rrDRYuGnTw597Xqka
++uM3137/hH3Os+Jf2dc0fXOITKwJvXJvecPVs0ta+Vg7ZO1MLn8w58Xx+6L58mbka
++DGHyU9yTueZE8D+QF/Tz28Y78dqtF56R1VPn9Xw4uJqrWYdd7b3vIZ1V6R4Nh05d
++iT57d/OhWwA=
++=hG7R
++-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
++`

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/write.go

@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package openpgp
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/armor"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet"
+	"github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k"
+)
+
+// DetachSign signs message with the private key from signer (which must
+// already have been decrypted) and writes the signature to w.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func DetachSign(w io.Writer, signer *Entity, message io.Reader, config *packet.Config) error {
+	return detachSign(w, signer, message, packet.SigTypeBinary, config)
+}
+
+// ArmoredDetachSign signs message with the private key from signer (which
+// must already have been decrypted) and writes an armored signature to w.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func ArmoredDetachSign(w io.Writer, signer *Entity, message io.Reader, config *packet.Config) (err error) {
+	return armoredDetachSign(w, signer, message, packet.SigTypeBinary, config)
+}
+
+// DetachSignText signs message (after canonicalising the line endings) with
+// the private key from signer (which must already have been decrypted) and
+// writes the signature to w.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func DetachSignText(w io.Writer, signer *Entity, message io.Reader, config *packet.Config) error {
+	return detachSign(w, signer, message, packet.SigTypeText, config)
+}
+
+// ArmoredDetachSignText signs message (after canonicalising the line endings)
+// with the private key from signer (which must already have been decrypted)
+// and writes an armored signature to w.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func ArmoredDetachSignText(w io.Writer, signer *Entity, message io.Reader, config *packet.Config) error {
+	return armoredDetachSign(w, signer, message, packet.SigTypeText, config)
+}
+
+func armoredDetachSign(w io.Writer, signer *Entity, message io.Reader, sigType packet.SignatureType, config *packet.Config) (err error) {
+	out, err := armor.Encode(w, SignatureType, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	err = detachSign(out, signer, message, sigType, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return out.Close()
+}
+
+// SignWithSigner signs the message of type sigType with s and writes the
+// signature to w.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func SignWithSigner(s packet.Signer, w io.Writer, message io.Reader, sigType packet.SignatureType, config *packet.Config) (err error) {
+	keyId := s.KeyId()
+	sig := new(packet.Signature)
+	sig.SigType = sigType
+	sig.PubKeyAlgo = s.PublicKeyAlgo()
+	sig.Hash = config.Hash()
+	sig.CreationTime = config.Now()
+	sig.IssuerKeyId = &keyId
+
+	s.Reset()
+
+	wrapped := s.(hash.Hash)
+
+	if sigType == packet.SigTypeText {
+		wrapped = NewCanonicalTextHash(s)
+	}
+
+	io.Copy(wrapped, message)
+
+	err = sig.Sign(s, nil, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	err = sig.Serialize(w)
+
+	return
+}
+
+func detachSign(w io.Writer, signer *Entity, message io.Reader, sigType packet.SignatureType, config *packet.Config) (err error) {
+	signerSubkey, ok := signer.signingKey(config.Now())
+	if !ok {
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("no valid signing keys")
+		return
+	}
+	if signerSubkey.PrivateKey == nil {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("signing key doesn't have a private key")
+	}
+	if signerSubkey.PrivateKey.Encrypted {
+		return errors.InvalidArgumentError("signing key is encrypted")
+	}
+
+	sig := new(packet.Signature)
+	sig.SigType = sigType
+	sig.PubKeyAlgo = signerSubkey.PrivateKey.PubKeyAlgo
+	sig.Hash = config.Hash()
+	sig.CreationTime = config.Now()
+	sig.IssuerKeyId = &signerSubkey.PrivateKey.KeyId
+
+	h, wrappedHash, err := hashForSignature(sig.Hash, sig.SigType)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	io.Copy(wrappedHash, message)
+
+	err = sig.Sign(h, signerSubkey.PrivateKey, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	return sig.Serialize(w)
+}
+
+// FileHints contains metadata about encrypted files. This metadata is, itself,
+// encrypted.
+type FileHints struct {
+	// IsBinary can be set to hint that the contents are binary data.
+	IsBinary bool
+	// FileName hints at the name of the file that should be written. It's
+	// truncated to 255 bytes if longer. It may be empty to suggest that the
+	// file should not be written to disk. It may be equal to "_CONSOLE" to
+	// suggest the data should not be written to disk.
+	FileName string
+	// ModTime contains the modification time of the file, or the zero time if not applicable.
+	ModTime time.Time
+}
+
+// SymmetricallyEncrypt acts like gpg -c: it encrypts a file with a passphrase.
+// The resulting WriteCloser must be closed after the contents of the file have
+// been written.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func SymmetricallyEncrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, passphrase []byte, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	if hints == nil {
+		hints = &FileHints{}
+	}
+
+	key, err := packet.SerializeSymmetricKeyEncrypted(ciphertext, passphrase, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	w, err := packet.SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted(ciphertext, config.Cipher(), key, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	literaldata := w
+	if algo := config.Compression(); algo != packet.CompressionNone {
+		var compConfig *packet.CompressionConfig
+		if config != nil {
+			compConfig = config.CompressionConfig
+		}
+		literaldata, err = packet.SerializeCompressed(w, algo, compConfig)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	var epochSeconds uint32
+	if !hints.ModTime.IsZero() {
+		epochSeconds = uint32(hints.ModTime.Unix())
+	}
+	return packet.SerializeLiteral(literaldata, hints.IsBinary, hints.FileName, epochSeconds)
+}
+
+// intersectPreferences mutates and returns a prefix of a that contains only
+// the values in the intersection of a and b. The order of a is preserved.
+func intersectPreferences(a []uint8, b []uint8) (intersection []uint8) {
+	var j int
+	for _, v := range a {
+		for _, v2 := range b {
+			if v == v2 {
+				a[j] = v
+				j++
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return a[:j]
+}
+
+func hashToHashId(h crypto.Hash) uint8 {
+	v, ok := s2k.HashToHashId(h)
+	if !ok {
+		panic("tried to convert unknown hash")
+	}
+	return v
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts a message to a number of recipients and, optionally, signs
+// it. hints contains optional information, that is also encrypted, that aids
+// the recipients in processing the message. The resulting WriteCloser must
+// be closed after the contents of the file have been written.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	var signer *packet.PrivateKey
+	if signed != nil {
+		signKey, ok := signed.signingKey(config.Now())
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("no valid signing keys")
+		}
+		signer = signKey.PrivateKey
+		if signer == nil {
+			return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("no private key in signing key")
+		}
+		if signer.Encrypted {
+			return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("signing key must be decrypted")
+		}
+	}
+
+	// These are the possible ciphers that we'll use for the message.
+	candidateCiphers := []uint8{
+		uint8(packet.CipherAES128),
+		uint8(packet.CipherAES256),
+		uint8(packet.CipherCAST5),
+	}
+	// These are the possible hash functions that we'll use for the signature.
+	candidateHashes := []uint8{
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA1),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),
+	}
+
+	// If no preferences were specified, assume something safe and reasonable.
+	defaultCiphers := []uint8{
+		uint8(packet.CipherAES128),
+		uint8(packet.CipherAES192),
+		uint8(packet.CipherAES256),
+		uint8(packet.CipherCAST5),
+	}
+
+	defaultHashes := []uint8{
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),
+	}
+
+	encryptKeys := make([]Key, len(to))
+	for i := range to {
+		var ok bool
+		encryptKeys[i], ok = to[i].encryptionKey(config.Now())
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt a message to key id " + strconv.FormatUint(to[i].PrimaryKey.KeyId, 16) + " because it has no encryption keys")
+		}
+
+		sig := to[i].primaryIdentity().SelfSignature
+
+		preferredSymmetric := sig.PreferredSymmetric
+		if len(preferredSymmetric) == 0 {
+			preferredSymmetric = defaultCiphers
+		}
+		preferredHashes := sig.PreferredHash
+		if len(preferredHashes) == 0 {
+			preferredHashes = defaultHashes
+		}
+		candidateCiphers = intersectPreferences(candidateCiphers, preferredSymmetric)
+		candidateHashes = intersectPreferences(candidateHashes, preferredHashes)
+	}
+
+	if len(candidateCiphers) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt because recipient set shares no common ciphers")
+	}
+	if len(candidateHashes) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt because recipient set shares no common hashes")
+	}
+
+	cipher := packet.CipherFunction(candidateCiphers[0])
+	// If the cipher specifed by config is a candidate, we'll use that.
+	configuredCipher := config.Cipher()
+	for _, c := range candidateCiphers {
+		cipherFunc := packet.CipherFunction(c)
+		if cipherFunc == configuredCipher {
+			cipher = cipherFunc
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	var hash crypto.Hash
+	for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
+		if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h.Available() {
+			hash = h
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	// If the hash specified by config is a candidate, we'll use that.
+	if configuredHash := config.Hash(); configuredHash.Available() {
+		for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
+			if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h == configuredHash {
+				hash = h
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if hash == 0 {
+		hashId := candidateHashes[0]
+		name, ok := s2k.HashIdToString(hashId)
+		if !ok {
+			name = "#" + strconv.Itoa(int(hashId))
+		}
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt because no candidate hash functions are compiled in. (Wanted " + name + " in this case.)")
+	}
+
+	symKey := make([]byte, cipher.KeySize())
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.Random(), symKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	for _, key := range encryptKeys {
+		if err := packet.SerializeEncryptedKey(ciphertext, key.PublicKey, cipher, symKey, config); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	encryptedData, err := packet.SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted(ciphertext, cipher, symKey, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if signer != nil {
+		ops := &packet.OnePassSignature{
+			SigType:    packet.SigTypeBinary,
+			Hash:       hash,
+			PubKeyAlgo: signer.PubKeyAlgo,
+			KeyId:      signer.KeyId,
+			IsLast:     true,
+		}
+		if err := ops.Serialize(encryptedData); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if hints == nil {
+		hints = &FileHints{}
+	}
+
+	w := encryptedData
+	if signer != nil {
+		// If we need to write a signature packet after the literal
+		// data then we need to stop literalData from closing
+		// encryptedData.
+		w = noOpCloser{encryptedData}
+
+	}
+	var epochSeconds uint32
+	if !hints.ModTime.IsZero() {
+		epochSeconds = uint32(hints.ModTime.Unix())
+	}
+	literalData, err := packet.SerializeLiteral(w, hints.IsBinary, hints.FileName, epochSeconds)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if signer != nil {
+		return signatureWriter{encryptedData, literalData, hash, hash.New(), signer, config}, nil
+	}
+	return literalData, nil
+}
+
+// signatureWriter hashes the contents of a message while passing it along to
+// literalData. When closed, it closes literalData, writes a signature packet
+// to encryptedData and then also closes encryptedData.
+type signatureWriter struct {
+	encryptedData io.WriteCloser
+	literalData   io.WriteCloser
+	hashType      crypto.Hash
+	h             hash.Hash
+	signer        *packet.PrivateKey
+	config        *packet.Config
+}
+
+func (s signatureWriter) Write(data []byte) (int, error) {
+	s.h.Write(data)
+	return s.literalData.Write(data)
+}
+
+func (s signatureWriter) Close() error {
+	sig := &packet.Signature{
+		SigType:      packet.SigTypeBinary,
+		PubKeyAlgo:   s.signer.PubKeyAlgo,
+		Hash:         s.hashType,
+		CreationTime: s.config.Now(),
+		IssuerKeyId:  &s.signer.KeyId,
+	}
+
+	if err := sig.Sign(s.h, s.signer, s.config); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := s.literalData.Close(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := sig.Serialize(s.encryptedData); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return s.encryptedData.Close()
+}
+
+// noOpCloser is like an ioutil.NopCloser, but for an io.Writer.
+// TODO: we have two of these in OpenPGP packages alone. This probably needs
+// to be promoted somewhere more common.
+type noOpCloser struct {
+	w io.Writer
+}
+
+func (c noOpCloser) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	return c.w.Write(data)
+}
+
+func (c noOpCloser) Close() error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+// AttachedSign is like openpgp.Encrypt (as in p.crypto/openpgp/write.go), but
+// don't encrypt at all, just sign the literal unencrypted data.
+// Unfortunately we need to duplicate some code here that's already
+// in write.go
+func AttachedSign(out io.WriteCloser, signed Entity, hints *FileHints,
+	config *packet.Config) (in io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+
+	if hints == nil {
+		hints = &FileHints{}
+	}
+
+	if config == nil {
+		config = &packet.Config{}
+	}
+
+	var signer *packet.PrivateKey
+
+	signKey, ok := signed.signingKey(config.Now())
+	if !ok {
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("no valid signing keys")
+		return
+	}
+	signer = signKey.PrivateKey
+	if signer == nil {
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("no valid signing keys")
+		return
+	}
+	if signer.Encrypted {
+		err = errors.InvalidArgumentError("signing key must be decrypted")
+		return
+	}
+
+	hasher := crypto.SHA512
+
+	ops := &packet.OnePassSignature{
+		SigType:    packet.SigTypeBinary,
+		Hash:       hasher,
+		PubKeyAlgo: signer.PubKeyAlgo,
+		KeyId:      signer.KeyId,
+		IsLast:     true,
+	}
+
+	if err = ops.Serialize(out); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	var epochSeconds uint32
+	if !hints.ModTime.IsZero() {
+		epochSeconds = uint32(hints.ModTime.Unix())
+	}
+
+	// We don't want the literal serializer to closer the output stream
+	// since we're going to need to write to it when we finish up the
+	// signature stuff.
+	in, err = packet.SerializeLiteral(noOpCloser{out}, hints.IsBinary, hints.FileName, epochSeconds)
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// If we need to write a signature packet after the literal
+	// data then we need to stop literalData from closing
+	// encryptedData.
+	in = signatureWriter{out, in, hasher, hasher.New(), signer, config}
+
+	return
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+// This file implements encryption and decryption using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
+
+// PKCS1v15DecrypterOpts is for passing options to PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption using
+// the crypto.Decrypter interface.
+type PKCS1v15DecryptOptions struct {
+	// SessionKeyLen is the length of the session key that is being
+	// decrypted. If not zero, then a padding error during decryption will
+	// cause a random plaintext of this length to be returned rather than
+	// an error. These alternatives happen in constant time.
+	SessionKeyLen int
+}
+
+// EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.
+//
+// The rand parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that encrypting
+// the same message twice doesn't result in the same ciphertext.
+//
+// WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than session keys
+// is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.
+func EncryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(msg) > k-11 {
+		err = ErrMessageTooLong
+		return
+	}
+
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	em[1] = 2
+	ps, mm := em[2:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]
+	err = nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, rand)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0
+	copy(mm, msg)
+
+	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+
+	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+	out = em
+	return
+}
+
+// DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
+//
+// Note that whether this function returns an error or not discloses secret
+// information. If an attacker can cause this function to run repeatedly and
+// learn whether each instance returned an error then they can decrypt and
+// forge signatures as if they had the private key. See
+// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey for a way of solving this problem.
+func DecryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	valid, out, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if valid == 0 {
+		return nil, ErrDecryption
+	}
+	out = out[index:]
+	return
+}
+
+// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// If rand != nil, it uses RSA blinding to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
+// It returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the
+// ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is
+// returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied
+// into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant
+// time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random
+// session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.
+// This will remove any possibility that an attacker can learn any information
+// about the plaintext.
+// See ``Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+// Encryption Standard PKCS #1'', Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology
+// (Crypto '98).
+//
+// Note that if the session key is too small then it may be possible for an
+// attacker to brute-force it. If they can do that then they can learn whether
+// a random value was used (because it'll be different for the same ciphertext)
+// and thus whether the padding was correct. This defeats the point of this
+// function. Using at least a 16-byte key will protect against this attack.
+func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) (err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k-(len(key)+3+8) < 0 {
+		return ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	valid, em, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(em) != k {
+		// This should be impossible because decryptPKCS1v15 always
+		// returns the full slice.
+		return ErrDecryption
+	}
+
+	valid &= subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(em)-index), int32(len(key)))
+	subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(valid, key, em[len(em)-len(key):])
+	return
+}
+
+// decryptPKCS1v15 decrypts ciphertext using priv and blinds the operation if
+// rand is not nil. It returns one or zero in valid that indicates whether the
+// plaintext was correctly structured. In either case, the plaintext is
+// returned in em so that it may be read independently of whether it was valid
+// in order to maintain constant memory access patterns. If the plaintext was
+// valid then index contains the index of the original message in em.
+func decryptPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid int, em []byte, index int, err error) {
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k < 11 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(ciphertext)
+	m, err := decrypt(rand, priv, c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	em = leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
+	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)
+
+	// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random
+	// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.
+	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.
+	//   index: the offset of the first zero byte.
+	lookingForIndex := 1
+
+	for i := 2; i < len(em); i++ {
+		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)
+		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)
+		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)
+	}
+
+	// The PS padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two
+	// bytes into em.
+	validPS := subtle.ConstantTimeLessOrEq(2+8, index)
+
+	valid = firstByteIsZero & secondByteIsTwo & (^lookingForIndex & 1) & validPS
+	index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(valid, index+1, 0)
+	return valid, em, index, nil
+}
+
+// nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.
+func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, rand io.Reader) (err error) {
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
+		for s[i] == 0 {
+			_, err = io.ReadFull(rand, s[i:i+1])
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			// In tests, the PRNG may return all zeros so we do
+			// this to break the loop.
+			s[i] ^= 0x42
+		}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// These are ASN1 DER structures:
+//   DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+//     digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+//     digest OCTET STRING
+//   }
+// For performance, we don't use the generic ASN1 encoder. Rather, we
+// precompute a prefix of the digest value that makes a valid ASN1 DER string
+// with the correct contents.
+var hashPrefixes = map[crypto.Hash][]byte{
+	crypto.MD5:       {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
+	crypto.SHA1:      {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
+	crypto.SHA224:    {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
+	crypto.SHA256:    {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
+	crypto.SHA384:    {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
+	crypto.SHA512:    {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
+	crypto.MD5SHA1:   {}, // A special TLS case which doesn't use an ASN1 prefix.
+	crypto.RIPEMD160: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31, 0x04, 0x14},
+}
+
+// SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS#1 v1.5.
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. If hash is zero, hashed is signed directly. This isn't
+// advisable except for interoperability.
+//
+// If rand is not nil then RSA blinding will be used to avoid timing side-channel attacks.
+//
+// This function is deterministic. Thus, if the set of possible messages is
+// small, an attacker may be able to build a map from messages to signatures
+// and identify the signed messages. As ever, signatures provide authenticity,
+// not confidentiality.
+func SignPKCS1v15(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
+	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k < tLen+11 {
+		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
+	}
+
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	em[1] = 1
+	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
+		em[i] = 0xff
+	}
+	copy(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
+	copy(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
+
+	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+	c, err := decryptAndCheck(rand, priv, m)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	copyWithLeftPad(em, c.Bytes())
+	s = em
+	return
+}
+
+// VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
+// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+// returning a nil error. If hash is zero then hashed is used directly. This
+// isn't advisable except for interoperability.
+func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) (err error) {
+	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
+	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if k < tLen+11 {
+		err = ErrVerification
+		return
+	}
+
+	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)
+	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
+	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
+
+	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
+	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)
+
+	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
+		ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)
+	}
+
+	if ok != 1 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte, err error) {
+	// Special case: crypto.Hash(0) is used to indicate that the data is
+	// signed directly.
+	if hash == 0 {
+		return inLen, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	hashLen = hash.Size()
+	if inLen != hashLen {
+		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
+	}
+	prefix, ok := hashPrefixes[hash]
+	if !ok {
+		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: unsupported hash function")
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// copyWithLeftPad copies src to the end of dest, padding with zero bytes as
+// needed.
+func copyWithLeftPad(dest, src []byte) {
+	numPaddingBytes := len(dest) - len(src)
+	for i := 0; i < numPaddingBytes; i++ {
+		dest[i] = 0
+	}
+	copy(dest[numPaddingBytes:], src)
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa/pss.go

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+// This file implements the PSS signature scheme [1].
+//
+// [1] http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs/files/h11300-wp-pkcs-1v2-2-rsa-cryptography-standard.pdf
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+	// See [1], section 9.1.1
+	hLen := hash.Size()
+	sLen := len(salt)
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+
+	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "message too
+	//     long" and stop.
+	//
+	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+	if len(mHash) != hLen {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
+	}
+
+	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop.
+
+	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: encoding error")
+	}
+
+	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+	db := em[:emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen]
+	h := em[emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen : emLen-1]
+
+	// 4.  Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0,
+	//     then salt is the empty string.
+	//
+	// 5.  Let
+	//       M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt;
+	//
+	//     M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+	//     initial zero octets.
+	//
+	// 6.  Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+	var prefix [8]byte
+
+	hash.Write(prefix[:])
+	hash.Write(mHash)
+	hash.Write(salt)
+
+	h = hash.Sum(h[:0])
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	// 7.  Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
+	//     zero octets.  The length of PS may be 0.
+	//
+	// 8.  Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
+	//     emLen - hLen - 1.
+
+	db[emLen-sLen-hLen-2] = 0x01
+	copy(db[emLen-sLen-hLen-1:], salt)
+
+	// 9.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+	//
+	// 10. Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask.
+
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+	// 11. Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+	//     maskedDB to zero.
+
+	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
+
+	// 12. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.
+	em[emLen-1] = 0xBC
+
+	// 13. Output EM.
+	return em, nil
+}
+
+func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+	// 1.  If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+	//     hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "inconsistent"
+	//     and stop.
+	//
+	// 2.  Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+	hLen := hash.Size()
+	if hLen != len(mHash) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 3.  If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+	if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 4.  If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
+	//     0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+	if em[len(em)-1] != 0xBC {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 5.  Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
+	//     let H be the next hLen octets.
+	db := em[:emLen-hLen-1]
+	h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : len(em)-1]
+
+	// 6.  If the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+	//     maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and
+	//     stop.
+	if em[0]&(0xFF<<uint(8-(8*emLen-emBits))) != 0 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+
+	// 7.  Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+	//
+	// 8.  Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask.
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+	// 9.  Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB
+	//     to zero.
+	db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
+
+	if sLen == PSSSaltLengthAuto {
+	FindSaltLength:
+		for sLen = emLen - (hLen + 2); sLen >= 0; sLen-- {
+			switch db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+			case 1:
+				break FindSaltLength
+			case 0:
+				continue
+			default:
+				return ErrVerification
+			}
+		}
+		if sLen < 0 {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+	} else {
+		// 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
+		//     or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
+		//     position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
+		//     output "inconsistent" and stop.
+		for _, e := range db[:emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+			if e != 0x00 {
+				return ErrVerification
+			}
+		}
+		if db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] != 0x01 {
+			return ErrVerification
+		}
+	}
+
+	// 11.  Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB.
+	salt := db[len(db)-sLen:]
+
+	// 12.  Let
+	//          M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt ;
+	//     M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+	//     initial zero octets.
+	//
+	// 13. Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+	var prefix [8]byte
+	hash.Write(prefix[:])
+	hash.Write(mHash)
+	hash.Write(salt)
+
+	h0 := hash.Sum(nil)
+
+	// 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent."
+	if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS [1] with specified salt.
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+// later used to verify the signature.
+func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
+	nBits := priv.N.BitLen()
+	em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, nBits-1, salt, hash.New())
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+	c, err := decryptAndCheck(rand, priv, m)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s = make([]byte, (nBits+7)/8)
+	copyWithLeftPad(s, c.Bytes())
+	return
+}
+
+const (
+	// PSSSaltLengthAuto causes the salt in a PSS signature to be as large
+	// as possible when signing, and to be auto-detected when verifying.
+	PSSSaltLengthAuto = 0
+	// PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash causes the salt length to equal the length
+	// of the hash used in the signature.
+	PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash = -1
+)
+
+// PSSOptions contains options for creating and verifying PSS signatures.
+type PSSOptions struct {
+	// SaltLength controls the length of the salt used in the PSS
+	// signature. It can either be a number of bytes, or one of the special
+	// PSSSaltLength constants.
+	SaltLength int
+
+	// Hash, if not zero, overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS.
+	// This is the only way to specify the hash function when using the
+	// crypto.Signer interface.
+	Hash crypto.Hash
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns pssOpts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements
+// crypto.SignerOpts.
+func (pssOpts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
+	return pssOpts.Hash
+}
+
+func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+	if opts == nil {
+		return PSSSaltLengthAuto
+	}
+	return opts.SaltLength
+}
+
+// SignPSS calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PSS [1].
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+// defaults are used.
+func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, opts *PSSOptions) (s []byte, err error) {
+	saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+	switch saltLength {
+	case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+		saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
+	case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+		saltLength = hash.Size()
+	}
+
+	if opts != nil && opts.Hash != 0 {
+		hash = opts.Hash
+	}
+
+	salt := make([]byte, saltLength)
+	if _, err = io.ReadFull(rand, salt); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	return signPSSWithSalt(rand, priv, hash, hashed, salt)
+}
+
+// VerifyPSS verifies a PSS signature.
+// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+// returning a nil error. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+// defaults are used.
+func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
+	return verifyPSS(pub, hash, hashed, sig, opts.saltLength())
+}
+
+// verifyPSS verifies a PSS signature with the given salt length.
+func verifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, saltLen int) error {
+	nBits := pub.N.BitLen()
+	if len(sig) != (nBits+7)/8 {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+	m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, s)
+	emBits := nBits - 1
+	emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+	if emLen < len(m.Bytes()) {
+		return ErrVerification
+	}
+	em := make([]byte, emLen)
+	copyWithLeftPad(em, m.Bytes())
+	if saltLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
+		saltLen = hash.Size()
+	}
+	return emsaPSSVerify(hashed, em, emBits, saltLen, hash.New())
+}

vendor/github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa/rsa.go

@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package rsa implements RSA encryption as specified in PKCS#1.
+//
+// RSA is a single, fundamental operation that is used in this package to
+// implement either public-key encryption or public-key signatures.
+//
+// The original specification for encryption and signatures with RSA is PKCS#1
+// and the terms "RSA encryption" and "RSA signatures" by default refer to
+// PKCS#1 version 1.5. However, that specification has flaws and new designs
+// should use version two, usually called by just OAEP and PSS, where
+// possible.
+//
+// Two sets of interfaces are included in this package. When a more abstract
+// interface isn't neccessary, there are functions for encrypting/decrypting
+// with v1.5/OAEP and signing/verifying with v1.5/PSS. If one needs to abstract
+// over the public-key primitive, the PrivateKey struct implements the
+// Decrypter and Signer interfaces from the crypto package.
+package rsa
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+var bigZero = big.NewInt(0)
+var bigOne = big.NewInt(1)
+
+// A PublicKey represents the public part of an RSA key.
+type PublicKey struct {
+	N *big.Int // modulus
+	E int64    // public exponent
+}
+
+// OAEPOptions is an interface for passing options to OAEP decryption using the
+// crypto.Decrypter interface.
+type OAEPOptions struct {
+	// Hash is the hash function that will be used when generating the mask.
+	Hash crypto.Hash
+	// Label is an arbitrary byte string that must be equal to the value
+	// used when encrypting.
+	Label []byte
+}
+
+var (
+	errPublicModulus       = errors.New("crypto/rsa: missing public modulus")
+	errPublicExponentSmall = errors.New("crypto/rsa: public exponent too small")
+	errPublicExponentLarge = errors.New("crypto/rsa: public exponent too large")
+)
+
+// checkPub sanity checks the public key before we use it.
+// We require pub.E to fit into a 32-bit integer so that we
+// do not have different behavior depending on whether
+// int is 32 or 64 bits. See also
+// http://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/03/16/rsae.html.
+func checkPub(pub *PublicKey) error {
+	if pub.N == nil {
+		return errPublicModulus
+	}
+	if pub.E < 2 {
+		return errPublicExponentSmall
+	}
+	if pub.E > 1<<63-1 {
+		return errPublicExponentLarge
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// A PrivateKey represents an RSA key
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey            // public part.
+	D         *big.Int   // private exponent
+	Primes    []*big.Int // prime factors of N, has >= 2 elements.
+
+	// Precomputed contains precomputed values that speed up private
+	// operations, if available.
+	Precomputed PrecomputedValues
+}
+
+// Public returns the public key corresponding to priv.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey {
+	return &priv.PublicKey
+}
+
+// Sign signs msg with priv, reading randomness from rand. If opts is a
+// *PSSOptions then the PSS algorithm will be used, otherwise PKCS#1 v1.5 will
+// be used. This method is intended to support keys where the private part is
+// kept in, for example, a hardware module. Common uses should use the Sign*
+// functions in this package.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, msg []byte, opts crypto.SignerOpts) ([]byte, error) {
+	if pssOpts, ok := opts.(*PSSOptions); ok {
+		return SignPSS(rand, priv, pssOpts.Hash, msg, pssOpts)
+	}
+
+	return SignPKCS1v15(rand, priv, opts.HashFunc(), msg)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts ciphertext with priv. If opts is nil or of type
+// *PKCS1v15DecryptOptions then PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption is performed. Otherwise
+// opts must have type *OAEPOptions and OAEP decryption is done.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Decrypt(rand io.Reader, ciphertext []byte, opts crypto.DecrypterOpts) (plaintext []byte, err error) {
+	if opts == nil {
+		return DecryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+	}
+
+	switch opts := opts.(type) {
+	case *OAEPOptions:
+		return DecryptOAEP(opts.Hash.New(), rand, priv, ciphertext, opts.Label)
+
+	case *PKCS1v15DecryptOptions:
+		if l := opts.SessionKeyLen; l > 0 {
+			plaintext = make([]byte, l)
+			if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, plaintext); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			if err := DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(rand, priv, ciphertext, plaintext); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return plaintext, nil
+		} else {
+			return DecryptPKCS1v15(rand, priv, ciphertext)
+		}
+
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid options for Decrypt")
+	}
+}
+
+type PrecomputedValues struct {
+	Dp, Dq *big.Int // D mod (P-1) (or mod Q-1)
+	Qinv   *big.Int // Q^-1 mod P
+
+	// CRTValues is used for the 3rd and subsequent primes. Due to a
+	// historical accident, the CRT for the first two primes is handled
+	// differently in PKCS#1 and interoperability is sufficiently
+	// important that we mirror this.
+	CRTValues []CRTValue
+}
+
+// CRTValue contains the precomputed Chinese remainder theorem values.
+type CRTValue struct {
+	Exp   *big.Int // D mod (prime-1).
+	Coeff *big.Int // R·Coeff ≡ 1 mod Prime.
+	R     *big.Int // product of primes prior to this (inc p and q).
+}
+
+// Validate performs basic sanity checks on the key.
+// It returns nil if the key is valid, or else an error describing a problem.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Validate() error {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Check that Πprimes == n.
+	modulus := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+	for _, prime := range priv.Primes {
+		// Any primes ≤ 1 will cause divide-by-zero panics later.
+		if prime.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 {
+			return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid prime value")
+		}
+		modulus.Mul(modulus, prime)
+	}
+	if modulus.Cmp(priv.N) != 0 {
+		return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid modulus")
+	}
+
+	// Check that de ≡ 1 mod p-1, for each prime.
+	// This implies that e is coprime to each p-1 as e has a multiplicative
+	// inverse. Therefore e is coprime to lcm(p-1,q-1,r-1,...) =
+	// exponent(ℤ/nℤ). It also implies that a^de ≡ a mod p as a^(p-1) ≡ 1
+	// mod p. Thus a^de ≡ a mod n for all a coprime to n, as required.
+	congruence := new(big.Int)
+	de := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(priv.E))
+	de.Mul(de, priv.D)
+	for _, prime := range priv.Primes {
+		pminus1 := new(big.Int).Sub(prime, bigOne)
+		congruence.Mod(de, pminus1)
+		if congruence.Cmp(bigOne) != 0 {
+			return errors.New("crypto/rsa: invalid exponents")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GenerateKey generates an RSA keypair of the given bit size using the
+// random source random (for example, crypto/rand.Reader).
+func GenerateKey(random io.Reader, bits int) (priv *PrivateKey, err error) {
+	return GenerateMultiPrimeKey(random, 2, bits)
+}
+
+// GenerateMultiPrimeKey generates a multi-prime RSA keypair of the given bit
+// size and the given random source, as suggested in [1]. Although the public
+// keys are compatible (actually, indistinguishable) from the 2-prime case,
+// the private keys are not. Thus it may not be possible to export multi-prime
+// private keys in certain formats or to subsequently import them into other
+// code.
+//
+// Table 1 in [2] suggests maximum numbers of primes for a given size.
+//
+// [1] US patent 4405829 (1972, expired)
+// [2] http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2006/cacr2006-16.pdf
+func GenerateMultiPrimeKey(random io.Reader, nprimes int, bits int) (priv *PrivateKey, err error) {
+	priv = new(PrivateKey)
+	priv.E = 65537
+
+	if nprimes < 2 {
+		return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: GenerateMultiPrimeKey: nprimes must be >= 2")
+	}
+
+	primes := make([]*big.Int, nprimes)
+
+NextSetOfPrimes:
+	for {
+		todo := bits
+		// crypto/rand should set the top two bits in each prime.
+		// Thus each prime has the form
+		//   p_i = 2^bitlen(p_i) × 0.11... (in base 2).
+		// And the product is:
+		//   P = 2^todo × α
+		// where α is the product of nprimes numbers of the form 0.11...
+		//
+		// If α < 1/2 (which can happen for nprimes > 2), we need to
+		// shift todo to compensate for lost bits: the mean value of 0.11...
+		// is 7/8, so todo + shift - nprimes * log2(7/8) ~= bits - 1/2
+		// will give good results.
+		if nprimes >= 7 {
+			todo += (nprimes - 2) / 5
+		}
+		for i := 0; i < nprimes; i++ {
+			primes[i], err = rand.Prime(random, todo/(nprimes-i))
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			todo -= primes[i].BitLen()
+		}
+
+		// Make sure that primes is pairwise unequal.
+		for i, prime := range primes {
+			for j := 0; j < i; j++ {
+				if prime.Cmp(primes[j]) == 0 {
+					continue NextSetOfPrimes
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		n := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+		totient := new(big.Int).Set(bigOne)
+		pminus1 := new(big.Int)
+		for _, prime := range primes {
+			n.Mul(n, prime)
+			pminus1.Sub(prime, bigOne)
+			totient.Mul(totient, pminus1)
+		}
+		if n.BitLen() != bits {
+			// This should never happen for nprimes == 2 because
+			// crypto/rand should set the top two bits in each prime.
+			// For nprimes > 2 we hope it does not happen often.
+			continue NextSetOfPrimes
+		}
+
+		g := new(big.Int)
+		priv.D = new(big.Int)
+		y := new(big.Int)
+		e := big.NewInt(int64(priv.E))
+		g.GCD(priv.D, y, e, totient)
+
+		if g.Cmp(bigOne) == 0 {
+			if priv.D.Sign() < 0 {
+				priv.D.Add(priv.D, totient)
+			}
+			priv.Primes = primes
+			priv.N = n
+
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	priv.Precompute()
+	return
+}
+
+// incCounter increments a four byte, big-endian counter.
+func incCounter(c *[4]byte) {
+	if c[3]++; c[3] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if c[2]++; c[2] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	if c[1]++; c[1] != 0 {
+		return
+	}
+	c[0]++
+}
+
+// mgf1XOR XORs the bytes in out with a mask generated using the MGF1 function
+// specified in PKCS#1 v2.1.
+func mgf1XOR(out []byte, hash hash.Hash, seed []byte) {
+	var counter [4]byte
+	var digest []byte
+
+	done := 0
+	for done < len(out) {
+		hash.Write(seed)
+		hash.Write(counter[0:4])
+		digest = hash.Sum(digest[:0])
+		hash.Reset()
+
+		for i := 0; i < len(digest) && done < len(out); i++ {
+			out[done] ^= digest[i]
+			done++
+		}
+		incCounter(&counter)
+	}
+}
+
+// ErrMessageTooLong is returned when attempting to encrypt a message which is
+// too large for the size of the public key.
+var ErrMessageTooLong = errors.New("crypto/rsa: message too long for RSA public key size")
+
+func encrypt(c *big.Int, pub *PublicKey, m *big.Int) *big.Int {
+	e := big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))
+	c.Exp(m, e, pub.N)
+	return c
+}
+
+// EncryptOAEP encrypts the given message with RSA-OAEP.
+//
+// OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle.
+// Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function
+// and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.
+//
+// The random parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that
+// encrypting the same message twice doesn't result in the same ciphertext.
+//
+// The label parameter may contain arbitrary data that will not be encrypted,
+// but which gives important context to the message. For example, if a given
+// public key is used to decrypt two types of messages then distinct label
+// values could be used to ensure that a ciphertext for one purpose cannot be
+// used for another by an attacker. If not required it can be empty.
+//
+// The message must be no longer than the length of the public modulus less
+// twice the hash length plus 2.
+func EncryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte, label []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	hash.Reset()
+	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(msg) > k-2*hash.Size()-2 {
+		err = ErrMessageTooLong
+		return
+	}
+
+	hash.Write(label)
+	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	em := make([]byte, k)
+	seed := em[1 : 1+hash.Size()]
+	db := em[1+hash.Size():]
+
+	copy(db[0:hash.Size()], lHash)
+	db[len(db)-len(msg)-1] = 1
+	copy(db[len(db)-len(msg):], msg)
+
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(random, seed)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, seed)
+	mgf1XOR(seed, hash, db)
+
+	m := new(big.Int)
+	m.SetBytes(em)
+	c := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, m)
+	out = c.Bytes()
+
+	if len(out) < k {
+		// If the output is too small, we need to left-pad with zeros.
+		t := make([]byte, k)
+		copy(t[k-len(out):], out)
+		out = t
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// ErrDecryption represents a failure to decrypt a message.
+// It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.
+var ErrDecryption = errors.New("crypto/rsa: decryption error")
+
+// ErrVerification represents a failure to verify a signature.
+// It is deliberately vague to avoid adaptive attacks.
+var ErrVerification = errors.New("crypto/rsa: verification error")
+
+// modInverse returns ia, the inverse of a in the multiplicative group of prime
+// order n. It requires that a be a member of the group (i.e. less than n).
+func modInverse(a, n *big.Int) (ia *big.Int, ok bool) {
+	g := new(big.Int)
+	x := new(big.Int)
+	y := new(big.Int)
+	g.GCD(x, y, a, n)
+	if g.Cmp(bigOne) != 0 {
+		// In this case, a and n aren't coprime and we cannot calculate
+		// the inverse. This happens because the values of n are nearly
+		// prime (being the product of two primes) rather than truly
+		// prime.
+		return
+	}
+
+	if x.Cmp(bigOne) < 0 {
+		// 0 is not the multiplicative inverse of any element so, if x
+		// < 1, then x is negative.
+		x.Add(x, n)
+	}
+
+	return x, true
+}
+
+// Precompute performs some calculations that speed up private key operations
+// in the future.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Precompute() {
+	if priv.Precomputed.Dp != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Dp = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[0], bigOne)
+	priv.Precomputed.Dp.Mod(priv.D, priv.Precomputed.Dp)
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Dq = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[1], bigOne)
+	priv.Precomputed.Dq.Mod(priv.D, priv.Precomputed.Dq)
+
+	priv.Precomputed.Qinv = new(big.Int).ModInverse(priv.Primes[1], priv.Primes[0])
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Mul(priv.Primes[0], priv.Primes[1])
+	priv.Precomputed.CRTValues = make([]CRTValue, len(priv.Primes)-2)
+	for i := 2; i < len(priv.Primes); i++ {
+		prime := priv.Primes[i]
+		values := &priv.Precomputed.CRTValues[i-2]
+
+		values.Exp = new(big.Int).Sub(prime, bigOne)
+		values.Exp.Mod(priv.D, values.Exp)
+
+		values.R = new(big.Int).Set(r)
+		values.Coeff = new(big.Int).ModInverse(r, prime)
+
+		r.Mul(r, prime)
+	}
+}
+
+// decrypt performs an RSA decryption, resulting in a plaintext integer. If a
+// random source is given, RSA blinding is used.
+func decrypt(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, c *big.Int) (m *big.Int, err error) {
+	// TODO(agl): can we get away with reusing blinds?
+	if c.Cmp(priv.N) > 0 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	var ir *big.Int
+	if random != nil {
+		// Blinding enabled. Blinding involves multiplying c by r^e.
+		// Then the decryption operation performs (m^e * r^e)^d mod n
+		// which equals mr mod n. The factor of r can then be removed
+		// by multiplying by the multiplicative inverse of r.
+
+		var r *big.Int
+
+		for {
+			r, err = rand.Int(random, priv.N)
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if r.Cmp(bigZero) == 0 {
+				r = bigOne
+			}
+			var ok bool
+			ir, ok = modInverse(r, priv.N)
+			if ok {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		bigE := big.NewInt(int64(priv.E))
+		rpowe := new(big.Int).Exp(r, bigE, priv.N)
+		cCopy := new(big.Int).Set(c)
+		cCopy.Mul(cCopy, rpowe)
+		cCopy.Mod(cCopy, priv.N)
+		c = cCopy
+	}
+
+	if priv.Precomputed.Dp == nil {
+		m = new(big.Int).Exp(c, priv.D, priv.N)
+	} else {
+		// We have the precalculated values needed for the CRT.
+		m = new(big.Int).Exp(c, priv.Precomputed.Dp, priv.Primes[0])
+		m2 := new(big.Int).Exp(c, priv.Precomputed.Dq, priv.Primes[1])
+		m.Sub(m, m2)
+		if m.Sign() < 0 {
+			m.Add(m, priv.Primes[0])
+		}
+		m.Mul(m, priv.Precomputed.Qinv)
+		m.Mod(m, priv.Primes[0])
+		m.Mul(m, priv.Primes[1])
+		m.Add(m, m2)
+
+		for i, values := range priv.Precomputed.CRTValues {
+			prime := priv.Primes[2+i]
+			m2.Exp(c, values.Exp, prime)
+			m2.Sub(m2, m)
+			m2.Mul(m2, values.Coeff)
+			m2.Mod(m2, prime)
+			if m2.Sign() < 0 {
+				m2.Add(m2, prime)
+			}
+			m2.Mul(m2, values.R)
+			m.Add(m, m2)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ir != nil {
+		// Unblind.
+		m.Mul(m, ir)
+		m.Mod(m, priv.N)
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func decryptAndCheck(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, c *big.Int) (m *big.Int, err error) {
+	m, err = decrypt(random, priv, c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// In order to defend against errors in the CRT computation, m^e is
+	// calculated, which should match the original ciphertext.
+	check := encrypt(new(big.Int), &priv.PublicKey, m)
+	if c.Cmp(check) != 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("rsa: internal error")
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+// DecryptOAEP decrypts ciphertext using RSA-OAEP.
+
+// OAEP is parameterised by a hash function that is used as a random oracle.
+// Encryption and decryption of a given message must use the same hash function
+// and sha256.New() is a reasonable choice.
+//
+// The random parameter, if not nil, is used to blind the private-key operation
+// and avoid timing side-channel attacks. Blinding is purely internal to this
+// function – the random data need not match that used when encrypting.
+//
+// The label parameter must match the value given when encrypting. See
+// EncryptOAEP for details.
+func DecryptOAEP(hash hash.Hash, random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, label []byte) (msg []byte, err error) {
+	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	k := (priv.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(ciphertext) > k ||
+		k < hash.Size()*2+2 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(ciphertext)
+
+	m, err := decrypt(random, priv, c)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	hash.Write(label)
+	lHash := hash.Sum(nil)
+	hash.Reset()
+
+	// Converting the plaintext number to bytes will strip any
+	// leading zeros so we may have to left pad. We do this unconditionally
+	// to avoid leaking timing information. (Although we still probably
+	// leak the number of leading zeros. It's not clear that we can do
+	// anything about this.)
+	em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
+
+	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
+
+	seed := em[1 : hash.Size()+1]
+	db := em[hash.Size()+1:]
+
+	mgf1XOR(seed, hash, db)
+	mgf1XOR(db, hash, seed)
+
+	lHash2 := db[0:hash.Size()]
+
+	// We have to validate the plaintext in constant time in order to avoid
+	// attacks like: J. Manger. A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
+	// Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) as Standardized in PKCS #1
+	// v2.0. In J. Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology.
+	lHash2Good := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(lHash, lHash2)
+
+	// The remainder of the plaintext must be zero or more 0x00, followed
+	// by 0x01, followed by the message.
+	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the 0x01
+	//   index: the offset of the first 0x01 byte
+	//   invalid: 1 iff we saw a non-zero byte before the 0x01.
+	var lookingForIndex, index, invalid int
+	lookingForIndex = 1
+	rest := db[hash.Size():]
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(rest); i++ {
+		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(rest[i], 0)
+		equals1 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(rest[i], 1)
+		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals1, i, index)
+		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals1, 0, lookingForIndex)
+		invalid = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&^equals0, 1, invalid)
+	}
+
+	if firstByteIsZero&lHash2Good&^invalid&^lookingForIndex != 1 {
+		err = ErrDecryption
+		return
+	}
+
+	msg = rest[index+1:]
+	return
+}
+
+// leftPad returns a new slice of length size. The contents of input are right
+// aligned in the new slice.
+func leftPad(input []byte, size int) (out []byte) {
+	n := len(input)
+	if n > size {
+		n = size
+	}
+	out = make([]byte, size)
+	copy(out[len(out)-n:], input)
+	return
+}

vendor/vendor.json

@@ -329,6 +329,12 @@
 			"revision": "5a0f697c9ed9d68fef0116532c6e05cfeae00e55",
 			"revisionTime": "2017-06-01T23:02:30Z"
 		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "p/8vSviYF91gFflhrt5vkyksroo=",
+			"path": "github.com/golang/snappy",
+			"revision": "553a641470496b2327abcac10b36396bd98e45c9",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-02-15T23:32:05Z"
+		},
 		{
 			"checksumSHA1": "ovDzecwDMswgStyaKHg0VosC3FU=",
 			"path": "github.com/googleapis/gax-go",
@@ -512,6 +518,14 @@
 			"version": "v0.10.0",
 			"versionExact": "v0.10.0"
 		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "FH5eOEHfHgdxPC/JnfmCeSBk66U=",
+			"path": "github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/encryption",
+			"revision": "v0.10.0",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-08-02T18:39:14Z",
+			"version": "v0.10.0",
+			"versionExact": "v0.10.0"
+		},
 		{
 			"checksumSHA1": "Vbo55GDzPgG/L/+W2pcvDhxrPZc=",
 			"path": "github.com/hashicorp/terraform/helper/experiment",
@@ -630,6 +644,26 @@
 			"version": "v0.10.0",
 			"versionExact": "v0.10.0"
 		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "au+CDkddC4sVFV15UaPiI7FvSw0=",
+			"path": "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/compressutil",
+			"revision": "6faf8365e922c4cf1bde05b6b886a17881b9ebca",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T18:41:46Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "yUiSTPf0QUuL2r/81sjuytqBoeQ=",
+			"path": "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil",
+			"revision": "6faf8365e922c4cf1bde05b6b886a17881b9ebca",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-09-25T18:41:46Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "YmXAnTwbzhLLBZM+1tQrJiG3qpc=",
+			"path": "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/pgpkeys",
+			"revision": "6b29fb2b7f70ed538ee2b3c057335d706b6d4e36",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-09-19T14:56:10Z",
+			"version": "=v0.8.3",
+			"versionExact": "v0.8.3"
+		},
 		{
 			"checksumSHA1": "ZhK6IO2XN81Y+3RAjTcVm1Ic7oU=",
 			"path": "github.com/hashicorp/yamux",
@@ -643,6 +677,84 @@
 			"revision": "bd40a432e4c76585ef6b72d3fd96fb9b6dc7b68d",
 			"revisionTime": "2016-08-03T19:07:31Z"
 		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "VJk3rOWfxEV9Ilig5lgzH1qg8Ss=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/brainpool",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "rnRjEJs5luF+DIXp2J6LFcQk8Gg=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/cast5",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "F5++ZQS5Vt7hd6lxPCKTffvph1A=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/curve25519",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "IvrDXwIixB5yPPbo6tq1/1cSn78=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/ed25519",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "4+fslB6pCbplNq4viy6CrOkkY6Y=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "fgFlkfkaotUjBVhJik2979oCeJw=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "+spfcEChljh3yeIg4K/xHOQ2pVM=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/armor",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "nWhmwjBJqPSvkCWqaap2Z9EiS1k=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/ecdh",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "uxXG9IC/XF8jwwvZUbW65+x8/+M=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/elgamal",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "EyUf82Yknzc75m8RcA21CNQINw0=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/errors",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "tw0BkvixAuw9Ai80hHzFy6W5mnk=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/packet",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "BGDxg1Xtsz0DSPzdQGJLLQqfYc8=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/openpgp/s2k",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
+		{
+			"checksumSHA1": "rE3pp7b3gfcmBregzpIvN5IdFhY=",
+			"path": "github.com/keybase/go-crypto/rsa",
+			"revision": "433e2f3d43ef1bd31387582a899389b2fbe2005e",
+			"revisionTime": "2017-06-28T15:29:38Z"
+		},
 		{
 			"checksumSHA1": "guxbLo8KHHBeM0rzou4OTzzpDNs=",
 			"path": "github.com/mitchellh/copystructure",

website/docs/r/google_service_account_key.html.markdown

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+layout: "google"
+page_title: "Google: google_service_account_key"
+sidebar_current: "docs-google-service-account-key"
+description: |-
+  Allows management of a Google Cloud Platform service account Key Pair
+---
+
+# google\_service\_account\_key
+
+Creates and manages service account key-pairs, which allow the user to establish identity of a service account outside of GCP. For more information, see [the official documentation](https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-managing-service-account-keys) and [API](https://cloud.google.com/iam/reference/rest/v1/projects.serviceAccounts.keys).
+
+
+## Example Usage, creating a new Key Pair
+
+```hcl
+resource "google_service_account" "acceptance" {
+  account_id = "%v"
+  display_name = "%v"
+}
+
+resource "google_service_account_key" "acceptance" {
+  service_account_id = "${google_service_account.acceptance.id}"
+  public_key_type = "TYPE_X509_PEM_FILE"
+}
+```
+
+## Create new Key Pair, encrypting the private key with a PGP Key
+
+```hcl
+resource "google_service_account" "acceptance" {
+  account_id = "%v"
+  display_name = "%v"
+}
+
+resource "google_service_account_key" "acceptance" {
+  service_account_id = "${google_service_account.acceptance.id}"
+  pgp_key = "keybase:keybaseusername"
+  public_key_type = "TYPE_X509_PEM_FILE"
+}
+```
+
+## Argument Reference
+
+The following arguments are supported:
+
+* `service_account_id` - (Required) The Service account id of the Key Pair.
+
+* `key_algorithm` - (Optional) The output format of the private key. GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS_FILE is the default output format. Valid values are listed at [ServiceAccountPrivateKeyType](https://cloud.google.com/iam/reference/rest/v1/projects.serviceAccounts.keys#ServiceAccountPrivateKeyType) (only used on create)
+
+* `public_key_type` (Optional) The output format of the public key requested. X509_PEM is the default output format.
+
+* `private_key_type` (Optional) The output format of the private key. GOOGLE_CREDENTIALS_FILE is the default output format.
+
+* `pgp_key` – (Optional) An optional PGP key to encrypt the resulting private
+key material. Only used when creating or importing a new key pair
+
+~> **NOTE:** a PGP key is not required, however it is strongly encouraged.
+Without a PGP key, the private key material will be stored in state unencrypted.
+
+## Attributes Reference
+
+The following attributes are exported in addition to the arguments listed above:
+
+* `name` - The name used for this key pair
+
+* `fingerprint` - The MD5 public key fingerprint as specified in section 4 of RFC 4716.
+
+* `public_key` - The public key, base64 encoded
+
+* `private_key` - The private key, base64 encoded. This is only populated
+when creating a new key, and when no `pgp_key` is provided
+
+* `private_key_encrypted` – The private key material, base 64 encoded and
+encrypted with the given `pgp_key`. This is only populated when creating a new
+key and `pgp_key` is supplied
+
+* `private_key_fingerprint` - The MD5 public key fingerprint for the encrypted
+private key
+
+* `valid_after` - The key can be used after this timestamp. A timestamp in RFC3339 UTC "Zulu" format, accurate to nanoseconds. Example: "2014-10-02T15:01:23.045123456Z".
+
+* `valid_before` - The key can be used before this timestamp.
+A timestamp in RFC3339 UTC "Zulu" format, accurate to nanoseconds. Example: "2014-10-02T15:01:23.045123456Z".
+

website/google.erb

@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@
       <li<%= sidebar_current("docs-google-service-account") %>>
         <a href="/docs/providers/google/r/google_service_account.html">google_service_account</a>
       </li>
+      <li<%= sidebar_current("docs-google-service-account-key") %>>
+      <a href="/docs/providers/google/r/google_service_account_key.html">google_service_account_key</a>
+    </li>
+
     </ul>
     </li>